John Duns Scotus and His Parisian Interlocutors

EDITED BY

WOUTER GORIS AND GARRETT R. SMITH

BRILL

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John Duns Scotus and His Parisian Interlocutors

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1

Introduction

Wouter Goris and Garrett R. Smith

John Duns Scotus arrived in Paris in 1302. Having already lectured on the *Sentences* at Oxford in the 1290's and begun his masterwork, the *Ordinatio*, Scotus arrived ready to lecture again on the *Sentences* and take his degree as a master of theology. At Paris, however, he found a different environment than at Oxford. The secular master Godfrey of Fontaines was still active, as were the followers of Henry of Ghent, who strenuously defended the doctrine of their master, according to the report of Jean de Pouilly. The Dominicans also had a strong presence at Paris, with Hervaeus Natalis, Durandus of Saint-Pourçain, John Quidort, and Meister Eckhart overlapping with Scotus' period of residency. The recently-founded Carmelite Order had its first master in the person of Gerard of Bologna, who was also active at Paris during Scotus' time there. This new environment was to challenge Scotus, and the result of this challenge was the formulation of his mature and final views to be found in the revisions to the *Ordinatio*, the *reportationes* of his lectures, and the *Quodlibet*.

The present volume contains the fruits of two conferences held at the Lehrstuhl for Medieval Philosophy at Bonn. The first conference treated the interlocutors of Scotus at Paris, the second the *Quodlibet*. Consequently, the proceedings are divided into two corresponding parts.

Part 1: The Interlocutors of John Duns Scotus at Paris

Given the vibrant intellectual community at Paris, the motivation for the first conference was the hope that some of Scotus' interactions with his peers could be identified. Thus, for example, Scotus' debate with William of Peter Godinus over the principle of individuation, or the reports of his public dispute over the Immaculate Conception, or his debates with other bachelors, perhaps recorded in his *Reportatio Parisiensis*, are all examples of Scotus' live interactions with his contemporaries. Initially, we adopted a strict view regarding who could qualify as in interlocutor; there must be an exchange, in which Scotus or the interlocutor lodged a critique or an objection, the target replied to the objection, which elicted a final reply from the objector. That is to say, instances in which, say, Scotus was criticized, responded, and his objector replied again. The following

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pages do reveal several such interlocutors, such as Godfrey of Fontaines and Gerard of Bologna.

The first contribution is by William J. Courtenay (Madison, WI): "Scotus's Parisian Environment. The Faculty of Theology, 1300–1307." Courtenay first revisits the possibility that Scotus may have previously been in Paris as part of the Franciscan lectorate program during the 1280's. He would not have been part of the faculty of Theology, but he would have been able to attend lectures. At this time, Godfrey of Fontaines, Giles of Rome, and Henry of Ghent were active at Paris. Next, Courtenay provides a topography of the various convents at Paris ca. 1302 and the masters and students resident in them. He also provides the important observation that at this period of time, the bachelors did not dispute with each other in principial disputations, as was the case some time later (for example, between Francis of Meyronnes and Pierre Roger in 1320), but rather, the interactions would be between bachelors and masters (both those about to incept and those acting as regent masters), and between masters and masters, for example, in quodlibetal disputes. Among the possible candidates for interlocutors among the Franciscans, for whom we have a list of the residents for 1302–1303 that was drawn up during the controversy between the King Philip the Fair and Boniface VIII. There are two lists of masters adhering to the side of the King, and one list of non-adherents. At the head of both lists of adherents is Alanus, who Courtenay argues must have already been a master by 1302. Another adherent master was John of Tongres. Among the non-adherents were the masters Gonsalvus Hispanus and Jacques de Quesnoy. Among the bachelors in residence was Albert of Metz, Giles of Longny, and Martin of Abbeville. Serving as the *socius* of master Alanus was Aufredus, whom Courtenay identifes as Aufredus Gonterus. Another notable person was Guillelmus Anglicus, probably William of Alnwick, perhaps in Paris as part of the Franciscan lectorate program. Turning to the other orders, Courtenay discussed the Dominicans, regarding which a list of adherents to the King survives. Here we find John Quidort and Hervaeus Natalis and James of Lausanne. Meister Eckhart was also present in Paris at this time, but he chose exile and so does not appear on the list. For the secular priests, Courtenay notes the presence of Henry of Harclay, Godfrey of Fontaines, Thomas de Bailly, and Jean de Pouilly.

Marina Fedeli (Macerata) contributed the essay "The *Collationes* attributed to John Duns Scotus: between Literary Genre and Interlocutors." She explained the difficulties that arise when attempting to identify Scotus's interlocutors in his *Collationes*. One difficulty is the genre; Fedeli identified Scotus' *Collationes* as disputes between bachelors within the Franciscan convent. The purpose was to hone their debating skills. Consequently, there is no magisterial determination of a question, even if one can sometimes identify one set of arguments as

defending Scotus's opinion. Fedeli went on to identify a group of questions in which Scotus debated with Richard of Conington (q. 12–17). Finally, she took q. 6 of the Oxford *Collationes* as an example: this *collatio* has a marginal reference in one manuscript that attributes the question to Richard of Conington. But in the middle of the question there is an explicit reference to William of Ware and Martin (of Alnwick?). At this point in the text, the position being discussed is hard to identify, though there are parallels in John Baconthorpe's quotations of Richard of Conington. Regarding the Parisian *Collationes*, Fedeli explained that the structure is different, since most of the questions have a section of arguments pro and con at the beginning, with a magisterial determination of the issue. Moreover, there are quotations and parallels with other works of Scotus. Fedeli ultimately concluded that the individuals debating in the Parisian *Collationes* are hard to identify because often they defend widely-held positions.

Alessandro De Pascalis (Bonn) contributed an essay titled "Duns Scotus on Prime Matter: The Parisian Doctrine." According to Aristotle, prime matter is something very close to a mental entity, postulated in order to explain substantial changes in physical reality; then, in itself, prime matter can have no actuality at all, whether essential or existential. In many of his works, both physical and metaphysical in fact, Aristotle relates the concepts of form and matter to those of act and potency. On the other hand, alongside this model, we find the Augustinian one. Augustine focuses on the moment in which God creates matter from nothing, describing it as something absolutely formless and very close to being nothing, being nonetheless something, inasmuch as it is created by God. This latter nuance will later be elaborated by Duns Scotus, who asserts that prime matter has, like all created entities, the ontological status of a *res*, and is a positive reality distinct from form. Such a claim is supported by him through the famous distinction between objective and subjective potency, through which he shows that prime matter is not an entity in potency in an absolute sense, rather in a qualified one. The contribution presents a textual appendix containing an edition of Scotus' *Reportatio* II-A and II-B for d. 12 q. 1, and *Ordinatio* d. 12 q. 1 β

Stehen D. Dumont (Notre Dame) analyzed a dispute over the will held between John Duns Scotus and Godfrey of Fontaines in his essay "The Disputation at the University of Paris between Godfrey of Fontaines and John Duns Scotus on Virtues in the Will." The debate was a *disputatio in aula*, a part of the promotion exercises for a new master. The present at the exercises was a presiding master (here, magister Alanus), the incepting master (Giles de Longny), a formed bachelor (Duns Scotus), and the chancellor of the University. Dumont shows, based on the manuscript evidence and by comparison with the works of

Godfrey, that Godfrey himself was present. Scotus's task was to offer a solution to a question about charity in the soul of Christ. Scotus did so by arguing there is charity in the will, whether the will is taken as an active power or a passive power. According to the first, God would cause *fruitio* in the will, according to the second, God would cause *visio* in the intellect, and then the intellect causes *fruitio* in the will. In the surviving text, after dialectical exchanges with magister Alanus and Giles of Longny, Scotus also debates Godfrey, who argues that there are no moral virtues in the will. The text of the debate was originally published in the first printing of the *Parisian Reportatio* but in a mutilated form. Dumont examines the role the text has played in the interpretation of Duns Scotus, analyizes the quality of the previous editions and provides a new edition based on the sole surviving manuscript.

Christopher Schabel (Nicosia) studied two of the regent masters who were contemporary to Scotus' time in Paris, in his essay "John Duns Scotus in the Eyes of His Fellow Regent Masters in 1306–1307, John of Pouilly and Henry of Friemar the Elder OESA." John of Pouilly was a secular, and Henry of Friemar the Elder an Augustinian Hermit. On the basis of statutes from the University of Paris, Schabel argues that the likeliest scenario for Scotus' career is for him to have been licensed in theology during the 1305–1306 academic year, with the inception exercises following later. This leaves 1306–1307 as the year Scotus acted as regent master. Schabel then proposes to study Scotus from the vantage of his fellow regent masters, on the topics of divine foreknowledge and the *Filioque*. After a detailed examination, however, Schabel concludes that at this early date Scotus's views were not well known outside of the Franciscan order. The authors in question do, however, refer to Scotus' univocity of being and the immaculate conception. Far more than Scotus, the positions of Henry of Ghent, Thomas Aquinas, and their followers occupied the debates of Scotus' day. In an appendix, Schabel offers an edition of Henry of Friemar's *Quaestio ordinaria de Verbo*, q. 3.

Timothy Noone (Washington, D.C.) contributes the essay "Nicholas Trivet on the Univocity of Being." Trivet, a Dominican, held a *Quodlibet* at Oxford in 1303 at which Scotus may have been present, since he was exiled from France at the time. Furthermore, the *opponens* at the debate advances Scotus' 'de certo et dubio' argument for the univocity of being, and Trivet's question is directed against Scotus' theory of univocity as expressed by that argument. Noone also reports, however, that Trivet is also critical of his fellow Dominican Thomas of Sutton's arguments against Scotus. Trivet's position on the matter is that being is logically equivocal. Substance and the nine categories of accidents are equivalent to this equivocal notion of being when they are taken together as a conjunction (substance + quantity + quality etc.). According to Noone,

Trivet's criticisms of Scotus missed the mark because of the focus on the argument from certain and doubtful concepts; thus, Trivet failed to realize that Scotus maintains the analogy of being in distinction 8 of the *Ordinatio*. He also failed to recognize that the theory of univocity was linked in Scotus' thought to broader epistemological discussions regarding the knowledge of God and substance.

Hernán Guerrero-Troncoso (Universidad Gabriela Mistral [Santiago, Chile] —Towarzystwo Naukowe w Toruniu [Poland]) contributed the essay "*Vestigia cuiuslibet in quolibet inquirendo*. A Comparative Reading of Gonsalvus Hispanus' *Quodlibet* q. 7." It has long been known that Gonsalvus Hispanus was associated with Duns Scotus, and knew him personally, even recommending him for promotion to master, but nevertheless, little research has been conducted on the doctrinal relations between them. Guerrero-Troncoso focused on the *Quodlibet* of Gonsalvus. This dispute, conducted while Scotus was at Paris, survives in the form of a *reportatio*. In a survey of some of the key positions, such as the role of phantasms and intelligible species, angelic cognition, infinity, the relation between essence and existence and the response to the Thomistic position, Guerrero-Troncoso notes a number of interesting parallels that suggest that Gonsalvus had some influence on the development of Duns Scotus' views. In an appendix, Guerrero-Troncoso offers a revised edition of the text of Gonsalvus' *Quodlibet* q. 7 and Duns Scotus' *Reportatio* II-B d. 11 q. 2.

Mikołaj Olszewski (Warsaw, Poland) also contributed to the study of Gonsalvus Hispanus, in his article "The concept of practice and the Franciscan understanding of the nature of theology. The cases of Gonsalvus Hispanus and Alexander of Alessandria." Olszewski begins at the origins of the Franciscan thesis that theology is a practical science in the thought of Odo Rigaldi and Bonaventure. The Franciscan thesis was subject to critique by Thomas Aquinas, Giles of Rome, Henry of Ghent, and Godfrey of Fontaines. Such was the situation when Gonsalvus and Alexander of Alessandria arrived on the scene. According to Olszewski they were faced with the task of developing a criterion to defend the practical nature of theology against the speculative and with reconciling their notion of the practical with Aristotle. Gonsalvus' position consisted of three theses: (1) that theology meets all the conditions of a practical science, (2) that theology is totally and completely practical, rather than a mix of speculative and practical, (3) that theology is the most practical of the sciences, since its end or goal is the noblest of the sciences, namely salvation. Alexander of Alessandria, however, argues with Gonsalvus in mind that theology retains speculative elements (such as theological reflection on the nature of the Trinity) as well as practical, and so it remains a mixed science. Finally, though both authors would have been present at Paris at the same time as Sco-

tus, and their works postdate the *Lectura Oxoniensis*, Olszewski concludes that they did not directly engage Scotus, though Alexander appears to have engaged Gonsalvus. In an appendix, Olszweski provides text from an anonymous commentary on the *Sentences* as well as qq. 9 and 10 from the prologue of Alexander of Alessandria's commentary on the same.

Garrett R. Smith (Bonn) contributed the essay "Gerard of Bologna's Critique of the Formal Distinction." Gerard of Bologna was the first Carmelite master to teach at the university of Paris. He had a direct acquaintance with Scotus' writings, including both the *Ordinatio* and the *Reportatio Parisiensis*, and he explicitly attacked Scotus' doctrine of the univocity of the concept of being and the formal distinction. Against Scotus, Gerard argued that there cannot be a plurality of formalities in God, and that all distinctions that obtain *ex natura rei* are unqualified real distinctions. Consequently, the formal distinction is a real distinction and cannot be applied to God. Gerard's own position is that the divine essence as such exceeds any one divine person, but all three persons taken together are adequately the same as the divine essence. But Gerard also posits an agnostic position, in which one simply has to fall silent before the divine mystery. Duns Scotus replied to Gerard in a special dispute, which comes down to us under the title of "Logica Scoti" or "Quaestio de formalitatibus." Here he formulates six propositions about the formalities in God and explains what does and does not follow from them. He ultimately concludes that one can posit a plurality of formalities in God, as long as one heavily qualifies the notion of distinction at play.

Part 2: The *Quodlibet* of John Duns Scotus

Wouter Goris (Bonn) traced a key theme running through the works of Scotus from the *Lectura* to the *Quodlibet* in "The Adequacy of Production according to Duns Scotus." The theme is the notion of adequacy as Scotus employs it to explain the procession of the persons in the Trinity. In the Trinity, an account is required as to why there are only three persons and not more or less. In his early Oxford period, Scotus argued that two persons and only two persons were produced, because the divine essence had only two productive powers, the intellect and the will. Goris shows that in late revisions to the *Ordinatio* and in his Parisian teaching, Scotus came to see the argument from adequacy as insufficient to account for the number of persons in the Trinity, and turned rather to his account of individuation through a haecceity. This is an application of Scotus' revised Parisian treatment of individuation found also in the debate with William Peter Godinus and in Scotus' *Quodlibet*.

Witold Salomon OFM (Rome) contributed the essay "Intuitive Erkenntnis im *Quodlibet* des seligen Johannes Duns Scotus im Hinblick auf das Problem des erkenntnistheoretischen Realismus." Salmon first discusses the proofs in favor of intuitive cognition found in Scotus's *Quodlibet* q. 6, then compares the text of the *Quodlibet* to passages in other works of Scotus, closing with a discussion of the realism entailed in Scotus's theory of intuitive cognition. In the first part, Scotus argues from reason and theology that there is another kind of cognition beyond abstractive cognition (cognition of something in a representation or similitude). Salamon then considered Scotus's attitude to intuitive cognition in his other works, surveying as well the modern scholarly debate regarding whether Scotus allowed for intuitive cognition in the present pilgrim state of life. Salamon ultimately concludes that Scotus's opinion changed over time: he began with an Aristotelian conception of knowledge that did not allow for non-abstractive knowledge and evolved into a more Augustinian position that did. In the third part of his contribution Salamon considered the object to which intuitive cognition terminates. In the final section the author argues that the basis of Scotus's realism is the direct connection between the knower and the existing object. This connection is maintained even in imperfect acts of intuition, such as in the memory recalling past acts of intuition. Salamon concludes with the observation that whereas in Thomism the existing object is grasped in the act of judgement, for Scotus it is grasped by an act of intuitive cognition, which grasps the object as a *simul totum*.

Christian Rode (Bonn), contributed the essay "John Duns Scotus on Social Philosophy: *Quodlibet*, Question 20." This question of Scotus's *Quodlibet* examines whether a priest who is obliged to say a mass for two people can satisify his obligation by saying one mass for both. Though this is a matter of sacramental or liturgical theology, Rode is able to discover an underlying social ontology that is relational. By saying or praying a mass a priest obtains merit, which can be applied to himself or others. Now, a member of the community is able to give alms in order for the priest to apply the merits of the mass to someone else. This may appear at first to be a strict obligation, what Rode calls a *do ut des* obligation, but Scotus rather holds that there is a gap between temporal goods and spiritual goods. Thus, the almsgiver cannot strictly obligate the priest, but there is an agreement that when the almsgiver gives, then the priest will of his own free choice redistribute the spiritual goods. The basic issue under discussion is solved by Scotus with the claim that the priest can say one mass for the intentions of two almsgivers, provided that such is the local custom and the almsgivers are aware of the custom. Thus, Rode is able to reconstruct a social ontology from this question of the *Quodlibet*, based on the relations between the priest, God, the almsgivers, free will, and the varieties of goods at play in the issue.

The following abbreviations are used in the notes:

ed. Vat.	*Doctoris Subtilis et mariani B. Ioannis Duns Scoti Ordinis Fratrum Minorum Opera Omnia*, ed. Commissio Scotistica, 14 vols. Civitas Vaticana: Typis Vaticanis, 1950–.
OPh	Opera philosophica, 5 vols. St. Bonaventure, NY: The Franciscan Institute, 1997–2006.
PB	Les Philosophes Belges, 15 vols. Louvain: Institut supérieur de philosophie de l'université, 1901–1941.
Wad.-Viv.	*Joannis Duns Scoti Doctoris Subtilis, Ordinis Minorum Opera Omnia*, ed. L. Wadding, 26 vols. Paris, L. Vivès, 1891–1895.

PART 1

The Interlocutors of John Duns Scotus at Paris

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2

Scotus's Parisian Environment: The Faculty of Theology, 1300–1307

William J. Courtenay

In the initial circular on the Scotus Interlocutors Project the topographical contexts for Scotus's academic career and writings were given as Oxford until 1302 and Paris, 1302–1307. While those places and dates are certainly correct for exchange of opinions between Scotus and his contemporaries, with a slight quibble as to whether the transition from Oxford to Paris should be 1301 or 1302, it is useful to look more broadly at the dating of Scotus's time or times in Paris and the contacts that were available to him. Although theologians at Paris, such as Godfrey of Fontaines, may not have had any direct contact with or knowledge of Scotus before 1302, it is worth noting that Scotus may well have seen and heard him and other theologians at Paris before 1302. I want to begin, therefore, by revisiting the question of whether Scotus was at Paris before 1302, followed by a more detailed look at the steps in his academic career from 1302 to 1307.

A decade ago at a conference on Scotus at Oriel College Oxford I argued, against the opinion of C.K. Brampton and Alan Wolter, that Scotus had spent time at Paris in the Franciscan lectorate program before 1300, as A.G. Little had argued almost a century ago.[1] The lectorate program was a three-to-four year period of theological study in a convent of the order located at a major *studium generale* to prepare lectors for convents and provincial *studia* of the

1 William J. Courtenay, "Scotus at Paris. Some Reconsiderations," in *The Opera Theologica of John Duns Scotus. Proceedings of "The Quadruple Congress" on John Duns Scotus, Part 2* [Oriel College, Oxford, July 2008], ed. R. Cross, Archa Verbi Subsidia 4 (Münster/St. Bonaventure, NY: Aschendorff, 2012), pp. 1–19; see also William J. Courtenay, "Scotus at Paris," in *Via scoti. Methodologica ad mentem Joannis Duns Scoti. Atti del Congresso Scotistico Internazionale, Roma 9–11 marzo 1993*, ed. L. Sileo, vol. 1 (Roma: Edizioni Antonianum, 1995), pp. 149–163. A.G. Little, "Chronological Notes on the Life of Duns Scotus," *English Historical Review* 47 (1932), pp. 568–582. That was also the opinion of André Callebaut, "Le bienheureux Jean Duns Scot, bachelier des Sentences à Paris en 1302–1303," *La France Franciscaine* 9 (1926), pp. 293–317. The opposite opinion was maintained by C.K. Brampton, "Duns Scotus at Oxford, 1288–1301," *Franciscan Studies* 24 (1964), pp. 5–20, and A.B. Wolter, "Duns Scotus at Oxford," in *Via Scoti*, pp. 183–192.

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order.[2] Brampton acknowledged that the faculty of theology at Paris required a number of years of Parisian residency before being permitted to read the *Sentences* there, but explained how Scotus could have bypassed that requirement. He, followed by Wolter, used a privilege granted to the mendicant orders later in the fourteenth century that two years of study at a *studium generale* other than Paris could count as a year of study at Paris.[3] Thus Scotus could have studied across many years at Oxford, including the lectorate program there, and have those years counted two-for-one against the Parisian requirement.

The problem with that argument is that the two-for-one arrangement in fulfilling the residence requirement at Paris was not an option in 1302. The controlling piece of legislation in 1302, which had been agreed upon around 1286 to 1290—a privilege granted by the regent masters in theology at Paris that applied to the Augustinian Hermits as well as to the Franciscans[4] and pre-

2 Although it is not stated in the legislation of the order, I am strongly of the opinion that in the case of the Franciscans, the Minister General chose candidates to be sent to Paris for the doctorate only among those who had previously been to Paris as students in the lectorate program. Having a large potential pool of possible candidates who had been to Paris for the lectorate, it is hard to imagine the Minister General choosing a friar who had not. Even though England at the time of Scotus was one of very few Franciscan provinces that had a *studium generale* with a doctoral program in theology (in fact they had two, Oxford and Cambridge) where friars could receive advanced training equal or almost equal to what *Cordeliers* at Paris could offer, the most talented students in the English province at the lectorate level would probably have been selected for Parisian study. The reference made by Gonsalvus de Balboa in his letter of November 1304 to having known Scotus through long experience, has been taken to refer to their time together at Paris when Scotus was there studying for the lectorate, but it is a thin reed that cannot support much if any certainty. Two years may have seemed a long time to Gonsalvus, and it is also possible that they could have met earlier at a meeting of the general chapter when one or both were diffinitors. The Latin text of Gonsalvus's letter appears in L. Wadding, *Annales Minorum*, VI, p. 51; A.G. Little, *Grey Friars in Oxford* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1892), p. 220: "… Joannem Scotum, de laudabili, scientia excellenti, ingenioque subtilissimo, aliisque insignibus conditionibus suis, partim experientia longa, partim fama …" Little provided an English translation in "Chronological Notes," pp. 577–578.

3 *Chartularium Universitatis Parisiensis* (CUP), ed. H. Denifle and É. Chatelain, vol. 2 (Paris: Delalain, 1891), p. 699, nº 1189. .

4 It was particularly relevant to the Franciscans in the first decade of the fourteenth century, since the evidence comes from a letter of Giles of Rome in 1309 reminding John de Murro (John Minio de Murrovalle), cardinal protector of the Franciscans and former minister general, of the agreement that had been negotiated while Giles was regent master in theology at Paris. The original document was copied into the first volume of *Contracts du Grand Couvent de Paris de l'Ordre des Freres Hermites de S. Augustin* compiled in the seventeenth century from sacks of original documents in the possession of the Paris Augustinian convent. While that volume is no longer extant, its contents are summarized at the beginning of volume two of that work (Paris, Arch. Nat., S 3640, f. 3^{v}, referring to *Contracts du Grand Couvent*, livre I,

sumably the Dominicans—was that friars seeking to read the *Sentences* at Paris could fulfill the pre-sentential residency requirement, which for secular students was nine years, with a minimum of four years residency in Paris. That considerable reduction, which had been negotiated while Giles of Rome was regent master at Paris (thus between 1287 and 1292), allowed no further exemptions. Scotus would not have been allowed to read the *Sentences* at Paris and to proceed to licensing and inception without having fulfilled that requirement before 1302.

But when might Scotus have been sent to Paris for the lectorate program by the English Franciscan province? A.G. Little, who maintained that 1302 was Scotus's second sojourn in Paris, argued for placing his first period of Parisian residency in 1293 to 1297, returning to Oxford to lecture on the *Sentences* before being sent back to Paris for the baccalaureate and doctorate. I think it more likely that Scotus's time in the lectorate program at Paris was around 1286 to 1290 for several reasons. According to the regulations confirmed at the Franciscan general chapter at Paris in 1292, a friar could be sent to Paris for the lectorate two or three years after the novitiate, or if sufficiently capable, immediately after the novitiate.[5] Scotus would then have been in his early 20s (the normal time for the lectorate) and immediately before he was ordained to the priesthood at Northampton in March 1291. The problem with Little's dating is that it would be highly unusual for a student, so soon after completing the lectorate (in 1297 according to Little's timetable), to immediately be named to read the *Sentences* at Oxford. Moreover, the late 1280s (in the timetable I am suggesting) would also correspond with the time in which Gonsalvus of Balboa, the future minister general of the Franciscan order, read the *Sentences* at Paris, and although we do not know, in fact cannot know, what Gonsalvus actually meant in November 1304 when he said he had known Scotus from long experience, an overlap of a year or more in residence at the Franciscan convent in Paris some fifteen years earlier would certainly fit that description. But then, perhaps, so would their time together in Paris between 1302 and 1304.

We need to keep in mind that Scotus was not studying in the faculty of theology at Paris in the late 1280s. He attended lectures from Franciscan bachelors and masters at Cordeliers, the Franciscan convent. But the principal reason why Paris was chosen as the place for the only lectorate program to which

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f. 23[r]). A portion of the French text can be found in *CUP* II, p. 144, n° 683. Although the privilege cited by Giles concerned the Augustinians, it is implausible that regents in theology would be granting a privilege to the Augustinian Hermits that the Franciscans and Dominicans did not have either previously or negotiated at that time.

5 *CUP* II, p. 57, n° 580.

every province of the order, including England, was permitted to send two students *de debito* at the expense of the order and one or two more, *de gratia* with the permission of the minister general, was that it was located in the midst of the University of Paris and the leading faculty of theology in Europe. It seems inconceivable to me that the leadership of the convent would not have allowed lectorate students to attend disputations of regent masters in theology. Whether or not Scotus took advantage of this opportunity, his time in Paris, if that dating is correct, fell within the regencies of Henry of Ghent, Godfrey of Fontaines, and Giles of Rome, all of whom lectured and were engaged in disputations. That does not qualify as interlocution, since Scotus was not lecturing or disputing at that time, and only the regent masters at Cordeliers, which according to Glorieux would have included Richard of Menneville (or Mediavilla), Raymond Rigauld, and John de Murro, would have had any contact with him. Those dates, 1286 to 1290, would also mean that Scotus was in Paris at the time of the confrontation between Henry of Ghent and the papal legate, Benedict Gaietani, the future Pope Boniface VIII, over who had the authority to interpret Scripture as it applied to mendicant privileges: masters of theology or the papal curia. Benedict insisted the authority belonged to the pope, and suspended Henry from teaching. Even if Scotus had not witnessed the confrontation in person, he would have heard it discussed, perhaps a shaping moment in his understanding of the relationship of papal power and magisterial authority. While it is certainly the case that Scotus would have become familiar with the views of Henry of Ghent, Godfrey of Fontaines, and Giles of Rome on the basis of written texts while studying at Oxford in the 1290s, it would be significant if he had had the opportunity to hear them in person in a disputation or a quodlibetal debate in the late 1280s, as well as those of other masters who were at Paris at that time.

Let me turn next to Scotus' second time in Paris when he read the *Sentences*, was licensed and incepted, and served as regent master before leaving Paris for Cologne in 1307. This is the period in which others at Paris came to know Scotus through his lectures and disputations, not simply Scotus knowing others at Paris, which would have been the case in the late 1280s. He was again resident at Cordeliers, the Franciscan convent. In the strong belief that physical environment is important for of our understanding of the life and work of a medieval philosopher or theologian, I think it worthwhile to note the location of Cordeliers in relation to other convents, colleges, and communities.

The Franciscan convent known as Cordeliers, lay just inside the wall on the Left Bank, at the southwest edge of thirteenth-century Paris. Sections of its medieval structure survive today at the faculty of medicine on rue de l'École de



FIGURE 2.1 Left Bank of Paris, 1302

Médecine between rue de l'Odéon and boulevard St. Michel.[6] The property was extensive, containing a large church, cloisters, refectory and dormitories with room for 200 students in the lectorate program and 22 cells reserved for bachelors and masters and their assistants.[7] There were houses of Beguines immediately across the street, who would have attended services and preaching in the Franciscan church. In fact the Beguines were a major audience for sermons by

6 The street was called rue des Cordeliers from the thirteenth century well into the early modern period.

7 Bert Roest, *A History of Franciscan Education* (*c. 1210–1517*) (Leiden/Boston/Köln: Brill, 2000), pp. 18–19.

masters of theology in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, including Franciscans.[8] In that same group of houses there was a grammar school for boys taught by a master of arts, and at the eastern end of the block, at the corner of rue Hautefeuille, was the collège des Prémontrés, which conducted a theological program for Premonstratensian students. At the end of the street, at the corner of rue de la Harpe, stood the church of St. Côme, which was the religious center of the English nation in the faculty of arts, some of whose members had connection with Oxford. Finally, the Franciscan convent was only a short distance from the collège de la Sorbonne, the heart of the faculty of theology, the Benedictine students at the collège de Cluny, the Dominican convent at St. Jacques, the convent of the Augustinian Hermits on the Seine (the present location of the Bibliothèque Mazarine and the Institut), and further to the east the Carmelite convent, adjacent to the schools for the faculty of canon law.

It is important to keep in mind that while the lectorate program at Paris was a period of theological study entirely under the control of the order although physically adjacent to the program and activities of the faculty of theology, the doctoral program in which Scotus was involved between 1302 and 1307 was within and under the control of the faculty of theology. In the case of the Franciscans, the minister general made the choice of which well-prepared friar, undoubtedly one who at an earlier stage of career had studied for the lectorate in Paris, would be sent back to Paris to read the *Sentences*, but the candidate also had to be "admitted to read" by the regent masters in theology. That decision by regent masters in theology, both secular and religious, was probably not the result of formal examination but based on whether the candidate proposed by the order had met all the requirements for admission. The chancellor, who was also a regent in theology, may have had more influence than other regents in granting admission to read, but as far as we know it was a collective decision. Those requirements as they applied to mendicants, however, did not correspond precisely with the rules as they applied to secular students. In fact it is a common mistake to use the statutes of the University of Paris (and of Oxford, for that matter) to reconstruct the academic biographies of mendicant theologians, and to use statutes from the second and third quarters of the fourteenth century to describe the program as it was in 1300, which is what Brampton and so many others have done. Secular students were required to have given two courses of lectures on the Bible across two years, one on a book of the Old Tes-

8 N. Bériou, *L'Avénement des maîtres de la Parole: la prédication à Paris au XIIIe siècle* (Turnhout: Brepols, 1998); Tanya Stabler-Miller, *The Beguines of Medieval Paris: Gender, Patronage, and Spiritual Authority* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2014).

tament and one on a book of the New. Scotus seems not to have been *biblicus* at Paris before reading the *Sentences*. Moreover, Scotus was allowed to proceed to licensing and inception after only one year at most as a formed bachelor, while the requirement for seculars was a three- to five-year period as formed bachelor.

Scotus's year as *sententiarius* was 1302–1303 (the conclusion reached by André Callebaut in 1926, Ephrem Longpré in 1928, and most recently independently confirmed by Bill Duba and Chris Schabel), not a two-year reading, 1302–1304.[9] As is well known, Scotus' sentential year was interrupted near the end in June 1303 by a period of exile, and at some point later in that year or in 1304 Scotus returned to complete his lectures. The ending of the colophon noted by Callebaut in the Worcester Cathedral Library, ms. F 69, namely "Here end the questions on the first of the Sentences given by brother John Duns Scotus at Paris in 1302, *intrante tercio*," continues, I think, to be misinterpreted. Callebaut understood "intrante tercio" to mean that his lectures on book I lasted into April 1303, the new year beginning on April 7 according to the Gallican calendar. But there is nothing to support Callebaut's argument that Scotus got a late start in 1302 and continued to lecture on book I three months beyond its usual termination date. On that hypothesis Scotus could barely finish book IV, the second book to be lectured on at Paris, before he went into exile. And it is also unlikely that the phrase refers to the third term of the academic year (mid-March through April), as Wolter maintained, for the same reasons. Nor can "intrante tercio" refer to book III of the *Sentences*, since lectures on book III never followed book one, whether the sequence was I, IV, II, and III, as it was at that time, or I, II, III, and IV. As I suggested in 1993, *non assertive*, and again a decade ago, *assertive*, I think "intrante tercio" means that Scotus was the third bachelor in the sequence of those reading the *Sentences* in that year, a fact the scribe thought worth noting.[10] Bachelors beginning to read in sequence is a very familiar practice in the fourteenth century, and although principial disputations were not part of the beginning exercise in 1302, a formal *principium* in praise of Scripture and the Lombard in the presence of masters and bachelors, with the promise not to argue anything contrary to faith and doctrine,

9 André. Callebaut, "Le bienheureux Jean Duns Scot"; Ephrem Longpré, "Le b. Jean Duns Scot, Pour le Saint Siège et contre le gallicanisme (25–28 juin 1303)," *La France Franciscaine* 11 (1928), pp. 137–162; William Duba and Chris Schabel, "Remigio, Auriol, Scotus, and the Myth of the Two-Year *Sentences* Lecture at Paris," *Recherches de Théologie et Philosophie médiévales* 84 (2017), pp. 143–179.

10 William. J. Courtenay, "Scotus at Paris," pp. 149–163 at pp. 160–162; Courtenay, "Scotus at Paris. Some Reconsiderations."

had been part of that academic exercise since the mid-thirteenth century. In order for each bachelor to present his *principium* in the presence of the masters and bachelors in theology, the *sententiarii* went in sequence. Scotus would have been obliged to attend the *principia* of the other bachelors reading in that year, but as far as we know there was not at this time a *principium* before beginning lectures on the fourth, second, and third books of the *Sentences*—only the first book at the beginning of the fall semester. I should note, however, that according to Chris Schabel, he and Bill Duba have uncovered *principia* for subsequent books in *studia* outside Paris before 1300. It is also uncertain whether the Carmelite bachelor gave the first *principium*, as was the case later in the fourteenth century. When the *principia* were completed in early October, Scotus began his lectures at Cordeliers, which would have been open to other religious, but his primary audience would have been Franciscans, certainly masters and formed bachelors in residence as well as some of the lectorate students in residence at the convent, a few of whom might be giving their own lectures on the *Sentences* at Paris a decade or so later.

Because principial disputations in which bachelors engaged each other were not part of sentential *principia* in 1302, interlocution was not between bachelors but between bachelors and masters, both those currently regent or those about to become regent through inception, or among regent masters themselves in quodlibetal questions.

Who might have been in Scotus's audience—the first exposure to his thought at Paris? We fortunately know the names of those who were in residence at Cordeliers in 1302–1303 because of Philip the Fair's attempt to force those resident in the mendicant convents at Paris to support his call for a council against Pope Boniface. One master in residence was Alanus, whose name does not appear in the sequential list of Franciscan masters compiled by Palémon Glorieux, although Glorieux did provide a thin biographical sketch.[11] If we remove William of Ware's name from that list, whom Glorieux maintained was regent master at Paris from 1296 to perhaps 1299,[12] there is room

11 Palémon Glorieux, *Répertoire des maîtres en Théologie de Paris au XIII^e siècle*, 2 (Paris: J. Vrin, 1933), p. 198, n° 339.

12 Glorieux, *Répertoire des maîtres en Théologie*, 2, pp. 144–145, n° 334. I find it amusing that the French Glorieux places William of Ware, sometimes called Scotus's teacher, at Paris, while the Oxonian Emden places Ware solely at Oxford as well as Harclay, although the latter read the *Sentences* at Paris. That same national bias may have been the reason the English Brampton insisted that Scotus studied for the lectorate at Oxford, not Paris. Many years ago R.W. Southern insisted that Robert of Grosseteste studied only in England, at Oxford, and was never at Paris, which has subsequently been proved to be a false claim.

to insert Alanus in the list of Franciscan regent masters, but only if he incepted before 1300. Admittedly one can be a master of theology, which means one has incepted after being licensed, without spending much time as a regent, or reigning master in the faculty of theology, despite the requirement, or at least the expectation, that one would "reign" for two years. Most mendicant theologians, however, seem to have fulfilled that office for only a year, sometimes less. The fact that Alanus's name is at the beginning of the two copies of the list of Franciscans who supported the position of the king, means that he held a major position in the convent at that time. Since Gonsalvus was regent master in 1302–1303, Glorieux, assuming a two-year regency was required of all masters, including mendicants, hypothesized that Alanus, having already incepted, served as regent master in 1303–1304 while Gonsalvus was in exile. It could as well be that 1302–1303 was the one and only year Gonsalvus was regent, which in fact it was, and that Alanus, who had incepted before June 1303, was either the incoming regent for 1303–1304, as Glorieux maintained but for different reasons, or had already served as regent in a previous year. I will have more to say about Master Alanus in a moment.

A second master among the adherents in residence at Cordeliers in 1302–1303 was John of Tongres, a former Premonstratensian master who, for unknown reasons, left that order and moved across the street to join the Franciscans at some point before 1302.[13] Among those who chose exile rather than adhere were two more masters, Gonsalvus, who was regent master in 1302–1303, and Jacques de Quesnoy.[14] The latter, according to Glorieux, was already master at Paris in the 1290s when Vital du Four read the *Sentences*. While several other Franciscans at Cordeliers in 1302 from the Vermandois region chose to adhere, Jacques chose to go into exile, probably back to Hainaut, north of the French border. Gonsalvus, unlike Scotus, did not return to Paris but became provincial minister for Castile in Spain and, at the general chapter at Assisi in 1304, was elected minister general of the order, replacing John Murro, who had been made cardinal in December 1302.[15]

Chauvinism aside, in the absence of any compelling evidence, we can place William of Ware and his influence on Scotus at Oxford in the last years of the thirteenth century, although it is certainly possible that Ware was among those sent to Paris for the lectorate earlier in his career.

13 Glorieux, *Répertoire des maîtres en Théologie*, 1, table between pp. 228 and 229.

14 Magister Jacobus de Quarcheto [Querchetum, or Quesnoy, a small village southeast of Tournai on the border of France].

15 Unless Murro fulfilled duties as minister general while being cardinal and cardinal protector of the Franciscan order, which seems unlikely, the office of minister general would have been vacant from January 1302 to May 1304.

Turning next to the bachelors who were at Cordeliers in 1302–1303, one was Giles of Longny [Longniaco], a formed bachelor who was promoted to the doctorate just before Scotus. Another Franciscan, Martin of Abbeville, was also a formed bachelor, as was probably the case with Albert of Metz. Since all three were past the stage of *sententiarius* and awaiting promotion to the doctorate, none of the three had a *socius* assigned to him.[16]

One of the most interesting Franciscans mentioned in the list of those supporting the position of the king in June 1303 is Aufredus, the *socius* or assistant of master Alanus and presumed with reason to be Aufredus Gonteri, an identification I accept.[17] Aufredus Gonteri, who was from the Franciscan convent at Quimper in Brittany before being sent to Paris, was certainly in residence at Cordeliers at this time, since in his questions on book I of the *Sentences* he stated that he had himself heard Scotus, which could only have been at Paris between 1302 and 1307.[18] Moreover, the heavy dependence of Aufredus's commentary on the *Sentences* on that of Henry of Harclay, who read the *Sentences* at Paris soon after Scotus, is further evidence of Aufredus Gonteri's presence in Paris at that time. Aufredus was almost certainly related to another Breton, Alanus Gonteri, MA and canon of St-Quentin in southern Picardy by Oct. 1308,[19] who read the *Sentences* at Paris around 1310, was master of theology by 1314, and the first Grand Master of the collège de Navarre in 1315.[20] The Aufredus resident at Cordeliers in 1302–1303, however, was assisting a different master Alanus, a Franciscan, who was also likely from Brittany, since in the early fourteenth century the name Alanus, like Aufredus, was more often than not a Breton name.[21]

16 Two other Franciscans at Cordeliers in 1302–1303 did have *socii* assigned to them: Nicholas of Laon with Arnulf de Marna as *socius*, and Nicholas of Hungary with a *socius* by the name of Matthew. They may have been biblical bachelors or in a preparatory year before reading the *Sentences*.

17 Aufredus (Alfred in English) is not a common name in France but is one often found among Bretons. Spelling the name as Anfredus is simply the result of a misreading of the two minims after the 'A'.

18 Vatican City, Bibl. Apost. Vat., Vat. lat. 1113, f. 7ra, and Wrocław, Bibl. Uniwersytecka I F 184, f. 12va: "venerabilem doctorem et fratrem Iohannem Scotum, quem pro posse quasi ubique sequor, quia ipsum diu [V: dum] audivi …".

19 *CUP* II, pp. 134–135, nº 671.

20 P. Glorieux, *Répertoire des maîtres de théologie*, 1, p. 457, nº 226; Glorieux, *Aux origines de la Sorbonne*, 1 (Paris: J. Vrin, 1966), p. 295; Nathalie Gorochov, *Le collège de Navarre de sa fondation (1305) au début du XVe siècle (1418)*, (Paris: Honoré Champion, 1997), p. 643.

21 For example, in the letters of Boniface VIII three of the four persons named Alanus were from the diocese of Quimper in Brittany: Alanus, abbot of the monastery of Ste-Croix at Quimperle [Reg. Vat. 48, f. 130^{r}], mag. Alanus de Guegat, canon of Quimper [Reg. Vat. 49,

Aufredus may have been in the Franciscan lectorate program at Paris in 1303, but if so, it would have had to have been toward the end of his four-year program. Lectorate students were sent to Paris to study theology, not to assist masters or bachelors at the convent. The functions of a *socius* were to assist the senior friar in the preparation of lectures, checking sources in the convent library, and sometimes making a *reportatio* copy of the lectures of the bachelor or master, activities that would have interfered with the studies of a student and would have required a more extensive knowledge and training than most lectorate students possessed. If the Aufredus at Cordeliers in 1302–1303 was Aufredus Gonteri, that raises the question of how someone, let's say in his mid-twenties at that time and at the end or beyond the lectorate program, could only have reached the stage of reading the *Sentences* at Paris in 1325, the accepted date on the basis of a manuscript colophon.

That colophon occurs in Gonteri's questions on the *Sentences* in Wrocław, Bibl. Univ. A 21, f. 306ra: "Here ends the *compilatio* of the *lectura* of the first [book] of the *Sentences*, *ordinata* [i.e. ordered or arranged] by Brother Aufredus Gonteri the Breton of the Order of Friars Minor, bachelor in sacred theology in Paris, in the year of our Lord 1325." Whether the date is the year in which Aufredus was *sententiarius* or the date of the *compilatio*, more than two decades separate the Aufredus of 1302–1303, a post-lectorate student or one in its final stages, from the bachelor of the *Sentences*, and one who had been reading the *Sentences* as a lector at Barcelona in 1322. While this is not impossible—almost twenty years separated the Augustinian Gregory of Rimini's beginning the lectorate at Paris from his baccalaureate at Paris—a span of a quarter century is highly unusual.[22] But to hypothesize that Aufredus read the *Sentences* at Paris

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11^{v}], and Alanus Angall, canon of Quimper [Reg. Vat. 49, f. 157^{v}]; the fourth was English, Alan of Walsingham. In the letters of Clement V, five of the eight persons named Alanus were from Brittany: Alanus de Accigeieio from the diocese of Rennes [Reg. Vat. 544, f. 104^{v}], Alanus, abbot of Quimperle [Reg. Vat. 56, f. 85^{r}], Alanus de Lamballe [Reg. Vat. 57, f. 131^{v}, Reg. Vat. 58, f. 80^{v} and 280^{r}], Alanus Bruni, a married clerk from the diocese of Tréguier [Reg. Vat. 60, f. 11^{v}], and Alanus, bishop elect of St. Brieuc [Reg. Vat. 60, f. 20^{r}, 28^{v}, 155^{v}]. Similarly, in *Rotuli Parisienses*, 1: 1316–1350, 5 of the 6 masters named Alanus were from Brittany. In *Rotuli Parisienses*, 2: 1350–1379, 4 of the 5 masters named Alanus were from Brittany.

22 On Aufredus, see Victorin Doucet, "Der unbekannte Skotist des Vaticanus Lat. 1113, Fr. Anfredus Gonteri O.F.M. (1325)," *Franziskanische Studien* 25 (1938), pp. 201–240; Friedrich Stegmüller, *Repertorium commentariorum in sententias Petri Lombardi* (Würzburg: Schöning, 1947), 1, pp. 42–44; William Duba, Russell Friedman, and Chris Schabel, "Henry of Harclay and Aufredo Gonteri Brito," in *Medieval Commentaries on the* Sentences *of Peter Lombard*, 2 (Leiden/Boston: E.J. Brill, 2010), ed. Philipp Rosemann, pp. 263–368; William J. Courtenay, "Early Scotists at Paris: A Reconstruction," *Franciscan Studies* 69 (2011),

earlier than 1325, lets say in the second decade of the fourteenth century, would require an explanation of why he did not describe himself as bachelor of theology at Barcelona in 1322 and why he went there as lector after reading the *Sentences* at Paris and before inception. While there are several examples of mendicants and secular masters serving as lectors after becoming doctors of theology,[23] I cannot, at the moment, think of an example of someone serving as lector in a provincial *studium* between reading the *Sentences* at Paris and incepting in theology. Unfortunately I do not have a good solution to what remains for me a puzzle.

Other Franciscans who were in residence with Scotus at Cordeliers in 1302–1303 were Guillelmus Anglicus or Guillelmus de Anglia, who is assumed to be William of Alnwick, editor of Scotus's questions on the *Sentences*. For whatever reasons, he supported the king and remained in Paris while Scotus preferred to leave. Alnwick may have been in the lectorate program at the time. His appointment as *sententiarius* at Paris is dated by Emden to be sometime before 1314.[24] Another Cordeliers resident was William of Sancto Patusio, confessor to Queen Marguerite of Provence, wife of Louis IX, and who must have been quite old at this point. There was also Durand, confessor to Queen Joan, wife of Philip the Fair, Gaufrid of Boneyo, who served as an *opponens* in a disputation with Scotus,[25] and Henricus Alemannus, who made a *reportatio* of Scotus's Parisian lectures.[26] Finally, Alexander de Alessandria was there in 1302, probably already a formed bachelor unless he returned to Paris to read the *Sentences* late in 1303, since he was licensed and papally made master in November 1304. He was the Franciscan regent at Paris in 1307–1308 and the first to attach his seal to the response of masters of theology to the king's questions concerning the Templars in March 1308.

The Dominican convent at St. Jacques, higher up the hill from Cordeliers, housed a number of important theologians in 1302–1303. The list of those in the Dominican convent in June 1303 was limited to those who adhered to the

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pp. 176–229, at pp. 201–202, 221; Chris Schabel and Garrett Smith, "The Franciscan *Studium* in Barcelona in the Early Fourteenth Century," in *Philosophy and Theology in the* Studia *of the Religious Orders and at Papal and Royal Courts*, ed. Kent Emery, William J. Courtenay, and Stephen M. Metzger (Turnhout: Brepols, 2012), pp. 359–392.

23 Examples are William of Alnwick, O.F.M., regent master at Oxford c. 1316 and lector at Bologna in 1323; and Benedict of Asnago, O.P., sometimes but inaccurately referred to as de Assignano, who was DTh (by 1324) when assigned as lector at Barcelona in 1326.

24 A.B. Emden, *A Biographical Register of the University of Oxford to A.D. 1500*, 1, p. 27.

25 Longpré, "Le B. Jean Duns Scot. Pour le Saint Siège et contra gallicanisme (25–28 Juin 1303)," pp. 146–147.

26 Longpré, "Le B. Jean Duns Scot," p. 151.

position of the king. They included John Quidort of Paris, Romeus de Bruguera from Spain, Hervaeus Natalis from Brittany, who was a fellow *sententiarius* with Scotus, Durand of St. Pourçain, and James of Lausanne, who in 1302 was at St. Jacques in the lectorate program, returned as *biblicus* in 1311, and was *sententiarius* in 1314–1315. Meister Eckhart, who was regent master in the non-French chair at St. Jacques in 1302, is not on the list, presumably because he chose to go into exile rather than support the call for a council against Boniface. He returned to Paris as regent in 1310. He is also an example of a mendicant who did not remain at Paris between reading the *Sentences* and licensing. After completing his lectures on the *Sentences* in 1293–1294, Eckhart left Paris to become prior of the Dominican convent at Erfurt and provincial of Thuringia and did not return to Paris until 1302 for licensing and inception as regent master—a period of six years.

Among others who were resident in Paris in 1302–1303, one of the most important was Henry of Harclay, even though A.B. Emden did not credit him with any time at Paris.[27] Harclay might have heard Scotus lecture or dispute, and was certainly familiar with his thought. Harclay's own questions on the *Sentences* composed at Paris between 1305 and 1307–1308, were heavily dependent on Scotus. If Harclay actually attended Scotus's lectures, however, it would have been in violation of a regulation enacted or repeated at the general chapter of 1292, namely that seculars, as distinct from those in religious orders, were forbidden to attend lectures on the *Sentences* at Cordeliers.[28] Harclay's familiarity with the views of John of Paris and Arnold of Villanova in circulation around 1300 at Paris is further evidence for Harclay's presence there. One can hypothesize that as a secular theologian, he would have been obliged to be resident at Paris more than four years before reading the *Sentences* and would have given his two *cursus* on books of the Bible, so he would have been in Paris well before Scotus was *sententiarius*.

Other seculars who were at Paris in the first decade of the fourteenth century who interacted with or were influenced by Scotus included Godfrey of Fontaines, a long-serving regent master in theology at Paris until his death in 1306 or 1309; Thomas de Bailly, a recent regent master in theology who reigned from 1301 to long after Scotus had left Paris; and Jean de Pouilly, who may well have been a fellow *sententiarius* with Scotus in 1302 and a formed bachelor from 1303 until he incepted as regent master sometime in the academic year

27 Emden, *A Biographical Register of the University of Oxford*, 2, pp. 874–875.

28 *CUP* II, p. 57: "Seculares autem ad hujusmodi lectiones [super Sententias] nullatenus admittantur ...."

1306–1307, the year before Scotus left Paris for Cologne.[29] If the Franciscan prohibition on seculars attending lectures on the *Sentences* at Cordeliers was enforced, rumors of the excitement stimulated by Scotus's lectures may well have drawn the attention of seculars, such as Harclay and Pouilly, and produced a channel of reported material during the 1302–1303 year.

There still seems, however, some uncertainty as to when Scotus returned to Paris, finished his lectures on book III of the *Sentences*, was licensed and incepted. As I pointed out in the paper I gave at Oriel College, it is likely that Scotus returned to Paris much earlier than has been assumed. It is often stated that Scotus did not return until the autumn of 1304 because the political climate had not yet settled, because the papal prohibition on licensing at Paris in theology and canon law was not lifted until April 18, 1304, and because Scotus was lecturing in England at Oxford or Cambridge and would have completed the 1303–1304 year there before returning to Paris. But there is no evidence on what Scotus was doing while absent from Paris. The prohibition on licensing has nothing to do with reading the *Sentences*. And by November 1303 Philip the Fair was not only permitting exiled students, both secular and religious, to return to Paris but was commanding royal officials along the route from the channel ports to Paris not to impede the travel of students in any way through tolls or taxation of goods. Philip did not suspend the exile of non-adherents precisely in November. It was already moot in late October, and Philip's November letters to the count of Boulogne-sur-Mer and the bailiff of Amiens were in response to complaints by England masters and students that they were being harassed on their way back to Paris.

We have no evidence as to exactly when Scotus made the return journey from England to Paris, but having only a few lectures left on book III of the *Sentences* in order to become a formed bachelor and qualify as a candidate for promotion to the doctorate, I find it hard to believe he waited more than a year before returning. I think it more likely that he returned to Paris sometime between late October 1303 and early 1304. We know that he participated as respondent in the Aula disputation of Giles of Longny when the latter incepted. Given the steps between licensing and inception, which usually lasted several months, we can conjecture that Giles was among those awaiting licensing in the spring of 1304 when the papal prohibition was lifted and was probably licensed at the end of that academic year and incepted at the beginning of

29 On Pouilly's first year as regent, see the introduction in William J. Courtenay and Karl Ubl, *Gelehrte Gutachten und Königliche Politik im Templerprozeß* (Monumenta Germaniae Historica, Studien und Texte 51), (Hannover: Harrassowitz, 2011).

the 1304–1305 year. By then Scotus would have been a formed bachelor, probably for more than six months, by my calculation. And the letter of Gonsalvus in mid-November 1304 that mentions the promotion of Giles implies that it was relatively recent. Gonsalvus mentions letters from William, guardian at the Paris convent, which announced Giles's promotion to the doctorate.[30] Had Giles's inception taken place in May or June, 1304, Gonsalvus would not have waited to November to reply to the guardian's letters.

Scotus's own licensing and inception probably took place in the next few months, possibly but not necessarily as early as Lent 1305. And while the requirement of a two-year period as regent master did not apply to mendicants, there would have been sufficient time for such before his departure for Cologne. But if he incepted in 1305, why is there only one series of quodlibetal questions? Available slots, so to speak, would be Advent 1305, Lent 1306, Advent 1306, or Lent 1307. One can conjecture that other quodlibeta were lost, but given Scotus's impact on contemporaries at Paris, I find that hard to believe. Or perhaps questions from various quodlibeta were put together as one. But a single series of quodlibetal questions make it possible that Scotus incepted in 1306 rather than 1305.

Whatever the answer is, it is certain that Scotus was at Cordeliers in April 1305 when Queen Joan of Navarre was buried in the church at Cordeliers.[31] Philip the Fair had wanted his wife to be buried at St. Denis, the resting place of Capetian kings and queens, and where he would be buried, but in her final testament she stipulated that she would be interred in the Franciscan church in Paris. Perhaps her Franciscan confessor, Durand, played a role in her decision. Whatever her reasoning, the funeral and burial would have been spectacular.

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30 *CUP* II, p. 117, no. 652: "Ad expeditionem dilecti in Christo patris Egidii de Legnaco, de quo per literas vestras certificatus existo …." The guardian was most likely William of Condé [de Condeto], named immediately after James the procurator in the list of Franciscans supporting Philip IV's call for a council to remove Boniface VIII. Another possibility is William of Sancto Patusio, whose name appears earlier on the list, but who was almost certainly too old to have been guardian in 1303.

31 Joan of Navarre died on April 2, 1305. Concerning her last wishes, see Elizabeth A.R. Brown, "La mort, les testaments et les fondations de Jeanne de Navarre, reine de France (1273–1305)," in *Une Histoire pour un royaume* (*XIIe–XVe siècle*). *Actes du colloque Corpus Regni organisé en hommage à Colette Beaune*, eds. Anne-Hélène Allirot, Murielle Gaude-Ferragu, and Gilles Lecuppre (Paris: Perrin, 2010), pp. 124–141. See also Elizabeth A. Brown, "Death and the Human Body in the later Middle Ages: the legislation of Boniface VIII and the division of the corpse," *Viator* 12 (1981), pp. 221–270, and Elizabeth Brown, "Moral Imperatives and Conundrums of Conscience: Reflections on Philip the Fair of France," *Speculum* 87 (2012), pp. 1–36.

It would have brought the royal court to Cordeliers, including of course King Philip and major figures in the court circle. And whether Scotus was master or still a formed bachelor, he would have been an eye witness. What Scotus thought of the king, apart from his refusal to join in Philip's campaign against Pope Boniface, is unknown. Within two years he was again out of France, on assignment in a Franciscan convent at Cologne.

3

The *Collationes* Attributed to John Duns Scotus: Between Literary Genre and Interlocutors

Marina Fedeli

The *Collationes oxonienses* and *parisienses* attributed to John Duns Scotus are among the less studied works by scholars. The reason for the lack of scholarly work is a direct consequence of the unknown literary genre as well as textual difficulties. Nevertheless, this work sheds light on the English and Parisian debates in the early fourteenth century, about which we still know very little.

The aim of this article is to show how the literary genre makes it difficult to identify both the authors and, at times, also the thought of Scotus.

Generally speaking, according to the studies of Olga Wejiers and Jacqueline Hamesse, two types of *collationes* can be identified: evening sermons, like *Collationes in Hexaemeron*, by Bonaventure of Bagnoregio, and school exercises, that is exchanges of opinions among friars which took place in the mendicant convents.[1] Scotus' *Collationes* belong to the second type and, as Bert Roest says, they had as a purpose "to train discussion skills ⟨of young friars⟩. The *collatio*—not to be identified with the academic evening sermons and the more informal evening lectures and readings, with the same name—was foremost a practice in *opponendo* and *respondendo* by students themselves."[2]

In the study of the recently edited *Collationes oxonienses*, Guido Alliney and Marina Fedeli have identified at least three kinds of *collationes*:

– the first is the dispute between two interlocutors on a topic assigned in the title (qq. 1–11; 24–26) who defend their opinions with several arguments, but there is no *solutio* to the question by a *magister*.

1 Jacqueline Hamesse, "'Collatio' *et* 'reportatio': *deux vocables spécifiques de la vie intellectuelle au moyen âge*," in *Terminologie de la vie intellectuelle au moyen âge*, ed. Olga Weijers (Turnhout: Brepols, 1988), pp. 78–87, at pp. 78–83; Olga Weijers, "Le Vocabulaire du Collège de Sorbonne," in *Vocabulaire des collèges universitaires* (*XIII^e–XVI^e siècles*). *Actes du colloque, Leuven 9–11 avril 1992*, ed. Olga Weijers (Turnhout: Brepols, 1993), pp. 9–25, at pp. 18–19; Olga Weijers, *Le maniement du savoir. Pratiques intellectuelles à l'époque des premières universités* (*XIII^e–XIV^e siècles*), (Turnhout: Brepols, 1996); Olga Weijers, *Terminologie des universités au XIII^e siècle* (Roma: Edizioni dell'Ateneo, 1987), pp. 372–378.

2 Bert Roest, *A History of Franciscan Education* (*c. 1210–1517*), (Leiden: Brill, 2000), p. 133.

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– the second is the dispute between two interlocutors on a doctrine presented at the beginning of the question (qq. 12–17). For example, *collatio* 13 opens with the exposition of three opinions on the distinction of divine attributes; the first of these is Scotus' theory, which is considered false and almost heretical. The question continues with the arguments against Scotus' opinion as well as with the exposition of the doctrine of the presenter.
– the third is the defence of the conductor's opinion: qq. 18–23 form a treatise because the six *collationes* are dedicated to human psychology. They are all very short because there is no dispute, but only the exposition of a theory.[3]

If the *Collationes* are exercises among students, which happened under the supervision of a master, then Duns Scotus could have participated as one of the interlocutors whose only task was to defend his own opinion. It is for this reason that the *solutio* of the questions is non-existent and that Scotus' thought cannot be found in some *collationes*. Additionally, it seems to be why the arguments, attributable to Scotus, sometimes have insufficient argumentative force.

If the *Collationes* are only a *reportatio* of exercises among students and Scotus is one of participants, then why is this text so important? The *Collationes*, traditionally attributed to Duns Scotus, sheds light on debates within the Franciscan community in the early 14th century because the Oxford series were discussed in the Spring Semester of 1301.

In particular, the doctrinal analysis of the *Collationes oxonienses* has tried to highlight the first impact of Scotus' theories in the English environment, strongly influenced by Henry of Ghent's thought. In some questions, Henry's theories are supported and revised in an innovative way by Richard of Conington, as primarily shown by Stephen Dumont for *collatio* 14.[4] Conington is probably the primary interlocutor for the whole group of questions 12–17: for some of these it is possible to search out quotes *quasi verbatim*, whereas the lack of Conington's texts prevents the comparison of *collationes* 15 and 16.[5]

Recently, Richard Cross has raised concerns about the attribution of *collatio* 17 to Conington because the author would seem to support a partially different doctrine.[6] In any case, if the author of *collatio* 17 is not Conington, he is

3 Guido Alliney and Marina Fedeli, "Introduzione," in *Ioannis Duns Scoti Collationes Oxonienses* (Firenze: Sismel Edizioni del Galluzzo, 2016), pp. LXXXII–XCIX.

4 Stephen D. Dumont, "William of Ware, Richard of Conington and the *Collationes Oxonienses* of John Duns Scotus," in *John Duns Scotus. Metaphysics and Ethics*, ed. Ludger Honnefelder et al., (Leiden: Brill, 1996), pp. 59–85.

5 G. Alliney and M. Fedeli, "Introduzione," pp. CXXIII–CXLI.

6 Richard Cross, "Scotus's *Collatio Oxoniensis* 17 and the Ontological Status of *impossibilia*," *Recherches de Théologie et Philosophie Médiévales* 84 (2017), pp. 383–406.

influenced by Henry of Ghent's and Richard of Conington's doctrines.[7] After all, Scotus and Conington were probably both at Oxford in 1300–1301 and were present as *respondens* and *opponens* in the exercises reported by the Worcester manuscript, Q. 99, regarding the issues of *quasi* matter and the distinction of divine attributes.[8]

However, Conington certainly is not the unique interlocutor of the *Collationes oxonienses*; indeed, Guido Alliney has demonstrated that in *collatio* 21—concerning the possibility that the will never acts necessarily towards the essence of God in Heaven—the author, who criticizes Scotus's opinion, has a theory not only influenced by Conington, but also by English Dominicans. In particular, the conductor uses two arguments against the absolute contingency of the created will asserted by Scotus: the first argument is influenced by Conington which states that the will necessarily desires God because it has no reason (*defectus cur*) to not desire the supreme good; the second argument says that the blessed intellect cannot consider anything other than the divine essence because the essence includes all objects of the intellect. This latter argument seems to have circulated among English Dominicans in the late 13th century.[9]

The identification of Scotus' interlocutors in the *Collationes oxonienses* is complicated and still wide open, especially since the debate sometimes prevents a clear exposition of their thoughts. This is more evident in the first 11 questions and the last 3 questions because only discussion is present, whereas in questions 12–23 one finds more space for the expression of opinions. In the

7 Jacopo Francesco Falà, Univocità, statuto delle essenze e scienza divina nelle Collationes oxonienses. Un dibattito nell'ordine minorita inglese agli inizi del XIV secolo, Ph.D. Diss., University of Macerata 2017, pp. 118–154.

8 In the question *Queritur, supposito quod in deo sit materia vel quasi materia et distinctio attributorum formaliter, an sit compositio* (f. 41^{vb}), we read: "Ad istas rationes respondet Koniton" and "Circa istam questionem Johs stude et iudica." Andrew G. Little and Franz Pelster, *Oxford Theology and Theologians c. a. d. 1282–1302* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1934), pp. 343–344.

9 Guido Alliney, "*Le* Collationes oxonienses *sulla volontà. Analisi degli influssi dottrinali in un apocrifo scotiano*," in *Contingenza e libertà. Teorie francescane del primo Trecento, Atti del Colloquio Internazionale, Macerata 12–13 dicembre 2008*, ed. Guido Alliney, Marina Fedeli, and Alessandro Pertosa (Macerata: EUM, 2012), pp. 19–44, at 43: "Le *collationes oxonienses* sulla volontà trasmetterebbero allora una teoria della volontà fortemente eclettica, dove i più aggiornati esiti della riflessione francescana (la dottrina dell'assenza di motivo per non volere l'essenza divina di Riccardo di Conington) e di parte della riflessione domenicana (la dottrina della capacità della volontà di distogliere l'intelletto dalla considerazione del fine di Tommaso Sutton) sono messi in opera per articolare una teoria moderata che, diversamente da quanto aveva fatto Scoto ma in linea con le più diffuse posizioni minorite del tempo, limita la contingenza della fruizione allo stato attuale, ammettendone invece la necessità *in patria*"; Alliney and Fedeli, "Introduzione," pp. CXLI–CXLVII.

first group of questions, characterized by discussion between two participants, generally one position is compatible with Duns Scotus and the second is influenced by Henry of Ghent's doctrines.

1 The Case of Question 6 of the *Collationes oxonienses*

In order to illustrate the complexity of identifying the interlocutors, a brief analysis of *collatio* 6 of the Oxford series is useful.

The title of the question is *Utrum relatio creature ad deum sit realiter aliqua essentia alia vel alia res ab essentia creature*. So, *collatio* 6 investigates the nature of contingent relation and the dependence of every creature on God. All that is not God is caused by Him and is linked to Him by a relation.

The expression 'alia essentia ab essentia creature' seems to evoke a passage from the *Sentences* by William of Ware when he says: "Dico igitur ad questionem quod relatio in creaturis dicit aliam essentiam ab essentia fundamenti."[10] According to Ware, foundation and relation in creatures are different *rationes reales* and therefore two different essences: *essentia absoluta* and *essentia respectiva*.[11]

Collatio 6 contains a dispute between two interlocutors: the first whom we can call *respondens*, that is the one who initially contributes, the second being the *opponens*, that is the one who intervenes in second place; clearly, these terms are not used in the traditional way.[12] The question demonstrates a particularity in relation to all the others since the debate between the two scholars is interrupted in order to refute the initial argument by the *opponens*.

The *respondens* argues that the essence of every creature is essentially dependent because it cannot be, nor be understood, without its relation to God.[13]

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10 Guillelmus de Ware, *In Sententiarum* I d. 33 q. 3, Firenze, Biblioteca Medicea Laurenziana, Plut. 33, dex. 1, f. 83^{v}, ll. 28–29.

11 Guillelmus de Ware, *In Sententiarum* I d. 33 q. 3, Firenze, Biblioteca Medicea Laurenziana, Plut. 33, dex. 1, f. 83^{v}, ll. 30–33: "[…] in creaturis autem non solum sunt diverse rationes reales (ratio fundamenti et ratio relationis), immo ipsa relatio est alia res a re fundamenti; nec tamen ex hoc quod est alia relatio [*lege* res] a fundamento est ibi proprie compositio […]; ibi sunt plures essentie quam ante: est enim ibi nunc essentia absoluta et essentia respectiva et prius fuit ibi solum essentia absoluta."

12 On the traditional use of terms 'respondens' and 'opponens', see Weijers, *Terminologie des universités au XIII^{e} siècle*, pp. 338–339, 347–355; Carlos Bazàn et al., *Les questions disputées et les questions quodlibetiques dans les facultés de théologie, de droit et de médecine* (Turnhout: Brepols, 1985), pp. 58–59, 63–66.

13 *Collationes oxonienses* q. 6 n. 14, ed. Alliney and Fedeli, p. 70: "Item, quod non potest esse

All that is created formally includes *respectus* to God;[14] the Creator, in fact, is He who gives the being and preserves it and so once the creature is destroyed, the relation of dependence is destroyed and vice versa.[15] Therefore, the dependence on God belongs to the essential aspects of every creature.

To support his position, the *respondens* uses two arguments: the infinite regress and the denial of change. In the first argument he asserts: if a real relation were really distinct from its foundation, an infinite regress would occur.[16] In fact, if a relation were different than its foundation, for that same reason the relation would refer to itself by way of another relation, which would be different than its foundation, and then there would be another relation, and so on to infinity. This classical argument, already present in Aristotle and Avicenna, was very evident in the 13th century debates.

In the second argument, the *respondens* uses the argument of change twice. The first time he quotes Aristotle, who denies that there is any change in the category of relation.[17] The second time, quoting Augustine, the *respondens* argues that some relations cannot be removed by change. For example, it is impossible to eliminate the relation between the *exemplar* and the divine intellect because it is inconceivable to consider the essence of a stone without its *ratio exemplati* to the divine intellect.[18] This relation between exemplar and divine

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nec intelligi sine alio, videtur esse idem realiter et essentialiter cum illo; sed essentia creature non potest esse nec intelligi sine dependentia eius ad deum; ergo etc."

14 *Collationes oxonienses* q. 6 n. 39, ed. Alliney and Fedeli, p. 78: "Item, ideo unum non dependet totaliter ad aliud, quia est aliquid secundum quod non refertur ad illud; ergo, per oppositum, cum creatura formaliter dependeat ad deum et totaliter, eius dependentia erit eius essentia."

15 *Collationes oxonienses* q. 6 n. 33, ed. Alliney and Fedeli, p. 76: "[…] quia nihil destruitur, destructo subiecto, nisi quod omnino est essentiale subiecto; ergo, si, subiecto destructo, destruatur relatio, vel econverso, destructa relatione, necessario destruitur subiectum, sequitur quod unum est de essentia alterius."

16 *Collationes oxonienses* q. 6 n. 29, ed. Alliney and Fedeli, pp. 74–75: "Item, si essentia creature sit aliud a relatione sua, ergo illa relatio qua refertur habebit aliam relationem qua refertur, et illa aliam vel alias: erit processus in infinitum."

17 *Collationes oxonienses* q. 6 n. 3, ed. Alliney and Fedeli, pp. 66–67: "[…] si relatio sit alia realitas a realitate fundamenti, ergo ad eam posset esse mutatio realis, quod est falsum secundum Philosophum, v *Physicorum*, quia in 'ad aliquid' non est motus, neque ut termini, neque ut subiecti."

18 *Collationes oxonienses* q. 6 n. 28, ed. Alliney and Fedeli, p. 74: "Contra. Augustinus, v *De trinitate*, capitulo 5, dans naturam accidentis dicit quod 'non solet dici accidens nisi quod aliqua mutatione accidentaliter amitti potest'. Tunc arguo sic: illud quod non est amissibile non est accidens; sed aliqua relatio nulla mutatione amitti potest; ergo non est accidens. Probatio minoris. Impossibile est intelligere essentiam lapidis ⟨et⟩ amittere

intellect is essential to the stone and so it cannot be only an accident that is added to substance.

In summary, according to the *respondens* relations are not accidents and do not have their own reality, because once the dependence is removed, the creature is destroyed and vice versa since this relation constitutes the essence of creature, namely, it is essentially dependent.

The *opponens* argues that creature essence and relation are really distinct because the dependence on God is an accident, outside of the essential definition of creature.[19] To support his opinion, the *opponens* poses a *positio impossibilis*: if God were not being, the essence of the created could exist, but it would not be dependent on God.[20] So, the essence is not relational because the creature refers itself to God only *denominative*, that is by means of relation.[21] In this way, the dependence is an accident added to the creaturely essence. The opponent's position is peculiar because he considers the creature as including two concepts received by two *res*,[22] and so essence and relation are two things created together and simultaneously inasmuch as they are materially the same thing.[23] In fact, the *opponens* adds that the relation and the essence

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rationem exemplati ad intellectum divinum ut exemplar; ratio exemplati dicit relationem; ergo non est accidens."

19 *Collationes oxonienses* q. 6, n. 7, ed. Alliney and Fedeli, pp. 67–68: "Ad questionem dicitur quod relatio creature ad deum realiter differt ab essentia creature, quod probatur per auctoritatem Augustini, VII *De trinitate*, capitulo 2: 'omnis essentia que relative dicitur est aliquid excepto relativo', et ibidem, capitulo 8, omnis essentia que non est 'ad se' secundum accidens dicitur"; n. 36, p. 77: "Ad secundum dicitur quod essentia creature nullam dependentiam dicit, formaliter circumscripta relatione ad deum; sed formaliter refertur per relationem, et denominative ex se, quia denominatur relatione que est formalis dependentia ad deum."

20 *Collationes oxonienses* q. 6 n. 8, ed. Alliney and Fedeli, p. 68: "Item, per rationem sic: quandocumque aliqua duo sic se habent, quod unum potest manere quocumque casu posito, possibili vel impossibili, alio non manente, ipsum non est idem realiter cum alio. Sed, posito casu possibili vel impossibili quod deus non esset, nihilominus tamen adhuc essentia creature posset esse; sed non dependens, quia a quocumque dependeret, ponatur non esse; ergo eius essentia et eius dependentia non sunt eadem res."

21 *Collationes oxonienses* q. 6 n. 36, ed. Alliney and Fedeli, p. 77: "Ad secundum dicitur quod essentia creature nullam dependentiam dicit, formaliter circumscripta relatione ad deum; sed formaliter refertur per relationem, et denominative ex se, quia denominatur relatione que est formalis dependentia ad deum."

22 *Collationes oxonienses* q. 6 n. 44, ed. Alliney and Fedeli, pp. 79–80: "[…] dicitur quod creatura non dependet totaliter ad deum nisi materialiter et subiective, loquendo de creatura que includit essentialiter duos conceptus acceptos a duabus rebus et realibus […]."

23 *Collationes oxonienses* q. 6 n. 10, ed. Alliney and Fedeli, p. 69: "[…] relationis realitas non est realitas fundamenti nisi materialiter, sed non formaliter, sicut actio et passio sunt diversa predicamenta realiter, et tamen sunt idem materialiter in motu in quo fundantur."

can be circumscribed only by intellect.[24] Thus, according to the *opponens*, the dependence on God is an inseparable accident of the creature that coincides with essence, but only subjectively.

The opponent's replies to the respondent's arguments are very interesting. In response, the *opponens* merely states that "in ad aliquid est mutatio: quere Martinum et Ware."[25] In fact, in the first book of *Sentences*, distinction 33, q. 3, William of Ware accepts some change in the category of relation, recognizing two ways in which a subject can change. According to the first, the subject receives a new form only after a mutation, for example the dark hair of a man: the hair will turn white only after it has lost its colour. So, a halfway mutation is necessary. According to the second, a previous mutation is not required, like when a man becomes a father: this man receives a new relation of paternity without a previous change. Therefore, Ware can say that there is mutation in relatives because the foundation changes when it receives a new relation.[26]

Despite the quotation, the *opponens*' doctrine and that of Ware is very dissimilar: according to the first, the dependence on God is distinct by a creaturely essence, whereas for William of Ware the dependence on God is the same essence because every creature is totally dependent on the Creator and therefore the essence implies reference to God. In Book II of the *Sentences*, dist. 1, q. 4, Ware distinguishes the general relations among creatures by a special kind of relation that links all created things to God. He says: "intelligendo essentia

24 *Collationes oxonienses* q. 6 n. 42, ed. Alliney and Fedeli, p. 78: "[…] circumscripta omni relatione essentie absolute ad deum, non referretur ipsa essentia nisi in potentia: non enim potest fieri circumscriptio nisi in intellectu tantum, et non in re, quia simul sunt creata essentia realiter et eius dependentia."

25 *Collationes oxonienses* q. 6, n. 24, ed. Alliney and Fedeli, p. 72.

26 Guillelmus de Ware, *In Sententiarum*, I, d. 33, q. 3, Firenze, Biblioteca Medicea Laurenziana, Plut. 33, dex. 1, f. 84r, ll. 16–23: "[…] quod mutatur, mutatur duobus modis. Uno modo sic: quod inter ipsum subiectum et illud quod recipitur in subiecto cadat mutatio media […]; alio modo mutatur subiectum aliquod, ita quod inter subiectum et illud quod recipitur in subiecto non cadit mutatio media: sic autem subiectum mutatur ad motum et mutationem, que sunt vie ad formam, non per aliquam mutationem cadentem mediam inter subiectum et motum, sed subiectum mutatur ipso motu. Dico ergo quod in proposito […] solum isto ultimo modo est mutatio ad relationem in altero extremo, non quod cadat alia mutatio media inter ipsum obiectum et ipsam relationem, sed relatio immediate advenit fundamento si forma poneretur in materia sine motu precedente. Unde philosophi negant mutationem in 'ad aliquid' que est via media inter subiectum et illud quod acquiritur per mutationem, non autem illam que est per subiectum mutatum."

creature non referri ad Deum, non est creatura."[27] This citation is important because William of Ware is the only medieval author quoted in the *Collationes oxonienses*, even though he seems to have already died in 1300.[28]

At this point, we can ask: who are the *respondens* and the *opponens*? As regards the opponent, he makes claim to a very unique theory, but currently it is difficult to attribute. Regarding the *respondens*' position, many issues arise because he asserts his opinion with many arguments that can be shared by different authors. It is possible to find correspondence with the arguments maintained by Scotus in Book II of the *Lectura*, dist. 1, q. 4–5. In particular, Scotus argues that, according to Augustine, an accident can disappear with a mutation, but the dependence on God is not an accident because the creature cannot be without its relation to God:

***Coll. ox*. q. 6 n. 28, ed. Alliney and Fedeli, p. 74**	**Duns Scotus, *Lect*. II d. 1 q. 4–5 n. 237, ed. Vat. 18, pp. 79–80**
Contra. Augustinus, V *De trinitate*, capitulo 5, dans naturam accidentis dicit quod "non solet dici accidens nisi quod aliqua mutatione accidentaliter amitti potest". Tunc arguo sic: illud quod non est amissibile non est accidens; sed aliqua relatio nulla mutatione amitti potest; ergo non est accidens.	Secundum Augustinum, illud 'accidens' dicitur quod est amissibile: aut igitur amissibile absolute (ita quod potest non esse), aut est sic amissibile quod non destruatur illud cuius est. Primum non convenit, quia sic omnis substantia creata est amissibilis (quia potest non esse); et tunc omne creatum esset accidens. […] Sed neutro modo relatio creaturae ad Deum potest esse accidens creaturae: quia non potest creatura esse sine respectu ad Deum.

27 Guillelmus de Ware, *In Sententiarum* II d. 1 q. 4, Firenze, Biblioteca Medicea Laurenziana, Plut. 33 dex., 1, f. 92r, ll. 13–17: "Dico […] quod relatio in creaturis est alia res a fundamento […] non tamen relatio creature ad Creatorem est accidens et alia res a fundamento, scilicet creatura, sed ipsamet substantia creature; et ratio huius diversitatis est, quia essentia creature est in totali dependentia ad Deum, in tantum quod ipsa essentia, in quantum comparatur ad Deum, secundum se totam non est nisi respectus quidam, ita quod […] intelligendo essentiam creature non referri ad Deum, non est creatura."

28 Antonie Vos recently suggested that William of Ware died in the year 1299. See Antonie Vos, *John Duns Scotus. A Life* (Summum Academic: Kampen 2018), p. 207. Regarding Martinus, he is probably Martin of Alnwick. In this case, the quotation could concern both his texts and his supplement to William of Ware's *Commentary* on the *Sentences*.

Furthermore, Scotus uses the argument of regress *ad infinitum* to assert that the relation to God is *idem res cum creatura*:

***Coll. ox.* q. 6 n. 29, ed. Alliney and Fedeli, pp. 74–75**	**Duns Scotus, *Lect.* II d. 1 q. 4–5 n. 251, ed. Vat. 18, pp. 84–85**
Item, si essentia creature sit aliud a relatione sua, ergo illa relatio qua refertur habebit aliam relationem qua refertur, et illa aliam vel alias: erit processus in infinitum quia, secundum Augustinus, VII *De trinitate* capitulo 2, "omne quod relative dicitur est aliquid excepto illo quo relative dicitur".	[...] si uniformiter conveniat omni alia a Deo et non est idem illis, ergo est accidens illis. Aut ergo isti accidenti accidit habitudo ad Deum, aut non. Si non accidit, sed est idem sibi, et uniformiter relatio ad Deum inest cuilibet alteri, igitur standum fuit in prima, quod relatio ad Deum fuit eadem cuilibet alteri a Deo. Si autem accidit sibi alia habitudo, de illa est quaerendum sicut de prima; et sic vel erit processus in infinitum (quod infinitae relationes reales sint in eadem, et ita infinita re), vel quod relatio creaturae ad Deum sit eadem res cum creatura.

As we can see, in neither case is there literal similarity. However, one can find an affinity with Richard of Conington. For example, according to Conington, the essence of what exists includes in its essence the relation to God, so the creature implies the *respectus* to the Creator. To support his doctrine, Conington adds that in removing the dependence on God, the creature is also removed, thus the *respectus* is essential for the creature.

***Coll. ox.* q. 6 n. 33, ed. Alliney and Fedeli, p. 76**	**Conington in Ioannes Baconthorpe, *Sent.* II d. 36 q. un. a. 1, Venetiis 1526, f. 195^{r}**
[...] nihil destruitur, destructo subiecto, nisi quod omnino est essentiale subiecto; ergo, si, subiecto destructo, destruatur relatio, vel econverso, destructa relatione, necessario destruitur subiectum, sequitur quod unum est de essentia alterius.	[...] igitur amota a creatura esse partis et participationis amovetur ipsamet creatura. Sed esse partis est esse in respectu; ergo amoto respectu a creatura removetur ipsamet creatura.

In addition, if the dependence were distinct from the essence of creature, then infinite regress is possible, so the dependence on God and the essence of creature coincide.

***Coll. ox.*, q. 6, n. 29 ed. Alliney-Fedeli, pp. 74–75**	**Conington in Ioannes Baconthorpe, *Sent.* II d. 36 q. un. a. 1, Venetiis 1526, f. 195^{v}**
Item, si essentia creature sit aliud a relatione sua, ergo illa relatio qua refertur habebit aliam relationem qua refertur, et illa aliam vel alias: erit processus in infinitum	Item. Arguo eodem argumento quo Philosophus, IV *Metaphysice* capitulo 3 et Commentator ubi probat quod unum nihil addit super ens propter processum in infinitum querendum propter quod est unum. Eodem modo hic queritur propter quod creatura dependet. Si seipsa habetur propositum. Si sua dependentia tanquam redeunte, queritur de illa propter quod dependet. Si seipsa habetur propositum. Si alio procedit in infinitum.

Even if there is no literal correspondence in favor of this hypothesis, there is a possible attribution to the Assisi codex that adds '*questio Richardi*' in the margin.[29] This codex only presents questions 1–10 and 12. One can read '*questio Richardi*' only in questions 6 and 12, and in all the other questions one reads '*questio Scoti*'. Indeed, in question 12, Conington is the conductor which makes it plausible that the author of *collatio* 6 is the same.

It is necessary to specify that the two arguments used by the respondent are very common among those who deny the reality of relations. Therefore, the complexity of attributing the position to the *respondens* derives from the lack of characterizing arguments. If the *respondens* were Scotus, he would affirm that the relation to God is really the same as the essence of creature, but not *formaliter*;[30] whereas, if the *respondens* were Conington, he would assert that the *respectus* to God is the *ratitudo rei*, that is the essence of creature is a *res rata* that includes relation to the Creator.[31]

29 Assisi, Biblioteca comunale, 172, f. 113^{v}.

30 Ioannes Duns Scotus, *Lectura* II d. 1 q. 4–5 n. 238, ed. Vat. 18, p. 80: "[…] dico quod relatio creaturae ad Deum, quae communis est omni creaturae, non est aliud ab essentia creaturae; non tamen est formaliter idem essentiae creaturae; nec fundamentum est praecise ille respectus, ita quod nihil sit nisi ille respectus."

31 Richardus de Conington, in Ioannes Baconus (Baconthorpe), *Super quatuor Sententiarum*

However, *collatio* 6 demonstrates a peculiarity since the discussion between the two is interrupted by answers to the initial arguments of the *opponens*, introduced by: "Rationes pro probatione non valent contra opinionem oppositam et ideo respondeo ad illas."[32] The first argument answers the *positio impossibilis* that God ceases to be, arguing that a creature is essentially dependent on God, and so if God is not in existence, then the creature cannot be in existence.[33]

The second argument answers *the reductio ad absurdum*, that is if the creature were essentially dependent on God, then there would be two formalities, corresponding by two realities, but in this way formalities and realities could be infinite. The reply claims that many formalities are received by the same thing and not by different things.[34] So, the final author explains to the *opponens* that the same *res* includes many *formalitates* and so many *realitates*, signifying the same thing in different ways. For example, the whiteness is, at the same time, whiteness and colour.

Thus, in the final arguments one can recognize Duns Scotus' theory of formal distinction, however, this theory is not applied to the dependence on God. So, it is likely that Scotus is the third participant, who intervenes at the end of the discussion to answer the *opponens*' arguments, whereas the *respondens* is probably Richard of Conington. In this case, there are few texts to support this attribution, therefore it remains only probable.

The case of question 6 highlights how difficult it is to identify the interlocutors in the discussions of some *collationes*. The continuous countering of

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libros II d. 36 q. un. art. 1, Venetiis 1526, f. 195r: "Ubi dicunt quidam—Conington—quod respectus dependentiae sunt per se intellectu creaturae, de essentia enim rei exsistentis est quod ipsa sit res rata, id est quod sit res extra animam; sed res rata ut est in effectu, habet esse existere, igitur de essentia rei exsistentis ut est in effectu, est quod sit res rata. Sed quod per essentiam est res rata, intra suam essentiam includit respectum ad Deum."

32 *Collationes oxonienses* q. 6 n. 46, ed. Alliney and Fedeli, p. 80.

33 *Collationes oxonienses* q. 6 n. 47, ed. Alliney and Fedeli, p. 80: "Ad primam. Dicitur ad maiorem quod tale impossibile non ponitur, nec debet poni quod includit contradictionem ex ratione intrinseca illius de quo ponitur; ita dicerent ipsi quod ita est in proposito, quia, posito quod deus non esset, ponitur positio impossibilis et includens contradictionem illi respectu cuius poneretur. Nam intrinsece creatura et essentialiter est."

34 *Collationes oxonienses* q. 6 n. 48, ed. Alliney and Fedeli, p. 81: "Ad aliud—cum dicitur quod eadem res includit multas formalitates, ergo realitates—nego consequentiam, quia in multis est quod eadem res habet multas formalitates acceptas sub eadem realitatem, diversimode significantes illam rem, sicut omnia attributa sunt eadem realiter et differunt formaliter, et eadem res in creaturis est ens et bona et vera et sic de aliis, et eadem albedo est albedo et color."

opposing theses makes it difficult to explain their own doctrines. Moreover, the few remaining texts of the authors of that time do not always allow for certain attributions.

2 The *Collationes parisienses* and the Case of *collatio* 19

Regarding the *Collationes parisienses*, full recognition about who the interlocutors are is still unclear because the group of editors, composed of Guido Alliney, Angela Casciano and Marina Fedeli, is still finishing the transcription and is developing a hypothesis of the *stemma codicum*. The results, as presented here, are inevitably incomplete.

Unlike the *Collationes oxonienses*, the Parisian series seems to present a different structure. They are similar to a *quaestio disputata* with *quod sic* and *quod non* arguments, the answer from the *respondens*, the objections of the *opponens*, and with the alternating arguments of the *respondens* and *opponens*. Whereas, the *determinatio* and the answers to opposite arguments are not always present.[35] The conductor of the question seldom uses first person and he rarely refers to the other participants with '*tu*'. Questions 4–9 present a particularity because one family of codices contains texts that seem close to a *reportatio*, in which there are signs of oral debate. More than likely, at the beginning the *Collationes parisienses* are discussed but then the texts are revised, and maybe by the same students who participated in the dispute. In fact, the exercise of *collatio* probably demanded the processing of a written text.[36] It is not surprising that the structure of the questions in the Oxonian and Parisian is different since the discussion of the *collationes* happened in two different convents, and they probably adapted the exercises according to their own habits and rules.

35 According to characteristics described by Bazàn et al., *Les questions disputées et les questions quodlibetiques*, pp. 63–66.

36 On the practices of textual revision see Weijers, *Le Vocabulaire du Collège de Sorbonne*, p. 20: "La communication orale, lecture et discussion, occupaient una place importante dans la vie du Collège, mais l'écrit y était également omniprésent. On vient de voir que la quatrième règle donnée par Robert de Sorbone—qui doit avoir pensé en particulier aux étudinats de son collège—recommandait la mise par écrit. […] il ne s'agit probablement pas d'un "exercice de rédaction", mais cette règle indique quand-même que les ètudiants prenaient des notes et écrivaient peut-être au jour le jour une sorte de résumé des leçons"; István Hajnal, *L'enseignement de l'écriture aux universités médiévales* (Budapest: Académie hongroise des Sciences, 1959), p. 143: "L'écriture faisait partie de la méthode pratique qui, employée dans de petits groupes, constituait l'essentiel de l'enseignement."

Compared to the *Collationes oxonienses*, the presence of Scotus is more evident and many quotes from Scotus' major works are found. Currently, there are no questions in which Scotus' doctrines are solely criticized.

The only exception is *collatio* 16, *Utrum in divinis filius generetur de substantia patris quasi de materia*, where there is no mention at all of Scotus' doctrine about the generation of the Son. This is a unique question because there seems to be only one author, and there are just three arguments *contra*, which are more general. The conductor of *collatio* 16 uses new arguments to claim that the divine essence is *quasi materia* as compared to Henry of Ghent, Richard of Conington, William of Ware and William of Alnwick.

In order to analyse the doctrines in the *Collationes*, question 19 allows us to examine the topic of relation and the connection with Scotus' major works in depth. The title of *collatio* is, *Utrum in deo sint alique relationes reales ad intra, preter relationes originis. Et hoc est querere an relationes communes in divinis, que sunt equalitas, similitudo, identitas, sint relationes reales*. This question focuses on three particular relations which, according to Aristotle, fall into numerical relations. These always presuppose unity because: two things are the same when substance is one; two things are similar when quality is one; and two things are equal when quantity is one.[37] Now, equality, likeness and identity in God point out symmetrical relations among divine persons that are 'common' to all three persons insofar as they merge into a common foundation that is the divine essence. It is a traditional question that generally occupies distinction 31 of a *Commentary* on the *Sentences*.

In addition, this is a unique *collatio* because it is the last of the Parisian series, and it is not documented by the printed tradition nor by the manuscript Città del Vaticano, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Vat. Lat. 876, both of which contain only the first 17 questions. The lack of this *collatio* in the Wadding edition and in the previous printings is not surprising because there are also two questions (qq. 4 and 20) in the *Collationes oxonienses* which are missing as well. The omission in the codex *Vaticanus* is more important because it is generally a reliable source, whereas the comparison with other manuscripts allows us to identify various gaps, showing that it does not contain the last two questions in their entirety nor several arguments in many *collationes*. Analysing the manuscript tradition of the *Collationes parisienses* has permitted us to hypothesize a construction of the text in several phases, evident from the different formulations of single arguments presented by some codices. In particular, some manuscripts offer a second construction of some arguments, introduced

37 Aristotle, *Metaphysica* V c. 15, 1021[a].

by '*vel sic*', or present parts of the discussion in different places in the questions. The ms. *Vaticanus Latinus* 876 generally omits these arguments, therefore, according to our hypothesis, it is probably the oldest and most incomplete version.[38]

The structure of *collatio* 19 is that of a discussion between the *respondens*, who maintains that common relations are real, and the *opponens*, who denies it.

The question can be divided into three parts which represent three subject matters: the conditions for a real relation, the multiplicity of common relations and the justification of the opinion for which these relations are real.

In the first part, the respondent argues that equality, likeness and identity are real relations because they are founded on extra-mental reality (*ex natura rei*), and they require really distinct extremes and follow *ex natura rei*.[39] This opinion is that of Duns Scotus for whom common relations are real. In fact, according to Scotus, three conditions are required for a real relation:

– first: a real foundation and a real term, that is they are things in extra-mental reality;
– second: really distinct extreme terms;
– third: relation is caused by extremes without any consideration of the intellect.[40]

All required conditions are observed in common relations in God, and for this reason Scotus concludes that equality, likeness and identity are real relations. In fact, the foundation of these common relations is the divine essence under different aspects: the essence as magnitude and infinity is the ground of equality, as pure act or attribute (like goodness or wisdom) is the foundation of likeness and as *quidditas* is the ground of identity.

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38 For a detailed analysis of the manuscript tradition, see Angela Casciano and Marina Fedeli, "La costruzione di un testo medioevale. Studio sulla tradizione manoscritta e a stampa delle *Collationes parisienses* attribuite a Giovanni Duns Scoto," *Documenti e studi* 31 (2020), pp. 333–381.

39 *Collationes Parisienses* q. 19, Oxford, Magdalen College Library, 194, f. 77va, ll. 8–24: "Dicitur quod sic, quia fundatur ex natura rei et requirunt extrema realiter distincta. […] Unde ad relationem realem sufficit quod oriatur ex natura rei."

40 Duns Scotus, *Lectura* I d. 31 q. un. n. 6, ed. Vat. 17, p. 424: "Respondeo quod sunt relationes reales, nam ad relationem realem non requiruntur nisi tria: requiritur enim primo quod fundamentum sit reale et terminus realis, et secundo quod fundamentum realiter differat a termino et extremum ab extremo, et tertio requiritur quod fundamentum et terminum consequatur relatio ex natura rei." On common relations in God according to Duns Scotus, see Jan Peter Beckmann, *Die Relationen der Identität und Gleichheit nach Johannes Duns Scotus. Untersuchungen zur Ontologie der Beziehungen* (Bonn: H. Bouvier, 1967).

For the second condition, the extreme terms are the divine persons who, before being related through these common relations, have already been constituted and are distinct through the relations of origin. Therefore, equality, likeness and identity originate from the divine persons without the involvement of the intellect.

Turning to *collatio* 19, Scotus merely exposes the three conditions, but does not explain how these conditions are fulfilled for common relations. However, the opponent replies that a real relation requires distinct foundations, but the ground of likeness in the Father is the same in the Son.[41] As Scotus immediately rebuts, extremes must be really distinct and not the foundations.[42] In other words, it is necessary that the Father and the Son be distinct, and not that they have distinct foundations, because they are grounded on the unique divine essence. In fact, common relations require the unity of foundation, according to Aristotle.[43] So the opponent clarifies his opinion further, asserting that for a real relation really distinct extremes are required inasmuch as they terminate a relation. Therefore, divine persons are really distinct supposits, but what terminates the relation of likeness in the Father and in the Son is the wisdom that is one because it is a perfection of divine essence.[44] According to this author, in addition to distinct extremes, distinct attributes in the divine persons are required for a real relation.

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41 *Collationes Parisienses* q. 19, Oxford, Magdalen College Library, 194, f. 77va, ll. 9–12: "Relatio realis extremorum requirit habitudinem realem fundamentorum; sed fundamentum similitudinis est idem in patre et filio, ut scientia et bonitas et alia que se habent per modum qualitatis; ergo etc."

42 *Collationes Parisienses* q. 19, Oxford, Magdalen College Library, 194, f. 77va, ll. 13–16: "[…] habitudo est extremorum, non fundamentorum; immo, si eadem superficies esset in duobus et eadem albedo reciperetur in eis, verius dicerentur similes quam secundum albedines diversas existentes in eis."

43 *Collationes Parisienses* q. 19, Oxford, Magdalen College Library, 194, f. 77va, ll. 17–20: "[…] relationes communes requirunt unitatem in fundamentis; et quanto fundamenta habent maiorem unitatem, tanto est ibi verior relatio communis, ita quod verior esset similitudo si eadem albedo esset in duobus quam si diverse."

44 *Collationes Parisienses* q. 19, Oxford, Magdalen College Library, 194, f. 77va, ll. 40–49: "[…] ad hoc quod sit relatio realis inter aliqua requiritur quod extrema sint diversa ut terminant relationem realem, quia relatio realis requirit extrema realia diversa; non autem sunt aliqua extrema relationis nisi ut sint terminantia relationem illam; ergo, si extrema, ut sunt terminantia relationem, non sunt distincta, nec erit relatio realis; sed, quamvis pater et filius sint realiter supposita diversa, tamen non sunt extrema realiter diversa, ut sunt terminantes relationem similitudinis aut equalitatis aut identitatis, quia relationem similitudinis terminant in hoc quod sunt boni scientes vel sapientes; sic de ceteris."

However, according to Scotus, wisdom in the Father and the Son is the *ratio terminandi* and, therefore, it is not necessary to be distinct.[45] To support his position, Scotus uses an argument that it is found in dist. 5, p. II of *Lectura* and *Reportatio* I-A and also in question 14 of the *Collationes oxonienses*,[46] regarding the formal term of generation. Scotus argues that if the formal term of production of the Son were not the essence but rather the relation, then the production of the Son would not be generation, it would be *adaliquatio* (that is alteration). So, the divine essence is the *ratio formalis* of generation and is the same in the Father and in the Son. For this same reason, the divine essence, under the aspect of wisdom, is what terminates the relation of likeness in the Father and in the Son.[47]

In summary, in the first part of *collatio* 19 the matter of discussion is the real distinction of extremes; according to Scotus this condition is observed in common relations because the extreme terms are divine persons. According to the opponent, foundations must be really distinct inasmuch as they terminate relations in the divine persons. For the *opponens*, the common relations are distinct only *secundum rationem*, even if he never says this in the whole *collatio*. This is not surprising, because the only task of the *collationes*' authors is improving dialectical skills and not explaining their opinions in depth.

The last arguments of the first part introduce the second matter of discussion, namely, the multiplicity of relations. According to Scotus, equality, likeness and identity are mutual relations and for this reason they are multiplied. Thus, the likeness, by which the Father is related to the Son, is not the same as the one by which the Son is related to the Father. In fact, common relations

45 *Collationes Parisienses* q. 19, Oxford, Magdalen College Library, 194, f. 77^{vb}, ll. 2–3: "[…] ad relationem realem sufficit quod extrema terminantia sint diversa, sed non requiritur quod secundum rationem terminandi sint diversa."

46 Duns Scotus, *Lectura* I d. 5 p. 2 q. un. n. 72, ed. Vat. 16, pp. 436–437: "Item, tertio antecedens probatur sic, per rationem: si essentia non esset formalis terminus productionis Filii, tunc generatio et productio Filii magis essent de genere relationis, et mutatio relativa, […] si igitur terminus productionis Filii esset relatio, tunc esset illa productio ad-aliquatio, nec esset productio substantiae, quod falsum est." Cf. John Duns Scotus, *The Examined Report of the Paris Lecture: Reportatio I-A*, edd. and trans. Allan B. Wolter and Oleg V. Bychkov, 2 vols. (St. Bonaventure, N.Y.: Franciscan Institute, 2004–2008), 1:275; *Collationes Oxonienses* q. 14 n. 27, ed. Alliney and Fedeli, p. 198.

47 *Collationes Parisienses* q. 19, Oxford, Magdalen College Library, 194, f. 77^{vb}, ll. 8–13: "[…] falsum est quod extrema relationis realis sunt diversa secundum quod terminant eam. Et hoc patet expresse in divinis personis, quoniam relatio non est ratio formalis secundum quam filius terminat generationem patris, quia tunc non esset generatio sed adequatio (*lege* adaliquatio); ideo essentia, que communicatur per generationem, est ratio formalis terminandi generationem; hec autem est eadem in patre et filio."

multiply because they pre-require relations of origin and the distinct divine persons. However, according to the opponent's reply, if common relations were multiplied, so too wisdom, by which means the Father is related to the Son, would be multiplied for every divine person.[48]

Scotus responds stating that the divine persons are similar or equal not *formaliter* but *fundamentaliter* and *causaliter*.[49] In other words, the Father is formally similar to the Son with the relation of likeness, while They are similar in wisdom inasmuch as They share the same essential attribute. So, the multiplicity of common relations is grounded in the perfections of divine essence, that is, oneness. Wisdom is in the three supposits as a unique foundation, but not formally, and so it does not give a similar being *formaliter*. Thus, Scotus compares a form that gives a being *formaliter* to one that gives a being *fundamentaliter* or *causaliter*.[50] After all, if the same form of whiteness were in two substances, it would give different white things which have the same form of whiteness.[51]

The same example of whiteness is also used by the opponent in his reply: if whiteness were in two substances, it would have only one action of diffusion, thus if the same wisdom were in two persons, it would produce only one relation of likeness. Therefore, divine perfections are attributes of the unique divine essence, which means they can give rise to a unique relation of likeness or equality: the relation of similarity of the Father to the Son is the same as that of the Son to the Father. Only by way of the intellect are there two relations.[52]

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48 *Collationes Parisienses* q. 19, Oxford, Magdalen College Library, 194, f. 77^{vb}, ll. 17–18: "Cum ergo sapientia det esse simile in patre respectu filii et econverso, impossibile est relationem similitudinis plurificari nisi sapientia plurificetur."

49 *Collationes Parisienses* q. 19, Oxford, Magdalen College Library, 194, f. 77^{vb}, ll. 24–26: "[…] fundamentum ut sapientia dat esse simile non formaliter, quia formaliter dicitur aliquid similem similitudine, sed dat esse similem fundamentaliter et causaliter."

50 Scotus uses a similar argument also in the *Ordinatio*: Duns Scotus, *Ordinatio* I q. 1 d. 7 n. 66, ed. Vat. 4, p. 135: "[…] dicimus quod Socrates est similis similitudine formaliter, sed dicitur similis albedine fundamentaliter sive causaliter"; Idem, *Ordinatio* I d. 31 q. un. n. 23, ed. Vat. 6, pp. 214–215: "[…] quod album et album dicuntur similia secundum albedinem, et hoc prout ly 'secundum' notat suum determinabile esse proximum fundamentum relationis; dicuntur autem esse similia similitudine formaliter."

51 *Collationes Parisienses* q. 19, Oxford, Magdalen College Library, 194, f. 77^{vb}, ll. 26–27: "Item, si eadem forma absoluta esset in duobus substantiis, daret diversa esse alba, et tamen esset eadem forma."

52 *Collationes Parisienses* q. 19, Oxford, Magdalen College Library, 194, f. 77^{vb}, ll. 34–37: "Si eadem albedo esset in diversis substantiis, non faceret nisi unam actionem disgregationis, nec produceret nisi unum effectum; ergo, quamvis eadem sapientia sit in duobus personis, non tamen causabit nisi unam similitudinem, et non duas nisi secundum rationem."

The opponent concludes arguing that equality does not seem to be a distinct relation from identity or likeness because it is founded on magnitude, which in God is infinity and infinity is the intrinsic grade of any attribute. Thus, it follows that the foundation of equality is not *formaliter* distinct from that of identity and likeness.[53] This objection is an interesting counter-argument because Scotus himself poses a similar argument as an objection in the *Lectura* and as a doubt in the *Ordinatio* I, distinction 31.

***Coll. par.* q. 19, Oxford, Magdalen College Library, 194, f. 78ra, ll. 11–14**	**Duns Scotus, *Lect.* I d. 31 q. un. n. 27, ed. Vat. 17, p. 430**	**Duns Scotus, *Ord.* I d. 31 q. un. n. 19, ed. Vat. 6, p. 212**
Propterea, arguitur sic. Magnitudo in divinis est infinitas que non dicit nisi gradum intrinsecum cuiuslibet alterius attributi; ergo equalitas, fundata super hanc magnitudinem, non erit formaliter distincta ab identitate et similitudine, quod tamen contingeret, si essent relationes reales.	Sed contra praedicta potest sic argui: Secundum praedicta, 'infinitum' et magnitudo in divinis non est attributum distinctum a bonitate et sapientia et aliis attributis, sed dicit intrinsecum gradum perfectionis cuiuslibet; cum igitur aequalitas fundatur supra magnitudinem, sicut similitudo supra bonitatem et sapientiam, etc.,—aequalitas non erit relatio alia a similitudine et identitate, sicut nec fundamentum a fundamento; igitur aequalitas non erit tertia relatio communis.	Sed de aequalitate sunt duo dubia: Primo enim videtur quod non sit relatio distincta ab identitate et similitudine, quia (sicut dictum est alias) 'infinitum' non est speciale attributum, sed dicit modum intrinsecum cuiuslibet attributi,—et pari ratione 'magnum', quod quasi dicit indistincte quod 'infinitum' dicit distincte: ergo magnitudo essentiae non distinguitur ab essentia (nec illa distinctione quae est inter attributa), et tunc aequalitas secundum istam magnitudinem non distinguitur ab identitate, quae est secundum essentiam; similiter, magnitudo non distinguitur a sapientia, illa distinctione quae est inter attributa,—ergo aequalitas secundum magnitudinem sapientiae non distinguitur a similitudine secundum sapientiam. Omnis autem magnitudo vel est essentiae, secundum quam est identitas,—vel attributi, secundum quod est similitudo; ergo nulla aequalitas videtur in divinis esse distincta ab identitate et similitudine.

53 *Collationes Parisienses* q. 19, Oxford, Magdalen College Library, 194, f. 78ra, ll. 11–14: "Propterea, arguitur sic. Magnitudo in divinis est infinitas, que non dicit nisi gradum intrinsecum cuiuslibet alterius attributi; ergo equalitas, fundata super hanc magnitudinem, non erit formaliter distincta ab identitate et similitudine, quod tamen contingeret, si essent relationes reales."

In the *collatio* 19, after stating that the argument is not relevant to the question, Scotus replies that infinity indicates an intrinsic grade of any perfection, and so equality is a proper mode of the foundation of identity and likeness, since equality represents the perfection and completion of each of those two relations. In God equality is perfect likeness and identity.[54] Though there is no literary correspondence, this argument is the same as distinction 31 of the first book of *Lectura* and *Ordinatio*, as the following comparison highlights:

***Coll. par.* q. 19, Oxford, Magdalen College Library, 194, f. 78ra, ll. 16–25**	**Duns Scotus, *Lect.* I d. 31 q. un. n. 29, ed. Vat. 17, pp. 430–431**	**Duns Scotus, *Ord.* I d. 31 q. un. n. 21, ed. Vat. 6, pp. 212–213**
Item, ad rationem dicitur quod, sicut infinitas non dicit nisi gradum intrinsecum alterius attributi, ita equalitas non dicit nisi perfectionem et completionem alterius relationis communis ut similitudinis, ut patet de minus albo et magis albo, quod quanto sunt magis equalia in sua virtute, tanto sunt magis similia. Unde in hiis que non sunt mole magna, equalitas non est nisi perfecta similitudo, et ita in divinis. Unde quecumque sunt equalia secundum quantitatem virtualem sunt similia, sed non econtra; et ideo equalitas non est formaliter alia relatio in divinis a similitudine, sed est perfectio eius.	Ad primum istorum potest dici quod aequalitas non sic distinguitur ab aliis relationibus—ut ab identitate et similitudine—sicut illa inter se, nec etiam sicut aequalitas in uno ab aequalitate in alio, quia quanto est maior aequalitas secundum quantitatem formae tanto est maior similitudo in forma; unde ubi est aequalitas secundum quantitatem formae, est similitudo secundum formam (sicut si accipitur intensum album et remissum, quanto albedo remissa magis intenditur et quantitas eius virtualis augmentatur, tanto similitudo augmentatur et fit similius albo intenso). Similiter in comparatione ad identitatem, quod	Ad primum potest concedi quod—sicut in creaturis—potest esse similitudo sine aequalitate (sicut remissum album est simile intenso albo, licet non perfecte), non autem e converso, in forma illa qua aliqua nata sunt assimilari; et per hoc, comparando aliqua in forma secundum quam nata est esse similitudo, aequalitas videtur quasi determinare similitudinem et fundamentum similitudinis. Ita potest concedi hic quod aequalitas non ita distinguitur ab identitate et similitudine sicut illa inter se, sed quod ipsa dicat modum proprium fundamenti utriusque illarum duarum relationum, et

54 *Collationes Parisienses* q. 19, Oxford, Magdalen College Library, 194, f. 78ra, ll. 14–25: "Dicitur primo quod ratio non est ad propositum, quia questio non querit si equalitas sit aliqua alia relatio a similitudine, sed si sit relatio realis in divinis. Item, ad rationem dicitur quod, sicut infinitas non dicit nisi gradum intrinsecum alterius attributi, ita equalitas non dicit nisi perfectionem et completionem alterius relationis communis ut similitudinis, ut patet de minus albo et magis albo, quod quanto sunt magis equalia in sua virtute, tanto sunt magis similia. Unde in hiis que (si *add. et del.*) non sunt mole magna, equalitas non est nisi perfecta similitudo, et ita in divinis. Unde quecumque sunt equalia secundum quantitatem virtualem sunt similia, sed non econtra; et ideo equalitas non est formaliter alia relatio in divinis a similitudine, sed est perfectio eius."

(*cont.*)

***Coll. par.* q. 19, Oxford, Magdalen College Library, 194, f. 78ra, ll. 16–25**	**Duns Scotus, *Lect.* I d. 31 q. un. n. 29, ed. Vat. 17, pp. 430–431**	**Duns Scotus, *Ord.* I d. 31 q. un. n. 21, ed. Vat. 6, pp. 212–213**
	aequalitas in divinis non tantum dicit identitatem sed perfectam identitatem, quia unitatem in actu eiusdem virtutis, quod non importat identitas de se. Et ideo non sic distinguitur ab aliis, sicut inter se alia distinguuntur nec sicut inter se extrema distinguuntur.	quasi etiam modum proprium utriusque relationis,—quod scilicet tam identitas quam similitudo sit perfecta: [...]. Nunc autem magnitudo, quae est quasi modus fundamenti identitatis et similitudinis, fundat aequalitatem, quae est quasi modus similitudinis et identitatis,—quia dicit utramque illarum ut perfectam.

This response is also quoted by Scotus himself in an answer to an objection in *Ordinatio* I, distinction 10, where the last *collatio* of the Paris series is explicitly mentioned.[55] It is precisely this quote that allowed Antonie Vos to date the *Collationes parisienses* in the autumn of 1301 and then assign the Parisian revision of *Ordinatio* 1–10 to the following period.[56] Vos' investigation is based on biographical data and textual references, but Alliney places the discussion of the *Collationes parisienses* in the same period through the doctrinal analysis of question 6. The *collatio* 6 deals with the causality of the voluntary act and, on this point of his thought, Scotus asserts in the *Reportatio* a doctrine explicitly criticized in the *Lectura* (the issue is not in the *Ordinatio*). Then, the *collatio* 6 represents an important step in the evolution of Scotus' thought: at the time of the discussion of the *Collationes*, Scotus has not yet changed his mind because he affirms the same position as the *Lectura*.[57] Therefore, the *collatio* must be prior to the *Reportatio*.

55 Duns Scotus, *Ordinatio* I d. 10 q. un. n. 36, ed. Vat. 4, p. 354: "Ad primum dico quod duo in actu, scilicet libertas et infinitas (quae est modus intrinsecus rei), habent duo correspondentia in principio 'quo', scilicet libertatem et infinitatem ut modum eius (quaere in ultima collatione Parisiensis); unde non dico infinitatem esse formalem rationem spirandi, sed voluntatem infinitam, nec in hoc dico duo principia formalia, quia 'infinitum' est modus intrinsecus utrique principio, scilicet libero et non libero."

56 Vos, *John Duns Scotus. A life*, p. 123.

57 Guido Alliney, "Quando Duns Scoto ha cambiato idea sulla volontà? La causa del volere secondo la *quaestio 6* delle *Collationes parisienses*," in *Tra antichità e modernità. Studi di storia della filosofia medievale e rinascimentale*, eds. Fabrizio Amerini, Simone Fellina, and Andrea Strazzoni (Turin: Università degli Studi di Torino, 2019), pp. 604–640.

The *collatio* 19 does not offer such important doctrinal elements for dating, but it is still possible to outline the link with the *Reportatio*.

The objection and Scotus' reply are not present in distinction 31 *Reportatio* I-A, however, the specification of equality as perfection and completion of likeness and identity is widely developed in distinction 19 of *Reportatio* I-A, where Scotus analyses whether the relation of equality is distinct by that of likeness and identity.

> [...] magnitudo super quam fundatur equalitas non dicit nisi modum vel gradum intrinsecum fundamentorum identitatis et similitudinis, et non distinguitur ab eis formaliter ut quid vel quale, sicut illa distinguuntur inter se. Unde equalitas non videtur dicere in divinis aliam relationem simpliciter a similitudine et identitate, sed tantum dicit perfectum modum utriusque relationis. Quod potest declarari in creaturis: si enim sunt duo ⟨alba⟩ et unum albius alio, illa utique sunt similia sed non equalia (non autem perfecte sunt similia nisi sint in albedine equalia), ita quod equalitas non dicit quasi simpliciter aliam relationem a similitudine istorum, sed perfectionem similitudinis in utroque extremorum et ita modum perfectum exsistentie fundamenti penes quod est similitudo in utroque.[58]

This text *verbatim* is also present in distinction 19 of the first book of *Ordinatio*, but in a *textus interpolatus* that the Vatican edition puts in the apparatus.[59] The absence of this argument in distinction 19 of the *Lectura*, where the question is very brief, and the elaboration of it in the *Ordinatio* apparatus and in the main text of *Reportatio* suggests that Scotus grasps the importance of explaining the distinction of common relations during the discussion of *collatio* 19. In fact, question 19 seems to be the bridge between the *Lectura* and the *Ordinatio* on the one hand and the *Reportatio* on the other.

To summarize this second part, Scotus argues that common relations are multiplied for every divine person and so we can say 'the Father is equal to

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58 Duns Scotus, *Reportatio Parisiensis* I-A d. 19 qq. 1–3, Wien, Österreichische Nationalbibliothek, cod. 1453, f. 61^{vb}, ll. 14–26. Cf. John Duns Scotus, *The Examined Report of the Paris Lecture: Reportatio I-A*, eds. Alan Wolter and Oleg Bychkov, vol. 1, p. 543. I quote the *Reportatio* I-A from Wien, Österreichische Nationalbibliothek, cod. 1453, because Stephen Dumont has shown the privileged status of this codex. Cf. Stephen D. Dumont, "John Duns Scotus's *Reportatio Parisiensis Examinata*. A Mystery Solved," *Recherches de Théologie et Philosophie Médiévales* 85 (2018), pp. 377–438.

59 Duns Scotus, *Ordinatio* I d. 19 q. un., ed. Vat. 5, pp. 272–274.

the Son' and 'the Son is equal the Father', whereas the opponent thinks that the foundation, the divine essence, is one and so the equality in the Father and in the Son are distinct only *secundum rationem*. In fact, perfections, which founded these common relations, are in the three persons inasmuch as they share the same essence, but they are not formally distinct. Furthermore, Scotus believes that equality is not distinguished from similarity and identity as much as similarity and identity are distinguished among themselves, because equality is a perfection of these two relations. This last argument allows us to consider *collatio* 19 as an important moment of reflection towards the drafting of the same topics in the *Reportatio* I-A.

This connection is also evident in the third part of *collatio* 19 where Scotus justifies his opinion by quoting different passages from the *Sentences* by Bonaventure of Bagnoregio. Scotus says that "hec autem opinio predicta non debet reputari nova, quia est opinio Bonaventure", this same expression can be found in dist. 31 of *Reportatio*, I-A:

***Coll. Par.* q. 19, Oxford, Magdalen College Library, 194, f. 78ra, ll. 25–37**	**Duns Scotus, *Rep. Par.* I-A d. 31 qq. 1–3, Wien, Österreichische Nationalbibliothek, cod. 1453, f. 96ra, ll. 3–43^{a}**
Hec autem opinio predicta non debet reputari nova, quia est opinio Bonaventure: quamvis enim non querat hanc questionem sub forma sua, tamen quicumque intelligit latinum potest percipere quod velit dicere quod sint reales, sicut patet in distinctione 19 et 31 per multa dicta eius. Unde dicit quod iste relationes sunt eadem causaliter et causantur ab eodem, sed non sunt idem formaliter, quod non esset verum si distinguentur tantum secundum rationem. Similiter dicit in distinctione 30, ubi querit an aliqua relatio dicatur de deo ex tempore, et dicit quod dei ad creaturam tantum est relatio secundum conceptionem nostram. Unde apparet ex intentione eius quod nullam relationem formaliter ponit in deo nisi realem, et ita cum ponat in deo sic relationes communes, manifestum est secundum intellectionem eius quod sunt ibi reales, et hoc patet magis diligenter intuenti dicta eius multa circa has relationes.	[…] et hec positio nec videatur nova, est opinio Bonaventure, qui dicit 19^{a} distinctione, in pede questionis, questione prima, dicit quod equale et inequale sunt passiones quantitatis, et sicut quantitas est duplex, scilicet molis et virtutis, ideo utrumque iste passiones ⟨consequuntur⟩. Et sicut quantitas virtutis summe reperitur in Deo, quia infinitas, ideo secundum illam potest in eo esse equalitas. Et sicut infinitas virtutis est in Deo realiter, et non tantum per actum intellectus, sicut et equalitas, que est passio communis, sequens ex natura rei illam quantitatem, est ibi realiter et non tantum per actum intellectus vel rationis. […] Item, in pede questionis secunde illius distinctionis, dicit quod hec nomina 'similitudo' et 'equalitas' dicunt respectus distinctorum suppositorum convenientium in aliquo uno, ita quod relatio dicit formalem eorum rationem; unitas essentie et pluralitas suppositorum dicunt rationem cause. Dicuntur enim proprie secundum relationem, causaliter autem vel fundamentaliter secundum substantiam. Vult ergo iste doctor quod relationes communes sint reales, cum oriantur, secundum eum, quasi causaliter ex unitate fundamenti et distinctione suppositorum,

a Cf. Duns Scotus, *Reportatio I-A*, ed. Alan Wolter and Oleg Bychkov, 2, pp. 281–283.

(*cont.*)

***Coll. Par.* q. 19, Oxford, Magdalen College Library, 194, f. 78ra, ll. 25–37**	**Duns Scotus, *Rep. Par.* I-A d. 31 qq. 1–3, Wien, Österreichische Nationalbibliothek, cod. 1453, f. 96ra, ll. 3–43**
	et non causantur per actum intellectus. Nec intelligit quod ista nomina dicant tantum relationem rationis, quia distinctione 30, questione prima, in pede questionis et in responsione ad secundum argumentum, ubi querit qualis sit relatio dei ad creaturam ex tempore, dicit quod dei ad creaturam non est relatio ex tempore, nisi secundum modum intelligendi, quia illa nomina, que dicuntur de deo ex tempore, dicunt substantiam secundum rem, et relationem secundum modum intelligendi; et ita illa nomina non dicunt relationem absolute, sed secundum modum intelligendi. Omnem autem relationem quam concedit simpliciter esse in deo et non secundum istam determinationem, scilicet secundum modum nostrum, ponit esse realem. Quare, cum equalitas et huiusmodi relationes communes sint ibi, secundum eum, et non secundum modum intelligendi tantum, videtur quod, secundum intentionem eius, sint reales. Nam ibidem distinguit relationem realem contra relationem secundum modum intelligendi.

The argument in the *Reportatio* I-A is more extended, but in both texts Scotus says that, according to Bonaventure, d. 19, 30 and 31, common relations are the same *causaliter* because they are caused by the same essence, but they are not the same *formaliter*. And so equality, likeness and identity are real relations.

This common reference in the *Collationes* and the *Reportatio* is important because Scotus is knowingly asserting an opinion that was not shared by many in his time, and thus he turns to Bonaventure to support and justify his doctrine. Also in this case, being an argument that is still in its beginning stages in the *Collationes*, it is developed in the *Reportatio*.

Unlike *collatio* 6 of the Oxford series, question 19 of the *Collationes parisienses* is surely attributable to Duns Scotus as the *respondens* because we find his distinctive arguments and we can see the bridge that connects the *Lectura*—*Ordinatio* and the *Reportatio*.

But if the *respondens* is Scotus, who is the *opponens*? Scotus' opponent supports a common theory ascribable to Henry of Ghent for whom the magnitude in God is as unique as its essence and, therefore, common relations are different only *secundum rationem*.[60] This doctrine is extensively accepted at the

60 Henricus de Gandavo, *Summa Quaestionum Ordinariarum* a. 55 q. 6, ed. I. Badius (Paris

time of Scotus, as the following text of question 5 of *Quaestiones Quodlibetales* by Alexander of Alexandria demonstrates:

> Secundum dubium est utrum equalitas sit relatio realis. Ad quod est communis opinio quod non. […] relatio realis requirit extremum distinctum et fundamentum distinctum et ideo quocumque istorum deficiente, deficit relatio realis. In divinis autem licet sint extrema distincta, tamen est unum fundamentum, quia sicut in tribus personis est una essentia, ita est una magnitudo, ex quo sequitur quod sicut magnitudo non numeratur in personis, ita non numeratur equalitas, propter quod non videtur esse relatio realis, quia omnia relatio realis numeratur in extremis. Et per hoc solvitur ad argumentum quorundam, qui sic arguunt: 'ubi est extremum distinctum ex natura rei et fundamentum ex natura rei, ibi est relatio realis; sed in divinis est magnitudo ex natura rei, extrema sunt distincta ex natura rei; ergo equalitas in divinis est relatio realis'. Licet magnitudo sit in divinis ex natura rei et extrema sint distincta, cum magnitudo non sit in distincta nec fundamentum distinctum, cuius distinctionem videtur requirere relatio realis. Licet enim pater non sit filius et per consequens extrema sint distincta, tamen quia una magnitudo est utriusque […]. Ideo non est nisi secundum rationem relatio equalitatis. Si quis tamen vellet tenere aliam opinionem, posset respondere ad argumenta facta contra eam.[61]

Alexander poses two opinions about the reality of equality relation: the first is the '*communis opinio*', as he defines it, for which the distinction of foundations is required for a real relation; whereas in the second he proposes that distinct extreme terms and a real foundation are sufficient.

Therefore, the requirement for distinct foundations for the reality and multiplication of relations is a widely accepted thesis in the early years of 14th

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1520, repr. St. Bonaventure, NY, 1953), 2, f. 110K–L: "Cum dicitur in divinis Pater est aequalis Filio, ex utraque parte est relatio secundum rationem, et hoc quia aequalitas aliquorum non est relatio nisi secundum magnitudines eorum commensuratas inter se […] Magnitudo autem spiritualis Patris et Filii est ipsa divina essentia, quae una est in utroque secundum rem et nullo modo plurificata […]. Personae enim divinae ex se, non ex opere intellectus, sunt plures,—sed essentia deitatis […], in quantum in ea fundatur aequalitas, accipitur penes intellectum ut plurificata"; art. 67 q. 3, f. 221H: "Licet relata sint alia in divinis secundum rem, tamen relationes communes—existentes in illis—non sunt aliae inter se nisi secundum rationem, sicut nec sua fundamenta."

61 Alexander de Alexandria, *Quaestiones Quodlibetales* q. 5, Città del Vaticano, BAV, Vat. Lat. 932, f. 9^{rb}, ll. 3–27.

century and, for this reason, it is very difficult to identify Scotus' interlocutor. What seems strange is that the opponent uses an objection present in the texts of Scotus to rebut him. The argument is even more interesting because in *collatio* 19 Scotus never speaks about magnitude or infinity as an intrinsic degree, and yet this doctrine is characteristic of Scotian thought. It is impossible to provide an exhaustive explanation using the data available from the *Collationes parisienses*; only a further study of the other questions will provide more details to help resolve the issue.

At present time, the most plausible hypothesis is that the author is familiar with Scotus' texts, which means he knows both Scotus' doubt as well as the answer; however, he disagrees with them. According to this assumption, the opponent poses the objection of magnitude and infinity as an intrinsic grade to express his concerns. In fact, in the last argument of the question the *opponens* claims that the form that completes the whole ambit of its species does not multiply, but rather all divine relations include the whole ambit because all that is in God is infinite; thus, just as there is only one generation, there is also one relation of equality that is not real.[62] Unfortunately, the question ends without a subsequent reply or solution which prevents a further confirmation.

3 Conclusion

The recognition of the interlocutors in the *Collationes*, as well as the authorship of the work, is tightly bound to the origin of these collections of questions. The *Collationes* represents a composite work that demonstrates school exercises and reflects the doctrines of the early of 14th century as well as the first impact of Scotus' thought in the English and Parisian environments. The traditional attribution to Scotus is founded on his participation in some *collationes*, but Scotus is not always present in all questions, and sometimes his doctrines are criticized, as in the central questions and the treatise on human will of the Oxford series.

62 *Collationes Parisienses* q. 19, Oxford, Magdalen College Library, 194, f. 78ra, ll. 37–44: "Propterea, arguitur sic: forma que complectitur totum ambitum sue speciei non potest plurificari, ut patet de uno angelo, si totum ambitum sue speciei contineret; sed omnis relatio que ponitur in divinis ad intra, totum ambitum sue speciei continet, quia quicquid est in divinis est infinitum; et ideo ponitur quod in divinis non potest esse nisi una generatio; ergo in deo non est nisi tantum una equalitas, sed si esset relatio realis, una esset in patre respectu filii et, econtra, alia in filio et sic de spiritu sancto; ergo."

The identification of the interlocutors is made even more difficult by the lack of manuscripts and published sources, but above all by the discussion that characterizes some *collationes*. For this reason, it is impossible to state with certainty that Conington is the *respondens* of *collatio* 6 of the Oxford series or that Scotus has participated in some way in the dispute. In fact, the opinions are too general to assign attribution, and the discussion prevents a clear exposition of doctrines.

Otherwise, in *collatio* 19 of the Paris series the *respondens*' thought shows a particular affinity with Scotus' major works and, in particular, the question seems to anticipate some passages of the *Reportatio* I-A. In this case, the opponent also remains unknown; we only know that he supports a doctrine called 'common' and that he has read Scotus' *Lectura*.

4

Duns Scotus on Prime Matter: A Focus on the Parisian Commentaries

Alessandro De Pascalis

1 Introduction: Aristotle and Augustine as Models

The concept of prime matter is one of the most multifaceted and controversial of medieval philosophical speculation.[1] Depending on whether one adopts an Aristotelian or an Augustinian perspective, prime matter can be considered either as something wholly potential and ontologically insubstantial (i.e, absolute indefiniteness) or as an entity distinctly conceived by its creator and established in being through a creative act.

According to what is stated by Aristotle, prime matter is something very close to a mental entity, postulated in order to explain substantial changes in physical reality; then, in itself, prime matter can have no actuality at all, whether essential or existential.[2] Aristotle often mentions matter and form together with *act* and *potency*: form is meant as the first substantial actualization of matter, while matter denotes the ultimate potential source of substantial change. In this sense, the possibility, retained by matter, of losing the form it has at that time in favor of another, matches the concept of potency; the capacity to bring matter into existence leads Aristotle to affirm that form is, on the contrary, the actual principle.

The Philosopher expresses this position in several passages of his works. For example, in the *Metaphysics* he claims that "by 'matter' I mean that which is

1 The present contribution has greatly benefited from conversations and meetings with Wouter Goris and Garrett Smith during our work on the critical edition of the *Additiones secundi libri*. To them I extend my heartfelt thanks.

2 For a similar reading of the concept of prime matter in Aristotle see James Weisheipl, "The concept of Matter in Fourteenth Century Science," in *The concept of Matter in Greek and Medieval Philosophy*, ed. Ernan McMullin (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1965), pp. 147–169. In particular see pp. 150–151: "For Aristotle this primary matter was itself devoid not only of all accidental characteristics, such as quantity, color and place, but it was devoid of every substantial actualization. […] Consequently the potentiality for such change must be utterly devoid of all characteristics, that is, 'matter' in this case is clearly a purely potential principle. Aristotle apparently considered the change of one element into another striking proof of 'matter' as a purely potential principle in nature."

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neither a certain kind of thing nor a quantity nor a quality nor any of the other things by which what exists is determined,"[3] and again "by matter I mean that which is not actually, but is potentially, an individual thing."[4] And also, in the *Physics*: "form indeed, rather than matter, is nature; for a thing is more properly said to be what it is when it exists in actuality than when it exists potentially."[5] Such a position is received by Aquinas[6] and expressed in a more radical way in his major philosophical works, in which the Dominican often reiterates his conception of matter as "what is in potency" (*materia est id quod est in potentia*),[7] namely a "potency-only entity" (*ens in potentia tantum*).[8] At times, Aquinas' position becomes even more extreme, defining matter just as "pure potency" (*potentia pura*),[9] or "passive potency" (*potentia passiva*)[10] without even qualifying it as an entity.

Alongside this Aristotelian-Thomist model, we find a second paradigm which could be referred to Augustine and Henry of Ghent. In the 12th book of *Confessions*, Augustine focuses on the moment in which God creates matter from nothing; he describes it as something absolutely formless and very close to being nothing, being nonetheless something, inasmuch as it is created by God: "for sooner could I imagine that not to be at all, which should be deprived of

3 Aristotle, *Met.* Z 3, 1029^{a}19–21.

4 Aristotle, *Met.* H 3, 1042^{a}27–29.

5 Aristotle, *Phys.* B 1, 192^{b}6–8.

6 For extensive studies on Aquinas' position on prime matter see Jeffrey Brower, *Aquinas's Ontology of the Material World: Change, Hylomorphism, and Material Objects* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014); Raymond Hain, "Aquinas and Aristotelian Hylomorphism," in *Aristotle in Aquinas's Theology*, eds. Gilles Emery and Matthew Levering (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015); Robert Pasnau, *Metaphysical Themes 1274–1671* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), esp. pp. 17–53.

7 Thomas de Aquino, *Summa theologiae* Ia q. 3 a. 8, ed. Leonina 4, p. 47: "Nam materia est in potentia […]"; q. 4 a. 1, ed. Leonina 4, p. 50: "Sicut enim materia, inquantum huiusmodi, est in potentia […]"; q. 7 a. 3 (ad. 4), ed. Leonina 4, p. 76: "[…] esse enim in potentia convenit materiae"; *ST* Ia IIae q. 55 a. 2, ed. Leonina 6, p. 350: "Sed potentia ad esse se tenet ex parte materiae, quae est ens in potentia […]"; *Summa contra Gentiles* II c. 30, ed. Leonina 13, p. 338: "Et quia materia, secundum id quod est, ens in potentia est"; *SCG* II c. 43, ed. Leonina 13, p. 366: "Materia enim non est nisi in potentia."

8 Thomas de Aquino, *ST* Ia q. 76 a. 7 ad 3, ed. Leonina 5, p. 231: "Sic enim et quaelibet forma, si consideretur ut actus, habet magnam distantiam a materia, quae est ens in potentia tantum."

9 Thomas de Aquino, *ST* Ia q. 115 a. 1 ad. 2, ed. Leonina 5, pp. 538–539: "Sed hoc est materia prima, quae est potentia pura, sicut Deus est actus purus."

10 Thomas de Aquino, *ST* Ia q. 46 a. 1 ad. 1, ed. Leonina 4, pp. 478–479: "Antequam mundus esset, possibile fuit mundum esse, non quidem secundum potentiam passivam, quae est materia […]".

all form, than conceive *a thing* between form and nothing, neither formed, nor nothing, a formless *almost nothing*."[11] In criticizing Aquinas, Henry of Ghent echoes those Augustinian words, stating that matter's being *prope nihil* states precisely its intermediate ontological status, placed between being something actually and non-being at all.[12] In Henry's system indeed, prime matter possesses an *esse* by its own right, related to its *quid* ("habet esse suum quo est quid capax formarum"). Matter is, in fact, a possible and creatable entity, and as such it corresponds to an essence 'ratified' by the divine mind ("habens ideam in mente creatoris").[13] By virtue of its being a creatable essence, matter is therefore susceptible of a *being for itself* ("immo ipsa est susceptibilis esse per se tamquam per se creabile").[14] The nature of matter, therefore a) is constituted in *its* proper *esse debile*,[15] namely its being a nature, which b) sees in God—not in form—its formal cause.

In the decades following Henry's teachings, his model was assumed, reworked and strengthened by the masters of the Franciscan school (such as John Peckham and William of Ware), who made it a true flagship of their metaphysics. Notably, the following pages are devoted to one of the most influential Franciscan masters in the history of Western thought, John Duns Scotus, who in his Commentaries on the *Sentences* explains his theory of the actuality of matter in terms of positivity.

2 Scotus' General Theory in *Lectura* II and *Quaestiones super libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis* VII

Taking into consideration Scotus' works currently available in critical edition, we can say that the Franciscan deals extensively with the topic of the ontology of prime matter in two main venues. The first is the Commentary on the VII book of Aristotle's *Metaphysics* (especially q. 5), while the second is the Com-

11 Augustinus, *Confessionum libri XIII* 12 c. 6 n. 6, ed. Luc Verheijen, Corpus Christianorum Series Latina 27 (Turnhout: Brepols, 1981), pp. 218–219.

12 For Henry's use of this passage from Augustine see Henricus de Gandavo, *Quodlibet* I q. 10, ed. Raymond Macken (Leuven: Leuven University Press, 1990), p. 63: "Et secundum Augustinum, XII *Confessionum*, ⟨cap. 6°⟩: *Prope nihil erat, quod informe erat* […]". For a study on prime matter in Henry of Ghent's work see Raymond Macken, "Le statut de la matière première dans la philosophie d'Henri de Gand," *Recherches de Théologie ancienne et médiévale* 46 (1979), pp. 130–182.

13 Henricus de Gandavo, *Quodlibet* I q. 10, ed. Macken, p. 66.

14 Henricus de Gandavo, *Quodlibet* I q. 10, ed. Macken, p. 66.

15 Henricus de Gandavo, *Quodlibet* I, q. 10, ed. Macken, p. 66.

mentary on the second book of the *Sentences* of Peter Lombard, specifically the version known as *Lectura*. With regard to the Commentary on the VII book of Aristotle's *Metaphysics* (= QMetVII), the critical editors of the volume claim that it is—unlike other sections of the same Commentary—a text pertaining to an advanced period of the theological training of Scotus, not earlier than his time in England as a bachelor. In particular, they highlight for qq. 5 and 12 "close parallels in distinctions 12 and 18 of Book II of Scotus's *Lectura*."[16] As for the *Lectura*, it is the earliest known version of Scotus' Commentary on the *Sentences*, performed by the Franciscan as a bachelor in Oxford around 1298–1299.

Having discussed these preliminaries, we can now move on to an overview of the main cores of Scotus' doctrine as it is contained in *Lectura* II, d. 12 and in QMetVII, q. 5.[17] I am going to outline them very synthetically here, postponing a more systematic treatment in the analysis of the Parisian *Reportata*.

In both texts, Scotus proves to have a threefold goal. Firstly, the Franciscan Master wants **a)** to show that matter possesses a being by its own. In order to prove this, Scotus uses what has been recently defined by Russel Friedmann "one of his most powerful and widely used strategies for investigating the ontological status of various items in scholastic metaphysics."[18] As a matter of fact, he arranges the ontology of prime matter in accordance with the requirements that matter itself needs to possess, on the basis of arguments both of reason and according to authorities from Aristotle's writings.[19] The result of the argument is that one *needs* (by inference) to come to the conclusion that matter is

16 See "Introduction," in Ioannes Duns Scotus, *Quaestiones super Libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis*, Opera philosophica [OPh] 3, eds. Robert Andrews, Girard Etzkorn, Gedeon Gál, Romuald Green, Francis Kelley, George Marcil, Timothy Noone, and Rega Wood, (St. Bonaventure: The Franciscan Institute, St. Bonaventure University, 1997), p. xliii.

17 For recent treatments of Scotus on prime matter in *Lectura* II.12 and QMetVII, see Russell L. Friedman, "Gerald Ot (d. 1349) on Prime Matter with an Edition of his II *Sentences*, distinction 12," *Recherches de Théologie et Philosophie médiévales* 86/2 (2019), pp. 365–450; Antonio Petagine, *Il fondamento positivo del mondo. Indagini francescane sulla materia all'inizio del XIV secolo (1300–1330 ca.)* (Roma: Aracne, 2019); Thomas M. Ward, *John Duns Scotus on Parts, Wholes, and Hylomorphism* (Leiden: Brill, 2014); *Materia: Nouvelles perspectives de recherche dans la pensée et la culture médiévales (XII^{e}–XVI ^{e} siècles)*, eds. Tiziana Suarez-Nani and Agostino Paravicini Bagliani (Firenze: Sismel-Edizioni del Galluzzo, 2017); William O. Duba, "What is Actually the Matter with Scotus? Landulph Caracciolo on Objective Potency and Hylomorphic Unity," in *Lo scotismo nel Mezzogiorno d'Italia*, ed. Francesco Fiorentino (Porto: Fédération Internationale des Instituts d'Études Médiévales, 2010), pp. 269–301.

18 Friedman, "Gerald Ot (d. 1349) on Prime Matter," p. 371.

19 See Ioannes Duns Scotus, *Lectura* II d. 12 q. un. nn. 11–28, ed. Vat. 19, pp. 72–79.

endowed with a reality of its own ("oportet quod habeat realitatem"), i.e, that it is a certain *thing*, different from form ("rem aliam a forma").[20] As a consequence of its being something real, Scotus argues that **b)** prime matter, in its being, is said to be potential in a qualified sense, namely as a "subject of potency,"[21] i.e.—as William Duba says—something that is "in passive potency to become something else."[22] Furthermore, Scotus contrasts the subjective potency with the objective one, namely the potency of an entity oriented to receive its own being from an external agent,[23] and he therefore strongly denies that matter is said to be potential in this latter sense. Finally, Scotus argues, **c)** to the real being of matter, and to its subjective potency, there corresponds a certain actuality, wherein actual "is said of everything which is external to its own cause,"[24] to the way of a positive entity, existing in a broad sense.[25] If we consider in fact act and potency as something that marks the difference *tout-court* between existence and non-existence, then the conclusion that Scotus comes to is that matter is an entity in act.[26]

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20 As recently stated by Ward, *John Duns Scotus on Parts*, p. 30: "in *Lectura* II, d. 12 Scotus is unequivocal: matter and form are *res et res*"; Ioannes Duns Scotus, *Lectura* II d. 12 q. un., ed. Vat. 19, n. 24–25, p. 78 and n. 49 p. 88.

21 Ioannes Duns Scotus, *Lectura* II d. 12 q. un., ed. Vat. 19, n. 30, p. 80. See also *Quaest. super Met.* VII q. 5 n. 17, OPh 4, p. 135.

22 Duba, "What is Actually the Matter with Scotus," p. 272; see also Ioannes Duns Scotus, *Lectura* II d. 12 q. un., ed. Vat. 19, n. 42, p. 84: "est potentia receptiva et aliqua entitas in qua fundatur ratio potentiae receptivae respectu alterius (sicut in superficie respectu albedinis)" and *Quaest. super Met.* VII q. 5 n. 17–18, OPh 4, pp. 135–136.

23 Ioannes Duns Scotus, *Lectura* II d. 12 q. un. n. 42, ed. Vat. 19, p. 84: "Non est tantum ens in potentia, ita quod sit terminus potentiae [...] et sic sit in potentia ad recipiendum suum esse proprium ab agente." On the double sense of potency in Scotus see also Ward, *John Duns Scotus on Parts*, p. 29; Petagine, *Il fondamento positivo del mondo*, pp. 37–38; Antonio Petagine, "Matter as Positive Being: John Duns Scotus and Peter Auriol," *Medioevo* 41 (2016), p. 145; Richard Cross, *The Physics of Duns Scotus: The Scientific Context of a Theological Vision* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998), pp. 17–18; William O. Duba, "Aristotelian Traditions in Franciscan Though: Matter and Potency according to Scotus and Auriol," in *The Origins of European Scholarship*, ed. Ioannis Taifacos (Stuttgard: Franz Steiner Verlag, 2006) p. 150; Catherine König-Pralong, *Avènement de l'Aristotélisme en terre chrétienne. L'essence et la matière: entre Thomas d'Aquin et Guillaume d'Ockham* (Paris: Vrin, 2005), p. 157; Roberta Padlina, "Matière et puissance dans la pensée de Jacques d'Ascoli," in *Materia: Nouvelles perspectives*, eds. Tiziana Suarez-Nani and Agostino Paravicini Bagliani, p. 159.

24 Ioannes Duns Scotus, *Lectura* II d. 12 q. un. n. 38, ed. Vat. 19, p. 82.

25 See Ioannes Duns Scotus, *Lectura* II d. 12 q. un. n. 40, ed. Vat. 19, p. 84; see also nn. 43–44, p. 85. For a very similar definition see *Quaest. super Met.* VII q. 5 n. 19, OPh 4, p. 136.

26 Ioannes Duns Scotus, *Lectura* II d. 12 q. un. n. 38, ed. Vat. 19, p. 82: "Unde si actus et potentia accipiantur prout dividunt ens, sic actus dicitur omne illud quod habet entitatem suam

3 Parisian *Reportationes*, *Additiones secundi libri* and *Ordinatio* β: The Parisian Textual Tradition of Scotus' Distinction 12

After lecturing on the *Sentences* in Oxford, Scotus lectured again in Paris during the academic year 1302–1303.[27] The second book of this Parisian Commentary has come to us into two different textual traditions: a direct tradition, represented by the so called *Reportata Parisiensia* (= RP II-A and RP II-B),[28] and an indirect tradition, represented by the *Additiones secundi libri extractae*. These latter have recently been critically edited and represent probably a *summa* of Scotus' Parisian and Oxonian teachings, crafted by William of Alnwick.[29] Most of what follows will center on a philosophical analysis of d. 12, q. 1 ("Utrum in substantia generabili et corruptibili sit aliqua entitas positiva distincta a forma") of Scotus' *Reportatio Parisiensis* II-A, which has remained unexplored until today due to the misleading textual tradition of the printed edition of Scotus' *Opera Omnia* (Wadding/Vivès). Below I briefly summarize some information concerning the history of the transmission of RP II-A d. 12, q. 1, necessary for the philosophical discussion later:

1) The version of RP II best known to scholars is II-A, the text on which Luke Wadding based his edition in 1639, reprinted in 1891–1895 by Vivès. However, due probably to a contamination of the textual tradition from which Wadding draws the text, the printed version of RP II, d. 12, q. 1 (Wadding XI, pp. 315–320) does not correspond to either version of Scotus' RP II (neither II-A nor II-B) but rather to *Additiones secundi libri extractae* (= *Add*II) d. 12 q. 1.

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extra causam suam,—et sic materia, cum sit principium et causa rei, dicitur ens in actu"; n. 30, p. 80: "Nam aliquid dicitur esse in potentia dupliciter: uno modo, quia est terminus potentiae, sive ad quod est potentia,—et istud dicitur esse in potentia obiective (sicut Antichristus modo dicitur esse in potentia, et similiter albedo generanda); alio modo, dicitur aliquid esse in potentia ut subiectum potentiae sive in quo est potentia,—et sic dicitur aliquid esse in potentia subiective, quia est in potentia ad aliud, quo tamen nondum perficitur (ut superficies dealbanda)."

27 Cf. William O. Duba and Christopher Schabel, "Remigio, Auriol, Scotus, and the myth of the two-year *Sentences* lecture at Paris," *Recherches de Théologie et Philosophie médiévales* 84/1 (2017), pp. 143–179, esp. pp. 165–173.

28 For a list of the Manuscripts of each version of the *Reportata*, see Barnaba Hechich, "Il problema delle '*Reportationes*' nell'eredità dottrinale del B. Giovanni Duns Scoto OFM," in *Giovanni Duns Scoto, Studi e ricerche nel VII Centenario della sua morte*, ed. Martin Carbajo Núnez (Roma: Antonianum, 2008), pp. 73–74.

29 For more detailed information about what *Additiones* are, see *Additiones secundi libri Johannis Duns Scoti extractae per Guillelmum de Alnwick*, eds. Alessandro De Pascalis, Wouter Goris, and Garrett Smith (Aschendorff, forthcoming).

2) As a confirmation of the claims made by Hechich and Dumont based on analyses performed on other textual sections of *Add*II,[30] I can here say that d. 12, q. 1 of the *Additiones secundi libri* is composed for a large part of textual material directly related to RP II-B (90%) and for a smaller part of material reworked from *Lectura* II (10%). *Add*II d. 12 q. 1 is a text that proves to be a very faithful *compilatio*, composed by Alnwick by summing up various teachings held by Scotus during his career as a Master, both in Oxford and in Paris; therefore, approaching this text, one must therefore keep in mind that
3) although containing a small portion of textual material from *Lectura* II, *Add* II d. 12 q. 1 is a text that is in large part a verbatim match with Scotus' RP II-B, and it is therefore possible to consider it as part of the Parisian textual tradition of Scotus' Commentaries.

In addition to the four versions so far mentioned of d. 12, q. 1 of Scotus' Commentary on the second book of the *Sentences*, namely, the Oxonian one (*Lectura* II, d. 12, quaestio unica), the two Parisian (RP II-A and RP II-B d. 12, q. 1) and the *Additiones*, there is a fifth version, which will conventionally be named here as *Ordinatio* β. To date nothing has been determined about what *Ordinatio* β is. The modern literature has mentioned this redaction only twice so far. The Vatican Commission mentions it for the first time in a table found on p. 92* of vol. VIII of the Vatican Edition, among the *Prolegomena* to the edition of the *Ordinatio*.[31] What the editors noted, in fact, is that distinctions 12 and 15–25 of the second book of Scotus' *Ordinatio* are actually constituted, in the manuscript tradition, by interpolated textual material taken from the Parisian Commentaries. In other words, the scribes and copyists who copied the manuscripts of the *Ordinatio* over the centuries, finding large portions of missing text, filled the gap in these distinctions by drawing the text from the Parisian *Reportationes*, II-A and II-B, from the *Additiones secundi libri*, and from a further textual redaction: *Ordinatio* β. This version, which the Vatican Commission found in manuscripts Paris, bibl. nat., lat. 15857 (ms. Y) and Paris, bibl. nat., lat. 15854 (ms. Q) of the edition of the *Ordinatio*, is referred to by them as a reworking of the

30 Cf. Stephen D. Dumont, "John Duns Scotus's *Reportatio Parisiensis Examinata*: A Mystery Solved," *Recherches de Théologie et Philosophie médiévales* 85/2 (2018), p. 420; Hechich, "Il problema delle '*Reportationes*'," p. 79.

31 See "Prolegomena," in *Ioannis Duns Scoti Ordinatio II, dist. 4–44*, ed. Vat. 8, p. 92*. The editors of the *Ordinatio* refer to this textual redaction as *Additiones* β, as they consider it to be an editorial revision of the *Additiones secundi libri*. However, since—as I will show below—the present work shows that these two versions are rather independent of each other, I have chosen here to use the name *Ordinatio* β

Additiones.[32] The second appearance of *Ordinatio* β occurs in a recent article by Stephen Dumont,[33] in which he states that this version "was constructed to fill the corresponding gap in *Ordinatio* II" and that its textual content is close to RP II-B. The nature of *Ordinatio* β has not been determined to date, since no study has been entirely devoted to it yet. However, the study presented in the present contribution would lead one to rule out the assumptions of both the editors of the *Ordinatio* and Dumont, since the text contained in d. 12 q. 1 of *Ordinatio* β seems independent and disconnected from both that of *Additiones secundi libri* and that of *Reportatio* II-B. In light of this and of the textual material presented in this paper, one cannot rule out the possibility that *Ordinatio* β represents a further tradition of Scotus' *Reportatio*, parallel to those known to date, employed alongside II-A, II-B and *Add*II in order to fill the gap in *Ordinatio* II.

In conclusion, this paper offers the edition of the three unedited texts previously mentioned, RP II-A, RP II-B and *Ordinatio* β, in order to promote future parallel studies devoted to establishing their connections. The philosophical analysis of the edited texts then, complements the study of II-A with that of II-B, *Ordinatio* β and *Additiones secundi libri*.

4 Scotus' Ontology of Prime Matter: The Parisian Works

4.1 *Matter as a* res

In all the redactions, the text of the question is divided into three articles. The first article aims to show that matter possesses a being of its own. The central thesis defended by Scotus—which, in my opinion, emerges more explicitly from the II-A version—is that prime matter has the ontological status of a *res*, and is structured as a *realitas* distinct from form. The first article is composed by seven answers—numbered in ascending order only in II-A—to one main objection. So, let us see in detail both the objection and each of the responses.

> Dicitur huic concedendo quod agens naturale in generatione naturali aliquid corrumpit et aliquid producit; corrumpit enim terminum a quo et producit terminum ad quem. Non tamen requiritur subiectum commune, quia "generatio est transmutatio totius in totum," I *De Generatione*; ergo totum terminum a quo corrumpit. Non sic est in alterationibus, quia acci-

32 See "Prolegomena," p. 90*.

33 See Dumont, "John Duns Scotus's *Reportatio Parisiensis Examinata*," pp. 418–419.

> dentia requirunt subiectum in quo sunt, et ideo non transmutatur totum in totum; sed forma substantialis non habet subiectum in quo est, sed totum est terminus a quo et totum terminus ad quem.[34]

The objector, while conceding that a natural agent, during a process of generation corrupts something (the *terminus a quo*) and produces something else (the *terminus ad quem*), denies the need to establish between these two terms a common subject with the function of substratum of the change. By invoking Aristotle, the objection argues that "the substantial form does not need a subject in which to be" because *everything* is corrupted and *everything* is generated. In summary, this antagonistic thesis states that there is no need for an underlying matter that acts as a substratum to change, and that generations and corruptions of natural substances take place on a purely formal level.

The following seven responses given by Scotus to the objection constitute the body of the reasoning contained in the first article. The **first** answer (II-A: §12–13; II-B: §14–16; *Ord* β: §11–12) proposes a paradoxical reasoning. If the objection were true—that is, if the generation did not need a *suppositum in quo*—, any natural agent having in itself the full effect ("agens habens totum effectum") could immediately cause everything into being without anything getting corrupted ("posset totum causare in esse sine corruptione contrarii"). Moreover, such an absurd event would always and necessarily happen, since "a natural agent necessarily does what it can, and since it can cause all the effect [...] it necessarily produces all ⟨of it⟩."[35] With the **second** answer (II-A: §14–16; II-B: §17–19; *Ord* β: §13–14) Scotus takes a step forward, introducing a theme that will be central throughout the rest of the entire argument, and

34 Ioannes Duns Scotus, *Reportatio Parisiensis* II-A d. 12 q. 1, edited below §11; cf *Reportatio Parisiensis* II-B d. 12 q. 1, ed. §12–13; cf. *Ordinatio* β d. 12 q. 1, ed. §10.

35 Ioannes Duns Scotus, *Reportatio Parisiensis* II-A d. 12 q. 1, ed. §12–13. RP II-B, *Add.* II and *Ord.* β show with an example the absurdity of such a thesis: if there was not a real subiectum in which the changes take place, the fire would have in its active virtue the power to generate further fire, necessarily and infinitely. Follows the text of II-B: "Consequens falsum. Probatio minoris, quia si ignis generandus sit una forma simplex, ergo totus ignis generandus est in virtute activa ignis generantis, vel nihilominus cum sit simplex; ergo potest ignem in esse producere sine actione corrumpente aerem quae magis debilitaret actionem illam quam fortificaret illud. Alio modo arguitur sic: agens naturale non impeditum de | de necessitate agit quantum est in virtute sua activa; sed contrarietas aquae non impedit, quia ignis generandus totus est in potestate ignis generantis; ergo ignis sine corruptio aquae posset generare ignem et ponere ignem totum in esse"; Ioannes Duns Scotus, *Reportatio Parisiensis* II-B d. 12 q. 1, ed. §15–16; cf. *Ordinatio* β d. 12 q. 1, ed. §13; *Additiones secundi libri* d. 12 q. 1, §16–17.

in this sense the II-A version proposes, compared to the other versions, some interesting terminological variations. As stated by Aristotle in the *Metaphysics*, each substance is intrinsically corruptible; but it could not be so if it were a simple act ("actus simplex"), since it would not have an intrinsic *ratio* of corruptibility. It is therefore necessary, concludes Scotus, that each substance is composed by an act and another *reality* ("ex actu et realitate propria alia").[36] The '*realitas*' to which Scotus alludes is precisely prime matter, defined in the other versions as "aliquid intrinsecum aliud a forma" (*Ord*β § 13) and 'principle of corruption' (II-B § 17; *Add*II § 21).

The **third** argument (II-A: § 17–18; II-B: § 20–24; *Ord* β: § 15–18) states that "if ⟨matter⟩ was not such an entity in the compound substances, it would follow that neither generation nor corruption could take place." In other words, if the subject had no *real* existence, substantial changes would not be possible, since they take place—according to Aristotle's teaching—in a subject. This subject, states II-A is a *quid aliud* ("something else") with respect to form. If it were not the case, that is, if matter did not persist ("si materia non maneret") through changes, each generation would actually be a transubstantiation, "like that of the bread in the body of Christ" explains II-B, in which "everything would be changed in everything."[37] The **fourth** and the **fifth** argument (II-A: § 20–21; II-B: § 25–26; *Ord* β: § 19–20) reinforce the idea that prime matter is *really* something, from an ontological point of view. Since receptive potencies are arranged according to an order, it is necessary to go back to something that is the first receptive (i.e., something that is not received in anything and that can receive everything). This is clearly prime matter. Now, since "the identical does not receive itself," says Scotus, "it is necessary that [the first receptive] is a *res* that differs from the received form."[38] Moreover, he goes on, since each entity is the result of four causes, and it is necessary for matter to be one of them, then each caused entity, inasmuch as it is real, is composed of matter and another *thing* ("habebit materiam et aliam rem").[39]

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36 Ioannes Duns Scotus, *Reportatio Parisiensis* II-A d. 12 q. 1, ed. § 14.

37 As was said, the II-B version is more explicative of what transubstantiation is: "Si dicas quod totum convertitur in totum ut panis convertitur in corpus Christi, illud non est verum, et esto quod sit talis conversio, tamen non est mutatio, ut patet libro IV distinctio 13, quia nihil est quod aliter se habet nunc quam prius," Ioannes Duns Scotus, *Reportatio Parisiensis* II-B d. 12 q. 1, ed. § 23. Such further specification can also be found, almost identical, in the *Add.* II version; cf. *Additiones secundi libri* d. 12 q. 1, § 27.

38 Ioannes Duns Scotus, *Reportatio Parisiensis* II-A d. 12 q. 1, ed. § 20.

39 Ioannes Duns Scotus, *Reportatio Parisiensis* II-A d. 12 q. 1, ed. n. 16. Actually, also II-B (but not *Add.* II, which as for this argument gives a quite different formulation from all the other versions; cf. *Additiones secundi libri* d. 12 q. 1, § 30) contains a very similar statement:

In the **sixth** response to the objection (II-A: § 22; II-B: § 27; *Ord* β: § 21) Scotus still emphasizes his paradigm of prime matter as something real. The argument is simple but effective reasoning: substances are divided into simple (e.g., angels) and composites (men, animals, etc.); but if a compound was not *really* ("realiter") composed by parts, it would not *really* ("realiter") be a compound.[40] This position is reiterated in the **seventh** argument (II-A: § 23; II-B: § 28; *Ord* β: § 22) by referring to the authority of Augustine, who—in agreement with Aristotle—states that since prime matter is "close to nothing," it must accordingly be something.[41]

4.2 *Matter as a Positive Entity*

The second article can be considered as the very core of the question. The purpose of Scotus in this section is to clarify the theory of prime matter as a 'positive entity', i.e., an entity that holds some degree of act.

The doctrine of matter as a positive entity is exposed by Scotus in two stages. The *first* stage consists in adopting the subdivision, introduced by Henry of Ghent,[42] between *objective* and *subjective* potencies (II-A: § 27–34; II-B: § 31–38; *Ord* β: § 26–32), discarding the path of the objective potency. Once having illustrated these two concepts, *secondly* Scotus shows the need to affirm that matter possesses an intrinsic actuality, connected to the subjective potency (II-A: § 35, 44–45; II-B: § 39, 49–51; *Ord* β: § 33, 36–43). But let us proceed with a focus on the first step:

> Et praemitto unam distinctionem, qualiter aliquid dicitur in potentia dupliciter, vel sicut terminus potentiae, vel sicut subiectum. Terminus potentiae dicitur in potentia obiectiva, subiectum vero in potentia subiectiva. Et aliquando potest esse quod eadem est potentia obiectiva et subiectiva in comparatione tamen ad diversa, sicut superficies dicitur in potentia subiectiva respectu albedinis inducendae, albedo vero dicitur in potentia obiectiva, ita quod eadem est habitudo formae inducendae ad subiectum. Et illa habitudo inter haec extrema, in comparatione ad

"quidquid habet formam pro causa necessario habet materiam pro causa," Ioannes Duns Scotus, *Reportatio Parisiensis* II-B d. 12 q. 1, ed. § 26.

40 Ioannes Duns Scotus, *Reportatio Parisiensis* II-A d. 12 q. 1, ed. § 22.

41 Ioannes Duns Scotus, *Reportatio Parisiensis* II-A d. 12 q. 1, ed. § 23.

42 For a detailed exposition of Henry of Ghent's distinction between objective and subjective potency see Pasquale Porro, "Possibilità ed *esse essentiae* in Enrico di Gand," in *Henry of Ghent: Proceedings of the International Colloquium on the Occasion of the 700th Anniversary of his Death (1293)*, ed. Willy Vanhamel (Leuven: Leuven University Press, 1996), pp. 222 et seq.

> subiectum dicitur potentia subiectiva, in comparatione vero ad formam inducendam dicitur potentia obiectiva. Sed possibile est obiectivam esse sine subiectiva, sicut patet in creatione, ubi tantum est potentia obedientialis.
>
> Aliqui tamen, sustinentes Philosophum vocaliter tantum, dicunt quod materia est aliquid sicut potentia obiectiva, non autem sicut potentia subiectiva, quia non maiorem entitatem tribuunt materiae nisi quod est in potentia sicut albedo quae producetur nunc ad annum. Sed isti realiter negant Philosophum et illud quod rationes superius adductae probant, quia si ignis in virtute sua activa habet formam ignis generandi—et nihil plus entitatis est in igne generando nisi potentia obiectiva—ignis habet totum ignem generandum in eius virtute activa. Et tunc, sicut concludit prima ratio superius, posset aliquid naturaliter generare sine corruptione.
>
> Et secunda ratio est contra hanc viam, quia ignis non est corruptibilis propter aliquid intrinsece inclusum. Similiter tertia ratio, quia non dicitur aliquid manere idem sub utroque terminorum quod tantum est in potentia obiectiva. Albedo enim nunc ad annum, nullius transmutationis est nunc subiectum; unde, quod solum est in potentia ut sit terminus actionis non ponit aliquid nunc manere idem sub utroque terminorum.
>
> […] Ideo dico quod materia est entitas extra causam suam. Ens enim in actu non dependet a non-ente in actu; compositum dependet a materia et forma; ergo neutrum istorum est solum potentia obiectiva.[43]

Something, says Scotus, can be said in potency in two ways: as something that is the subject in which a change takes place, or as something that is the end ("terminus") of the potency. RP II-B and *Add*II clarify this concept in a perhaps more efficacious way: while the subject of the potency is said to be potential towards something else ("est in potentia ad aliud"), the term of the potency is potential *simpliciter*, that is to say, it is what the potency is aimed to ("ad illud est potentia").[44]

All the textual redactions agree that *obiectiva* and *subiectiva* are just two different perspectives of the same concept, that of potency, interpreted in II-A as the *habitudo* that connects subject and accident. Even if there is in fact a difference between the subject—which retains a subjective potency—and the *terminus*—which is in objective potency, i.e., does not exist yet—of a potency,

43 Ioannes Duns Scotus, *Reportatio Parisiensis* II-A d. 12 q. 1, ed. § 28–33.

44 Ioannes Duns Scotus, *Reportatio Parisiensis* II-B d. 12, ed. § 32; *Additiones secundi libri* d. 12 q. 1, § 37.

we can say that both are present at the same time, according to different perspectives ("in comparatione ad diversa"). II-B's version is also worthy of note, as here Scotus clearly states that *obiectiva* and *subiectiva* are not two distinct potencies ("et forte istae duae potentiae non sunt diversae, nec sunt duae") but two different ways of being of the same potency, depending on whether it is in a subject or in something that does not yet exist ("eadem potentia ut est in subiecto ad aliud dicitur subiectiva, et illa eadem ut est potentia illius ad quod est potentia dicitur obiectiva").[45]

Again, in all textual redactions of this question, Scotus exemplifies this concept by means of the example of a surface that takes on itself the accident of whiteness (II-A: § 28; II-B: 32; *Ord* β: § 27; *Add*II: § 37). So, let us assume the example of a substrate (S), which at some instant of time (t_1) is potential to receive an accident of the category of quality (W), e.g., a black table, whose owner has decided that soon it will be painted white. In t_1, says Scotus, both potencies are simultaneously present: S is in *subjective* potency towards W, while W is in *objective* potency, since it represents the privation of the black table to become white and does not inhere to any subject. The potency, Scotus continues, is the same *habitudo* that links the two extremes S and W; such a relationship between the extremes ("illa habitudo inter hec extrema"), which is the *habitudo/potentia*, while it is said subjective when taking S into account ("in comparatione ad subiectum"), is said objective considering W ("in comparatione ad formam inducendam").[46]

However, although from the above we can conclude that objective and subjective potency are complementary concepts and two opposite extremes of the same reality, it is important to stress that in Scotus' view they have very different ontological consistencies. While, in fact, what is in subjective potency *really exists* at t_1, what is in objective potency *does not exist yet*, just like something that has not yet been produced, whose being is not into the external reality, but just into the potency of its cause ("sicut albedo futura [...] quod tantum habet esse intra potentiam suae causae": II-B[47]). In this regard, Scotus at this point embarks on a controversy against some—arguably Giles of Rome and Aquinas—who, whilst appealing to the authority of Aristotle, end up betraying his teachings ("sustinentes Philosophum vocaliter tantum"). According to these adversaries of the Aristotelianism, matter is nothing more than an entity in objective potency, just like the whiteness that is going to be produced in the

45 Ioannes Duns Scotus, *Reportatio Parisiensis* II-B d. 12 q. 1, ed. § 32.
46 Ioannes Duns Scotus, *Reportatio Parisiensis* II-A d. 12 q. 1, ed. § 28.
47 Ioannes Duns Scotus, *Reportatio Parisiensis* II-B d. 12 q. 1, ed. § 36–37.

future, for example the next year ("non maiorem entitatem tribuunt materie nisi quod est ens in potentia sicut albedo que producetur nunc ad annum"). But this is a misinterpretation of Aristotle ("sed isti realiter negant Philosophum"),[48] as proved by the arguments outlined in the first article: if in fact matter was not endowed with a *reality* of its own, something could generate something else without anything getting corrupted, as in the example of the fire that would propagate infinitely.

After ruling out the negative way of the objective potency, Scotus takes the positive way of the subjective potency. The reality of prime matter, says Scotus, is in fact that of a positive entity that exists externally to its cause ("extra causam suam"), i.e., that of a real extramental being. Since a compound substance is composed by both matter and form, it is necessary to conclude that neither of these two components exists merely in objective potency ("neutrum istorum est solum in potentia obiectiva").[49]

Below I present a comparative table of the different textual redactions in order to show the different ways in which Scotus demonstrates that both form and matter are actual entities:[50]

RP II-A, ed. § 34	RP II-B, ed. § 38	*Ord* β, ed. § 32
Materia ergo est ens in actu distinguendo actu contra potentiam quam habet effectus in agente, et est ens in potentia quia est receptivum cuiuscumque actus actuantis, et ideo dicitur maxime ens in potentia, quia est receptivum illius quod maxime actuat. Habet tamen esse, et dicitur ens in esse proprio distincto contra esse formae, quia impossibile est quod aliquid sit verum ens extra causam suam et tamen nullum esse habeat.	Dicitur autem ens in potentia, quia est ens receptivum actus substantialis primo et accidentalis mediante illo; et ideo licet aliquo modo sit ens in actu quia aliquid extra suam causam, tamen distinguitur contra actum distinguentem et completivum speciei. Et ideo describitur per ens in potentia quia est maxime receptivum actus, non quod omnino non sit nisi sicut Antichristus.	Tamen dicitur ens in potentia, quia quanto aliquid habet minus de actu, tanto magis est receptivum actus; quanto autem magis est receptivum actus, tanto magis est in potentia; et quia materia est receptiva omnium formarum substantialium et accidentalium, ideo maxime est in potentia respectu earum; et ideo diffinitur per esse in potentia secundum Aristotelem, non enim habet actum distinguentem, vel dividentem, vel receptum, vel informantem et dantem sibi esse specificum, ex quo tamen est receptivum illius actus per suppositum, et est causa compositi; non potest esse nihil, quia nihil non est alicuius receptivum.

48 Ioannes Duns Scotus, *Reportatio Parisiensis* II-A d. 12 q. 1, ed. § 29.

49 Ioannes Duns Scotus, *Reportatio Parisiensis* II-A d. 12 q. 1, ed. § 33.

50 Note that the text of *Add.* II is for this passage a verbatim match with II-B; cf. Ioannes Duns Scotus, *Additiones secundi libri* d. 12 q. 1, § 43.

To the previous partition of the concept of potency we now see a corresponding double meaning of act. To the objective potency (p_o), held by something that has not yet been produced into being and is still interior to its cause is opposed an act, which we could call *simplex* (a_s),[51] corresponding to something that simply exists in the extramental being. As we know p_o is not the only kind of potency, because something can be considered potential in a less radical and more qualified sense, that is, in subjective potency, hereinafter referred to as receptive potency (p_r), *potentia receptiva*.[52] To this last potency Scotus opposes a qualified act, defined in the II-A version as *actum actuantem* (a_a), proper of substantial forms. The other versions define the formal act as "distinguentem et completivum speciei" (II-B and *Add*II) and "distinguentem, vel dividentem, vel receptum, vel informantem et dantem sibi esse specificum" (*Ord*β) These four elements structure reality, in Scotus' ontological model, as follows (from what is more actual to what is less so):

- (a_a) actuating act: act understood in its 'technical' sense of substantial form; it is what performs the task of actualizing, since it is "quod maxime actuat"
- (a_s) simple act; act meant in a broader sense, including everything that simply exists outside the mind
- (p_r) receptive potency; concept complementary to a_s; potency meant in a qualified sense; it is said in p_r something that is receptive of a_a ("receptivum cuiuscumque actus actuantis")
- (p_o) objective potency; potency in the absolute sense of something that exists internally to its own cause ("quod nullo modo est in actu extra causam suam")

Let us now see which combinations of these different kinds of act and potency can be found according to Scotus. He theorizes two scenarios, which can be read again in each textual redaction:[53]

51 I used such definition for the sake of the discussion, but it has never been used directly by Scotus, who actually leaves a terminological vacuum in correspondence with this concept. As it has been pointed out by Antonio Petagine, this lack of a definition, in Scotus' writings, of the act possessed by matter, has been noted by the Scotists of the following years, who ventured into the elaboration of new definitions such as *actus entitativus* (Antonius Andreae) or *actus transcendens* (Geraldus Odonis). See Antonio Petagine, "La matière est-elle un étant positif? La réponse de Jean le Chanoine", in *Materia: Nouvelles perspectives*, pp. 178–179.

52 Ioannes Duns Scotus, *Reportatio Parisiensis* II-A d. 12 q. 1, ed. § 44, 48.

53 Again, *Add.* II gives a text which is very close to II-B for this passage; cf. Ioannes Duns Scotus, *Additiones secundi libri* d. 12 q. 1, § 54.

RP II-A, ed. § 43–44	RP II-B, ed. § 48	*Ord*β, ed. § 42
[...] dico quod loquendo de actu ut actus et potentia dividunt totum ens, secundum quod ens in actu fuit prius in potentia, sic materia non est ens in potentia, sed ens in actu, cum sit actu pars entis in actu. Non tamen est materia actus; nam ista dicuntur denominative, ut ponuntur dividere ens in actu et in potentia, et non dicuntur in quid. Si tamen ens in actu accipitur pro actuante et potentia pro eo quod recipit actum actuantem, dico quod materia non est ens actu, et sic loquitur Philosophus, VII, cum dicit "actus separat et distinguit" et VIII ⟨*Metaphysicae*⟩, ubi loquitur de actu actuante qui facit unum cum potentia receptiva, et actus ut accipitur pro principio agendi. Nec etiam ens in actu competit materiae, sed ut ens actu distinguitur contra ens in potentia quod nullo modo est in actu extra causam suam.	[...] dico quod potentia ut distinguitur contra actum et ut sunt differentiae entis est aliquid quod solum habet esse in virtute suae causae, quod potest esse in effectu, et hoc modo in omni genere est actus et potentia. Primo modo non est materia ens in potentia, quia habet verum esse extra suam causam; sed materia isto modo est actus ut distinguitur contra potentiam talem. Sed alio modo accipitur actus et potentia VII *Metaphysicae* et VIII, ubi dicitur "actus separat et distinguit" et potentia illud quod est distinguibile; tunc materia sic non est actus, sed potentia. Et istae actus et potentia non possunt esse differentiae entis, quia ista solum conveniunt simplicibus, sed actus et potentia primo modo dicta, ut dividunt ens, conveniunt simplicibus et compositis	[...] dico quod si accipias esse actu ut distinguitur contra potentiam secundum quod actus et potentia dividunt totum ens, sic dico quod materia potest dici in actu; et licet non dicatur actus, quia actus habet eam distinguere et denominare, posset tamen dici actus secundum quod Aristoteles accipit actum in pluribus locis, in VI et VIII *Metaphysicae*; si autem actus dividatur contra illud quod recipit actum, sic materia non est actus, quia est primum receptivum actus; tale autem oportet esse denudatum ab omni actu, quia est distinguibile per omnem actum ut possit sic esse pars omnis entis.

1st case-scenario if one asks whether matter is something *tout-court* potential as something that has not yet been produced into being (p_o) then, Scotus says, matter is an actual entity (a_s).

2nd case-scenario if instead act is meant as a_a, then matter is precisely that potency designated for the reception of such act (p_r).

The *actus actuantis* is most likely a neologism coined by the Subtle Doctor and a textual peculiarity of II-A.[54] The function of this metaphysical device is to

54 It also seems that 'actus actuantis' is a designation that achieved some success in the following years, also testifying the fortune and the diffusion of the II-A version of RP. Francisco Suárez makes, for example, extensive use of it in his *Disputationes Metaphysicae*, in the dd. XIII and XXXIX where he says: "Dico tertio: materia dicitur esse pura potentia respectu actus informantis seu actuantis et respectu actus absolute et simpliciter dicti"; "Nam quod forma illa plus habeat de ratione actus actuantis non videtur satis convincere, quia etiam accidentia habent plus de ratione actus actuantis quam

extend the concept of act making it inclusive of an intermediate entity, such as prime matter, which, despite not being the principle of an action (rather it is the most passive existing thing), possesses a being of its own, and therefore a corresponding qualified act.

4.3 *Matter and Form as Distinct Entities*

The third article explores the theme of how matter and form are distinct from each other. The whole article focuses on showing that the essences of matter and form do not have shared contents, or, to use the words of II-B and *Add*II, to demonstrate that "nihil unius includitur in alio nec econverso."[55] At this point, it is important to point out a difference between the versions: while II-B and *Add*II are clear in stating that matter is really distinct from form ("distinguitur ab ipsa realiter"),[56] II-A uses a negative and perhaps less precise formulation, stating that matter and form have nothing identical in common ("nihil est idemptice idem in prima materia et forma").[57] In any case, the sense of Scotus' reasoning is the same in all versions: matter and form are "primo diversa" from one another and *simpliciter* or *omnino* "alterius rationis."

Once affirmed that prime matter has an autonomous essence and that it is distinct from form in the way of a different *res*—as Scotus stressed in the first article of the question—II-A offers one more interesting definition. As the foundation of the composite entities—although the essence of matter is that of being the "primum receptivum" of forms, which are, on the contrary "nata recipi" (II-B § 54; *Add*II § 61)—prime matter is in fact, according to Scotus, an *ens absolutum*.[58] This is an important feature of Scotus' ontology of prime matter. If in fact matter had not a fully developed essence, but just a relative one ("si materia in essentia sua esset quid respectivum"), it could not be the true foundation of the substantial forms, as it would be more relative than what is

materia, et nihilominus in sua entitate actuali simpliciter sunt minus perfecta […]" and "[…] tres potissimum requirere conditiones ex parte rei denominantis. Prima, ut, licet non sit forma inhaerens, habeat tamen aliqualem modum formae, id est, perficientis vel actuantis id quod denominat […]"; Francisco Suarez, *A Commentary on Aristotle's Metaphysics* (Index locupletissimus in Metaphysicam Aristotelis), *translated from the Latin with an Introduction and Notes*, ed. John P. Doyle (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press 2004).

55 Ioannes Duns Scotus, *Reportatio Parisiensis* II-B d. 12 q. 1, ed. § 54; *Additiones secundi libri* d. 12 q. 1, § 61.

56 Ioannes Duns Scotus, *Reportatio Parisiensis* II-B d. 12 q. 1, ed. § 54; *Additiones secundi libri* d. 12 q. 1, § 61; cf. also *Ordinatio* β d. 12 q. 1, ed. § 46.

57 Ioannes Duns Scotus, *Reportatio Parisiensis* II-A d. 12 q. 1, ed. § 48.

58 Ioannes Duns Scotus, *Reportatio Parisiensis* II-A d. 12 q. 1, ed. § 49.

founded in it, i.e. forms ("non enim potest fundamentum esse magis respectivum quam id quod in eo fundatur").[59]

The idea that prime matter is an absolute being, and not something resembling a relation, is the red thread woven by Scotus through the whole question. The assumption that matter holds the ontological status of a *res* (art. 1) is supported in Scotus by the theory that its being is associated to an actual existence (art. 2). Form and matter are what is as different as it could possibly be ("primo diversa") and two absolute entities, but since one of the two—matter—is something maximally receptive, while the other—form—is the principle of action *par excellence*, it is necessary to affirm that they are really distinct from each other (art. 3).

5 The Editions

5.1 *Cited Sources*

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Aristoteles. *De generatione et corruptione*. Ed. Joanna Judycka. Leiden: Brill, 1986 (= AL IX.1).

59 For a later use of the conceptual pair *absolutum*/*respectivum*, which we found in Scotus' II-A, see the extensive use that John of Bassolis made of it in his II *Sent*. d. 12 q. 1, for example: "Primo, quia vel materia dicit nihil, vel nihil dicit *absolutum*—sed merum *respectum*—vel dicit aliquid *absolutum* […]", "Si autem materia dicit aliquid *absolutum*, aut illud distinguitur ex natura rei a respectu aut non. Si non, habeo propositum contra eos, scilicet quod non dicit aliquid *absolutum* distinctum a *respectu et illud absolutum voco materiam* ex qua per se cum forma fit unum per se compositum absolutum, *non autem ille respectus dicendus est materia* sicut patet," Joannis de Bassolis, *In secundum Sententiarum questiones ingeniosissime* d. 12 q. 1 a. 2, Parisiis 1516, ff. 66$^{rb–va}$.

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5.2 Sigla *and* Ratio edendi

5.2.1 *Reportatio Parisiensis* II-A

The edition is based on the following witnesses:[60]

Om Oxford, Merton College Library, 61, ff. 161^{r}–163^{v}

T Torino, Biblioteca Nazionale Universitaria, K.II.26, 137va–138^{vb}

W Worcester, Cathedral and Chapter Library F.69, ff. 96^{rb}–98^{rb}

p *Reportata super secundum Sententiarum fratris Joannis Duns Scoti ordinis minorum doctoris subtilis Parisiensis nunquam antea impressa*. Edidit Jean Granjon (John Major), Venetiis 1517.

60 An updated list of the mss. transmitting both A and B versions of Scotus' *Reportatio Parisiensis* II can be found in Dumont, "John Duns Scotus's *Reportatio Parisiensis Examinata*," p. 437.

The present question is also transmitted in its entirety by one further codex, Oxford, Balliol College Library, 205 (ff. 231^{r}–234^{r}), which however has been excluded from the edition as it proved to be a copy of Om, with which it shares all the single readings and accidents without ever improving its version, rather adding in turn further isolated accidents.

Fragments of the present question (specifically the first article, §1–26) are also found in some MSS of Scotus' *Ordinatio* II: Assisi bibl. com. 137 (f. 129^{vb}), BAV, Vat. lat. 883 (f. 137ra), BAV, Vat. lat. 876 (f. 223^{vb}) and Paris, bibl. nat. 14564 (f. 71^{rb}). These witnesses, as partial, have been excluded from the edition.

The edition of the II-A presented here is not extensive enough to allow a sufficient critical study of the manuscript tradition, which is to be postponed until a more extensive study can be made. The manuscript adopted as the leading one is Om, as it appeared to be the one with the fewest number of isolated accidents, and I have tried to follow it as much as possible.

5.2.2 *Reportatio Parisiensis* II-B

The manuscripts used for the edition are the following:

L Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Vat. lat. 13687, ff. 136va–138^{vb}
P Biblioteca Antoniana, 175, ff. 25va–26^{vb}

This question is also transmitted by the ms Orléans, Bibliotheque Municipale, 146 (ff. 30ra–31^{vb}). However, that witness has been excluded from the edition since it is most likely a copy of ms. P, as it shares all the errors of P, adding new ones and never improving its text.

In the edition, I tried to follow MS L as far as possible, as it appeared to be the least incorrect from the point of view of mechanical errors. The MS P supplemented its reading in the case of homeoteleuta or in the case of manifestly incorrect or unintelligible readings.

5.2.3 *Ordinatio* β

The edition is based on the following manuscripts:

Og Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Vat. lat. 878, ff. 249ra–251^{vb}
R Firenze, Biblioteca Medicea Laurenziana, plut. 31 dextr. cod. 5, ff. 42^{rb}–43^{vb}
Q Paris, Bibliothèque nationale de France, lat. 15854, ff. 129ra–130va

This redaction of the question is also transmitted by the following codices: BAV, Urbin. lat. 117, ff. 79va–82va; BAV Vat. lat. 877, ff. 155^{vb}–157^{vb}; BAV, Vat. lat. 879,

ff. 77ra–79^{rb}; Paris, Bibliothèque nationale de France, lat. 15857. The edited question, in the textual redaction designated here as *Ordinatio* β, can also be found in the Wadding/Vivès edition, in the section containing the *Opus Oxoniense* (see Vivès XII, pp. 546–574).

The manuscripts chosen for the edition are the result of a sample selection. The manuscript selected as the leading one is Q, as it proved to contain the least number of isolated mechanical errors. MSS Og and R appear to be independent copies of a common model, as they share a high number of readings. These codices have more errors than Q, such as homeoteleuta and other types of omissions and iterations, and were therefore used to supplement Q's reading only when necessary.

⟨Ioannis Duns Scoti
Reportatio Parisiensis II-a
Distinctio duodecima
Quaestio 1⟩

Om 161^{r}
W 96^{rb}
T 137va
P 33^{rb}

[1] Utrum in substantia generabili et corruptibili sit aliqua entitas positiva distincta a forma.

⟨Argumenta principalia⟩

p 33va

[2] Quod non. VII *Metaphysicae*, cap. 8 "materia neque est quid, neque | quantum, neque quale";[1] ergo nulla entitas positiva. Dicitur quod materia est ens in potentia. Contra, aut est in potentia materia, aut in potentia forma, aut in potentia compositum. Non secundo, nec tertio, quia tunc postea fieret actu forma vel compositum; sed hoc est impossibile; ergo, etc. Si est in potentia materia, ergo non est actu materia; ergo omnino nihil est.

[3] Item, V *Physicae*: "quod movetur est, quod generatur non est";[2] ergo generatio non est motus; ergo uniformiter accipit utrobique pro subiecto, quia sicut terminus generationis dum est in generari non est, sic nec terminus motus; ergo quale esse affirmatur de subiecto motus, tale negatur a subiecto generationis. Sed subiectum motus inquantum huiusmodi est formaliter ens in potentia, quia "motus est actus entis in potentia inquantum huiusmodi,"[3] III *Physicae*; ergo esse in potentia negatur a subiecto generationis.

[4] Item, I *Physicae*, "materia non est scibilis nisi per analogiam ad formam";[4] sed si haberet entitatem positivam aliam a forma esset scibilis secundum se.

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5 Utrum] Circa hanc distinctionem duodecimam queritur primo utrum materia p | in] Quaeritur utrum W | substantia generabili] *inv.* Om p | generabili] *om.* p | aliqua] *om.* p 8 cap. 8] *om.* W | neque] nec T | neque] nec W T 8–9 quantum] quanta W 9 neque] nec W T | ergo] igitur T p 10 est] ens *add.* p 10–11 in potentia] *om.* W 11 secundo] modo *add.* W T 12 ergo] igitur T p 13 ergo] igitur W T p | ergo] igitur p | est] intelligo per materiam quod existit per se, quod non est quale, nec quantum, nec aliud decem(!) predicamentorum, quem est in potentia omnia ista decem predicamenta, ut declaratum est in Physicis *add.* T 14 Physicae] Physicorum W | ergo] igitur T p 15 ergo] igitur T | accipit] accidit T | subiecto] supposito p 17 ergo] igitur T p | subiecto] motus *add.* T 18 huiusmodi] *om.* T 19 est … huiusmodi] *iter.* Om | Physicae] Physicorum W 20 ergo] igitur p 21 Physicae] Physicorum W | analogiam] entitatem W audaciam p 22 entitatem … aliam] aliam entitatem W

1 Aristot., *Metaph.* VII c. 3, AL 25 3.2, p. 135; 1029^{a}20–21; *Auct. Aristot.* 1.161, PhM 17, p. 128.
2 Aristot., *Phys.* V c. 1, AL 7 1.2, p. 195; 225^{a}25–29.
3 Aristot., *Phys.* III c. 1, AL 7 1.2, pp. 98–99; 201^{a}10–11.
4 Aristot., *Phys.* I c. 7, AL 7 1.2, p. 34; 191^{a}8–11; *Auct. Aristot.* 2.29, PhM 17, p. 142.

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[5] Item, si materia esset aliquid positive, aut ergo esset actus, aut ens in actu. Non actus, quia "actus separat et distinguit"[5] VII *Metaphysicae*, nunc autem "in fundamento naturae nihil est distinctum,"[6] II *Metaphysicae*. Si est ens actu, ergo composita, et sic non esset primum principium. Ergo nulla realitas positiva est ipsius materiae.

[6] Oppositum: II *Physicae* et V *Metaphysicae* habetur quod "materia est ex quo fit res cum insit"[7] per hoc quod est, ex quo patet quod non est forma, quia illud ex quo fit compositum praecedit forma. Per hoc quod dicitur 'cum insit' excluditur privatio.

⟨Articulus 1⟩

⟨Opinio⟩

[7] Ad quaestionem dicitur quod res generabilis | est simplex, et aliqui dicunt quod est tantum materia, aliqui quod est tantum forma et idem intelligunt in re. W 96va

[8] Dicentes quod est tantum materia dicunt quod materia proficit in gradus suos qui non sunt aliud ab essentia materiae; sicut enim dimensio interminata proficit usque ad terminum et non est quantitas terminata res alia ab interminata, sed est eius terminus intrinsecus, tamen aliquo modo dicitur quantitas composita ex interminata et termino, sic forma substantialis est terminus intrinsecus materiae, et tamen dicitur substantia composita ex illo interminato et termino. Alii vocant illud formam.[8]

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1 aliquid] ens W | ergo] igitur T p 2 VII Metaphysicae] *om.* W p 4 ergo] igitur T p | Ergo] igitur T p 6 Physicae] Physicorum W 7 quo] qua p | quo] qua p 8 forma] formam T non *add.* Om W 12 res generabilis] *inv.* p 13 est] *om.* W 14 re] se T 15 Dicentes] dicendo Om p | est tantum] *inv.* T | materia] *om.* p 16 ab ... materiae] a materia W 17 usque] usum T | ad] in p | terminata] interminata W | ab] a W 17–18 interminata] terminata W 19 composita ex] *in marg.* W terminata ex *add.* W | termino] terminata p | est] dicitur T 21 illud] istud W

5 ARISTOT., *Metaph.* VII c. 13, AL 25 3.2, p. 159; 1039^{a}7; *Auct. Aristot.* 1.187, PhM 17, p. 130.

6 ARISTOT., *Metaph.* I c. 8, transl. arab.-lat., ed. Iuntina 8, f. 14^{rb} F; 989^{b}6–7; *Auct. Aristot.* 1.31, PhM 17, p. 117.

7 ARISTOT., *Phys.* I c. 9, AL 7 1.2, p. 240; 192^{a}30–32; *Metaph.* V c. 4, AL 25 3.2, p. 96; 1014^{b}27–28; *Metaph.* V c. 4, AL 25 3.2, p. 97; 1015^{a}3–4.

8 Cf. DUNS SCOTUS, *Lect.* II d. 12. q. un., ed. Vat. 19, pp. 79–80.

⟨Contra opinionem⟩

[9] Contra istam viam. Primo per rationes PHILOSOPHI, I *Physicorum*, I *De Generatione* et XII *Metaphysicae* "omne agens naturale aliquid corrumpit et aliquid producit in generatione naturali."[9]

[10] Ergo requirit prius oppositum generando, quod est terminus a quo generationis, et non fit oppositum ex opposito: concordia enim non fit discordia; ergo requirit aliquid in quod agit alterum ab utroque terminorum; ergo oportet aliquid esse subiectum commune sub utroque terminorum.

[11] Dicitur huic concedendo quod agens naturale in generatione naturali aliquid corrumpit et aliquid producit; corrumpit enim terminum a quo et producit terminum ad quem. Non tamen requiritur subiectum commune, quia "generatio est transmutatio totius in totum,"[10] I *De Generatione*; ergo totum terminum a quo corrumpit. Non sic est in alterationibus, quia accidentia requi-
T 137^{vb} runt subiectum in quo sunt, | et ideo non transmutatur totum in totum; sed forma substantialis non habet subiectum in quo est, sed totum est terminus a quo et totum terminus ad quem.

Om 161^{v} [12] Contra: nihil prohibet | effectum produci a generante sine illo quo presente producto termino magis debilitatur agens, et [p 33^{vb}] hoc quando agens habet in virtute effectum suum sine illo alio; sed praesentia contrarii magis debilitat agens naturale quam absentia eius; ergo, si in eius virtute habet totum effectum, posset totum effectum ponere in esse absque praesentia contrarii. Si enim generatum est simplex, si agens habet formam in eius potestate, totum

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2 Primo] *om.* W probo T | rationes] rationem p | I Physicorum] *om.* p | Physicorum] et *add.* Om p 3 et] *om.* Om p | XII] II T 5 Ergo] igitur p | Ergo requirit] generatione convenit T | requirit] requiritur W | oppositum] aliquid in W in *add.* p | quod] quia p 6 non … opposito] oppositum non fit oppositum W | fit] fuit T | fit] fuit T 7 ergo] igitur T p | requirit] requiritur T | ab] *om.* p | utroque] utrobique Om | terminorum] illorum T | ergo] igitur p 8 subiectum] suppositum p | utroque] utrobique Om | terminorum] et *add.* T 11 subiectum] suppositum p 12 transmutatio] translatio p | totum] per Philosophum *add.* W | ergo] igitur p 13 corrumpit] etc. *add.* W | alterationibus] alterantibus p 14 subiectum] suppositum p | transmutatur] transfertur p 15 subiectum] suppositum p 16 terminus] *om.* W 17 Contra] illud *add.* T p | effectum] terminum W | illo quo] *inv.* p 18 producto termino] *om.* W | magis … agens] agens magis debilitatur W | hoc] *om.* W 19 suum] *om.* W | illo alio] corruptione illius W | contrarii] aliqua p 20 naturale] *om.* W | ergo] igitur T p | si … habet] agens habens W 21 effectum … absque] causare in esse sine W | praesentia] corruptione W 22 generatum] productum W | est] sit W | in eius] *inv.* W

9 ARISTOT., *Phys.* I c. 7, AL 7 1.2, pp. 30–31; 190^{a}14–21; *De gen. et corr.* I c. 4, AL 11 1, pp. 23–24; 319^{b}1–31.

10 Cf. ARISTOT., *De gen. et corr.* I c. 4, AL 11 1, p. 24; 319^{b}14–18; *Auct. Aristot.* 4.3, PhM 17, p. 167.

effectum habet in eius potestate, et ita posset agens naturale naturaliter agere, vel generare substantiam, sine corruptione alicuius contrarii.

[13] Praeterea, hoc non solum sequitur quod possit, immo quod necessario hoc faciat, quia agens naturale necessario agit quantum potest, et totum effectum potest causare, etsi contrarium non sit presens; ergo necessario totum producit, etsi contrarium non sit presens, ergo potest generare sine corruptione. Non enim intenditur corruptio nisi quia aliquid effectus causandi est intrinsece aliquid ipsius corrumpendi.

[14] Secundo ad idem, VII *Metaphysicae*, cap. 5, "aliqua substantia est corruptibilis ab intrinseco"[11] eo modo quo caelum non est corruptibile; sed talis non potest esse tantum actus simplex, quia sic nihil haberet ratione cuius esset corruptibilis; ergo oportet quod sit substantia composita ex actu et realitate propria alia.

[15] Dices: substantia simplex quae habet contrarium est corruptibilis, quae non, non.

[16] Contra: per hoc quod habet contrarium non efficitur alia natura in se magis quam si non haberet; ergo nihil intrinsecum in ea est ratio corruptibilitatis, ideo PHILOSOPHUS ponit quod "possibile esse et non esse habet materiam intrinsecam."[12]

[17] Tertio ad idem sic: si non est aliqua talis entitas | in substantia composita, W 96^{vb}
sequitur quod nulla erit generatio, nulla corruptio, et quod nulla mutatio sit possibilis in substantiis, vel substantialis, quia ut habetur V *Physicae* "generatio est mutatio a non subiecto in subiectum, corruptio econtra";[13] ergo si nullum est subiectum commune neutra istarum erit possibilis.

[18] Similiter, VI *Physicae* vult quod "non est mutatio nisi alicuius aliter se habentis";[14] sed non est aliqua mutatio alicuius aliter se habentis a privatione

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1 effectum] *om.* W 1–2 agere vel] *om.* T p | agere ... generare] producere W 2 alicuius] *om.* W | alicuius contrarii] *inv.* p 3 Praeterea] praeter p | immo] sed W 4 quantum] inquantum W 5 causare] creare p 5–6 ergo ... presens] *om.* (*hom.*) p 8 ipsius] *om.* W 9 VII] II T 10 caelum] totum p 12 ergo] igitur T p | realitate] propria *add.* Om 14 Dices] dicit Om; dicunt p 16 alia] aliqua p 17 ergo] igitur T p 20 ad ... sic] sic ad idem p | est] sit W | aliqua] *om.* W 21 erit] est T | nulla] nec W | et] etiam p | et ... nulla] nec W 21–22 sit ... substantialis] substantialis possibilis W 22 Physicae] Physicorum W T 23 mutatio] *iter. sed del.* Om | ergo] igitur T p 24 est] sit W | istarum] *om.* T 25 VI] VIII T | Physicae] Physicorum W | est] sit W 26 sed ... habentis] *om.* (*hom.*) T | alicuius ... habentis] *om.* W

11 Cf. ARISTOT., *Metaph.* VII c. 7, AL 25 3.2, p. 143; 1032^{a}20–21.

12 ARISTOT., *Metaph.* VII c. 7, AL 25 3.2, p. 143; 1032^{a}20–22; *Auct. Aristot.* 1.170, PhM 17, p. 129.

13 ARISTOT., *Phys.* V c. 1, AL 7 1.2, pp. 194–195; 225^{a}1–20; *Auct. Aristot.* 2.152,153, PhM 17, p. 152.

14 Cf. ARISTOT., *Phys.* VI c. 3–4, AL 7 1.2, p. 229; 234^{b}5–17.

ad formam si materia non est quid aliud a forma; nam privatio non est nata esse nisi in illo quod est natum esse sub opposito eius; forma autem non est nata esse sub opposita forma, nec etiam manet forma eadem sub utroque terminorum, nec aliquid se habet aliter quam prius nisi sit manens.

[19] Et cum allegatur pro illa parte quod in generatione convertitur totum in totum, non est intelligendum quod ibi sit transubstantiatio; sed si materia non maneret, generatio esset vera transubstantiatio. Ideo in hac mutatione proprie est transubstantiatio totius in totum et in nulla alia, quia non est transmutatio in transubstantiatione cum ibi nulla sit mutatio. Transmutatio enim includit mutationem, in aliis vero mutationibus non est transmutatio totius in totum, quia non est ibi totum, quia cum mutatur lignum frigidum in lignum calidum, non est hoc totum nisi per accidens ex ligno et calido. Unde quod est per se totum est lignum et illud non transmutatur. Nunc autem totum per se non est totum per partes, sed totum per accidens non est nisi quasi partes. Quia ergo non est totum per se ex subiecto et accidente, non transmutatur ibi totum in totum, sicut autem ibi est totum per accidens sic per accidens transmutatur in totum; sed ubi totum est compositum ex materia et forma, esto quod sint decem formae substantiales in eodem, adhuc totum est per se unum.

p 34ra [20] Quarto ad | idem sic: "in genere causae materialis est per se ordo,"[15] II *Metaphysicae*; in potentiis receptivis potest aliquid esse receptivum magis, aliquid minus; ergo in isto genere causae erit status ad primum receptivum, et idem non recepit se; ergo oportet quod sit res alia a forma recepta.

[21] Quinto ad idem sic: aliquod causatum est causatum a quatuor causis, aliter enim aliqua causa causabit sine efficiente; ergo oportet quod materia sit una istarum quatuor, et causa non est tota res. Nunc, si materia sit causa, oportet quatuor esse causas, quia si materia est causa, forma erit; et ipsa non est nisi ab efficiente; efficiens movetur a fine. Si tamen materia non concurrit ad

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1 si] sed T 4 prius] *scrips. sed del.* W manet *add. sed del.* Om 5 cum] tunc T 6 transubstantiatio] transmutatio T 7 generatio] *om.* W | vera] *om.* W | transubstantiatio] transmutatio T et *add.* T | proprie] *om.* W 8 est transubstantiatio] transmutatio *scrips. sed del. et mg. corr.* T | transubstantiatio] transmutatio T p | transmutatio] transubstantiatio W transubstantiatio *scrips. sed. del. et mg. corr.* Om 9 transubstantiatione] transmutatione T translatione p | mutatio] et *add.* W | enim] *om.* W 11 quia] *om.* Om et p | mutatur] inmutatur T | lignum] *om.* T 12 calido] quia nec unum *add. infra* W 13 transmutatur] transmutaretur p 14 totum per] suae p | per] *om.* W | ergo] igitur T p 16–17 sicut ... totum] *om.* (*hom.*) T 16 ibi] non *add.* W | est] ibi *scrips. sed del. et* nisi(!) *add. infra* W 17 forma] substantiali *add.* W 17–18 sint decem] set* dece T 19 in] materia in *add.* Om T p 20 potentiis] enim *add.* W *om.* p 21 ergo] igitur p | isto] illo p 22 recepit] recipit p | ergo] igitur p 24 ergo] igitur T p 26 quia] nunc W 27 efficiens] autem *add.* W vero *add.* T p | tamen] *om.* p

15 Aristot., *Metaph.* II c. 2, AL 25 3.2, pp. 44–45; 994a1–b6.

causatum, nullius erit causa. Ergo, ubi concurrit, causatum habebit materiam et aliam rem.

[22] Sexto ad idem sic: substantia, quae per se est, dividitur in simplex et compositum; sed si compositum non habet realiter partes, non est realiter compositum.

[23] Septimo sic: AUGUSTINUS, XI *Confessionum* "domine duo fecisti, unum prope nihil ut materiam"[16] et VII *Super Genesim*,[17] et ubique | ubi loquitur de materia sensit idem cum ARISTOTELE quod est tertium ab utroque contrariorum. Om 162r

[24] Et cum dicitur de illa opinione de profectu materiae in formam, ex isto sequeretur quod res generatae non distinguerentur specifice, quia si | formae non sunt res alia a materia, ergo non distinguuntur specifice a materia, et quae non differunt specie in tertio, sed sunt in illo eiusdem speciei, non possunt inter se differre specie. Ergo nulla forma generalis differret ab alia specie. W 97ra T 138ra

[25] Praeterea, haec de anima intellectiva manifeste est positio falsa; non enim potest anima intellectiva esse gradus materiae sicut intensius album est gradus formae albedinis, neque est simile de dimensione interminata et termino, quia terminus et terminatum non sunt idem identice. Talia enim non constituunt unum, sed illa quae componunt unum inter se non sunt unum; idem enim, cum se ipso, nullum compositum constituit; tamen dimensio interminata et suus terminus aliquam compositionem faciunt.

[26] Ideo dico sic, istae rationes concludunt quod aliqua est entitas positiva materiae.

⟨Articulus 2⟩

[27] Secundo, qualis sit illa entitas materiae.

[28] Dico quod talis qualis ex istis conditionibus probatis per rationes superius positas potest concludi. Et praemitto unam distinctionem, qualiter aliquid

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1 Ergo] igitur T p 6 XI] II p 7 prope] te et aliud prope *add.* T 10 de] pro W | isto] ista p 11 formae] forma p 12 sunt] sint W sit p | alia] aliae W | ergo] *om.* W igitur T p | distinguuntur] distinguitur p 13 non ... specie] *om.* W | specie] specifice T | sed] *om.* W si p | in illo] *om.* W | illo] isto p | possunt] possent W 14 Ergo] igitur p | generalis] generabilis p 15 Praeterea haec] item W | manifeste ... positio] est opinio manifeste W 18 idem] *non leg.* T 21 aliquam] a materia p 22 sic] sicut W p | rationes] res p 25 illa] ista p | materiae] et *add.* W T p 26 probatis] *om.* W probaretur p 26–27 superius] prius W 27 Et] primo *add.* W T

16 Cf. AUGUST., *Conf.* XII c. 7, CCSL 27, p. 220.

17 Cf. AUGUST., *De Gen. ad litt.* I c. 15, CSEL 28 3.2, pp. 21–22.

dicitur in potentia dupliciter, vel sicut terminus potentiae, vel sicut subiectum. Terminus potentiae dicitur in potentia obiectiva, subiectum vero in potentia subiectiva.[18] Et aliquando potest esse quod eadem est potentia obiectiva et subiectiva in comparatione tamen ad diversa, sicut superficies dicitur in potentia subiectiva respectu albedinis inducendae, albedo vero dicitur in potentia obiectiva, ita quod eadem est habitudo formae inducendae ad subiectum. Et illa habitudo inter haec extrema, in comparatione ad subiectum dicitur potentia subiectiva, in comparatione vero ad formam inducendam dicitur potentia obiectiva. Sed possibile est obiectivam esse sine subiectiva, sicut patet in creatione, ubi tantum est potentia obedientialis.

[29] Aliqui tamen, sustinentes PHILOSOPHUM vocaliter tantum, dicunt quod materia est aliquid sicut potentia obiectiva, non autem sicut potentia subiectiva, quia non maiorem entitatem tribuunt materiae nisi quod est in potentia sicut albedo quae producetur nunc ad annum.[19] Sed isti realiter

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2–3 subiectum ... obiectiva] *om.* (*hom.*) Om 5 vero] enim Om p 7 illa] ita p 8 inducendam] *om.* Om p 9 Sed ... subiectiva] *om.* T | obiectivam] obiectam p | subiectiva] subiectam p | patet] *om.* T 10 obedientialis] obedibilis Om p 11 tamen] *om.* p | tantum] tamen T *om.* p 13 est] ens *add.* W 14 nunc] hinc p | annum] *dub.* W 14–81.1 realiter negant] *inv.* W

18 Cf. HENR. DE GAND., *Quodl.* X q. 7, Op. om. 14, pp. 152–153: "Dicendum quod aliquid ex se est potentiale esse dupliciter: uno modo ut solum per se subiectum transmutationis a non esse in esse, et non ut per se terminus; alio modo ut terminus eius. Primo modo in naturalibus sola materia est potentiale esse. Secundo vero modo sola forma educta de potentia materiae vel ipsum compositum ex materia et forma est potentiale esse. De potentiali esse primo modo verum est quod efficiens sive agens quodcumque non potest illud facere esse in actu nisi imprimendo se ut formam illi vel aliquid aliud [...] Et tali modo potentiale esse bene potest esse in actu existentiae cum hoc quod est sic potentiale esse, ut materia prima in naturalibus, quae in quantum est subiectum transmutationis naturalis, non est possibile ad esse simpliciter, sed habet esse existentiae a Deo per creationem ut terminus eius [...]"; DUNS SCOTUS, *Lect.* II d. 12. q. un., ed. Vat. 19, p. 80.

19 AEGIDIUS ROMANUS, *De materia caeli contra Averroistas* q. 1, ed. Padua 1493, f. 242va: "Sed quod subicitur in generatione et corruptione, quae sunt transmutationes in substantia, est ens in potentia tantum, quod enim expoliatur una forma substantiali et induitur alia oportet quod sit potentia ante actum ..."; q. 2, ed. Padua 1493, f. 246^{vb}–247ra: "[...] vel quia unum est ipse actus, alter vero est potentia et carens actu et sic differt forma a materia. Materia autem a materia non habet per quod differat per essentiam, quia materiam secundum essentiam non dicit aliquem actum, immo sua essentia est esse in potentia"; IDEM, *Reportatio* II q. 45, ed. LUNA, p. 284: "Hoc non possumus videre, quod in potentia pura possit esse aliqua distinctio. Materia bene differt ab alia materia secundum esse, non tamen secundum essentiam. [...] Et sic una materia, quantum est in se, non potest differre ab alia materia"; THOM. DE AQUINO, *Summa theol.* I q. 46 a. 1 ad 1, ed. Leon. 4, pp. 478–479: "Sed quod possibile est esse, est materia, quae est in potentia ad esse, quod est per formam, et ad non esse, quod est per privationem. Si ergo mundus

negant PHILOSOPHUM et illud quod rationes superius adductae probant, quia si | ignis in virtute sua activa habet formam ignis generandi—et nihil plus entitatis est in igne generando nisi potentia obiectiva—ignis habet totum ignem generandum in eius virtute activa. Et tunc, sicut concludit prima ratio superius, posset aliquid naturaliter generare sine corruptione. p 34^{rb}

[30] Et secunda ratio est contra hanc viam, quia ignis non est corruptibilis propter aliquid intrinsece inclusum.

[31] Similiter tertia ratio, quia non dicitur aliquid manere idem sub utroque terminorum quod tantum est in potentia obiectiva. Albedo enim nunc ad annum, nullius transmutationis est nunc subiectum; unde, quod solum est in potentia ut sit terminus actionis non ponit aliquid nunc manere idem sub utroque terminorum.

[32] Similiter, rationes sequentes aequaliter concludunt contra istam opinionem, sicut contra primam, et auctoritates Philosophi quod "materia est per se principium",[20] I *Physicorum*, "per se causa"[21] II *Physicae* et V *Metaphysicae*, "per se pars substantiae compositae,"[22] VII *Metaphysicae*.

[33] Ideo dico quod materia est entitas extra causam suam. Ens enim in actu non dependet a non-ente in actu; compositum dependet a materia et forma; ergo neutrum istorum est solum potentia obiectiva. Nec ista potentia, quae est essentia materiae, multiplicatur ad multiplicationem terminorum, sed illa potentia materiae, quae est respectus ad terminum, numeratur secundum terminos, de qua potentia dicit ARISTOTELES III | *Physicae*: si 'posse sanari' et 'posse laborari'[23] sint idem, actus erunt idem, non autem de prima potentia, W 97^{rb}

4 concludit] concludat T 5 aliquid] *om.* W | aliquid naturaliter] *inv.* p 6 Et] etiam *add.* W | est] erit T p 7 intrinsece] intrinsecum W 9 nunc] hinc p 10 nunc] *om.* T 11 ponit] potest W | nunc] *om.* p 14 quod] quia T 15 Physicae] Physicorum W T 17 entitas] sicut subiectum potentiae est *add.* T | suam] sicut entitas positiva *add.* W 18 actu] sed *add.* T 19 ergo] igitur T p | solum] in *add.* W | ista] illa p 22 potentia] *om.* W | Physicae] Physicorum W 23 posse] *om.* W | laborari] egrotari W liberari Om | prima potentia] *inv.* T

incoepit esse, ante mundum fuit materia [...] Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, antequam mundus esset, possibile fuit mundum esse, non quidem secundum potentiam passivam, quae est materia ..."; *Summa theol.* I q. 48 a. 3, ed. Leon. 4, p. 493: "Subiectum autem privationis et formae est unum et idem, scilicet ens in potentia, sive sit ens in potentia simpliciter, sicut materia prima ..."; *Summa theol.* I q. 115 a. 1 ad. 2, ed. Leon. 5, pp. 538–539: "Sed hoc est materia prima, quae est potentia pura, sicut Deus est actus purus."

20 Cf. ARISTOT., *Phys.* I c. 7, AL 7 1.2, pp. 34–35; 191^{a}8–17; *Auct. Aristot.* 2.17, PhM 17, p. 141.

21 ARISTOT., *Phys.* II c. 3, AL 7 1.2, pp. 58–59; 195^{a}15–16; *Auct. Aristot.* 2.67, PhM 17, p. 145; ARISTOT., *Metaph.* I c. 3, AL 25 3.2, p. 18; 983^{a}26–32; *Auct. Aristot.* 1.119, PhM 17, p. 124.

22 Cf. ARISTOT., *Metaph.* VII c. 8, AL 25 3.2, p. 146; 1033^{b}17–19.

23 Cf. ARISTOT., *Phys.* III c. 1, AL 7 1.2, pp. 100–101; 201^{a}34–b3.

quae est subiectum. Istud patet, quia si nulla realitas esset alia in composito a forma, generatio esset creatio, quia nihil formae praeexistebat.

[34] Materia ergo est ens in actu distinguendo actu contra potentiam quam habet effectus in agente, et est ens in potentia quia est receptivum cuiuscumque actus actuantis, et ideo dicitur maxime ens in potentia, quia est receptivum illius quod maxime actuat. Habet tamen esse, et dicitur ens in esse proprio distincto contra esse formae, quia impossibile est quod aliquid sit verum ens extra causam suam et tamen nullum esse habeat.[24]

[35] Contra: ex hoc sequitur quod non esset possibilis vera generatio, sicut arguit ARISTOTELES I *De Generatione*: si subiectum generationis est ens actu, generatio non differt ab alteratione,[25] quia omne adveniens enti in actu est accidens. Si ergo materia est quaedam entitas positiva in actu, omne sibi adveniens erit accidens.[26]

[36] Secundo sic: potentiale quod est susceptivum non est aliquid illius generis cuius est susceptivum. Susceptivum coloris non est in genere coloris, sed quantitatis; susceptivum quantitatis non est de genere quantitatis, sed substantiae; | ergo primum susceptivum actus substantialis non est de genere substantiae; materia est primum susceptivum formae substantialis, ergo non erit in genere substantiae, nec pari | ratione aliquod ens positivum generis posterioris.

Om 162v

T 138rb

1 quia] quod T | si] *om.* Om 1–2 a forma] *om.* W 2 generatio] igitur p non *add.* Om p 3 ergo] igitur T p | actu] tamen T 5 actuantis] actualitatis Om 6 tamen] in *add.* T 7 verum] unum p | ens] existens T 9 vera] una p 12 accidens] actus *scrips. sed del. et mg. corr.* T | ergo] igitur T p | actu] ergo *add.* Om 14 susceptivum] susceptum T 15 Susceptivum] enim *add.* W | in] de W | coloris] colorem Om 17–18 ergo … substantiae] *om.* (*hom.*) p 17 susceptivum] susceptum T 18 susceptivum] susceptum T | ergo] igitur p | erit] est T 19 in] de W

24 Cf. RICHARDUS DE MEDIAVILLA, *Sent.* II d. 12 a. 1 q. 1, ed. Brixiae 1591, f. 143b: "Hic expresse videtur dicere, quod esse materiae non est ex sola forma, quod unum non esset, si materia esset res pure possibilis. Dico ergo quod ipsa esse essentia non ⟨est⟩ pure possibilis; tenet tamen in entibus infimum actualitatis gradum, carens quantum est ex se actualitate simili actualitatibus rerum quae recipiuntur in ea"; Brixiae 1591, f. 144a: "Ad quintum […] ut iam dictum est materia aliquam actualitatem importat, quamvis differentem ad actualitate formae."

25 ARISTOT., *De gen. et corr.* I c. 1, AL II 1, pp. 5–7; 314a7–314b12.

26 AEGIDIUS ROMANUS, *De materia caeli contra Averroistas* q. 1, ed. Padua 1493, f. 242va: "quod subicitur in generatione et corruptione, quae sunt transmutationes in substantia, est ens in potentia tantum […] quia si esset aliquid in actu—ut dicit ibi Commentatorem—nullam formam substantialem reciperet."

[37] Item, sequeretur quod compositum non esset per se unum, quia componeretur ex duobus in actu; ex duabus actualitatibus non fit per se unum.[27]

[38] Ad istum tertium[28] primo respondeo quod vel oportet dicere quod ens generabile et corruptibile est omnino simplex sicut forma, vel compositum ex aliquo et nihilo, vel ex aliquo et aliquo. Primum non potest dari, quia nihil est per se generabile et corruptibile nisi substantia composita; forma autem per accidens. Secundum claudit opposita. Ergo oportet dare tertium. Cum ergo ratio substantiae dividitur | in substantiam simplicem et compositam, non p 34va repugnat quod sit sic composita et per se una; si autem omne unum esset omnino simplex, in eo non posset esse hoc et hoc; stat ergo cum unitate compositi quod habeat partes in actu, distinguendo ⟨actum⟩ contra potentiam obiectivam.

[39] Dices: pari ratione 'homo albus' erit per se unum, quia ita probabiliter potest sustineri.

[40] Dico quod non: unum enim, vel est immediata passio entis, ita quod non cadit passio media, vel non est nobis nota passio media, et haec non solum est per se secundo modo 'ens est unum', sed etiam immediata, quia transcendens non habet diffinitionem. Et ideo non est aliquod medium concludendi ens esse unum nisi quia ens est ens; et sicut est de ente in generali, sic in specialibus entibus ens speciale est unum per se.

[41] Quare ergo ex quibusdam fit unum per se et ex aliis non?

[42] Dico, sicut vult PHILOSOPHUS VIII *Metaphysicae*, quod "in simplicibus non est dubium, | quia statim sunt id quod sunt."[29] Ideo, quia materia et forma W 97va sunt talia entia, ex hiis fit unum compositum per se, ex homine et albo non;

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2 per … unum] unum per se T 3 istum] idem Om illud T p | quod] quia Om | quod … dicere] *om.* W 6 per se] *om.* W 7 Ergo] igitur p | ergo] igitur T p 8 dividitur] dividatur W 9 sit sic] substantia sit W T 10 eo] ipso W T p | ergo] igitur p 11 distinguendo] distincto p 13 Dices] dicunt p 14 potest] hoc *add.* W 16 nobis … media] media nota passio nobis Om | et] ideo *add.* W 16–17 solum est] est tantum W 18 aliquod] aliud T 21 ergo] igitur p | aliis] aliquibusdam T | non] *om.* p 22 quod in] de W | simplicibus] superioribus Om 23 quia] quod Om

27 AEGIDIUS ROMANUS, *De materia caeli contra Averroistas* q. 2, ed. Padua 1493, f. 246ra: "Sed tunc quaeramus de illa materia, aut dicit puram potentiam, aut non, quod scilicet secundum essentiam suam non dicat puram potentiam sed dicat aliquid in actu. Arguemus contra eos ex eorum dictum, quod nunquam ex duobus in actu fit unum per essentiam."

28 Cf. supra § 37.

29 Cf. ARISTOT., *Metaph.* VIII c. 6, AL 25 3.2, pp. 177–178; 1045a35–b3; 1045b23–24: "Quecumque vero non habent materiam nec intellectualem nec sensualem, statim quid esse est unumquodque, quemadmodum et quod est ens, hoc in quantum quale quid. […] Quecumque vero non habent materiam, omnia simpliciter sunt quod quid."

non tamen tanta est unitas compositi sicut simplicis. Ideo in entibus est iste ordo unitatis: primo est unitas simplicium; secundo unitas compositi per se; tertio unitas per accidens subiecti et accidentis; quarto unitas ordinis; quinto unitas aggregationis, ut cumulus. Nec est alia ratio—ut dicit PHILOSOPHUS—quare ex materia et forma fit unum per se, nisi quia hoc per se actus, illud per se potentia respectu eiusdem. Nec est ratio specialis alia nisi quia materia nata est esse causa intrinseca entis et forma similiter. Et quia haec est ultimata potentialitas, illa vero ultimata actualitas illius, ideo ex hiis fit unum per se.

[43] Et cum dicitur 'ex actu et actu non fit unum per se',[30] dico quod loquendo de actu ut actus et potentia dividunt totum ens, secundum quod ens in actu fuit prius in potentia, sic materia non est ens in potentia, sed ens in actu, cum sit actu pars entis in actu. Non tamen est materia actus; nam ista dicuntur denominative, ut ponuntur dividere ens in actu et in potentia, et non dicuntur in quid.

[44] Si tamen ens in actu accipitur pro actuante et potentia pro eo quod recipit actum actuantem, dico quod materia non est ens actu, et sic loquitur PHILOSOPHUS, VII, cum dicit "actus separat et distinguit"[31] et VIII ⟨*Metaphysicae*⟩, ubi loquitur de actu actuante qui facit unum cum potentia receptiva, et actus ut accipitur pro principio agendi. Nec etiam ens in actu competit materiae, sed ut ens actu distinguitur contra ens in potentia quod nullo modo est in actu extra causam suam. Et sic ex duobus in actu potest fieri per se unum et tamen utrumque habet proprium esse, cum non sit ponere ens in actu aliquo modo praeter esse. Patet ergo ad tertium.

[45] Ad primum illorum trium,[32] dico quod antiqui ponebant, sicut PHILOSOPHUS eis imponit, quod subiectum generationis fuit corpus actu, ita quod primum subiectum fuit ens in actu per formam substantialem, et tale est per se alterabile. Nunc autem ponere subiectum generationis ens aliquo modo non

1 iste] illae p 2 unitas] ordo T | secundo] est *add.* p 3 quinto] quia Om p 6 respectu] respectum Om | nisi] *om.* p 7 intrinseca] *om.* T | forma] formaliter p | ultimata] ultima T 8 illa vero] et illa W | ultimata] ultima T | illius] intrinseca *add.* W 9 actu … actu] duobus in actu T 11 fuit prius] *inv.* W | ens] *om.* W | ens] *om.* W 12 ista] illa p 13 et] ens *add.* W | non] ideo T 15 Si] sed T | tamen] *scrips. sed del. et* cum *in marg. adnot.* T | ens … accipitur] accipiatur ens in actu W | pro] actu *add.* T p 18 et] etiam W 20 actu distinguitur] *inv.* Om 22 aliquo] quo T 23 praeter] sine W per T | ergo] igitur T p 24 illorum] istorum W | dico] *om.* W | antiqui] aliqui Om p 25 subiectum] suppositum p 26 subiectum] suppositum p | ens] corpus W | in] *om.* W 27 subiectum] suppositum p

30 Cf. supra § 37.

31 ARISTOT., *Metaph.* VII c. 13, AL 25 3.2, p. 159; 1039ª7; *Auct. Aristot.* 1.187, PhM 17, p. 130.

32 Cf. supra § 35.

destruit generationem, quia ratio generationis necessario includit quod subiectum sit aliquod ens manens idem sub utroque terminorum, aliter enim nihil aliter se haberet, licet non similiter se haberet, tamen non aliter se haberet.

[46] Ad tertium,[33] si ponitur quod | quodlibet genus habet proprium potentiale et proprium actuale, ita quod albedo quamquam sit forma simplex componitur ex intrinsecis principiis, ut habetur XII *Metaphysicae*, secundo cap. Aliorum principiatorum sunt alia principia, tunc sequitur quod susceptivum in quodlibet genere est in eodem genere per reductionem, sicut quantitas interminata ponitur proprium potentiale in genere | quantitatis. Vel non ponendo accidentia componi ex principiis intrinsecis, ratio est quare susceptivum coloris non est eiusdem generis, sed aliquid prioris generis, ut superficies, quia color habet potentiale quod secundum totum genus est prius toto genere coloris, et sic quantitas respectu substantiae. Ergo necesse est formas primi | generis simpliciter habere primum | susceptivum quod sit in eodem genere per reductionem, quia non posset esse generis prioris primi generis. p 34^{vb} T 138va W 97^{vb} Om 163^{r}

[47] Patet ergo secundum principale qualis sit entitas materiae.

⟨Articulus 3⟩

[48] Tertio, quomodo distinguitur a forma? Dico quod materia est primo diversa a forma et simpliciter alterius rationis, quia prima extrema ut actus et potentia componentia unum sunt primo diversa, quia nihil est identice idem in prima materia et forma, quia si aliquid eiusdem rationis cum forma esset in materia, quantum ad illud materia non esset potentia receptiva, sed actuaret aliud; ergo non se tota esset primum receptivum. Si aliquid eiusdem rationis cum materia esset in forma, quantum ad illud non actuaret, sed actum reciperet; ergo non esset primus actus simpliciter, quia quantum ad illud non daret

1 destruit] distinguit Om p 3 licet] enim *add.* T | tamen] a *add.* p | tamen … haberet] *om.* W 4 ponitur] ponatur W 6 intrinsecis principiis] *inv.* W | secundo cap] quod W aut *add.* p 7 principiatorum] *om.* W principia p 9 ponitur] *om.* p | proprium … quantitatis] in eodem genere per reductionem cum quantitate terminata W 9–10 ponendo accidentia] potentia actuata p 11 aliquid … generis] prioris generans p | ut] et T 13 Ergo] igitur p 15 posset] possit Om p 16 ergo] igitur T p 18 distinguitur] differt p | forma] et *add.* W T p | materia] *om.* W | primo] simpliciter W 19 simpliciter] *om.* W 20 primo] prima W | in] cum p 22 illud] id p | potentia] *om.* W 22–23 actuaret aliud] *inv.* W 23 ergo] igitur T p | Si] sed T 24 cum … forma] *om.* W 25 ergo] et quantum ad illud W igitur T p | actus] *om.* T

33 Cf. supra § 36.

esse actuando. Ideo, quanto magis componentia sunt diversa, dum hoc actus illud potentia respectu huius, tanto magis disponit⟨ur⟩ vel requiritur ad hoc quod constituitur tertium ex his.

[49] Ex his sequitur quod tam materia quam forma est ens absolutum. Si enim materia in essentia sua esset quid respectivum, ut quidam ponunt, non esset primum fundamentum formae substantialis; non enim potest fundamentum esse magis respectivum quam id quod in eo fundatur.

[50] Adhuc arguitur contra dicta per COMMENTATOREM VIII *Metaphysicae*, co. 15, in fine exponentem ARISTOTELEM "agens extrahens formam a materia non largitur multitudinem sed perfectionem";[34] si tamen materia et forma essent duo entia diversa, extrahens formam causaret multitudinem.

[51] Dico quod in generatione naturali concurrunt duae potentiae. Una enim est potentia respectu termini producti, alia est potentia subiectiva materiae a qua extrahitur forma. Primo enim extrahitur compositum sicut primus terminus potentiae et sibi non largitur agens multitudinem, quia ita compositus est ignis in potentia in potentialitate, sicut est in actu ignis in actu, quia duas partes essentiales realiter differentes in potentia habuit ignis in potentia sicut ignis in actu realiter diversas in actu. Sed cuiuscumque generationis est aliqua potentia, ita quod generati est aliqua potentia quae praecedit, quae pars est geniti, ut habetur VII *Metaphysicae*.[35] Ideo extrahitur forma per accidens a materia et compositum per se; non ergo extrahens largitur multitudinem nisi per accidens in hoc quod facit illud esse in actu quod prius fuit in potentia nec largitur multitudinem aliam, quia sicut unum fuit generabile in potentia obiectiva et nunc est in actu, qui est totius geniti, et potentia subiectiva materiae quae adhuc
p 35ra manet sicut prius, ideo non | plura sunt nunc in actu quam prius erant in potentia. Vocando tamen 'multitudinem' quia novum ens est in actu et sic plura sunt in actu quam prius, quantum ad hoc est ibi aliqua multitudo; tamen prius fuit materia pars alterius entis in actu.

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1 actuando] *om.* W et *add.* W | dum] dummodo W tamen *add.* T p 2 illud potentia] *om.* W 3 constituitur] constituatur W 5 respectivum] receptivum Om | ut] sicut T | ut … ponunt] *om.* W 6 primum] *om.* T 7 id] illud T 8 Adhuc … dicta] contra dicta adhuc arguitur W 9 co … Aristotelem] *om.* W | fine] exponentem illud translatio* enim non largitur multitudinem sed perfectionem in esse et in toto hoc est unum in actu *add.* T 9–10 a materia] aliquam T 12 enim] *om.* T 16 est … actu] ignis in actu in sua actualitate W 18 aliqua] alia p 21 ergo] igitur T p | largitur] per *add.* Om | nisi] non p 23 aliam] qua prefuit in potentia *add.* W T | nunc] tunc T 24 geniti] generati T | subiectiva] receptiva W

34 AVER., *In Metaph.* VIII c. 15, ed. Iuntina 8, f. 224raA; *Auct. Aristot.* 1.217, PhM 17, p. 133.
35 Locus non inventus.

⟨Ad argumenta principalia⟩

[52] Ad primum principale,[36] auctoritas PHILOSOPHI VII ⟨*Metaphysicae*⟩ non est dicta ex intentione quod "materia non est quid, etc.", sed dicitur hoc opponendo ad partem falsam disputando quaestionem. Et hoc patet, quia postea dicit "sed impossibile" et arguit ad oppositum. Vel si debeat admitti auctoritas, potest dici quod ut ens determinatur speciebus et differentiis, sic materia nec est quid, nec quantum, nec quale.

[53] Dices: | 'ARISTOTELES dicit quod omnia praedicantur denominative de materia, nihil ergo de ea praedicatur essentialiter'. W 98ra

[54] Dico quod materia non praedicatur de composito nisi denominative, ut "archa est lignea, non lignum."[37] Similiter ut dicitur IX *Metaphysicae* "hoc non est illud, sed illinum."[38] Et sicut praedicatio per se non convertitur, sic nec praedicatio denominativa. Cum ergo materia dicatur denominative de composito, compositum non praedicatur de materia denominative, ergo falsum est assumptum quod dicit omnia praedicari denominative de materia; certum est enim quod haec non est denominativa 'materia est materia'.

[55] Praeterea, hoc esto, quod omnia praedicarentur | denominative de materia, adhuc dico quod duplex est denominatio; denominativum enim differt solo casu a principali. Potest ergo intelligi formam cadere dupliciter ad aliud: vel ad suppositum alterius naturae vel alterius generis, vel ad suppositum proprii generis. Et duplex est denominatio, quarum una accipitur per cadentiam formae ad suppositum alterius naturae; alia per cadentiam formae a propria quidditate ad suppositum proprium. Prima est propria denominatio, et ibi est propria praedicatio denominativa et ibi numquam est praedicatio nisi accidentalis. Secunda dicitur minus proprie denominatio sicut 'homo est animal' et non 'animalitas', ubi est praedicatio denominativa sicut superius dicitur T 138vb

3 quod] quia T | dicitur] dicit T p | hoc] *om.* W 4 patet] apparet W | quia] quod T | postea] post W 6 quod … ens] *om.* p 7 nec … quale] etc W 8 Dices] dicunt p | praedicantur] predicatur Om 9 materia] et non essentialiter *add.* W | de] *om.* Om T | praedicatur] *om.* W 12 illinum] illum Om illius p | sicut] predestinatio *scrips. sed del.* Om 12–13 per … praedicatio] *iter.* Om 13 ergo] igitur W 14 non … materia] de materia non praedicatur W | ergo] igitur p 15 est] *om.* Om 17 Praeterea] praeter p | praedicarentur] dicatur *add.* p 19 ergo] igitur p 20–21 alterius … suppositum] *om.* (*hom.*) p 21 Et] sic *add.* W T 21–22 per cadentiam] pro cadentia p 22 naturae] vel alterius generis vel ad suppositum alterius naturae *add.* p | per cadentiam] pro cadentia p 23 propria] proprie W 24 propria] proprie W

36 Cf. supra § 2.

37 Cf. ARISTOT., *Metaph.* IX c. 7, AL 25 3.2, p. 187; 1049a19–21.

38 ARISTOT., *Metaph.* IX c. 7, AL 25 3.2, p. 187; 1049a19–20.

de inferiori per cadentiam formae a quidditate. Ista tamen praedicatio est per
Om 163v se et numquam accidentalis. | Sic non dicimus quod 'homo est anima', sed 'animatus' denominative; nec anima dicitur 'homo', sed 'humana'. Ista denominatio non est accidentalis. Sic materia dicta de composito denominative non dicitur de eo accidentaliter.

[56] Ad aliud,[39] sicut vult COMMENTATOR, I *Physicorum*, "aliquid est per accidens sine quo non potest res esse."[40] Privatio est principium per accidens, tamen necessarium; sic subiectum motus inquantum huiusmodi, licet formaliter sit ens in potentia, est tamen necessario in actu, etsi per accidens. Nunc autem non est necesse subiectum generationis esse ens in actu per formam substantialem, sicut oportet subiectum motus; dico ergo quod ly 'quod' uniformiter refert subiectum utrobique. Et ratio formalis subiecti motus non ponit nisi quod sit ens in potentia per se. Necessario tamen requirit concomitanter quod sit ens in actu per formam substantialem, sicut "aliter album aedificat per accidens, aliter homo"[41] V *Metaphysicae*. Aedificator enim per se; album vero per accidens et non necessario; homo vero per accidens, necessario tamen requiritur quod aedificans sit homo, vel quodcumque rationale. Et cum dicitur quod solum affirmatur esse in potentia de subiecto motus inquantum huiu-
p 35rb smodi, dico quod falsum est quia necessario affirmatur | de eo esse in actu, licet non per se.

[57] Ad aliud,[42] cum dicit PHILOSOPHUS quod subiectum motus, vel subiecta natura, est scibilis per analogiam ad formam, patet per ARISTOTELEM, usque ad V *Physicorum*, loquitur de subiecto ut indifferenter se habet ad motum proprie et ad mutationem subitam, quia prius non distinguit motum a mutatione subita. Et ideo illa auctoritas non plus concludit de subiecto generationis quam de subiecto motus proprie dicti. Hoc patet: subdit enim statim sicut aes se habet ad statuam et lignum ad lectum.[43] Ideo dico quod iste est intellectus

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1 per cadentiam] pro cadentia p | praedicatio] denominatio W | est] *om.* Om T 2 non] nec p 3 anima] etiam p | Ista] illa p 7 esse] sicut *add.* T 8 tamen] non *add.* W | necessarium] necessario T p | subiectum] intellectus *add. sed del.* Om suppositum p 11 ergo] igitur p 13 requirit concomitanter] requiritur communiter p 14 album] *om.* Om 16 tamen] non p 17 vel ... rationale] *om.* W 21 dicit Philosophus] dicitur p | subiectum ... vel] *scrips. sed del.* W | vel] in p 22 natura] *om.* p | est scibilis] non est scibilis nisi p; est formam vel Om | per] quod W p 23 Physicorum] *om.* Om T p 24 subitam] subiectam Om p 25 subita] subiecta p | ideo] *om.* T p 26–27 Hoc ... lectum] *om.* W 27 iste] ille p

39 Cf. supra § 3.
40 Cf. AVER., *Phys.* I com. 66, ed. Iuntina 4, f. 39va G.
41 Cf. ARISTOT., *Metaph.* V c. 7, AL 25 3.2, pp. 102–103; 1017a9–20.
42 Cf. supra § 4.
43 Cf. THOMAS DE AQUINO, *In I Phys.* c. 7 lect. 13, ed. Leon. 2, p. 46.

ARISTOTELIS, quod cognitio alicuius ut in se et ad se non sufficit ut ipsum est ad alterum, ita quod eius cognitio ut principium est | ad terminum, non est scibilis nec potest haberi a Deo nec ab angelo, nisi in analogia ad terminum, quia aliter non est scibile. W 98rb

[58] Sed dices: estne materia in se scibilis nisi in analogia ad formam?

[59] Dico quod in se est simpliciter scibilis, sed non a nobis; in se quidem, quia sicut essentia divina prius potest eam causare aliquo modo quam formam, ita intellectus eius potest eam prius intelligere; non tamen a nobis est scibilis sic, propter impotentiam nostram,[44] nec forma substantialis nisi per operationes sensibiles, quia ex quo videmus nunc illud calefacere in actu et nunc causare operationem contrariam, per se arguimus novam formam substantialem post priorem. Et ulterius, cum non possit esse nova forma nisi aliquid sit substratum naturae, arguimus hoc esse materiam, tamquam quid tertium a contrariis formis, et sic devenimus in cognitionem materiae ex transmutatione secundum formas, et ex diversa operatione diversas formas, sicut transmutatio secundum locum fecit scire locum. Nec tamen propter hoc sequitur quod forma substantialis non est cognoscibilis nisi in analogia ad operationes quantum est de se; neque enim perfectissima intelligimus neque imperfectissima, sed media, quia ipsa tantum nobis sunt proportionata.

[60] Ad ultimum,[45] cum dicitur 'materia aut est actus aut in actu', dictum est quod est in actu uno modo, et ens in potentia alio modo. Nec propter hoc sequitur quod est composita, quia non est in actu sicut substantia composita.

[61] Ad illud[46] ad oppositum patet, quia non concedo quod sit aliquid compositum realiter et tamen non ex partibus realibus.

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1 ipsum] *om.* W 2 eius cognitio] *inv.* W 5 dices] dicunt p 6 est simpliciter] *inv.* p 7 modo] prius *add.* W 8 prius] *om.* W | a] *mg. corr.* T 9 nec] enim *add.* Om T p 10 illud] istud W 11–12 substantialem] essentialem p 12 esse] *om.* T | sit] fuerit W 13 naturae] commune W | quid tertium] *om.* T 15 formas] operationes Om 15–16 transmutatio] translatio p 16 Nec] non T | tamen] *om.* W 19 nobis sunt] *inv.* p 21 propter hoc] propterea p 23 ad] in W 24 realibus] *iter.* W

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44 Cf. RICHARDUS DE MEDIAVILLA, *Sent.* II d. 12 a. 1 q. 1, ed. Brixiae 1591, f. 144a: "Ad quartum dicendum quod [...] quamvis materia quantum est ex parte sua cognoscibilis sit positive, non tamen quo ad nos propter nostri intellectus debilitatem. Unde intellectus angelicus eam potissime cognoscit, etiam praeter analogiam ad formam."

45 Cf. supra § 5.

46 Cf. supra § 6.

⟨Ioannis Duns Scoti
Reportatio Parisiensis II-B
Distinctio duodecima
Quaestio 1⟩

L 136va
P25va

[1] Utrum in substantia rei generabilis et corruptibilis sit aliqua entitas positiva realiter distincta a forma.

⟨Argumenta principalia⟩

[2] Quod non. Probatio: VII *Metaphysicae* dicit Aristoteles quod "materia nec est quid, nec quale, nec quantum, nec aliquid entium quibus ens determinatur";[1] ergo non est substantia.

[3] Dicit quod materia est determinativa entis in potentia, et auctoritas Aristotelis tenet de ente in actu.

[4] Contra, si materia est ens in potentia, aut in potentia materia, aut in potentia forma, aut in potentia compositum; non est in potentia forma nec compositum, quia utrumque positum in esse est impossibile. Eodem modo materia non est in potentia materia, quia tunc materia non esset materia, et ens non dicitur pluribus modis, patet II *De anima*;[2] ergo materia non est ens in potentia.

[5] Item, V *Physicae* probat Aristoteles quod generatio non est motus per hoc argumentum: "quod movetur est et quod generatur non est; ergo generatio non est motus."[3] Ergo oportet quod uniformiter attribuatur esse ei quod movetur et negetur esse ab eo quod generatur, aliter argumentum non valeret. Sed esse affirmatum de illo quod movetur est esse in potentia, quia "motus est actus entis in potentia secundum quod in potentia,"[4] III *Physicae*; ergo esse negatum de eo quod generatur erit esse in potentia; ergo materia non erit ens in potentia, quia argumentum non procedit de termino generationis, sed de subiectum; manifestum est, quia de termino non est verum dicere, quia non est.

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6 positiva] passiva P | realiter] *om.* P 8 Probatio] probatur P 11–12 et … Aristotelis] *om.* (*lac.*) L 13 Contra] sed *praem.* P 14–15 non … positum] *om.* (*hom.*) P 19 quod] *om.* L 20 et] *om.* P 21 Ergo oportet] *inv.* P | ei quod] a quod non P 22 esse … eo] ab esse L 23 affirmatum] aufertur P 24 secundum] sed L 25 erit] est P 27 quia] quod P

1 Aristot., *Metaph.* VII c. 3, AL 25 3.2, p. 135; 1029a20–21; *Auct. Aristot.* 1.161, PhM 17, p. 128.

2 Cf. Aristot., *De anima* II c. 1, ed. Leon. 45.1, p. 67; 412b8–9: "Unum enim et esse cum multipliciter dicatur, quod proprie est, actus est."

3 Aristot., *Phys.* V c. 1, AL 7 1.2, p. 195; 225a25–29.

4 Aristot., *Phys.* III c. 1, AL 7 1.2, pp. 98–99; 201a10–11.

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[6] Item, I *Physicae* "materia non est scibilis nisi per analogiam ad formam";[5] sed si esset ens positivum realiter distinctum a forma, esset actu ens aliud a forma ⟨et⟩ posset per se cognosci.

[7] Item, si materia esset ens positivum distinctum actualiter a forma, esset actu ens aliud a forma; aut ergo actus, aut ens in actu compositum ex actu et potentia. Primum non, quia "actus separat et distinguit,"[6] VII *Metaphysicae*, et "in fundamento naturae nihil est distinctum,"[7] II *Metaphysicae*; nec potest materia esse compositum ex actu et potentia, quia tunc non esset principium, sed principiatum.

[8] Oppositum, II *Physicae* et V ⟨*Metaphysicae*⟩ | "materia est ex qua fit res cum insit";[8] ergo materia est aliquid inhaerens rei, cum res est ex qua res fit; sed forma non est ex qua res fit, quia est terminus factionis; ergo materia et forma sunt realiter distincta. L 136^{vb}

⟨Articulus 1⟩

⟨Opinio⟩

[9] Una opinio dicit rem generabilem et corruptibilem habere tantum in se unam realitatem positivam, et quidam dicunt illam esse materiam et quidam formam, et differunt istae opiniones solum in voce et non in re.

[10] Nam, dicentes illam unam realitatem esse materiam dicunt materiam proficere in gradum entitatis suae cum res generatur, sicut dimensio interminata, cum terminatur, non acquirit novam entitatem aliam realiter ab ipsa, sed proficitur in gradu suae propriae entitatis cum terminatur. Ita dicitur quod forma est terminus intrinsecus materiae, et ideo rem aliquam generari non est nisi materiam proficere acquirendo gradum intrinsecum suae propriae entitatis.[9] Et alii illud idem dicunt esse profectum formae in gradibus suae entitatis,

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1 per] propter P 3–5 posset … forma] *om.* (*hom.*) L 7 II] III P 8 esset] esse P 10 V] II P 11 res est] sit res L 12 est] *om.* L 13 realiter] materialiter L 16 se] esse P 17 positivam] passivam P | et] *om.* P 22 cum] *infra adnot. al. man.* L 25 suae … entitatis] *om.* (*hom.*) P

5 ARISTOT., *Phys.* I c. 7, AL 7 1.2, p. 34; 191^{a}8–11; *Auct. Aristot.* 2.29, PhM 17, p. 142.

6 ARISTOT., *Metaph.* VII c. 13, AL 25 3.2, p. 159; 1039^{a}7; *Auct. Aristot.* 1.187, PhM 17, p. 130.

7 ARISTOT., *Metaph.* I c. 8, transl. arab.-lat., ed. Iuntina 8, f. 14^{rb} F; 989^{b}6–7; *Auct. Aristot.* 1.31, PhM 17, p. 117.

8 ARISTOT., *Phys.* I c. 9, AL 7 1.2, p. 240; 192^{a}30–32; *Metaph.* V c. 4, AL 25 3.2, p. 96; 1014^{b}27–28; *Metaph.* V c. 4, AL 25 3.2, p. 97; 1015^{a}3–4.

9 Cf. DUNS SCOT., *Lect.* II d. 12. q. un., ed. Vat. 19, pp. 79–80; THOMAS DE AQUINO, *In Sent.* II d. 12 q. 1 a. 1, ed. MANDONNET II, p. 302; ibid. a. 4, ed. MANDONNET II, pp. 313–315.

et materia ut hoc est sub hoc termino suo intrinseco est compositum, ut est sub illo termino intrinseco est aliud compositum.[10]

⟨Contra opinionem⟩

[11] Contra illud, I *Physicae* et I *De generatione*: "omne agens naturale aliquid producit et aliquid corrumpit";[11] ergo in omni actione naturali oportet aliquid esse contrarium generando. Ex hoc accipit ARISTOTELES, ubi supra, talem propositionem 'omne quod fit, ⟨fit⟩ ex opposito';[12] oppositum non ita oportet quod unum fiat aliud ut aliquando unum fit aliud, ut albedo non fit nigredo, sed unum oppositum fit ex alio; igitur aliquid est commune subiectum, primo sub uno contrariorum, secundo sub alio; et tunc album fit nigrum.

[12] Dicit quod omne agens naturale requirit aliquid in quod agat, et illud est totum corrumpendum, non subiectum manens idem, quia corrumpendum non manet.

[13] Pro isto videtur esse ARISTOTELEM, I *De generatione*, ubi dicit quod generatio differt ab alteratione, quia in generatione totum transit in totum, in alteratione pars in partem.[13] Ideo dicitur quod cum ex aqua generatur aer, quod aqua quae forma simplex est, transit in totum aerem, et non manet aliquod idem commune, sed totum est terminus a quo et totum est terminus ad quem.

[14] Contra illud: nihil prohibet effectum produci ab agente sine illo quo praesente virtus agentis magis debilitatur quam fortificatur; sed praesentia contrarii corrumpentis aerem magis impedit virtutem activam generandi ignem ex illo aere, et virtus | illa magis debilitatur; ergo ignis posset generare P 25^{vb} ignem ex aere absque actione alicuius corrumpentis aerem.

[15] Consequens falsum. Probatio minoris, quia si ignis generandus sit una forma simplex, ergo totus ignis generandus est in virtute activa ignis generantis, vel nihilominus cum sit simplex; ergo potest ignem in esse producere sine

1–2 et ... compositum] et materiam dum non esse sub hoc termino intrinseco est aliud a composito L 5 aliquid ... corrumpit] aliquid corrumpit et aliquid producit P | actione] generatione L | aliquid] *om.* L 6 contrarium] aliquid *add.* L | generando] et *add.* P 7 oportet] *infra adnot. al. man.* L *om.* P 9 igitur] quod *scr. sed del. et infra corr. al. man.* L quia P 11 aliquid] aliquod P 12 non] nam L | quia] quod L 14 esse] *om.* P 16 dicitur] dico P 18 est] *om.* P 22 illo] ipso P | debilitatur] debilitatus L 23 actione] actu P | alicuius] *in marg. adnot. al. man.* L 24 Consequens] est *add.* P 26 nihilominus] nihil enim P | in ... producere] producere in esse P

10 Locus non inventus.

11 ARISTOT., *Phys.* I c. 7, AL 7 1.2, pp. 30–31; 190^{a}14–21; *De gen. et corr.* I c. 4, AL 11 1, pp. 23–24; 319^{b}1–31.

12 Cf. ARISTOT., *Phys.* I c. 9, AL 7 1.2, p. 40; 192^{a}20–23.

13 Cf. ARISTOT., *De gen. et corr.* I c. 4, AL 11 1, p. 24; 319^{b}14–18; *Auct. Aristot.* 4.3, PhM 17, p. 167.

actione corrumpente aerem quae magis debilitaret actionem illam quam fortificaret illud.

[16] Alio modo arguitur sic: agens naturale non impeditum de | de necessitate agit quantum est in virtute sua activa; sed contrarietas aquae non impedit, quia ignis generandus totus est in potestate ignis generantis; ergo ignis sine corruptio aquae posset generare ignem et ponere ignem totum in esse. L 137ra

[17] Item, VII *Metaphysicae* cap. 5, aliqua substantia est corruptibilis a principiis intrinsecis eo modo quo caelum non est corruptibile;[14] sed si sit totum quoddam ens simplex non inclinat ad corruptionem, nec habet in se principia corrumpentia; ergo non erit corruptibilis plus quam caelum.

[18] Dicit: immo quia licet sit forma simplex, tamen habet contrarium.

[19] Sed non valet quia illud non est aliud in se per hoc quod habet contrarium; et si habet contrarium, tamen in se non habet principia contraria quae sint causa corruptionis, et ideo non est corruptibilis, quia in se non habet quod potest non esse. Unde ARISTOTELES VII *Metaphysicae* probat quod omne generabile habet materiam, quia omne generabile potest esse et non esse, et materia est qua res potest esse et non esse.[15]

[20] Item, si ⟨materia⟩ non sit aliqua entitas positiva alia a forma, nec erit generatio, nec corruptio, nec aliqua mutatio. Probatio: quia generatio est a non subiecto in subiectum, patet V *Physicae*;[16] sed si sit forma sola substantia non est aliquod subiectum.

[21] Item, nec erit mutatio, quia "mutari—VI *Physicae*—est aliter se habere, nunc quam prius";[17] se habere aliter nunc quam prius est conditio entis, nam idem et diversum sunt differentiae entis, X *Metaphysicae*;[18] sed illud quod non est non aliter se habuit quam prius; sed si forma corrumpenda fuit omnino simplex in termino mutationis, non omnino est; ergo nec aliter; ergo non est mutatio.

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1 illam] suam P 2 illud] *non leg.* P 3 Alio] idem *praem.* P | arguitur] arguo L 4 aquae] quae P 5–6 corruptio] corruptione P 6 et ponere] non leg. L | ignem totum] *inv.* P 7 5] 2 P | aliqua] *om.* P 8 eo] *om.* L 9 corruptionem] et *add.* P 11 immo quia] vero P 13 si] est *add.* L | non … principia] principia non habent P 14 ideo] *in marg. adnot. al. man.* L 16 materiam quia] naturam in quod L 18 Item] praeterea s* P 20–21 patet … subiectum] *om.* (*hom.*) P 22 quia … Physicae] 6 Physicae mutatio P 23 aliter nunc] nunc et aliter L 25 habuit] habet P 25–26 fuit … aliter] sit omnino in termino mutationis, ipsa omnino non est; ergo aliter L

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14 Cf. ARISTOT., *Metaph.* VII c. 7, AL 25 3.2, p. 143; 1032^{a}20–21.

15 ARISTOT., *Metaph.* VII c. 7, AL 25 3.2, p. 143; 1032^{a}20–22; *Auct. Aristot.* 1.170, PhM 17, p. 129.

16 ARISTOT., *Phys.* V c. 1, AL 7 1.2, pp. 194–195; 225^{a}1–20; *Auct. Aristot.* 2.152,153, PhM 17, p. 152.

17 Cf. ARISTOT., *Phys.* VI c. 3–4, AL 7 1.2, p. 229; 234^{b}5–17.

18 Cf. ARISTOT., *Metaph.* X c. 8, AL 25 3.2, p. 214; 1058^{a}9–28.

[22] Item, mutatio est a privatione in habitum; sed si corrumpendum sit ens simplex, non est mutatio a privatione, quia privatio non est nisi in susceptivo apto nato, et forma simplex non est susceptiva alterius contrarie; ergo nulla mutatio.

[23] Si dicas quod totum convertitur in totum ut panis convertitur in corpus Christi, illud non est verum, et esto quod sit talis conversio, tamen non est mutatio, ut patet libro IV distinctio 13,[19] quia nihil est quod aliter se habet nunc quam prius.

[24] Ad auctoritatem ARISTOTELIS I *De Generatione*,[20] dico quod in omni alia mutatione a generatione totum non mutatur in totum, quia totum non est, sicut lignum calidum mutatur in lignum frigidum, quia totum non est iam, et hoc quia non est vere unum totum lignum calidum, sed est ens per accidens. Ideo totum non est nisi partes, quia sicut acervus lapidum non est nisi lapides, ita totum ens per accidens non est vere totum nisi partes, et ideo non mutatur totum in totum. Sed in generatione substantiali esto quod sint plures formae in generato vel corrupto, tamen totum est vere unum; et ideo aer totum, qui est vere unum, transit in ignem totum, qui est vere unum. Sed non sequitur quod nihil maneat commune, quia primum totum fuit unum totum per se et recedente prima forma advenit materiae nova quae facit aliud totum per se; et ideo
L 137^{rb} quia unum | totum succedit alii, ideo dicitur totum esse conversum in totum, manet tamen subiectum commune.

[25] Item, in omni genere causae est reperire ordinem per se; igitur in genere causae materialis, sicut in genere causae formalis vel finalis, est reperire ordinem essentialem, ergo unum primum in illo quod est primum receptivum; sed primum receptivum est distinctum a primo recepto realiter, quia idem non recipit se; ergo in omni re generabili est aliqua entitas positiva alia a forma.

[26] Item, aliquod ens est causatum a quatuor causis, aliter sequeretur vel quod aliqua causa ultra causabit sine causa priore, vel quod causa materialis non est causa; nam quidquid habet formam pro causa necessario habet

2 in] *om.* P 5 Si] sed P | panis] *om.* L | convertitur] *om.* P 6 illud] ibi *add.* L | tamen] *om.* L 7 distinctio 13] *om.* L 12 est] *om.* P | ens] *om.* L 13 totum] *om.* P 13–14 quia ... partes] *om.* (*hom.*) L 16 totum] *om.* L 17 qui] quod P | vere unum] totum vere ignem L 20 in totum] *om.* P 22 se] vel in genere materialis sicut efficientis patet II Metaphysicae *add.* P 23 sicut ... finalis] *om.* P | formalis ... est] *in marg. adnot. al. man.* L 24 illo] ipso P | est] erit P 25 distinctum] per se *add.* P 26 aliqua] *om.* P 29 quod] *om.* P

19 Cf. DUNS SCOTUS, *Rep.* IV-A d. 13 q. 1, ed. Wad.-Viv. 24, pp. 184–187.
20 Cf. supra § 13.

materiam pro causa. Ex hoc habetur propositum, quia causa et causatum sunt distincta realiter; ergo materia alia a | composito generabili et corruptibili. P 26ra

[27] Item, substantia dividitur in substantiam simplicem et compositam; sed substantia composita habet necessario aliam entitatem positivam realiter distinctam a forma, aliter non erit realiter composita.

[28] Item, AUGUSTINUS XII *Confessionum* "duo fecisti domine a te unum prope" ut angelus "alterum prope nihil,"[21] scilicet materia; et in eodem, cap. 5 quod "materia non est omnino nihil."[22] Et similiter *Super Genesim* ad litteram libro VII "ergo materia est aliqua entitas."[23]

[29] Cum dicitur quod materia proficit in gradu suae entitatis, illud non valet, quia si forma esset terminus intrinsecus materiae, res generabiles et corruptibiles non distinguerentur specie, quia ille terminus intrinsecus non variat speciem.

[30] Item, manifestum est quod anima intellectiva non est per se terminus ille intrinsecus materiae, nec potest materia proficere ad illum gradum.

⟨Articulus 2⟩

[31] Dico ergo quod materia est ens. Sed quale ens?

[32] Dico quod ens in potentia, sed illud dupliciter potest intelligi. Nam aliquid est in potentia sicut terminus potentiae, et ad illud est potentia; aliquid est in potentia sicut subiectum potentiae et ipsum est in potentia ad aliud. Prima potentia vocatur obiectiva, secunda subiectiva. Et forte istae duae potentiae non sunt diversae, nec sunt duae, quia eadem potentia ut est in subiecto ad aliud dicitur subiectiva, et illa eadem ut est potentia illius ad quod est poten-

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1 habetur] *in marg. adnot. al. man.* L *om.* P | et] vel P 2 composito] corrupto P 3 substantia ... compositam] et potentia P 5 aliter] *om.* P | non] *in marg. adnot.* L | erit] esset P 6 XII] XIII P | duo] *in marg. adnot. al. man.* L | domine] *infra adnot. al. man.* L *om.* P 7 ut angelus] *om.* P | alterum] aliud P | scilicet materia] *in marg. adnot. al. man.* L | eodem] d. 8 *add.* P 8 quod] quia P | Et] vel P 9 est] *om.* P 10 dicitur] dicit L | gradu] a* L 11 si] *in marg. adnot. al. man.* L 12 ille] iste P 14–15 non ... intrinsecus] *om.* (*hom.*) P 15 materiae ... proficere] per se terminus non potest mere proficere P | nec] *in marg. adnot. al. man.* L 18 ens] *om.* P 18–19 sed ... potentia] *om.* (*hom.*) P 19 potentiae] dico tunc quod *add.* L | illud] idem P 21 subiectiva] nota quid vocatur potentia obiectiva et subiectiva *in marg. add. al. man.* L 22 sunt] *om.* P 23 dicitur] scilicet *add.* P

21 Cf. AUGUST., *Conf.* XII c. 7, CCSL 27, p. 220.

22 Cf. AUGUST., *Conf.* XII c. 15, CCSL 27, p. 227.

23 Cf. AUGUST., *De Gen. ad litt.* I c. 15, CSEL 28 3.2, pp. 21–22.

tia dicitur obiectiva. Exemplum: nam alio modo superficies est in potentia ad albedinem et alio modo est albedo in potentia antequam sit.

[33] Quomodo est ergo materia ens in potentia?

[34] Qui dicunt materiam esse ens in potentia sicut illud est in potentia quod nunc non est, sed tantum est in virtute suae causae, non possunt salvare mutationem aliquam, quia nihil est praesuppositum agenti, quia illud quod sic est in potentia est in potestate agentis ut est albedo haec ad annum, et non praesupponitur actioni. Si ergo materia tale ens in potentia esset, non esset aliqua mutatio, quia nihil aliter se ⟨haberet⟩ quam prius, et per consequens materia
L 137va non erit intrinsecum subiectum alicuius mutationis, sed terminus. |

[35] Qualiter ergo est ens in potentia materia?

[36] Dico quod materia est per se principium, patet I *Physicae*;[24] est etiam per se causa, patet II *Physicae* et V *Metaphysicae*;[25] est etiam materia per se pars ⟨compositi⟩, VII *Metaphysicae*;[26] item etiam materia est per se subiectum generationis, patet per tres rationes primas, et manet idem in tota mutatione; item est terminus creationis divinae, patet supra per AUGUSTINUM XIII *Confessionum*[27] et similiter per ARISTOTELEM est ingenita et incorruptibilis, I *Physicae*.[28] Ergo necessario est aliquod ens positivum extra suam causam, non solum ens in potentia ut modo est Antichristus, vel aliquid aliud quod habet esse solum quia agens sufficiens suae productionis est, quia tale ens nec erit per se causa, nec per se principium, nec pars compositi, sicut albedo futura. Item, nec tale manet idem sub utroque extremo, quia est terminus mutationis, nec ponitur materia ens in potentia ut potentia dicit respectum ad terminum mutationis, quia talis potentia mutatur ad mutationem terminorum, sicut dicitur III *Physicae* quod sanari et aegrotari differunt,[29] sed materia manet eadem sub terminis oppositis; ideo est in potentia ut principium potentiale.

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3 est ... ens] ergo materia est P 5 tantum] tamen P | virtute] *infra adnot. al. man.* L 7 annum] accidenti P 8 tale] scilicet *add.* P | esset] ens *add.* P 9 aliter se] esset se aliter P | haberet] habens L P 10 non] nam P | intrinsecum] *in marg. add. al. man.* L *om.* P 11 est ... potentia] ens in potentia est P 13–14 est ... Metaphysicae] est per se causa, patet II Metaphysicae L 16 divinae] *om.* L 19 habet] solum *add.* L 21 nec] est *add.* P | sicut] sed P 23 ponitur materia] potentia materia est P 25 quod] quia P | sed ... manet] et manet materia P 26 potentia] materia P

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24 Cf. ARISTOT., *Phys.* I c. 7, AL 7 1.2, pp. 34–35; 191a8–17; *Auct. Aristot.* 2.17, PhM 17, p. 141.

25 ARISTOT., *Phys.* II c. 3, AL 7 1.2, pp. 58–59; 195a15–16; *Auct. Aristot.* 2.67, PhM 17, p. 145; ARISTOT., *Metaph.* I c. 3, AL 25 3.2, p. 18; 983a26–32; *Auct. Aristot.* 1.119, PhM 17, p. 124.

26 Cf. ARISTOT., *Metaph.* VII c. 8, AL 25 3.2, p. 146; 1033b17–19.

27 AUGUST., *Conf.* XII c. 8, CCSL 27, p. 220.

28 ARISTOT., *Phys.* I c. 9, AL 7 1.2, p. 40; 192a28–29.

29 Cf. ARISTOT., *Phys.* III c. 1, AL 7 1.2, pp. 100–101; 201a34–b3.

[37] Item, creatio non terminatur ad illud quod tantum habet esse intra potentiam suae causae, et materia est terminus creationis, patet per AUGUSTINUM ubi supra;[30] ideo ens verum positivum distinctum ab entitate formae est materia.

[38] Dicitur autem ens in potentia, quia est ens receptivum actus substantialis primo et accidentalis mediante illo; et ideo licet aliquo modo sit ens in actu quia aliquid extra suam causam, tamen distinguitur contra actum distinguentem et completivum speciei. Et ideo describitur per ens in potentia quia est maxime receptivum actus, non quod omnino non sit nisi sicut Antichristus.

[39] Contra illud, isto modo non salvatur vere generatio, ut patet per rationem ARISTOTELIS contra antiquos ponentes subiectum generationis esse aliquod corpus, I *De Generatione*;[31] ibi arguit ARISTOTELES sic quia tunc generatio non esset nisi alteratio, quia omne quod advenit enti in actu est accidens. Ergo eodem modo hic, si materia esset aliqua entitas actualis positiva distincta contra formam, et solum diceretur ens in potentia quia receptiva actus completi speciei, quidquid sibi adveniret constitueret unum ens per accidens cum eo, et esset generatio solum alteratio.

[40] Item, in omnibus aliis generibus potentiale illius generis nihil est illius generis, patet in omni genere accidentis. Nam receptivum coloris nihil est in genere coloris; ergo | in genere substantiae susceptivum illius generis nihil erit P 26^{rb} illius generis; ergo materia nulla substantia est distincta a forma in genere substantiae.

[41] Item, ex duobus entibus actualibus non fit vere unum, patet VII *Metaphysicae*;[32] ergo si materia haberet potentialitatem talem quod esset quaedam entitas actualis susceptiva actus completivi speciei, ex | forma et materia non L 137^{vb} fieret vere unum.

[42] Dico ergo quod vel omnis res generabilis et corruptibilis est omnino simplex sicut forma, vel oportet quod sit composita ex aliquo et nihilo, vel composita ex aliquo et aliquo. Primum est improbatum supra, secundum est non

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2 terminus] *om.* L 4 est materia] *om.* L 5 receptivum] susceptivum P 8 Et] *om.* P 9 est maxime] *inv.* P | non] omnino P 10 isto] illo P 10–12 vere … quia] *om.* L 14 aliqua] alia P | positiva] potentialiter P 15–16 completi] expletivi P 16 constitueret] *om.* L 17 et] non L 19 receptivum] susceptivum P 20 coloris] colorum P 21 generis] *om.* P | materia] nihil videtur P 24 potentialitatem] possibilitatem P 25 actualis] accidentalis P | susceptiva] susceptivum P | materia] forma P 26 fieret] fit P 27 ergo] *infra adnot. al. man.* L *om.* P | et] vel L 28 oportet] *infra adnot. al. man.* L *om.* P 29 est non] *inv.* P

30 Cf. supra § 36.

31 ARISTOT., *De gen. et corr.* I c. 1, AL 11 1, pp. 5–7; 314^{a}7–314^{b}12.

32 Cf. ARISTOT., *Metaph.* VIII c. 6, AL 25 3.2, p. 177; 1045^{a}27–32.

intelligibile quod componitur ex aliquo et nihilo; ergo relinquitur tertium, quod componitur ex aliquo et aliquo, et hoc concedo. Et tamen est vere unum, quia non omne unum est unum simplex, immo unum dividitur in unum simplex et unum compositum; uni vere uni non repugnat quod sit in hoc et in hoc.

[43] Dicit: quare ergo 'homo albus' non potest esse per se unum?

[44] Dico quod unum est per se passio entis, vel immediata, vel si sit aliqua passio media inter unum et ens non est illa nobis nota. Et sicut unum in communi est passio immediata entis in communi, ita in speciali ente unum in speciali est passio immediata entis in speciali et convenit enti immediate, in quod non potest demonstrari de illud per aliquid notius vel prius.

[45] Si ergo de aliquo quaeratur quare illud est unum per se, dico quod habet talem formam quae est per se ens, ideo per se unum; et illud eadem ratione non est per se unum quia non habet formam per quam est per se ens.

[46] Sed contra, tu assignas unitatem solum a parte totius, quia per formam totius una est. Sed quare est hoc ex parte componentium, scilicet quod haec duo—materia et forma—constituunt unum per se, et homo et albus non?

[47] Dico ad illud quod Aristoteles, viii *Metaphysicae*, dicit quod in simplicibus non est dubium quare hoc est unum per se, quia talia statim sunt illud quod sunt;[33] sed ultra unitatem simplicitatis oportet ponere unitatem compositi, et in illis reddere rationem quare ista duo constituunt unum per se nescivit Aristotelem aliam rationem reddere nisi quia hoc actus et haec potentia, quia enim A est quoddam ens tale, non principiatum nec causatum, et ex natura sua est natum esse pars alicuius entis, et B ex alia parte, quia tale ens est, scilicet principium entis, et ex natura talis entis habet aptitudinemm ut sit pars entis; ideo ex A et B fit unum ens per se, quia eius partes scilicet A et B, sunt sibi naturaliter intrinsece. Et albedo non est talis, quia ipsa nata sit ex natura sua ⟨non⟩ esse partem intrinsecam alicuius entis, ideo non facit unum per se cum subiecto. Materia autem est pars entis, quia per se et intrinseca ex natura talis entis, quia receptiva actus et perfectionis; ideo materia et forma faciunt vere unum.

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1 aliquo] et aliquo *add.* L 2 aliquo] et nihilo *add.* L 2–3 quia … unum] *om.* (*hom.*) P 5 Dicit] *om.* L | unum] *in marg. adnot. al. man.* L 6–7 aliqua] alia P 7 illa] ita P 8 immediata … communi] entis in communi immediata P 9 convenit enti] conveniens eis P | in] tantum *add.* P 10 potest] possunt P | vel] et P per *add.* L 11 *de … quaeratur*] *quaeritur de aliquo* L | illud est] *inv.* P 13 per quam] quae L 14 per formam] forma L 15 hoc] *infra adnot. al. man.* L *om.* P 16 homo … albus] album P 17 ad illud] *om.* P 20 quare] quia P | ista] illa P 21 hoc] est *add.* P | et] *om.* L 22 tale] *om.* L | principiatum] privatum P 23 et] quod P | natum] est *add.* L | alicuius] actus L 25 ens] *om.* L 27 intrinsecam] extrinsecam P

33 Cf. Aristot., *Metaph.* viii c. 6, al 25 3.2, pp. 177–178; 1045^{a}35–b3; 1045^{b}23–24.

[48] Cum dicit 'ex duobus in actu non fit vere unum', dico quod potentia ut distinguitur contra actum et ut sunt differentiae entis est aliquid quod solum habet esse in virtute suae causae, quod potest esse in effectu, et hoc modo in omni genere est actus et potentia. Primo modo non est materia ens in potentia, quia habet | verum esse extra suam causam; sed materia isto modo est actus ut L 138ra distinguitur contra potentiam talem. Sed alio modo accipitur actus et potentia VII *Metaphysicae* et VIII, ubi dicitur "actus separat et distinguit"[34] et potentia illud quod est distinguibile; tunc materia sic non est actus, sed potentia. Et istae actus et potentia non possunt esse differentiae entis, quia ista solum conveniunt simplicibus, sed actus et potentia primo modo dicta, ut dividunt ens, conveniunt simplicibus et compositis.

[49] Tunc dico ad argumentum[35] quod ex duobus in actu, isto secundo modo accipiendo actum, qui est principium agendi, non potest fieri vere unum, quia quilibet talis actus natus est tribuere perfectionem actualem toti composito; ideo non se compatiuntur in uno per se composito. Sed accipiendo actum primo modo, ut dicit solam entitatem positivam quamcumque extra suam causam, sic est differentia entis. Dico quod ex talibus, quorum utrumque est ens in actu tali actualitate, potest fieri unum per se.

[50] Ad aliud, cum dicit quod generatio non erit nisi | alteratio,[36] non valet; P 26va etsi ARISTOTELES dixisset generationem non esse alterationem, tamen non dixerit ipsam non esse mutationem; unde etsi dixit quod ens in actu non est subiectum generationis, tamen non dixit quod ens in actu nihil est subiectum generationis.

[51] Sed antiqui, ut ipse imponit eis, posuerunt quod corpus habens formam substantialem in actu esset subiectum generationis, ut patet I *De Generatione*, quia alii aquam alii terram; et tale corpus habens formam est in actu complete et est per se alterabile. Ideo forma sibi acquisita est per alterationem solam acquisita; sed in proposito non valet, quia subiectum generationis vere, et si

1 Cum ... unum] *om.* P | ut] non L 2 differentiae] duae *scr. sed del. et infra corr. al. man.* L 5 quia] quod P | verum] *iter.* L | extra] *om.* L | isto ... est] non est illo modo P 7–8 potentia] ponitur P 8 sic] *om.* P 9 differentiae] respectu L | ista] illa P 10 ut ... ens] *in marg. adnot. al. man.* L 12 isto] illo P 14 toti] partite(!) et P 16 ut] non L 16–17 causam] et *add.* L 17 quod] *om.* L 17–18 quorum ... se] duobus duobus quorum utrumque est ens P 19 Ad] *om.* P | dicit] dicitur P | erit] esset P 20 etsi] quod sic P | esse alterationem] *inv.* L | tamen non] *om.* L 21 dixerit] dixisset P 22 quod ... actu] ipsam non esse mutationem quia P 24 ipse] *om.* P 26 quia] quod P | et] cum P | est] ens *add.* P | complete] completo P

34 ARISTOT., *Metaph.* VII c. 13, AL 25 3.2, p. 159; 1039a7; *Auct. Aristot.* 1.187, PhM 17, p. 130.
35 Cf. supra § 41.
36 Cf. supra § 39.

non potest esse ens in potentia modo quo albedo futura est in potentia, quia in virtute sui agentis.

[52] Ad aliud, cum dicitur quod illud quod est potentiale et receptivum in uno genere accidentis non pertinet ad aliud genus,[37] dico quod si poneretur quod albedo componeretur ex principiis essentialibus qualitatis, tunc illa propositio non esset vera; sed esto quod ita ⟨non⟩ sit, tunc ratio concludit oppositum, quia potentiale in uno genere accidentis est actuale de genere quantitatis in alio genere priori, ut potentiale et receptivum in genere colorum—et universaliter in genere qualitatis potentiale et receptivum—est aliquid actuale de genere quantitatis, ut superficies respectu colorum. Ergo potentiale et receptivum in primo genere non potest esse de aliquo genere priori, quia non est
L 138rb aliquod genus prius; ideo oportet esse de eodem genere; ideo materia est | de genere substantiae.

⟨Articulus 3⟩

[53] Sed quomodo distinguitur materia a forma?

[54] Dico quod distinguitur ab ipsa realiter quadam realitate receptiva omnino alterius rationis a forma et alterius essentiae, et est primo diversum ab illo, quia illa sunt primo diversa, quae sic se habent quod nihil unius includitur in alio nec econverso; sed forma et materia sunt huiusmodi. Probatio, quia si aliquid formae includeretur in materia, forma quantum ad illud non esset nata recipi, sed magis recipere; ergo forma non esset primum receptum, sed aliquid eius esset non receptum, sed receptivum. Eodem modo, si aliquid materiae esset inclusum in forma, ipsa non esset primo receptiva, sed recepta quantum ad aliquid sui.

[55] Sed tunc quaeritur: si sint primo diversa, quomodo faciunt per se unum?

[56] Dico quod communiter quanto aliqua duo sunt magis diversa formaliter, tanto sunt magis disposita ad faciendum unum per se, quia in illa constitutione non requiritur similitudo in natura, sed proportio conveniens, quae potest esse inter primo diversa.

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1 futura] *non leg.* L 3 quod] *om.* P 4 accidentis] entis L 5 componeretur] poneretur L | qualitatis] quantitatis P 6 esset] est P | sed … ratio] sed illa ratio non P 7 de … quantitatis] *om.* P 8 priori] accidentis *add.* P 10 Ergo] et *add.* P 12–13 ideo … genere] *om.* (*hom.*) P 16 quadam realitate] et realitate quadam P 18 illo] ipsa P 19 sed] *om.* P 22 sed] si P 25 sint] sunt P 26 communiter] *non leg.* L | duo sunt] sunt duo scilicet L 27–28 constitutione] propensione L 29 inter] in termino P

37 Cf. supra § 40.

[57] Contra, COMMENTATOR, VIII *Metaphysicae* dicit quod ex actu et potentia non fit unum nisi per agens extrahens actum, quod non largitur multitudinem, sed perfectionem;[38] sed materia dicit aliquam entitatem positivam aliam ab entitate formae, ergo agens extrahens formam de materia largiretur multitudinem.

[58] Dico quod in generabilibus et corruptibilibus concurrunt duae potentiae. Una est potentia obiectiva, quae est terminus generationis, quae est totus in potentia ad essendum; et illud quod sic est in potentia extrahitur ab agente in actu; et illud non causat multitudinem, sed perfectionem, quia albedo in actu non est compositior quam ipsa in potentia est, et alia est potentia in generatione, quae est alicuius ad aliud, scilicet ad terminum generationis, quia necesse est aliquid praeexistere generationi quod sit pars geniti, ut patet V *Metaphysicae*, ubi dicitur "materia est ex qua fit res cum insit,"[39] et istam potentialitatem concomitatur extractio formae de materia. Et dico quod agens huic potentiae largitur multitudinem, quia aliquid est in actu quod prius non fuit, aliter non esset generatio.

⟨Ad argumenta principalia⟩

[59] Ad primum argumentum, cum dicitur 'non est quid, nec quantum, nec quale',[40] dico quod Aristoteles illud dicit tamquam falsum ad quod deducit adversarium. Sic enim dicit: sic itaque intendentibus apparet hoc, scilicet quod materia est nec quid et subdit hoc autem falsum, et ideo non est ad propositum.

[60] Et si concedatur auctoritas, ipsa solvit se, quia concedo quod materia non est aliquod eorum quibus ens dividitur, quia talia sunt species et differentiae. Et concedo quod materia non est | species, nec differentia. P 26^{vb}

[61] Dicit: materia praedicatur denominative de omnibus, ergo de nullo essentialiter.

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1 Contra] illud *add.* P 3 sed] si *add.* P | aliquam] aliam P | aliam] *om.* P 4 ergo] *om.* P 7 quae] qui P 9 albedo] *om.* L 10 ipsa] ipsum P | est] *om.* P 13–14 istam potentialitatem] illam possibilitatem P 18–19 nec … quale] neque quale P 19 tamquam] tanquam P 20 scilicet] *om.* P 21 et ideo] *om.* L 22 si] vel P 22–23 quia … dividitur] quod materia est aliquid eo quo determinatur L 23–24 aliquod … est] *iter.* P 25 praedicatur] *in marg. adnot. al. man.* L

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38 AVERROES, *In Metaph.* VIII c. 15, ed. Iuntina 8, f. 224raA; *Auct. Aristot.* 1.217, PhM 17, p. 133.

39 ARISTOT., *Metaph.* V c. 4, AL 25 3.2, p. 96; 1014^{b}27–28; *Metaph.* V c. 4, AL 25 3.2, p. 97; 1015^{a}3–4.

40 Cf. supra § 2.

L 138va [62] Dico ad illud quod ARISTOTELES, IX *Metaphysicae*, | dicit quod materia praedicatur de composito denominative. Unde dicit quod hoc non est illud, sed illinum, et archa non est lignum sed lignea;[41] sed non ens non praedicatur denominative de aliquo; ideo materia est ens.

[63] Dico ergo quod denominativa differunt a principali sola cadentia, patet in praedicamentis. Sed forma potest intelligi cadere ad aliud dupliciter: vel enim potest cadere a sua quidditate ad suppositum naturae propriae, vel potest cadere ad suppositum alterius naturae. Primo dicitur denominatio minus proprie, quia hoc modo denominative praedicatur superius de per se inferiori ut 'homo est animal', 'animal' significat denominative per illam cadentiam quae est forma animalitatis ad suppositum suae naturae propriae, et isto modo pars non praedicatur de toto, quia homo non est anima, nec compositum est materia. Sed secundo modo ut forma partis cadit ad suppositum alterius naturae denominando ipsum, sic potest praedicari de composito, unde 'homo est animatus', quia 'animatus' significat formam animae contractam et comparatur ad aliud suppositum, quam sit suppositum suae propriae quidditatis; ideo potest conveniri composito.

[64] Ad aliud de V *Physicae*,[42] dico quod uniformiter concludit, et esse affirmatum de subiecto motus est esse in potentia, quo tamen necessario coniungitur esse in actu, etsi per accidens, inquantum est subiectum motus. Unde aliquid potest esse conveniens alii per accidens, quia non de formali ratione entis, et tamen unus est necessario requiritur aliud. Hoc modo privatio est principium per accidens naturae, patet I *Physicae*.[43] Sic dico quod tamen esse in potentia, quod convenit subiecto motus, ut sic coniungitur necessario esse, etsi per accidens est in actu illius eiusdem subiecti. Et quia subiectum generationis a quo negatur esse non necessario est ens in actu, ideo sufficit ad probationem ARISTOTELIS quod generatio non est motus.

[65] Ad aliud de analogia,[44] dico quod materia est scibilis alicui intellectui sine analogia ad formam, sed non intellectui nostro. Primum patet quia

1 ad illud] *om.* P 3 ens] est P 7 quidditate] quantitate L vel *add.* P 9 praedicatur] potest L 10 animal] *om.* L 11 animalitatis] actualitatis L 12 nec compositum] ut exponitur P 12–13 est materia] *om.* L 13 Sed … suppositum] *om.* L 14–16 potest … potest] *iter.* P 17 conveniri] communicare P 19 potentia] cum *add.* P 22 entis] eius P | aliud] ad illud P 23 tamen] *om.* P 24 esse] *om.* P 25 est] ens P 26 a quo] *om.* L 29 patet] *om.* L

41 Cf. ARISTOT., *Metaph.* IX c. 7, AL 25 3.2, p. 187; 1049a19–21.

42 Cf. supra § 5.

43 AVERROES, *Phys.* I com. 66, ed. Iuntina 4, f. 39va G.

44 Cf. supra § 6.

habet propriam ideam in mente divina si sit ens positivum, et ideo secundum se est scibilis sine analogia ad formam, sed non potest cognosci a nobis sine analogia ad formam, quia non nisi per operationes sensibiles; ex operationibus autem devenimus in cognitionem principiorum operationum quae formae sunt. Ideo cum in eadem parte intellectus operationes distinctas secundum speciem arguimus principia distincta et formas distinctas secundum speciem. Et ideo scimus factam generationem et mutationem formae et in eadem parte et sic cognoscimus unum subiectum manere quod vocatur materia. Sic COMMENTATOR dicit IV *Physicae*: sicut trasmutatio secundum ubi fecit scire locum, ita transmutatio secundum formam fecit scire materiam.[45] Modo non sequitur, 'materia non est cognoscibilis a nobis nisi per analogiam ad formam, ergo in se non est aliqua entitas positiva distincta a forma'. Nam, nec perfectiora et superiora nec | imperfectissima et infima sunt proportionata cognoscibilia ab L 138^{vb} intellectu nostro ex seipsis, sed media; et tamen illa in se vere sunt entia et distincta contra alia sine quibus neque nos in cognitionem illorum devenimus.

[66] Ad ultimum patet quomodo materia est ens in actu et quomodo non.

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1 ens] esse L 2 ad formam] *om.* L 4 autem] enim P | operationum] *om.* L 6 arguimus] *om.* L | formas distinctas] formae distinctae L 9–10 ubi … secundum] *om.* (*hom.*) L 11 analogiam] analogia P 13 nec] et P 14 sed … illa] sicut media et causata ista P 15 neque] *om.* P 16 ultimum] Cf. supra § 7. | ultimum] obiectionem P

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45 Cf. AVERROES, *In Metaph.* VIII com. 12 (ed. Iuntina 8, f. 220va G).

⟨*Ordinatio* β
Distinctio duodecima
Quaestio 1⟩

Og 249ra
Q 129ra
R 42rb

[1] Circa istam duodecimam distinctionem in qua magister agit de creaturae pure corporali, quaeruntur duo de principio materiali. Primo UTRUM IN SUBSTANTIA GENERABILI ET CORRUPTIBILI SIT ALIQUA ENTITAS POSITIVA REALITER DISTINCTA A FORMA, secundo utrum per aliquam potentiam materia possit esse sine forma. Circa primum arguitur quod non. PHILOSOPHUS, VII *Metaphysicae*: "materia non est quid, nec quale"[1] et sic de aliis praedicamentis; ergo non continetur sub aliquo illorum quibus ens dividitur et distinguitur; ergo non distinguitur a forma; forma enim substantialis est substantia.

[2] Sed dices quod non est ens actu, sed tamen est ens in potentia.

[3] Contra, materia non est materia in potentia, quia materiae non est materia, nec forma, ut dictum est, nec compositum, et sic de aliis; ergo nihil.

[4] Praeterea, V *Physicorum*: "quod movetur est, sed quod generatur non est";[2] per hoc volens PHILOSOPHUS probare differentiam generationis a motu;

Q 129rb

ergo oportet quod intelligatur in | eodem modo esse in secundo negative et in primo affermative; sed esse quod affirmatur de eo quod movetur est esse in potentia, quia "motus est actus existentis in potentia secundum quod huiusmodi", III *Physicae*;[3] ergo esse negatum de eo quod generatur est esse in potentia; ergo patet quod materia, quae est subiectum generationis, non est ens in potentia, quia argumentum non procedit de termino generationis, sed de

4–5 Circa … Primo] Circa distinctionem duodecimam, quaero Og Circa distinctionem duodecimam quaerit Magister de natura mere corruptibili, ubi quaero utrum in substantia per se generabili et corruptibili materia sit aliquod ens positivum realiter distinctum a forma. Quaere totam istam quaestionem in questiones super VII Metaphysicae, sub proptio titulo R 7–8 secundo … forma] *om.* Og R 8 Circa … arguitur] videtur R utrum Og | Philosophus] *om.* R 10–11 et distinguitur] *om.* Og 13 non] *om.* Q | sed … ens] ens tamen Og R 14 materiae] materia Og 16 Praeterea] item Og R Philosophus *add.* Og R 17 Philosophus] *om.* Og R | probare] habere Q 18 ergo oportet] *inv.* Og R | intelligatur in] *om.* Og | in] *om.* R 18–19 esse … affermative] quod movetur est, quod generatur non est; ly 'ens' vel ly 'esse' in illo quod movetur affirmando et ab illo quod generatur removendo Og 20 existentis] entis Og 21 Physicae] Physicorum Og | esse] est R | est] erit Og R non *add.* Og 21–22 potentia] quia motus est actus entis in potentia *add.* R 22 patet quod] *om.* Q | est subiectum] *inv.* R | est ens] *inv.* R

1 ARISTOT., *Metaph.* VII c. 3, AL 25 3.2, p. 135; 1029a20–21; *Auct. Aristot.* 1.161, PhM 17, p. 128.

2 ARISTOT., *Phys.* V c. 1, AL 7 1.2, p. 195; 225a25–29.

3 ARISTOT., *Phys.* III c. 1, AL 7 1.2, pp. 98–99; 201a10–11.

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subiecto, quia de termino non est verum dicere quod non sit. Cum igitur materia non sit ens actu nec ens in potentia, igitur est nihil.

[5] Praeterea, I *Physicorum*, "materia non est scibilis nisi in analogia ad formam"; sed si esset per se ens sine entitate formae, sive ens realiter distinctum a forma, esset per se intelligibilis; ergo, | etc. R 42va

[6] Praeterea, si materia esset aliquid, esset aliquis actus, quia omne positivum extra animam actus quidam est; sed non est actus, quia "actus distinguit et dividit," materia autem non dividit nec distinguit, quia "in fundamento naturae nihil est distinctum," II *Metaphysicae*.[4]

[7] Praeterea, si esset actus, compositum non esset per se unum, quia ex duobus entibus in actu non fit per se unum, nec potest esse compositum, quia compositum non est principium, sed principiatum. Si autem esset actus, esset vel actus qui est forma, vel actu ens compositum; cum igitur non sit nec hoc nec illud, est nihil, vel non est aliqua entitas distincta a forma.

[8] Contra, PHILOSOPHUS, II *Physicae* et V *Metaphysicae*: "materia est ex quo fit res cum insit";[5] per hoc quod dicitur 'cum insit' excluditur privatio; ergo, ⟨etc.⟩

⟨Articulus 1⟩

⟨Opinio⟩

[9] Hic dicit una opinio rem generabilem et corruptibilem habere in se tantum unam realitatem positivam, et quidam dicunt illam esse materiam et quidam

1 sit] est Og R 2 actu ... potentia] in potentia nec etiam in actu Og R | igitur ... nihil] patet ergo nihil est Og R 3 Praeterea] item Og R secundum Aristotelem *add.* Og R | Physicorum] physicae R 4 entitate formae] *inv.* Og R | realiter] *om.* Q 6 Praeterea] item Og R | aliquid] quid positivum R | aliquid esset] *om.* Og 6–7 quia ... est] extra animam R 6 omne] ens Q 7 actus] activus Og 7–8 distinguit ... dividit] dividit et distinguit Og R 8 materia autem] sed materia Og R | quia ... fundamento] in fundamento enim Og R 9 II Metaphysicae] *om.* Og R 10 Praeterea] et *praem.* Og R | compositum] *iter.* Q 11 in] *om.* R 12 esset] *om.* Og R 14 est nihil] *inv.* Og R 15 Physicae] physicorum Og | V] II Og 16 quo] qua Og R 16–17 per ... etc] 'cum insit' ponitur ad differentiam oppositi ex quo dicitur fieri res, non tamen inest forma; forma autem non potest esse illud ex quo fit res, quia forma est terminus factionis, sed illud ex quo fit aliud praecedit natura illud quod fit ex eo; igitur, etc. Og R 20 Hic ... opinio] Una opinio dicit hanc Og R | in ... tantum] tantum in se Og R 21 et] *om.* Og

4 ARISTOT., *Metaph.* I c. 8, transl. arab.-lat., ed. Iuntina 8, f. 14rb F; 989b6–7; *Auct. Aristot.* 1.31, PhM 17, p. 117.

5 ARISTOT., *Phys.* I c. 9, AL 7 1.2, p. 240; 192a30–32; *Metaph.* V c. 4, AL 25 3.2, p. 96; 1014b27–28; *Metaph.* V c. 4, AL 25 3.2, p. 97; 1015a3–4.

formam, et differunt opiniones istae solum in voce et non in re. Nam dicentes illam realitatem esse materiam, dicunt materiam proficere in gradum entitatis non per aliquid extrinsecum, sed per suum intrinsecum. Exemplum de quantitate interminata, quae terminatur non per aliquid extrinsecum, sed per terminum intrinsecum; sicut dicunt forma non est terminus extrinsecus, sed intrinsecus materiae, quae licet sit terminus, non tamen est aliud a materia, et ipsa ut aliter et aliter terminatur dicitur aliud et aliud compositum, et tamen omnes illi gradus sunt idem materiae identice.

⟨Contra opinionem⟩

[10] Positio ista non videtur rationabilis, nec videtur esse secundum intentionem PHILOSOPHI. Arguo enim sic: in generatione naturali, secundum PHILOSOPHUM, I *De Generatione*, semper aliquid corrumpitur et aliquid generatur;[6] | Og 249va
tunc accipit PHILOSOPHUS quod in generatione ex opposito fit oppositum, non quod oppositum maneat, sed aliquid commune utrique termino quod vult esse materiam, quae non potest esse idem cum aliquo oppositorum, quia unum oppositorum non manet cum alio. Sed respondetur quod agens naturale requirit aliquid in quod agat, et hoc est terminus corrumpendus; tunc ergo quando dicitur quod 'ex hoc fit illud', verum est, non tamen oportet quod aliquid maneat eius quod praefuit quod sit commune illis, sed illa fit ex opposito, quod hoc totum fit hoc totum. Et illa videtur esse intentio PHILOSOPHI, I *De generatione*, ubi dicit quod in hoc distinguitur generatio ab alteratione, quia in generatione totum convertitur in totum, non sic in alteratione,[7] propter hoc quod generabilia et corruptibilia sunt per se entia simplicia.

[11] Contra, nihil prohibet effectum produci ab agente sine illo quo praesente virtus agentis magis debilitatur quam fortificetur; sed praesentia contrarii in aere quod debet corrumpi ab igne magis debilitat virtutem ignis ad producen-

1 opiniones istae] *inv.* Og R 2 illam] unam *add.* Og R 3 intrinsecum] proficit *add.* Og R 4 aliquid] *om.* Og | aliquid extrinsecum] *inv.* R 5 sicut] ergo ut R 5–6 sed … materiae] materiae, sed terminus intrinsecus Og 6 quae] tamen *add.* Og R | tamen] *om.* Og | est] *om.* Og R 7 ipsa] materia *add.* Og R | aliter] sic Og R | aliud … aliud] tale et aliud Og R 10 Positio ista] *inv.* Og R | videtur] esse *add.* Og R 11 enim] *om.* Og R 14 quod] quia Q 16 non] quod Og 17 corrumpendus] correspondens Og 18 ex] *om.* Q | oportet] dicitur Q 20 illa] haec Og R | Philosophi] ut dicit *add.* Og ut dicunt *add.* R 22 in] *om.* Og Q 25 debilitatur] debilitaretur Og 25–26 quam … debilitat] *om.* (*hom.*) R 25 fortificetur] fortificaretur Og

6 ARISTOT., *Phys.* I c. 7, AL 7 1.2, pp. 30–31; 190a14–21; *De gen. et corr.* I c. 4, AL 11 1, pp. 23–24; 319b1–31.

7 Cf. ARISTOT., *De gen. et corr.* I c. 4, AL 11 1, p. 24; 319b14–18; *Auct. Aristot.* 4.3, PhM 17, p. 167.

dum ignem quam fortificet; ergo ignis agens, qui praehabet in virtute sua totum ignem generandum, quia ignis generandus non est nisi quid simplex secundum illos, non habens partem et partem realiter distinctas, poterit ignem generare nullo contrario praesupposito.

[12] Et hoc idem arguitur aliter sic: agens naturale potens in aliquem effectum totum, de necessitate producit eum si non prohibetur, quia agens naturale non impeditum de necessitate agit in quodlibet quod est in virtute eius activa, ut patet de forma quam producit et inducit necessario agens non impeditum, nec ab alio agente nec ex parte passi; si ergo agens naturale habet aliquem totalem effectum in virtute sua activa, necessario ponet ipsum si non fuerit impeditum; sed non impeditur nisi per contrarium corrumpendum, quod de se sit pars compositi, sed totum est contrarium, agens non indiget opposito in producendo, nec oportet quod corrumpat, quia non corrumpit nisi ut aliquid quod est in corrupto sit ipsius geniti, quia etiam ex eius praesentia magis impediretur quam promuoveretur in actione sua; ideo enim agens non potest producere nisi corrumpendo, quia non habet totum effectum in virtute sua, et ideo oportet corrumpere aliquid ut quod fuit aliquid alterius, scilicet corrupti, sit aliquid ipsius geniti; ergo, etc.

[13] Praeterea, secundo sic: "aliqua substantia est corruptibilis per aliquid intrinsecum sibi," secundum PHILOSOPHUM, VII *Metaphysicae*, cap. 5;[8] sed nulla substantia quae est forma simplex est corruptibilis per aliquid sibi | intrinsecum; ergo cum aliqua sit corruptibilis, hoc erit per aliquid intrinsecum aliud a forma; hoc non est nisi materia, ut dicit PHILOSOPHUS in eodem VII, quod "materia est qua res potest esse et non esse."[9] Og 249^{vb}

[14] Dices quod ideo est corruptibilis, quia habet contrarium; sed hoc non valet, quia nihil est contrarium alicui ratione cuius sit corruptibile, nisi quia

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1 agens] agentis Og 4 contrario] contra R 5 aliter] alio modo Og R 6 totum] *om.* R 7 impeditum] impeditur Og 7–8 impeditum ... non] *om.* (*hom.*) R 7 quodlibet] quidlibet Og 9 ab ... agente] ex parte sui Og R | aliquem] aliquam R 10 totalem] rationalem R | necessario ponet] ergo de necessitate ponit Og ergo necessario ponit R | si ... fuerit] non R | fuerit] est Og 11–12 quod ... compositi] si autem in corrumpendo sive in eo quod corrumpitur nihil sit necessarium ad esse compositi Og R 12 est] *om.* Og R | agens] *om.* Og R 13 nec] sive Og sive non R 15 impediretur] impeditur Og in actione sua *add.* Og | in ... sua] *om.* Og 15–17 est ... quod] *om.* (*hom.*) R 16 nisi] in *add.* Og 17 oportet] ipsum *add.* Og | ut] et Og illud *add.* Og 19 Praeterea] item Og R | est] *om.* Q 20 intrinsecum sibi] *inv.* Og | 5] 9 Og 21 quae ... simplex] *om.* Og R 21–22 intrinsecum] quae est forma simplex *add.* Og R 22 aliquid] aliud *add.* Og R 22–23 aliud ... forma] *om.* Og R 23 nisi] in Og | quod] quia Og R 25 sed] *om.* Og R 26 corruptibile] corruptibilis Og

8 Cf. ARISTOT., *Metaph.* VII c. 7, AL 25 3.2, p. 143; 1032^{a}20–21.

9 ARISTOT., *Metaph.* VII c. 7, AL 25 3.2, p. 143; 1032^{a}20–22; *Auct. Aristot.* 1.170, PhM 17, p. 129.

Q 129va habet | aliquid intrinsecum ratione cuius habet 'posse non esse', quia scilicet per hoc potest recipere suum contrarium, et hoc insinuat Philosophus dicens ibi quod materia est id quo res potest esse et non esse,[10] et ratio est quia est capax alicuius formae quam non habet, quae opponitur illi sub qua est.

[15] Praeterea, si materia non est distincta a forma, non est possibilis aliqua mutatio substantialis. Probo per PHILOSOPHUM, V *Physicorum*: mutatio quaedam est de non subiecto in subiectum, alia a subiecto in non subiectum, alia de subiecto in subiectum; de non subiecto autem in non subiectum est impossi-
R 42vb bilis.[11] Sed omnis mutatio | est aliter se habentis, tunc sic generatio est mutatio de non subiecto in subiectum, corruptio est mutatio a subiecto in non subiectum; ergo est ibi aliquid aliter se habens; sed non est ibi materia quae ponitur subiectum commune; igitur generatio non est a non subiecto in subiectum, nec corruptio a subiecto in non subiectum, similiter non erit in corruptione mutatio a forma in privationem, nec in generatione a privatione ad formam si ibi non est subiectum materia, quia privatio non est nisi in apto nato.

[16] Et si dicas quod ignis qui generatur vel corrumpitur aliter se habet, non valet, quia nihil ignis manet; ergo nec ignis aliter se habet, quia aliter se habere est conditio entis, ut patet X *Metaphysicae*.[12]

[17] Et si dicas: 'quare non potest converti totum in totum ut ex toto generetur totum?', dico quod bene potest hoc fieri, sed non generando, sed magis transubstantiando, sicut panis convertitur in corpus Christi, et ista conversio non est mutatio, ut dicetur in IV.[13]

[18] Et tunc respondeo ad auctoritatem, quae est vocalis, 'generatio est mutatio totius in totum', sciendum est enim quod in aliis mutationibus extra sub-

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2–3 dicens ibi] ubi dicens Og *inv.* R 3–4 est capax] *inv.* Og 4 alicuius formae] *inv.* Og R | non] *om.* Q 5 distincta ... forma] *om.* Q | non] et ideo R 6 mutatio substantialis] *inv.* Og | Probo] vero *add.* R | V] II Og 7 subiectum] alia vero quae est *add.* Og R 7–8 alia ... subiectum] *om.* (*hom.*) Og R 8 autem] *om.* Og 10–11 corruptio ... subiectum] *om.* (*hom.*) Q 10 mutatio] unica ratio R 11 est ibi] *inv.* Og | sed] si igitur Og R | ibi materia] *inv.* Og 12 igitur] *om.* Og R 12–13 nec corruptio] et similiter de corruptione erit quod scilicet non erit Og R 13 similiter] hoc est Og R | in] ex Og | corruptione] et *add.* R 14 privationem] privatione Og | nec ... generatione] vel Og R | formam] ut in generatione *add.* Og in generatione *add.* R | si] sed Og R 16 vel] et Og R 20 hoc fieri] *om.* Og R | sed] hoc *add.* Og R | non] est *add.* Og R 21 transubstantiando] transmutando Og | ista] illa Og 22 dicetur] est ostensum Og R 23 vocalis] cum dicitur *add.* Og R 24 est enim] *om.* Og R | extra] a Og R 24–109.1 substantiam] substantia Og R id est generatione et corruptione *add.* Og R

10 Cf. supra § 13.

11 ARISTOT., *Phys.* V c. 1, AL 7 1.2, pp. 194–195; 225a1–20; *Auct. Aristot.* 2.152,153, PhM 17, p. 152.

12 Cf. ARISTOT., *Metaph.* X c. 8, AL 25 3.2, p. 214; 1058a9–28.

13 Cf. DUNS SCOTUS, *Rep.* IV-A d. 13 q. 1, ed. Wad.-Viv. 24, pp. 184–187.

stantiam, sicut in alteratione, non est mutatio totius in totum, quia ibi non est proprie aliquod totum; eo tamen modo quo est ibi totum quasi per accidens et quadam aggregatione, eo modo est ibi mutatio totius in totum. Unde in VII dicit PHILOSOPHUS quod non generatur albedo, sed lignum album; ⟨sed⟩ non est vere totum nisi secundum quid, sicut nec acervus lapidum est proprie totum, sed partes vel lapides. Sed lignum est quoddam per se totum, et generatur totum per se et corrumpitur etiam totum per se, quod est unum quotcumque fiunt | formae in tali per se unum, quia enim ignis est aliquod totum Og 250ra per se unum ens quod ⟨est⟩ generatum et aqua similiter est quoddam totum habens partes realiter distinctas, quae vere faciunt unum per se; ideo tota dicitur corrumpi vel esse corrupta quando ex ea fit ignis, et hinc est quando totum dicitur converti in totum, quia totum per se unum fit post corruptionem alicuius totius quod vere fuit unum, et per consequens vere totum corruptum, quamvis subiectum maneat commune.

[19] Item, in omni genere est reperire per se ordinem, sicut patet in genere causae efficientis; in genere igitur causae materialis erit ordo essentialis, et sic in receptivis materialibus erit dare primum receptivum essentialiter; sed primum receptivum non est nisi ad primum actum, sed primus actus est substantialis; idem autem non recipit seipsum, sed oportet quod realiter distinguatur ab illo; igitur primum compositum erit compositum ex receptivo et actu primo realiter distincto ab illo.

[20] Praeterea, aliquod causatum est causatum a quatuor causis, quia si non, sequitur quod aliqua causa ultima causabit sine priori, vel erit dare quod materia non erit causa alicuius. Probo: nullum creatum est quin habeat formam; ergo si non est ex omnibus quatuor causis, sequitur vel quod non habet effi-

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1 quia] qui Og 2 quasi] scilicet Og R 3 aggregatione] congregatione Q | ibi] *om.* Og R 4 non ... albedo] albedo non generatur Og R 5 nisi] sed Og R | acervus lapidum] actus lapidis R 6 est ... totum] per se est quoddam totum per se Og R 7 totum ... se] per se totum Og | totum ... se] per se totum Og | quod] quia Og | quod ... unum] Et ideo per se quoddam totum generatur *add.* R | unum] per se quod generatur et quod etiam corrumpitur. Et ideo per se quoddam totum generatur *add.* Og 8 fiunt] fuerint R | fiunt ... formae] formae sint Og | in ... unum] et similiter etiam corrumpitur R | tali ... unum] et similiter etiam corrumpitur *add.* Og | unum] et similiter etiam corrumpitur *add.* Og | enim] *om.* Og igitur R 8–9 est ... quod] *om.* Og 9 per ... unum] unum per se R | ens quod] quod est R | est] etiam Og etiam *add.* R | quoddam] est *add.* Og 10 tota] totum Og 11 et] *om.* Og R | quando] quod R 12 corruptionem] cognitionem Og 15 Item ... genere] in omni enim genere Q | genere] generatione R 16 materialis] materiae Q 16–17 et ... receptivis] in receptivis igitur Og R 17 materialibus] immaterialibus R | erit] est Og R 18 sed] et Og R 19 idem autem] sed idem Og R 20 erit] est Og | receptivo] receptione Og 21 distincto] distincte R 22 Praeterea] item Og R | causatum] creatum Og | causatum] tantum Og | quia] qui Og 23 causa] *om.* Q 24 causa] per se *add.* Og R | Probo] probatio R 25 ergo si] *inv.* Og R | sequitur ... quod] vel Og R

cientem sive finem, quae sunt causae priores quam sit forma, vel si habet illas, sequitur quod materia nullius erit causa. Tunc arguo sic: si aliquod causatum est vere causatum, vere est a quatuor causis; sed materia non est idem causato, ergo causatum habet in se materiam et formam, quae sunt duae causae.

[21] Praeterea, substantia per se ens dividitur in substantiam simplicem et compositam; sed per se composita non potest esse divisa contra simplicem nisi habeat partes realiter differentes et realitatem distinctam a forma; ergo, etc.

[22] Praeterea, AUGUSTINUS, XI *Confessionum*: "duo fecisti domine, unum prope te et aliud prope nihil," quod vocat materiam;[14] forma autem non potest esse prope nihil.

[23] Praeterea, AUGUSTINUS probat ibi materiam esse ⟨scitam⟩ per mutationem, quia oportet aliquid moveri, sicut dicit PHILOSOPHUS; propter quod COMMENTATOR dicit quod "transmutatio fecit scire materiam."[15]

[24] Ad rationem oppositam, dico quod si forma substantialis non esset nisi gradus intrinsecus materiae, sequeretur tunc quod per illos gradus generabilia non distinguantur specie, quia isti gradus sunt essentialiter idem tertio, scilicet materiae, nec sunt alterius rationis secundum illos gradus.

[25] Praeterea, certum est quod anima intellectiva non potest esse gradus intrinsecus materiae, quia ipsa est terminus creationis.

⟨Articulus 2⟩

[26] Est igitur videndum quale ens est materia.

[27] Ad quod praemitto quadam distinctionem de potentia. Aliquid enim
Og 250^{rb} potest esse in potentia dupliciter: uno modo ut terminus, | alio modo ut sub-

1 sive] et Og R | priores … sit] priores Og R 1–2 vel … sequitur] vel erit dare si habet illas Og R 2 quod] quam Og | nullius erit] *inv.* R 3 vere est] *om.* Og R | sed] et Og R 5 Praeterea] item Og R | per … ens] ens per se Og 5–6 et … simplicem] *om.* (*hom.*) Q 7 etc] *om.* Q 8 Praeterea] item Og R | duo … domine] fecisti duo domine Og fecisti domine duo R | unum] *om.* R 9–10 quod … nihil] *om.* (*hom.*) R 11 Praeterea] *om.* Og item R | Augustinus … ibi] ibi probat Augustinus Og R | materiam esse] *inv.* Og R | per] se *add.* Og 12 moveri] manere Og R 12–13 propter … quod] et ideo dicit IV quod Og et ideo dicit Commetator quod R 14 oppositam] opinionis Og 15 sequeretur tunc] *inv.* Og R | illos gradus] *inv.* Og R | generabilia] et corruptibilia *add.* Og R 16 distinguantur] distinguerentur Og R | sunt essentialiter] *inv.* Og R 17 materiae] caeli et mundi Og | sunt] est R | rationis] materiae Q 18 gradus] terminus Og R 19 ipsa] anima intellectiva Og R 21 ens est] esse habet Og 22 quod] primo *add.* Og 22–23 Aliquid … dupliciter] *om.* Og 22 enim] *om.* R 23–111.1 substantia] subiectum R

14 Cf. AUGUST., *Conf.* XII c. 7, CCSL 27, p. 220.

15 Cf. AVERROES, *In Metaph.* VIII com. 12, ed. Iuntina 8, f. 220va G.

stantia quod est in potentia ad terminum, et forte est eadem potentia cum materia—alio modo superficies est in potentia ad albedinem et alio modo albedo est in potentia antequam sit—sed ut comparata ad diversa dicitur obiectiva vel subiectiva, ita quod in subiecto existens dicitur potentia subiectiva, et eadem prout respicit agens dicitur obiectiva; possunt tamen separari, ut in creabili, ubi est potentia obiectiva et non subiectiva, quia ibi non subicitur aliquid.

[28] Dicunt tamen aliqui quod materia est in potentia obiectiva tantum, sicut albedo est in potentia obiectiva | quando non est, quae tamen secundum Q 129^{vb}
quid est, quia est in virtute causae suae vel | causarum suarum. Contra hoc con- R 43ra
cludunt omnes rationes factae superius.

[29] Et iterum arguo sic, qui habet totum ignem generandum in virtute sua activa potest totum illum generare, ex quo non supponit aliquid per se ens in potentia subiectiva; ergo similiter etiam nec ignis nec quodcumque generatum vel generandum erit realiter compositum ex diversis entitatibus, sed simplex quoddam. Non salvatur etiam mutatio substantialis secundum hanc viam, quia nihil aliter se habet in mutatione substantiali; quod enim aliter se habet nunc quam prius oportet manere et esse, et secundum hanc viam materia non est nisi in termino vel terminus generationis, ut videtur.

[30] Similiter, patet quod haec via negat compositionem, sicut enim quando albedo de potentia obiectiva redit ad actum, non propter hoc fit in albedine realis compositio, sic cum ex igne in potentia fit ignis in actu nulla erit ibi compositio; et ideo ponens materiam solum in potentia obiectiva et non subiectiva negat omnem rationem PHILOSOPHI de materia.

[31] Dico igitur quod "materia est per se unum principium naturae," ut dicit PHILOSOPHUS, I *Physicae*;[16] secundo quod est "per se causa," ut dicit II *Physicae*

1 et ... potentia] et sic est eadem potentia forte Og 1–2 et ... materia] *om.* R 1–3 cum ... sit] *om.* Q 3 sit] et est eadem potentia forte *add.* R 4 vel] et Og | in subiecto] ut subiectum Q | potentia] *om.* Og R 5 respicit] *om.* Og 6 in creabili] vel ctabili(!) Og 8 tamen] igitur Og R | est] ens *add.* Og R 9 obiectiva] *om.* Og R 10 quid] aliquid R | quia est] scilicet Og R 12 arguo sic] *inv.* Og R | sic] quia *add.* Og 13 totum illum] illud totum R | generare] ergo *add.* Og | aliquid ... se] per se aliquid Og | aliquid ... ens] per se existens aliquid R | ens] existens Og 14 ergo] *om.* Og R | quodcumque] aliud *add.* Og R 15 vel ... erit] erit vel generandum Og | entitatibus] entibus R 18 et] sed Og R | est] secundum istos ut videtur *add.* Og R 19 ut videtur] *om.* Og R 21 de] in Og R 22 realis compositio] *inv.* Og R | cum] tamen Og 24 Philosophi] et *add.* Og 25 unum principium] *inv.* Og R | ut] et Og 26 Physicae] physicorum Og R | Physicae] physicorum Og

16 Cf. ARISTOT., *Phys.* I c. 7, AL 7 1.2, pp. 34–35; 191^{a}8–17; *Auct. Aristot.* 2.17, PhM 17, p. 141.

et V *Metaphysicae*;[17] dicit quod est "pars alicuius compositi," VII *Metaphysicae*;[18] quod est "per se fundamentum formarum," I *Metaphysicae*;[19] quod est "per se subiectum mutationum substantialium," V *Physicae*;[20] quod est "per se causa compositi," II *Physicae*;[21] quod est terminus creationis.[22] Ergo sequitur quod est aliquid non in potentia obiectiva tantum, ut probant omnes rationes supradictae, sed oportet tunc quod sit in potentia subiectiva existens in actu vel actus—non curo quodcumque dicatur—secundum quod omne illud dicitur actu vel actus quod est extra causam suam. Cum enim sit principium et causa entis, oportet necessario quod sit aliquod ens, quia cum principiatum et causatum dependeat a causa et a principio suo, si esset nihil vel non ens dependeret a nihilo vel non ente, quod est impossibile.

Og 250va [32] Praeterea, manet sub terminis oppositis eadem et sub potentiis | numero diversis quae in ipsa corrumpuntur, et est terminus creationis, patet. Et secundum hoc est realitas distincta a forma ex eisdem causis, et est quid positivum, quia receptivum formae. Tamen dicitur ens in potentia, quia quanto aliquid habet minus de actu, tanto magis est receptivum actus; quanto autem magis est receptivum actus, tanto magis est in potentia; et quia materia est receptiva omnium formarum substantialium et accidentalium, ideo maxime est in potentia respectu earum; et ideo diffinitur per esse in potentia secundum ARISTOTELEM, non enim habet actum distinguentem, vel dividentem, vel receptum, vel informantem et dantem sibi esse specificum, ex quo tamen

1 V] II Og si R | pars] *om.* Og | alicuius compositi] *inv.* Og R et *add.* R 2 formarum] et *add.* R 3 mutationum substantialium] mutatio unum sub alium Og | substantialium] et *add.* R | V Physicae] I physicorum Og 4 compositi] et *add.* R | Physicae] physicorum Og R | terminus] finis Og 7 dicatur] dicativus Og | dicitur] potest dici Og R 9 necessario] *om.* Og R | ens] necessario *add.* Og R 10 dependeat] dependeant Og | causa] secunda *add.* Q | a] *om.* Og R | vel] quod Og | dependeret] *om.* Og ens *add.* R 11 quod] non *add.* Og 12 Praeterea] item Og R 13 ipsa] prima R | et] etiam Og R | patet] supra per Augustinum *add.* R 15 Tamen dicitur] *inv.* Og diffinitur tamen per R | ens … potentia] in potentia ens Og 16 aliquid] quid R | tanto] creato R 17 magis … tanto] *om.* (*hom.*) R | est … magis] *om.* (*hom.*) Q | quia] *om.* R 19 respectu] *om.* Og | ideo] propter hoc Og R | per esse] quod est ens Og R 20 vel] et Og R 21 sibi] *om.* Og R

17 ARISTOT., *Phys.* II c. 3, AL 7 1.2, pp. 58–59; 195a15–16; *Auct. Aristot.* 2.67, PhM 17, p. 145; ARISTOT., *Metaph.* I c. 3, AL 25 3.2, p. 18; 983a26–32; *Auct. Aristot.* 1.119, PhM 17, p. 124.

18 Cf. ARISTOT., *Metaph.* VII c. 8, AL 25 3.2, p. 146; 1033b17–19.

19 Cf. ARISTOT., *Metaph.* I c. 8, transl. arab.-lat., ed. Iuntina 8, f. 14rb F; 989b6–7.

20 ARISTOT., *Phys.* V c. 1, AL 7 1.2, p. 196; 225a34–b5.

21 Cf. supra § 31.

22 Cf. AUGUST., *Conf.* XII c. 8, CCSL 27, p. 220.

est receptivum illius actus per suppositum, et est causa compositi; non potest esse nihil, quia nihil non est alicuius receptivum.

[33] Sed contra hoc obicitur quod scilicet materia non habet tale esse actu. PHILOSOPHUS enim, I *De generatione*, arguit contra illos qui ponebant subiectum generationis sive materiam aliquod corpus in actu, quia tunc secundum PHILOSOPHUM generatio non esset nisi alteratio, quia omne quod advenit enti in actu est accidens;[23] ergo eodem modo hic, si materia sit de se aliqua entitas in actu, vel actualis distincta contra formam, et solum diceretur ens in potentia quia receptiva actus completivi speciei, quidquid sibi adveniret constitueret unum ens per accidens cum eo; tolleretur igitur omnis mutatio substantialis per hunc modum.

[34] Praeterea, potentiale in omnibus aliis generibus a substantia non est actu illius generis, patet in omni genere accidentis. Nam susceptivum coloris nihil est in genere coloris; ergo in genere substantiae, receptivum nihil erit generis substantiae; igitur susceptivum formae substantialis non est realiter distinctum a forma substantiali, quia illud susceptivum non reponitur in alio genere, nec reducitur ad aliud genus quam ad substantiam; non ergo realiter distinguitur a forma.

[35] Praeterea, ex duobus entibus in actu non fit per se unum; ergo ex materia, quae secundum istum modum est ens actu, non fieret per se unum cum forma, nec resultaret unum compositum quod esset per se unum.

[36] Respondeo ut prius, quod materia dicit entitatem aliquam positivam extra intellectum et causam suam, secundum quam entitatem est capax formarum substantialium quae sunt actus simpliciter. Unde oportet quod res gene-

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1 illius] vis Q | per suppositum] praesuppositum R | per … compositi] vel formae Og | et … compositi] etiam a causa illius actus vel formae R 2 alicuius receptivum] *inv.* Og R 7 hic] habet R | de se] *om.* Og | aliqua] ista *add.* Og 8 in] de se est Og R 9 completivi] completivus Q Og | sibi adveniret] *inv.* Og 12 Praeterea] item Og R 12–13 potentiale … generis] omnibus aliis generibus, potentiale illius generis Og in omnibus aliis generibus, potentiale illius generis nihil est illius generis R 14–15 receptivum … substantiae] susceptivum illius generis nihil est illius generis susceptivum Og R 15 igitur susceptivum] *inv.* Og | susceptivum] *om.* R | est] erit Og R 16 a … substantiali] sive substantialiter a forma Og R | quia … susceptivum] susceptivum autem illud Og R 16–17 non … genere] in alio genere non reponitur vel ad aliud genus Og R | non … genus] in alio genere non reponitur vel ad aliud genus non reducitur Og 17 ergo] igitur R 19 Praeterea] item Og R | duobus entibus] duabus entitatibus Og R | per … unum] unum per se Og R 19–20 ex … modum] secundum istum modum ex materia quae Og secundum istum modum ex materia quae secundum te R 20 modum] secundum esse *add.* Og | ens actu] *inv.* Og | per … unum] unum per se Og R 21 quod esset] *om.* Og R | se] ens *add.* Og R 24 Unde] vel *add.* Og R | quod] omnes *add.* R

23 ARISTOT., *De gen. et corr.* I c. 1, AL 11 1, pp. 5–7; $314^{a}7$–$314^{b}12$.

rabilis et corruptibilis sit omnino simplex ut forma, vel componatur ex aliquo et nihilo, vel sit composita ex aliquo et aliquo. Primum est absurdum, scilicet quod generabile sit simplex, et contra hoc sunt rationes superius factae. Secundum etiam est impossibile, scilicet quod aliquid componatur ex nihilo et aliquo. Ergo sequitur necessario tertium, scilicet quod aliquid componitur ex
Og 250^{vb} aliquo et aliquo | sicut ex materia et forma; sicut enim non est inconveniens quod in composito sit aliquid et aliquid, sic non est inconveniens quod aliquid sit compositum.

R 43^{rb} [37] Et tunc ad argumentum tertium, dico | quod sicut non repugnat per se uni quod sit compositum, ita non repugnat ei quod sit ex aliquibus actualibus entitatibus realiter distinctis.

[38] Sed dices quod etiam ex albo et ligno potest fieri unum per se, quia quoddam compositum.

[39] Respondeo: in ente in communi unitas vel est idem quod ens, vel est passio immediate conveniens ens, et ideo non potest demonstrari de ente, quia
Q 130ra si demonstraretur aut hoc esset | ex definitione subiecti, scilicet entis vel unius; sed ista sunt transcendentia et non habent definitionem, et ideo unitas in communi, vel passio immediata entis quae est esse unum, non potest demonstrari de ente, vel si esse unum sit passio mediata, illud tamen per quod inest enti non est nobis notum. Sic etiam dico in speciali quod vel est idem cum quolibet ente speciali unitas entis specialis vel est passio immediata eius, et secundum hoc cuiuslibet enti speciali immediate inest sua entitas, vel si inest ex natura alterius illud non est nobis notum. Quando ergo quaeritur: 'quare ergo com-

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1 corruptibilis] vel *add.* Og R | simplex] vel *add.* Og | componatur] sit composita Og R 2 composita] compositum Q 2–3 scilicet] *om.* Og 3 quod] quodlibet *add.* Og | generabile] generale Og | superius] supra Og 5 aliquo] *om.* (*hom.*) R | sequitur necessario] *inv.* Og R | scilicet quod] *inv.* Og R 6 sicut … est] non est autem Og R 7 in composito] compositum Q 7–8 sic … compositum] *om.* Q sicut non est inconveniens quod in compositum sit aliquid R 9 dico] secundum R 10–11 ex … distinctis] *om.* (*hom.*) R 11 distinctis] aliqua entitate actuali, et ex alia entitate actuali distincta ab illo realiter Og ex aliqua entitate actuali et alia accidentali distincta ab alia realiter R 16 aut] vel Og | ex] demonstratione *add.* Og | vel] etiam *add.* Og 17 unitas] entitas R 17–18 communi] de ente *add.* Og vel est re *add.* R 18 immediata] *om.* Og R | esse] omne R | esse unum] *inv.* Og 19 ente] quia si demonstraretur vel hoc esset ex diffinitione subiecti, scilicet entis, vel etiam unius; sed ista sunt trascendentia et non habent diffinitionem; et ideo unitas in communi de ente *add.* R | illud] *om.* Og | illud tamen] *inv.* R 19–20 per … notum] non est nobis notum per quod inest enti Og non est notum per quod inest enti R 20–21 quod … speciali] *om.* (*hom.*) Q 21 entis] eius Og illius R | vel … eius] *om.* Og | eius] specialis cuiuscumque enti in speciali R | et] tunc *add.* Og R | secundum] ipsum *add.* Og 22 cuiuslibet … entitas] immediate cuilibet inest unitas eius Og R | inest] est Og R 23 illud] hoc tamen Og R | Quando … quaeritur] *om.* Og R

positum est per se unum?', non est reddenda alia causa nisi quia habet talem formam. Et ideo sicut ens per se potest esse simplex et compositum, sic non repugnat per se passioni eius, scilicet suae unitati esse simplex vel composita.

[40] Dices: tu bene assignas rationem unitatis ex parte totius, secundum quod scilicet totum ideo est per se unum quia habet talem formam, et aliud est per accidens unum propter talem formam; sed quaero de partibus compositi: unde habent quod istae dant esse per se unum et aliae non?

[41] Respondeo: PHILOSOPHUS, in VIII *Metaphysicae*, quaerit quare aliquid est unum et dicit quod simplex est unum quia statim est id quod est;[24] sed in compositis est dare aliquam rationem, et nescivit PHILOSOPHUS aliam dare nisi quia hoc est actus et illud potentia, ita quod haec potentia est essentialiter receptiva secundum totum genus suum et illud actus essentialiter perficiens aliud, et ideo ex his fit unum per se, scilicet ex materia et forma. Et sic non est de subiecto et accidente, quia enim tam materia quam forma sunt causae intrinsecae entitatis compositi, ita faciunt per se unum; albedo vero et homo non sunt sic causae intrinsecae, quia homo in ultima actualitate sua potest esse sine albedine, et ideo nec per se habet potentialitatem ad albedinem, et ideo tantum faciunt unum per accidens; aliqua etiam constituunt unum tantum aggregatione, ideo possunt esse unum aggregatione, aliqua | etiam sunt unum unitate ordinis, quia scilicet ordinantur ad unum. Og 251ra

[42] Et si fiat altercatio, sicut argutum est supra, quod ex actu et actu non fit unum per se, nec ex esse et esse, dico quod si accipias esse actu ut distinguitur contra potentiam secundum quod actus et potentia dividunt totum ens, sic dico quod materia potest dici in actu; et licet non dicatur actus, quia actus habet eam distinguere et denominare, posset tamen dici actus secundum quod ARISTOTELES accipit actum in pluribus locis, in VI et VIII *Metaphysicae*; si autem actus dividatur contra illud quod recipit actum, sic materia non est

1 per ... unum] unum per se Og R | non ... nisi] *om.* Og R 2 formam] non est aliqua causa addenda *add.* Og R | et] per Og 3 vel] esse *add.* Og | composita] compositum Og esse compositum R 4 Dices] unde *praem.* Og sed *praem.* R | tu bene] unde Q | unitatis] vel unius *add.* Og vel unus *add.* R | secundum] *om.* Og R 5 ideo] *om.* Og | habet] *om.* R 5–6 et ... formam] *om.* (*hom.*) Og 6 est] *om.* R 7 istae] illae Og R | per se] *om.* Og R 8 in] *om.* Q 10 est] oportet Og R | aliquam] aliam Og 11 potentia est] *inv.* R | est] *om.* Og 12 suum] illius Og R 13 Et] non Q 15 entitatis] ipsius *add.* Og ipsi *add.* R | ita] ideo Og R 16 sic] sicut Og 18 accidens] lapis vero et lapis, quia nec per se nec per accidens *add.* Og R | aliqua etiam] *om.* Og R 18–19 tantum] nisi Og R 19 aliqua] quaedam Og R 20 ad] aliquid Og aliquod *add.* R 21 sicut] secundum quod Og R | quod] scilicet *add.* Og R | non] et ideo R 22 si] *om.* Q 25 eam] ipsam Og R 26 locis] ita *add.* Og | VI] VII *add.* Og R

24 Cf. ARISTOT., *Metaph.* VIII c. 6, AL 25 3.2, pp. 177–178; 1045a35–b3; 1045b23–24.

actus, quia est primum receptivum actus; tale autem oportet esse denudatum ab omni actu, quia est distinguibile per omnem actum ut possit sic esse pars omnis entis.

[43] Cum igitur dicis quod ex duobus entibus non fit unum,[25] dico quod falsum est quando unum est in potentia ad aliud et similiter dicendum est de esse et esse.

[44] Ad argumentum primum,[26] illud etiam quod dicit quod generatio esset alteratio et probatur per antiquos, dico quod antiqui ponebant corpus habens formam substantialem esse materiam et subiectum generationis, ut patet I *De generatione*; ideo sequitur quod faciebant omnem generationem alterationem, sed in proposito non pono quod materia sit actuata et distincta per aliquam formam substantialem.

[45] Ad secundum,[27] de receptivo in genere substantiae et accidentis, dico quod si albedo poneretur composita ex partibus essentialibus secundum quod PHILOSOPHUS videtur ponere XII *Metaphysicae* principia proportionalia in omni genere, tunc est ad propositum. Et si hoc non ponatur, pono tunc in accidentibus receptivum alicuius accidentis non esse eiusdem rationis cum recepto, nec per se nec per reductionem. Et tunc etiam sequitur propositum, quia potentiale et receptivum in uno genere vel respectu alicuius generis prioris est actuale, ut receptivum in genere colorum, et universaliter in genere qualitatis est aliquid actuale de genere priori, scilicet de genere quantitatis, ut est
R 43va superficies respectu | colorum; ergo potentiale et receptivum in primo genere non potest esse de aliquo alio priori genere; ideo oportet esse de eodem genere, scilicet de genere substantiae.

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2 possit sic] *inv.* Og R 4 dico quod] *om.* Og R 5–6 de ... esse] *om.* Og 7 illud ... quod] *om.* Q 8 et ... quod] probas quia Og R | antiqui] ponentes materiam esse aliquod corpus in actu secundum Philosophum ponebant generationem alterationem, dico quod *add.* Og 9–10 De generatione] alii scilicet aqua alii terram, etc *add.* Og R 10 ideo] et *praem.* Og | sequitur] sequebatur Og 12 substantialem] liberalem formam Og 13 secundum] aliud Og R | de ... accidentis] de receptivo vel potentiali respectu alterius accidentis quod non pertinet ad genus recepti sicut de receptivo albedinis quod est superficies, ipsa enim non est eiusdem generis cum albedine Og R | dico] item *praem.* R 14 albedo poneretur] *inv.* Og R 15 Philosophus videtur] *inv.* Og R | proportionalia] proportionabilia Og 16 propositum] oppositum R | hoc ... ponatur] non ponam hoc Og R 17 alicuius accidentis] *inv.* Og R | esse] est Og | rationis] generis Og R 18 reductionem] redemptionem Q | sequitur] sequeretur ad Og | propositum] oppositum Og R 19 vel] *om.* R 20 ut] vel Q 20–21 qualitatis] *om.* Og 21–22 et ... colorum] *om.* (*hom.*) Q 24 scilicet ... genere] *om.* Og

25 Cf. supra § 35.
26 Cf. supra § 33.
27 Cf. supra § 34.

⟨Articulus 3⟩

[46] Sequitur tertio videre quomodo materia realiter distinguitur a forma, ubi dico quod sunt omnino alterius rationis et primo diversa. Quod probo sic: actus et potentia, quae sunt principia entis, sunt primo diversa; materia et forma sunt huiusmodi; ergo, ⟨etc.⟩ Si enim forma esset eiusdem rationis cum materia, non competeret sibi dare esse, et si materia esset eiusdem rationis cum forma non competeret sibi recipere esse. Si etiam aliquid formae includeretur in materia, forma quantum ad hoc non esset apta nata recipi, sed magis recipere, et sic forma non esset primum receptum si aliquid eius esset non receptum sed receptivum. Eodem modo, si aliquid materiae esset inclusum in forma, ipsa non esset primo receptiva, sed recepta quantum ad aliquid sui; sic igitur sunt omnino alterius rationis et primo diversa inter se.

[47] Quomodo igitur ex quo sunt duo principia sic distincta et primo diversa, possunt constituere aliquid unum simpliciter? Dico quod quanto aliqua sunt magis distincta et diversa formaliter, tanto sunt magis disposita ad faciendum per se unum, quia in illa constitutione non requiritur | similitudo in natura, sed Q 130^{rb}
proportio conveniens, quae potest esse inter primo diversa.

[48] Dico igitur quod mihi est contradictio quod materia sit terminus creationis et pars compositi et quod non habeat aliquod esse, cum tamen sit aliqua essentia; quod enim aliqua essentia sit extra causam suam et non habeat aliquod esse quo sit essentia est mihi contradictio.

[49] Obicitur etiam ab aliis contra dicta per COMMENTATOREM, VIII *Metaphysicae*, ubi dicit quod generans non facit aliud quam extrahere illud quod est in potentia ad actum; unde dicit quod non largitur multitudinem, sed perfectionem;[28] sed si produceret aliquam actualitatem quae prius non fuisset in

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2 tertio] secundo Q | materia … distinguitur] distinguitur realiter materia Og R | ubi] *om.* Og R 3 Quod … sic] *om.* Og 3–5 actus … etc] quae enim sunt extrema alicuius differentiae sunt primo diversa; actus et potentia, quae sunt forma et materia | sunt omnino huiusmodi; ideo etc Og R 5 enim] etiam Og R 6 rationis] rationem Og 9 forma … esset] non esset forma Og R | non receptum] in receptum R 11 receptiva] sed recepta *add.* Og 11–12 sunt omnino] *om.* R 13 sic] *om.* Og | primo] *om.* Og R 14 simpliciter] per se Og R | quanto aliqua] illa quae Og R 15–16 magis … unum] primo diversa non possunt constituere aliquid idem simplex; quanto tamen aliqua sunt [magis distincta vel diversa formaliter, magis sunt *om.* Og] disposita ad faciendum unum per se Og R 18 est contradictio] *inv.* Og R 19–20 aliqua essentia] *inv.* Og R 20 aliqua essentia] *inv.* Og R 20–21 aliquod esse] esse quod R 21 est mihi] *inv.* Og R 22 ab … per] contra dicta ab aliis Og R 23 ubi] qui Og R | quam] nisi quia Og nisi quod R | extrahere] extrahit R

28 AVERROES, *In Metaph.* VIII c. 15, ed. Iuntina 8, f. 224raA; *Auct. Aristot.* 1.217, PhM 17, p. 133.

materia, iam largiretur multitudinem quod est contra eum; oportet ergo quod sicut fuit tantum unum in potentia, ita sit unum tantum in actu. Et sic non erunt duae entitates absolutae in generato.

[50] Respondeo: in generationibus et corruptionibus communiter concurrunt potentia obiectiva et subiectiva, et ex potentia obiectiva trahit agens ad actum illud quod est in tali potentia, puta totalem terminum generationis, qui includit et formam et materiam, dum est in potentia obiectiva sicut quando est in actu habet utrumque; et hoc modo agens non largitur multitudinem, sed perfectionem solum; sicut enim totus ignis est factus in actu, sic totus fuit in potentia, et haec est prima extractio eius quod fuit in potentia obiectiva. Secunda extractio est secundum quod agens de potentia materiae praeexistentis, et quae in fine generationis est pars compositi, educit formam quae est altera pars compositi, quae prius non fuit in actu, nec in re extra sicut materia. Et sic agens vel generans largitur multitudinem loquendo de multitudine in actu; sic igitur generans largitur perfectionem prout accipit totum terminum
Og 251va generationis, quod erat in potentia obiectiva; alio autem modo | accipiendo potentiam subiectivam ut de qua extrahit formam, sic largitur aliquam multitudinem actualem.

⟨Ad argumenta principalia⟩

[51] Ad argumentum primum,[29] dico quod illa propositio non facit ad propositum, quia Aristoteles non dicit eam ex intentione, sed arguendo ad partem falsam pro opinione antiquorum, quod patet primo ex processu litterae, quia postquam dixit quod 'nec est quid nec quale', etc; subdit, 'sic quid intendentibus vero materiam subiectum esse, sed impossibile'; non est autem modus Aristotelis subiungere 'sed impossibile' suae determinationi. Esto tamen quod sit

2 fuit … potentia] unum fuit in potentia tantum Og R | sit … tantum] tantum sit unum Og R 5 potentia obiectiva] ista Og R | trahit] contrahit Og 6 tali potentia] potentia obiectiva Og R | puta] ut *praem.* Og 9 enim] *add.* Og 10 et] *om.* R | fuit] est Og R 11 Secunda] vera R | quod] quam Og R 12 quae] est *add.* Og R | est] *om.* Og R 13 fuit] praefuit Og R 15 largitur perfectionem] non largitur multitudinem Og R 16 quod … in] pro Og R 17–18 multitudinem actualem] *inv.* Og R 20 argumentum primum] *inv.* Og R | illa] ista Og R 22 primo] *om.* R 23 quid] nec quantum *add.* Og R | sic] se Og | quid] quidam R 24 non … autem] quod non est Og quia non est R 25 suae determinationi] *inv.* Og R 25–119.1 Esto … verum] Et est etiam quod verum sit Og et esto etiam quod verum sit R

29 Cf. supra § 1.

verum, auctoritas tamen solvit argumentum; ponit enim illa quibus ens determinatur et distinguitur; distinctio autem vel determinatio fit ab actu actuante et distinguente qualis est forma, et nihil huius est materia.

[52] Sed dices ultra quod materia praedicatur de omnibus denominative; unde VII *Metaphysicae* dicit PHILOSOPHUS quod "archa non est lignum, sed lignea";[30] ergo de nullo praedicatur essentialiter; ergo si nullum est eorum quae sunt, nihil erit.

[53] Dico quod ex hoc quod materia praedicatur denominative de aliquo, patet quod non est nihil, sed aliquid, quia 'nihil' non denominat 'aliquid'. Dico igitur quod denominativa proprie dicuntur quae differunt cadentia ab illo, patet in praedicamentis. Casus autem ille potest esse vel sicut accidentis ad subiectum, vel sicut formae ad suppositum eiusdem naturae; et secundum hoc est duplex praedicatio denominativa, una accidentis denominantis subiectum, alia formae non acceptae in abstracto, nec secundum rationem quidditatis absolutae, sed quasi in concreto per cadentiam formae ad suppositum naturae propriae, secundum quod dicimus 'homo est animatus' non 'homo est anima'; et isto modo omnia superiora | dicuntur de suis inferioribus, ut 'Sortes est homo', 'homo est animal', non 'homo est animalitas', vel 'Sortes' 'humanitas'. Et sic etiam in proposito dicitur quod materia est informata, non tamen quod materia sit forma. R 43^{vb}

[54] Ad illud de V *Physicae* 'quod movetur est' etc,[31] dico quod licet entitas actualis non sit mobili ratio recipiendi motum, sed magis ut est ens in potentia, est tamen accidens necessario requisitum ad hoc quod moveatur. Et sic loquitur PHILOSOPHUS dicens 'quod movetur est', non quod haec sit sicut conditio mobilis per se, sed per accidens, requisita tamen necessario ad motum. Per se autem conditio mobilis est esse in potentia; bene autem potest esse

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1 tamen] non Og | solvit] dubium vel *add.* Og R | enim] ibi *add.* R | illa] ista R 2 actuante] actualitate Og 3 qualis] actus *add.* Og R | et] vel Og 5 dicit] vult Og R 6 praedicatur] *om.* Og R | est] *om.* Og 7 sunt] erit *add.* Og | nihil erit] *inv.* R 9 patet] *om.* Og | denominat] denominatur Og 10 differunt] dicuntur R | illo] alio Og aliquo R 11 patet] *om.* Q | Casus autem] aliquis R | esse] *om.* Og 13 praedicatio denominativa] *inv.* Og R 15 concreto] composito Og 17 inferioribus] superioribus Og 21 V] II Og | Physicae] physicorum Og | quod ... etc] de esse quod debet uniformiter affirmari in motu et negari a subiecto generationis, cum dicit Aristoteles quod movetur est, quod generatur non est Og R 24 sicut] *om.* Og R 25 requisita] requisitum Og | tamen] *om.* Og 26 potentia] sic igitur dicit Philosophus quod moto necessario est quantum ad conditionem necessario requisitam in mobili, licet per accidens *add.* Og R | bene autem] aliquid enim Og R

30 Cf. ARISTOT., *Metaph.* IX c. 7, AL 25 3.2, p. 187; 1049^{a}19–21.

31 Cf. supra § 4.

aliquid conveniens aliqui per accidens et tamen necessario per accidens in quam quia non includitur in ratione formali illius, necessario tamen requisitum
Og 251^{vb} ad illud, quia sine illud istud non esset, sicut privatio est | principium per accidens naturae, I *Physicae*.[32] Ad probandum igitur quod generatio non sit motus, sufficit ARISTOTELI ostendere quod subiectum generationis non necessario est ens actu, sed est ens in potentia; subiecto autem motus, sive ei quod movetur, necessario coniungitur esse ens actu, licet per accidens, ut dictum est.

[55] Ad aliud, de materia quae non est scibilis,[33] etc., dico quod PHILOSOPHUS indistincte et in universali loquitur de motu usque ad quintum librum, et ideo consideratio eius de materia se extendit ad subiectum tam mutationis quam motus; loquitur enim ibi de materia ut est subiectum, non solum in generatione, sed etiam in alteratione, et habet ordinem ad transmutationem; sic nec subiectum motus nec mutationis est scibile per se, nec scitur
Q 130va per se, sed in comparatione | ad aliud; sed non sequitur quod non sit alio modo scibile per se et secundum se, sicut ignis ut transmutetur localiter non potest cognosci nisi per comparationem ad locum, potest tamen cognosci alio modo et perfectiori quam per comparationem ad locum. Intentio etiam PHILOSOPHI est ibi quod quantumcumque materia vel subiectum cognoscatur et sit cognoscibile in se et per se, est tamen cognoscibilis in comparatione ad formam. Dico igitur quod materia secundum se in sua essentia est cognoscibilis, sed non a nobis. Primum patet, quia omnis entitas absoluta in se est cognoscibilis; materia est huiusmodi; ergo habet enim ideam in Deo, vel ex parte obiecti, vel secundum rationem ex parte essentiae secundum aliam opinionem. Secundum patet, nam forma est magis cognoscibilis a nobis quam

1 aliquid] *om.* Og R | aliqui] alii Og R | tamen necessario] *inv.* Og R 2 formali illius] *inv.* Og | necessario tamen] et tamen necessario Og R 3 quia … esset] *om.* Og R | sicut … est] hoc modo principio Og hoc modo privatio R 4 Physicae] Physicorum Og R | sit] esset Og R 5 ostendere] *om.* Q 5–6 necessario est] erat necessario Og R 6 ens] in *add.* Og R | est] *om.* Og R 8 non … scibilis] est scibilis in analogia Og R 8–9 Philosophus] loquitur *add.* Og R 9 loquitur] *om.* Og R 10 materia] est secundum quod *add.* Og R | subiectum] obiectum Og R 10–11 tam … motus] alterationis Og R 11 enim] igitur R | enim ibi] ibi etiam Og 11–12 non … etiam] *om.* R | non … alteratione] alterationis Og 12 et] ut *add.* Og 12–13 transmutationem] et *add.* R 13 sic nec] et sic videturOg 13–15 nec … se] *om.* (*hom.*) R 15 se] scilicet *add.* Og | ut] cum non Og R 15–16 non … cognosci] *om.* Og R 16 potest tamen] *inv.* Og R cum *praem.* R 17 perfectiori] modo *add.* R 18 ibi] haec Og R | cognoscatur] cognoscitur Og 19 et] vel Og | cognoscibilis] eius cognitio possibilis Og R 21 Primum] primo Og | quia] quod R 22 ergo] etc *add.* Og R 23–24 opinionem] non est tamen cognoscibilis a nobis *add.* Og R 24 Secundum patet] *om.* Og R | nam forma] forma enim Og R

32 AVERROES, *In Phys.* I com. 66, ed. Iuntina 4, f. 39va G.

33 Cf. supra § 5.

materia; sed forma non cognoscitur nisi ex operationibus, ergo nec materia; quanto enim est aliquid magis remotum a sensibus, tanto minus est a nobis cognoscibile. Cognoscimus ergo materiam, ut dicit COMMENTATOR, per transmutationem;[34] videmus enim unam formam novam post aliam, quia videmus novam operationem quae arguit novam formam; ergo subiectum transmutationis commune manet, hoc est materia. Non ergo sequitur 'est cognoscibilis in analogia ad formam, ergo alio modo vel in se vel secundum se non est cognoscibilis'.

[56] Ad aliud, de actu,[35] dico quod si accipias actum pro actu informante, sic dico quod materia non est actus; si autem accipias actum pro omni eo quod est extra causam suam, sic materia potest dici ens actu vel actus; sed secundum communem modum loquendi esse actum attribuitur et appropriatur formae.

[57] Ad oppositum,[36] patet quomodo materia est ens actu et quomodo non.

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1 materia] sed *add.* Og 2 est aliquid] *inv.* Og R | sensibus] sensibilibus Og 2–3 est ... cognoscibile] cognoscibile est a nobis Og cognoscibile a nobis est R 3 materiam] *om.* Og R | Commentator] materiam *add.* Og R 3–4 transmutationem] mutationem Og 4 aliam] probo *add.* Og R 5 novam] *in marg.* R 6–7 est ... formam] non est cognoscibilis a nobis nisi in analogia ad formam, vel est cognoscibilis in analogia ad formam Og R 7 vel] et Og 9 quod] *om.* Og R 9–10 pro ... actum] *om.* (*hom.*) R 10 sic ... quod] *om.* Q 12 communem modum] usum communem Og R 13 actu] *om.* Og

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34 Cf. AVERROES, *In Metaph.* VIII com. 12 (ed. Iuntina 8, f. 220va G).

35 Cf. supra § 6.

36 Cf. supra § 7.

5

The Disputation at the University of Paris between Godfrey of Fontaines and John Duns Scotus on Virtues in the Will

Stephen D. Dumont

When John Duns Scotus began lecturing as a bachelor in theology at the University of Paris in the Fall of 1302, Godfrey of Fontaines was still a regent master of the faculty but near the end of his imposing, twenty-year career.[1] Scotus himself arrived at Paris already a mature academic in his late thirties with a growing reputation, having spent the previous decade in theological studies at Oxford.[2] He also arrived quite familiar with Godfrey's views. From the opening pages of his early Oxford lectures on Lombard's *Sentences* to their massive expansion into his monumental *Ordinatio*, Scotus had examined and criticized a number of Godfrey's positions.[3] He annotated his own working copy of the *Ordinatio*—the so-called *Liber Scoti*—with numerous references and responses to Godfrey by name.[4] Now, as a bachelor of theology at Paris, Scotus would lecture for a

1 For an overview of Godfrey's life and academic career, see John F. Wippel, *The Metaphysical Thought of Godfrey of Fontaines: A Study in Late Thirteenth-Century Philosophy* (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 1981), pp. xv–xxi. Andrea Aiello, "Godfrey of Fontaines's Life, Career, and Library," in *A Companion to Godfrey of Fontaines*, ed. Antoine Côté, Martin Pickavé, and Michael Szlachta, Brill's Companions to the Christian Tradition (Leiden: Brill, forthcoming). The last record of Godfrey at Paris is a meeting of the Sorbonne in 1306. See Maurice de Wulf, *Un théologien-philosophe du xiiie siècle: Étude sur la vie, les oeuvres et l'influence de Godefroid de Fontaines* (Bruxelles: M. Hayez, 1904), p. 31

2 On Scotus's academic career, see my "John Duns Scotus's Life in Context," in *Interpreting Duns Scotus: Critical Essays*, ed. Giorgio Pini (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2022), pp. 8–43. I argued that Scotus was sent to Paris to read the *Sentences* by the Minister General, John of Murrovale, at the General Chapter of Genoa in Spring of 1302. See pp. 28 and 73 n. 107. Recent scholarship additionally thinks it likely that the Order had previously sent Scotus to Paris in the mid to late 1280s for its lectorate program. See ibid., pp. 6–17. This opens the possibility that Scotus witnessed Godfrey's early quodlibetal disputations. For Gonsalvus's letter, see note 14 below.

3 In the prologue to his early *Lectura*, Scotus reports Godfrey's distinctive view on the nature of theology as both practical and speculative from his *Quodlibet* xiii, q. 1. See Scotus, i *Lect.* prol. p. 4 q. 1–2 nn. 161–162, ed. Vat. 16, pp. 53–54.

4 For a list of Scotus's own annotations concerning Godfrey's positions recorded in the first book of his *Ordinatio*, see my "Godfrey of Fontaines and the Succession Theory of Forms at

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second time on the *Sentences* over the academic year 1302–1303. Once again Scotus critically engaged Godfrey on a number of issues, at places taking an even stronger stance against him than in his corresponding Oxford lectures.[5]

All of this raises an intriguing possibility. Did Godfrey and Scotus ever engage in live debate at Paris? Ordinarily, identifying disputants during this period is difficult, since contemporary opponents typically remained unnamed with their views cited impersonally (*dicitur*; *aliqui dicunt*). Remarkably, however, a disputation does survive in which Scotus and Godfrey are expressly identified and recorded in direct, public debate. Indeed, their debate occurred at one of the most public ceremonies within the medieval university, an event known as 'inception', that marked the inauguration of a new master of theology. More remarkable still was the ultimate issue under dispute, namely, whether there are virtues in the will. This topic was important not only for demarcating Scotus's strong voluntarism from Godfrey's stringent Aristotelianism but, more generally, as indicative of a major transformation in western ethics.[6]

Paris in the Early Fourteenth Century," in *Philosophical Debates at Paris in the Early Fourteenth Century*, eds. Stephen F. Brown, Thomas Dewender, and Theo Kobusch (Leiden; Boston: Brill, 2009), p. 51 n. 55. Scotus cites Godfrey by name in the main text of his *Ordinatio* IV when discussing the Eucharist ("… secundum scilicet, Godefridum V *Quodlibet* quaestione 1 …") and then also quotes Godfrey's *Quodlibet* IX q. 3 on the topic. See, Scotus IV *Ord.* d. 11 p. 1 a. 2 q. 1 n. 111 and d. 12 p. 3 a. 1 q. 1 nn. 328–348, ed. Vat. 12, pp. 222, pp. 395–400. Scotus must have redacted this portion of the *Ordinatio* IV quite late, presumably at Paris, as he noted in his own copy that he had failed to dictate the final distinctions of Book IV. Scribes filled in the missing material with his Parisian lectures. See IV *Ord.* d. 49 'Editorum monitus', ed. Vat. 14, p. 394.

5 In the revised version of the first book of his Parisian lectures on the *Sentences* known as the *Reportatio examinata* (I-A), Scotus especially reports and criticizes Godfrey's positions on the scientific character of theology and the nature of qualitative change. In these and other cases, Scotus refers to Godfrey simply as 'Doctor' or 'Magister'. See Scotus, *Rep. par.* I-A, eds. Allan Wolter and Oleg Bychkov, vol. 1 (St. Bonaventure, NY: Franciscan Institute, 2004), pp. 6–7, 13–24, 58–60, 208–210, 299–301, 440, 482–496, 510; vol. 2 (St. Bonaventure, NY: Franciscan Institute, 2008), pp. 98, 106, 174–175. Whereas in his earlier Oxford *Lectura* Scotus had held that the moderate view that the intellect and will were essentially ordered co-causes of volition, in his Parisian commentary at II d. 25 Scotus instead argued against Godfrey for the more radical position that the will is the total cause of volition. On this whole issue, see my "Did Duns Scotus Change His Mind on the Will?" in *Nach der Verurteilung von 1277 / After the Condemnation of 1277: Philosophie und Theologie an der Universität von Paris im letzten Viertel des 13. Jahrhunderts. Studien und Texte / Philosophy and Theology at the University of Paris in the Last Quarter of the Thirteenth Century. Studies and Texts*, eds. Jan A. Aertsen, Andreas Speer, and Kent Emery (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2013), pp. 719–794.

6 For an overview of this important development, see Bonnie Kent, *Virtues of the Will: The Transformation of Ethics in the Late Thirteenth Century* (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 1995).

The survival of this particular debate is especially fortuitous, given that Godfrey's known writings do not contain, surprisingly, an *ex professo* treatment of this issue. Although Godfrey's early *Quodlibet* III.13 (1286) expressly concerned whether moral habits informed the will, his formal response to the question was left blank, apparently never transferred from his authorial copy.[7] In his *Quodlibet* XII (1296/1297), Godfrey promised to dispute an ordinary question on this specific issue but, as far as can be discovered, he never did.[8] Finally, in his late *Quodlibet* XIV q. 3 (1298/1299) on legal justice, Godfrey briefly states his position that all the moral virtues are located in the sense appetite rather than in the will, but he there gives no arguments, noting only that he had already treated the issue elsewhere.[9] Godfrey's *Disputed Question* 15 also concerned this issue, but this text seems to contradict his quodlibetal position and was considered problematic even by his contemporaries.[10] In sum, not only does a public

7 *Quod.* III q. 13, ed. M. de Wulf and A. Pelzer, Les Philosophes du Moyen Âge, vol. 2 (Louvain: Institut Supérieur de l'Universitè, 1904), p. 226: "Responsio in libro magistri."

8 Godfrey of Fontaines, *Quod.* XII q. 2, ed. J. Hoffmanns, PB 5 (Louvain: Institut Supérieur de Philosophie de l'Université, 1932), p. 83: "Primum istorum est utrum in voluntate sit necessarium ponere habitus virtuosos. Secundum est utrum habitus virtuosi, si sint in voluntate, aliquo modo diminuant de voluntatis libertate. … Sed quia quae ad duas priores quaestiones pertinent intendo in *Quaestionibus Ordinariis*, praecipue in illa qua quaeritur 'utrum iustitia sit in voluntate', pertractare, illis ad praesens omissis …." This announced question has not been identified, unless Godfrey is referring to what survives as his *Quod.* XIV q. 1 "Utrum iustitia sit virtus generalis ab aliis virtutibus moralibus distincta," PB 5, pp. 303–319. On this, see John F Wippel, "Godfrey of Fontaines' *Quodlibet* XIV on Justice as a General Virtue: Is It Really a *Quodlibet*?" in *Theological Quodlibeta in the Middle Ages. The Thirteenth Century*, ed. Christopher Schabel (Leiden/Boston: Brill, 2006), pp. 287–344.

9 *Quod.* XIV q. 3, ed. J. Hoffmans, PB 5, p. 342: "Et ideo necesse est ponere per se et primo et principaliter habitum in appetitu et non in voluntate."

10 Godfrey's *Disputed Quaestion* 15, "Utrum sit aliquis habitus in voluntate," has been published across two separate studies. The first part on theological habits is edited in Bernhard Neumann, *Der Mensch und die himmlische Seligkeit nach der Lehre Gottfrieds von Fontaines* (Limburg: Lahn-Verlag, 1958), pp. 160–161. The second section on moral habits, which is quoted nearly verbatim by Durandus, is edited in Joseph Koch, *Durandi de S. Porciano O.P. Tractatus de Habitibus. Quaestio Quarta*, Opuscula et Textus Series Scholastica, 8 (Münster, 1930), pp. 60–66, where one of the manuscripts identifies the opinion as that of Godfrey (cf. apparatus to p. 60, line 5). This question of Godfrey has long been seen as problematic, since it argues that moral habits are required both in the will as well as the sensitive appetite. This seems inconsistent with Godfrey's express statements denying moral habits in the will, especially in his late *Quodlibet* XIV, as just noted above. Pelzer in his original catalogue of Godfrey's manuscripts was doubtful of this question's authenticity, although he later accepted it as genuine (PB 14, p. 285). See Auguste Pelzer, "Godefroid de Fontaines. Les manuscrits de ses *Quolibets* conservés à la Vaticane et dans quelques autres bibliothèques," *Revue néo-scolastique de philosophie* 20 (1913), p. 529. Nevertheless, even Godfrey's

disputation at Paris between Godfrey of Fontaines and Duns Scotus survive, but it concerns a defining issue in their moral psychology. Perhaps more surprising still is that their singular debate was identified in the literature a century ago, only then to have gone all but ignored.

1 Inception

The lengthy program in theology at the medieval University of Paris culminated in two distinct ceremonies that marked the passage of bachelor to master.[11] The first was licensing, that is, the granting of permission to teach (*licentia docendi*). This was conferred by the chancellor after an examination of the candidate and confirmation of his completion of the duties of a bachelor, namely, lecturing on the *Sentences* and frequent 'opposing' and 'responding' in disputations. The second ceremony was inception, an elaborate series of disputations that

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contemporaries noted the discrepancy of his *Disputed Question* 15 with the opposite view in his *Quodlibet*. Thus, Robert Walsingham, in his own *Quod*. I. q. 15 about 1312, criticizes this very inconsistency when reporting Godfrey's positions, as Pelzer himself notes, PB 14, p. 285, n. 2: "Robert Walsingham, *Quolibet* I, q. 15, ms. Worcester Cathedral F. 3, f. 242r: 'Male dicit iste doctor [sc. Godefredus], qui virtutes istas naturales, quae sunt quaedam habilitates ad virtutes morales principales, ponit in voluntate, ut patet in *Quaestionibus suis ordinariis*, q. 6 et 7. Quia nec dicit consequenter, cum ipsemet omnes virtutes morales principales ponat in appetitu sensitivo et nullam in voluntate, ut patuit quaestione precedente.'" The "preceding question" to which Walsingham here refers is his own *Quod*. I q. 14, where he had summarized Godfrey's position that there are no moral virtues in the will. This question of Walsingham is edited in Thomas Graf, *De subiecto psychico gratiae et virtutum secundum doctrinam scholasticorum usque ad medium saeculum XIV, pars prima, De subiecto virtutum cardinalium II*, Studia Anselmiana philosophica theologica, fasc. 3/4 (Romae: Herder, 1935), p. 104*: "Quartus vero doctor magnus Godefredus in moralibus dicit recte oppositum, quod omnes virtutes morales ita sunt essentialiter ponendae in appetitu sensitivo, quod nulla sit ponenda in appetitu intellectivo." Graf himself (p. 169) addresses the apparent inconsistency and tries to relieve it by arguing that Godfrey only intends to exclude *virtues*, but not *habits*, from the will. As is clear, however, Godfrey expressly denies habits as dispositions in the will in *Quod*. XIV q. 3, PB 5, p. 342: "… non requiritur aliquis habitus disponens et habilitans voluntatem …". Godfrey repeats this same view in his very late inception debate with Scotus considered here. It would seem, then, that either Godfrey changed his mind on this major issue or his *Disputed Question* 15 is not authentic.

11 The procedures and their sources here summarized depend especially upon Bernardo C. Bazàn, "Les question disputées, principalement dans les facultés de théologie," in *Les Questions disputées et les questions quodlibétiques dans les facultés de théologie, de droit et de médecine*, Typologie des sources du Moyen Age occidental, 44–45 (Turnhout: Brepols, 1985), pp. 109–122. See also Olga Weijers, *Terminologie des universités au XIIIe siècle* (Roma: Edizioni dell'Ateneo, 1987), pp. 407–424.

marked the inaugural magisterial act of the former bachelor and his ceremonial induction into the guild of masters. Inception comprised a series of disputations held across three days that were termed, respectively, vespers, *aula*, and *resumptio*. Four questions in all were to be debated, and they were circulated in advance by the incepting master—two at the vespers and two at the *aula*. As the terms indicate, vespers was held in the late afternoon of the first day of the debates. The *aula* was held the following morning in the bishop's hall—hence its name—and was the main ceremony during which lectures in the faculty were suspended. The *resumptio* occurred within a few days later and was the new master's formal and full resolution of the main disputation held in the *aula*. At the two questions of the vespers, the first was largely debated among the bachelors, while the second was a dispute between a senior master of the faculty and the incepting master. It was, however, the first question held the next day at the *aula*—the third overall—that was the most important academic event of the inception, for it was here that the former bachelor was ceremonially vested with magisterial regalia and rendered his first determination as a new master. This question itself had an involved procedure consisting of an elaborate *disputatio*. The main burden of the debate itself fell to a senior bachelor—a *baccalareus formatus*—who was required to have served in this role of respondent prior to his own promotion. His responsibility was to give a formal answer to the question and then reply to the initial arguments. The attending masters then rose in turn to object to the senior bachelor's solution, beginning with the new master being promoted (*magister aulandus*), then his sponsoring master (*magister aulator*), and finally the other masters in order of seniority ending with the chancellor or his representative. The senior bachelor had to defend his initial solution against each of these ensuing objections by the masters. The second question of the *aula*, which was the fourth and last of the inception ceremony, was called the *quaestio magistrorum*, since it was a debate between the attending junior and senior masters. Finally, after these two prolonged disputations, the new master would stand and pronounce his own resolution to the main question of the *aula*, marking his first determination as master of theology.[12] Within a few days, the new master had to hold a public *resumptio* in which he fully resolved his solution to the first question disputed in the *aula*.

12 Despite the seemingly dispassionate record of these public disputations, they could turn bitterly partisan and raucous. See the remarks of Godfrey's student, John of Pouilly, on his inception in 1307 in Ludwig Hödl, "Die Aulien des Magisters Johannes von Pouilly und der scholastische Streit über die Begründung der menschlichen Willensfreiheit," *Scholastik* 35 (1960), pp. 57–75.

Two records survive of Scotus's participation in inception exercises at Paris. He took part in a *quaestio magistrorum* during the academic year 1305–1306 at the inception of an unidentified master. In this case, Scotus was in the role of junior master debating with the senior Dominican regent, William Peter Godinus, in their well known disputation on individuation.[13] More importantly, Scotus also served as the responding bachelor in the *aula* of the Franciscan master who immediately preceded him at Paris, Giles of Longny. At this inception, the senior master who presided over the *aula*, with whom Scotus debated at length as required by the above outlined procedures, was Godfrey of Fontaines. The significance of this precious question, despite having been published in the first complete printing of Scotus's Parisian commentary on the *Sentences*, has gone virtually unnoticed owing to its mutilated transmission and scholarly misunderstanding.

2 The Inception of Giles of Longny

One of the few historical documents surviving from Scotus's career at Paris is the famous letter of Gonsalvus of Spain, the then Franciscan Minister General, addressed to the Order's Parisian convent. Dated November 18, 1304, the letter is a reply to the convent guardian, a certain Brother William, who had written Gonsalvus to inform him of the recent promotion of Giles of Longny as the next master of theology at Paris.[14] After acknowledging the promotion of Giles, Gonsalvus instructed William and the masters of the convent that Duns Scotus, "whose reputation had spread everywhere," should be promoted next.[15]

13 On the disputation, see Franz Pelster, "Handschriftliches zu Skotus mit neuen Angaben über sein Leben," *Franziskanische Studien* 10 (1923), pp. 15–16. The question was edited by Clemens Stroick, "Eine Pariser Disputation vom Jahre 1306: Die Verteidigung des Thomistischen Individuationsprinzips gegen Johannes Duns Scotus durch Guillelmus Petri de Godino, O.P.," in *Thomas von Aquino: Interpretation und Rezeption: Studien und Texte*, ed. Willehad Paul Eckart (Mainz: Matthias-Grünewald, 1974), pp. 559–608. A new, more accurate edition has been prepared by Wouter Goris and Garrett Smith, "Duns Scotus's Debate with William Peter Godinus over the Principle of Individuation" (https://scotus-godinus.de/).

14 Chartularium Universitatis Parisiensis (*CUP*), ed. Henricus Denifle, vol. 2 (Paris: Ex typis fratrum Delalain, 1891), n. 652 pp. 117–118. For a translation and dating of the letter, see A.G. Little, "Chronological Notes on the Life of Duns Scotus," *The English Historical Review* 47 (1932), p. 578.

15 Gonsalvus's turn of phrase is biblical (Lk 4:14), where it describes the beginning of Christ's public life.

Our concern, however, is not with the promotion of Scotus himself but rather with the preceding one of Giles communicated by the convent to Gonsalvus.

In the preface to his seventeenth century edition of Scotus's Parisian *Sentences*, now known as the *Reportatio Parisiensis*, Luke Wadding had correctly inferred from internal cross-references that at Paris Scotus lectured on the four books in the order of I–IV-II-III.[16] Wadding further detected that Scotus's Parisian lectures were incomplete, terminating roughly halfway through Book III at distinction 18, by recognizing that the remaining questions were a crude compilation of Oxford material.[17] Finally, he observed that at precisely this juncture, Book III distinction 18 itself comprised the following three questions, the last of which was a disputation ending with the phrase: *Et sic finit disputatio in aula*.

> Scotus, *Rep. par*. III d. 18 qq. 1–3
> (Major, ff. 27ra–31^{rb}; Wadding-Vivès 23.379–400):
> q. 1 Utrum Christus meruit in primo instanti suae conceptionis.
> q. 2 Utrum Deus potest remittere culpam sine infusione gratiae.
> q. 3 Utrum sit necessarium ponere habitum charitatis in anima Christi propter actum fruitionis verae. … Et sic finit disputatio in aula.

While Wadding had correctly surmised both that Scotus prematurely ended his Parisian *Sentences* at this juncture and that they were later completed with Oxford material, he did not understand the phrase *disputatio in aula*. Wadding wrongly thought that it referred to a disputation that Scotus held as a part of his course on the *Sentences* themselves.[18] The true academic nature of this *disputatio in aula*, Scotus's role in it, and the reason for the abrupt end of his Parisian lectures would not be uncovered until modern scholarship.

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16 Wadding, "Censura," ed. Wad.-Viv. 22, pp. 1–2. Wadding's analysis on the order of Scotus's Parisian lectures was confirmed by Carolus Balić, *Les commentaires de Jean Duns Scot sur les quatre livres des Sentences: Étude historique et critique* (Louvain: Bureaux de la Revue, 1927), pp. 215–216 and in the preface to the critical edition of *Lectura* III in "Prolegomena," ed. Vat. 21, pp. 8*–9*.

17 Wadding, "Censura," ed. Wad.-Viv. 22, pp. 2–3: "Quae autem sequuntur in hac editione, prodierunt ex officina alicujus Scotistae, qui obscure et confuse satis illas confarcinavit ex scripto Oxoniensi …"

18 Wadding, "Censura," ed. Wad.-Viv. 22, p. 3: "Opus demum istud non per otium, aut successivis horis in cubiculo scripsisse, neque ultima lima adhibita eo fine composuisse, ut in omnium ederet conspectum, sed importuno et coacto studio in scholis legisse, constat ex illis verbis paulo antea relatis ad finem distinctionis 18 libri tertii: *Sic finit disputationis in aula*."

Franz Pelster was the first to interpret correctly the above phrase *disputatio in aula* terminating Scotus's *Reportatio parisiensis* III d. 18, q. 3.[19] Using the newly edited statutes for the faculty of theology at Bologna (1365), which had been modelled on the now lost regulations of Paris, Pelster saw that the title *disputatio in aula* was the academic term of art for the specific exercise of the induction of a new master of theology held in the bishop's hall, as outlined above. He also established that this was *not* the inception of Scotus himself but rather that of Giles of Longny. Pelster showed that the order and roles of the participants named in the disputation corresponded precisely to the statutory procedure: Scotus was the responding bachelor (*bachelor formatus sive responsalis*), Giles the new master to be promoted (*magister novus aulandus*), Alanus the presiding master of Giles (*magister aulator*), and Godfrey—that is, Godfrey of Fontaines—the senior master acting in place of the Chancellor (*dominus cancellarius vel vicem gerens*). In short, Pelster showed that disputation appended to the end of book III of Scotus's Parisian commentary as d. 18, q. 3 was the very record itself of the inception of Giles of Longny documented in the above letter of Gonsalvus of Spain to the Parisian convent. It was not, as Wadding had implied, part of Scotus's own lectures on the *Sentences* themselves.

Ten years later, Ephrem Longpré made two important findings in a pair of Spanish manuscripts containing Scotus's *Reportatio parisiensis* III.[20] The first was an annotation at the end of distinction 17 in Barcelona, Archivo de la Corona de Aragón, Ripoll MS 53: "Up to this point Brother John Duns lectured [i.e., on the *Sentences*] at Paris; the rest is from England."[21] This annotation confirmed Wadding's original surmise that the third book of Scotus's Parisian

19 Franz Pelster, "Handschriftliches zu Skotus mit neuen Angaben über sein Leben," *Franziskanische Studien* 10 (1923), pp. 11–15. Pelster had obtained proofs of Franz Ehrle's forthcoming edition of the Bologna statutes prior to its publication. See p. 11 note 1.

20 Ephrem Longpré, "Le ms. 139 de la cathédrale de Valencia: Étude sur les *réportations* de Duns Scot," *Revue néoscolastique de philosophie* 36 (1934), pp. 437–458.

21 Longpré, "Le ms. 139," p. 455, quoting Ripoll, f. 43^{rb}: "Usque huc legit fr. Johannes Duns Parisius; aliud de Anglia." Ultimately, Longpré (p. 455 n. 64) rejected the complete accuracy of this annotation, arguing that III d. 24 on the nature of theology had to be from Scotus's Parisian lectures, since it discussed Henry of Ghent's theory of the *lumen medium*, which is mentioned in the Parisian but not in the Oxford commentaries. Longpré, however, did not know of the existence of the later Oxford *Lectura* III, to which this distinction in fact belongs and thus is consistent with the above annotation. See *Lect.* III d. 24 q. un. nn. 23–47, ed. Vat. 21, pp. 131–142. Nevertheless, the Ripoll manuscript does in fact belong to a manuscript tradition separate from either the 'III-A' or 'III-C' versions of the Parisian commentaries and has been designated by the Scotus editors as *Reportatio* III-B.

lectures on the *Sentence* actually ended at distinction 17 with the remaining material supplied from his Oxford lectures.

Longpré's second and more important discovery was found in manuscript 178 (*olim* 139) of the Biblioteca de la Catedral in Valencia. This was a key annotation that rubricated both of the above questions 2 and 3 of *Reportatio parisiensis* III, distinction 18:

> Note that the two following questions [i.e., III, d. 18, qq. 2–3 listed above] do not belong to the lecture on the third book [of the *Sentences*], but they occurred in the inception (*principium*) of Brother Giles, master of theology in our Order. In the first question the said Giles responds in the vespers, while in the second John Scotus responds *in aula*. Look for them at the end.[22]

This annotation attested that *both* questions 2 and 3 of distinction 18 belonged to the inception of the mentioned Giles of Longny at Paris, comprising respectively his vespers and *aula*. Most importantly it specified that Scotus was the respondent in the *aula* of Giles. It thus remarkably confirmed what Pelster had already established purely from his reading of university statutes. Entirely new, however, was the identification of Q. 2 as the vespers of the same inception in which, according to statute, Giles himself would have responded. Pelster had been unable to make this latter identification, since, as will be clear below, Giles of Longny was not named in the printed versions of Q. 2 owing to its mutilation in the 1517 *editio princeps* of John Major, the only known text up to that time and the source of all subsequent reprints. Regrettably, as Longpré discovered, the two announced questions were in fact not to be found anywhere in the Valencia manuscript, so that the only known text of Giles's inception remained the one printed by Major.

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22 València, Arxiu i Biblioteca de la Catedral, MS 178, f. 113^{rb}: "Nota quod duae quaestiones sequentes non sunt de lectura tertii, sed fuerunt in principio fratris Aegidii magistri nostri, de quarum prima respondet dictus Aegidius in vesperis, de secunda vero frater Joannes Scotus in aula. Require eas in fine." Quoted by Longpré, "Le ms. 139," p. 458. Longpré cites the manuscript according to its old shelfmark of 139. Cf. Elías Olmos y Canalda, *Catalogo descriptivo: códices de la catedral de Valencia*, 2nd ed. (Valencia, 1943), 133. The term *principium* used in the notation was the original designation for the inception exercise in the Parisian statutes of 1215 by Robert Courçon. William of Alnwick also used the term to designate Scotus's own inception question. See William Alnwick, *Quaestiones disputatae de esse intelligibili et de Quodlibet*, ed. Athanasius Ledoux (Quarrachi: Collegium S. Bonaventurae, 1937), p. 158. It later came to designate also the inaugural sermon given by the incepting master. On the two usages, see Weijers, *Terminologie*, pp. 414 and 421.

Inexplicably, Longpré did not connect these two questions to the statutes on inception or incorporate the previously published analysis of Pelster, whose prior article he simply cited in a final footnote without comment.[23] Instead, Longpré focused on correlating the disputants named in Q. 3 with his recently published census of the Parisian convent taken on June 24–25, 1303 by order of King Philip the Fair as part of his campaign against Pope Boniface VIII.[24] From his analysis of this document, Longpré determined that, in addition to Scotus himself, who was entered on the census as reading the *Sentences*, the mentioned Giles was recorded as Giles of Longny, a bachelor of theology. The third figure named in Q. 3 was Alanus, whom Longpré identified in the census as Alan of Tongres, master of theology.[25] Finally, Longpré addressed the fourth participant in Q. 3, whom he called "a certain Goffredus". Longpré had suggested two possibilities listed on the same royal inventory of the Franciscan house. Initially, in his two editions of the convent inventory itself, Longpré had suggested for "Goffredus" an unknown Gaufridus de Boneyo, first as a likely possibility and then with more caution.[26] In the present article, he then hesitantly suggested instead Aufredus Gonteri, who was the *socius* of above master Alanus and only much later *lector* at the Barcelona convent. In the end, however, Longpré said he could not identify with certainty this "Goffredus" named in the dispute.[27] It seems that Longpré's hesitation about the identity of the named Godfrey and the exact nature of the disputation apparently stemmed from his incorrect assumption that all the participants were Franciscan.

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23 Longpré, "Le ms. 139," p. 458 n. 75.

24 Éphrem Longpré originally published the census in "Le B. Jean Duns Scot. Pour le Saint Siège et contre le gallicanisme, Paris (25–28 juin 1303)," *La France franciscaine* 11 (1928), pp. 137–162 and then republished it two years later with corrections as *Le b. Jean Duns Scot OFM pour le Saint Siège et contre le gallicanisme: Paris, 25–28 juin 1303* (Quaracchi: Collège de St. Bonaventure, 1930). For a recent edition with corrections and historical background, see William J. Courtenay, "Early Scotists at Paris: A Reconsideration," *Franciscan Studies* 69 (2011), pp. 175–229.

25 In fact, Alanus was not from Tongres. See note 46 below.

26 In the original 1928 article, Longpré was more certain that this Gaufridus de Boneyo was the 'Godefredus' named in the disputation. See "Le B. Jean Duns Scot" (1928), pp. 146–147 n. 4: "Ce religieux est *sans doute* le Goffredus qui apparaît, comme opposant, dans la question déjà citée …." In the corrected version of 1930 he was less sure. Longpré, *Le b. Jean Duns Scot* (1930), p. 17 note 4: "Ce religieux est *peut-être* le Goffredus qui apparaît, comme opposant, dans la question déjà citée …."

27 Longpré, "Le ms. 139," p. 457: "… et finalement un certain Goffredus, que l'on a cherché d'identifier jusqu'ici sans trop de succès et qui *pourrait* bien être fr. Anfredus, O.F.M., plus tard lecteur à Barcelone."

In a subsequent publication, Pelster remarked on Longpré's discovery of the Valencia manuscript and his revised suggestion that the "Goffredus" at Giles's inception was Aufredus Gonteri.[28] Observing that by statute the disputant at this place in the inception debate was either the chancellor or his representative, Pelster scathingly dismissed Longpré's suggestion of Aufredus Gonteri, who was at this time a student aide (*socius*) in Paris, as "belonging to the realm of fantasy." Pelster reiterated the obvious: the only master of theology at Paris during this time named 'Godfrey' was in fact Godfrey of Fontaines. All doubt, however, about the genre of the disputations, the identity of the participants, and their respective roles was removed by the eventual discovery of a manuscript copy of the disputations themselves.

Some twenty-five years after Longpré's above articles, Charles Balić finally identified what still remains the only known manuscript of the two above questions: Casale Monferrato, Biblioteca del Seminario Vescovile MS B 2 = [C].[29] Here the questions are announced with the same rubric found in the Valencia codex and at the same location of III d. 18, qq. 2–3. Unlike the Valencia copy, however, the Casale Monferrato manuscript placed the two questions directly after the rubric, where they have been preserved. More crucially, the Casale Monferrato manuscript revealed, as Balić discovered, that the edition of John Major, and thus all subsequent printings, had mutilated the vespers debate by expunging the identities of the two disputants, namely, Godfrey and Giles. Thus, where C expressly names Godfrey as the initial respondent in the vespers (*Arguit Godefredus quod sic* C, f. 110ra28), the Major edition substitutes *Arguitur quod sic* (M, f. 29^{rb}39). Similarly, where C identifies Giles as the incepting master responding to Godfrey (*Dixit Aegidius* C, f. 110^{rb}10), Major and all other editions have simply *Dico ergo quod* (M f. 29^{vb}10), thus falsely making it appear as if the respondent was Scotus himself. Moreover, a second hand in C confirmed these identities throughout, annotating in the margins the successive exchanges between Godfrey and Giles.[30] These identifications in C show

28 Franz Pelster, "Hat Duns Scotus in Paris zweimal das dritte Buch der *Sentenzen* erklärt? Ein Beitrag zur Erforschung der Natur und Geschichte der *Reportata* und *Principia*," *Gregorianum* 27 (1946), p. 227 n. 22.

29 Charles Balić, "Henricus de Harcley et Ioannes Duns Scotus," in *Mélanges offerts à Étienne Gilson* (Paris: J. Vrin, 1959), pp. 95–101. The two inception questions occupy ff. 110ra–111va.

30 Thus, in C, f. 110^{rb} the second hand has annotated the sequence of exchanges after Godfrey's initial reply as follows: "Respondet Aegidius (l. 10) … Contra arguit Godfredus (l. 33) … Respondet Aegidius (l. 41) … Arguit contra Godfredus (l. 43) … Responsio Aegidii (l. 45)." This same annotator continued with identifications of the participants in the *aula* debate preserved in Q. 3 as indicated in the edition below.

that Q. 2 strictly conformed to the procedures for the second disputation in the vespers: the question is proposed by the senior master to the incepting candidate with arguments, to which the candidate then responds, followed by an exchange between the two. Scotus neither was nor could have been a respondent in this question, since statutes assign no role in the vespers debates to the senior bachelor of the *aula* ceremony.

But how did the mutilation of the vespers debate between Godfrey and Giles of Longny come about in the Major edition? Most likely, the manuscript source of the printed text was missing the descriptive annotation that identified these two questions as belonging to the inception of Giles rather than to Scotus's *Sentences* themselves. Consequently, the editors to whom John Major entrusted the "cleansing of errors" from the manuscripts—the Parisian bachelors of theology Jacques Rufin and Pierre du Sault—failed to understand that these two questions were not actually part of Scotus's commentary.[31] As Balić suggested, the editors must have therefore altered the text to make Scotus himself the respondent in the vespers question.[32] This same difficulty did not arise for the *aula* question, since it carried its own *explicit* attesting that it was a disputation and, in any case, Scotus was himself the main respondent. The Major editors then numbered the inception *vespers* and *aula* as questions 2 and 3, thereby wrongly incorporating into distinction 18 of Scotus's commentary itself what were in fact entirely separate disputations appended to it. Whatever the ultimate explanation, the Major edition obscured the true academic nature of these inception debates for four hundred years. Before finally turning to the debate itself, it remains to explain why the inception exercises of Giles of Longny were inserted into what appear to be the middle of the third book Scotus's Parisian *Sentences*.

3 Scotus's Commentaries on Book III of the *Sentences*

Several features of Scotus's *Sentences* commentaries explain the precise placement of these two inception questions. First, scholars had long thought that

31 Major identifies the two editors in his prefatory letter: "Quare duobus baccalaureis recenter tamen licentiatis, fratri videlicet Jacobo Rufin minoritano ac fratri Petro du Sault, hunc nostrum Montemacutum nobiscum incolenti, curiam huius codicis emaculandi commisi." (ed. 1518, f. 1^{v}). On these two theologians, see James K. Farge, *Biographical Register of Paris Doctors of Theology, 1500–1536* (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1980), pp. 154–155 n. 167 and pp. 397–398 n. 427.

32 See Balić, "Henricus de Harcley," p. 99, but he does not take into account Major's prefatory letter.

prior to about 1320 lectures on the *Sentences* at Paris were given over two academic years. It has now been established that by Scotus's time—and perhaps earlier—all four books of the *Sentences* were covered in a single year at Paris.[33] Moreover, as mentioned above, lectures were given in the sequence I–IV-II-III, as Wadding had originally surmised was the case for Scotus's Parisian commentary. Finally, Scotus ended his lectures on the *Sentences* at Paris by June 25, 1303, that is, shortly before the end of term. This date is certain, since it is when Scotus, together with most of the foreign friars in the Paris convent, were ordered to leave France by Philip the Fair for refusing to support his above mentioned council against Boniface VIII. Indeed, the most authoritative family of manuscripts of Scotus's Parisian *Sentences* on the third book—those presently identified as *Reportatio parisiensis* III-A—confirm that his lectures ended prematurely and exactly at book III distinction 17, never to be completed, as Wadding had originally surmised.

Second, it has been established that upon his above expulsion from France, Scotus returned to the Franciscan convent at Oxford during the 1303–1304 academic year, where he lectured for a second time on book III of the *Sentences*, completing all forty distinctions. This second set of Oxford lectures on book III is now designated *Lectura* III to distinguish it from Scotus's other Oxford commentary, *Ordinatio* III. The Oxford provenance and later dating of this *Lectura* III is based on references that it records by Scotus himself to his lectures on the third book previously given at Paris (*dixi Parisius*).[34]

The final and most challenging feature of Scotus's commentaries on the *Sentences* is their pervasive contamination. This arose from a serious defect in his corpus: Scotus lectured at both Oxford and Paris, generating different versions, none of which were complete in all four books.[35] To compensate, scribes and compilers supplied distinctions missing in one version of Scotus's commentaries with the corresponding sections of another, often in a heavily redacted form known as *additiones*. It is in fact this editorial practice of *additio* that makes it appear as if Giles of Longny's inception exercise was inserted

33 This important result is set out in William Duba and Christopher Schabel, "Remigio, Auriol, Scotus, and the Myth of the Two-Year Sentences Lecture at Paris," *Recherches de Théologie et Philosophie Médiévales* 84 (2017), pp. 143–179, with particular attention given to Scotus at pp. 165–172.

34 *Lect.* III d. 5 nn. 14–20, ed. Vat. 20, pp. 161–163: "Dixi Parisius primo …." The editors attempt in the apparatus to identify the various Parisian sources that Scotus is here recalling and working into his *Lectura* III given at Oxford during his exile from Paris.

35 For a guide to the complicated situation with the four different versions of the third book of Scotus's Parisian lectures, see Appendix II below.

randomly into the middle of Scotus's Parisian lectures, when in fact it occurs precisely at their end.

As indicated, Scotus actually completed less than half of his lectures on the third book at Paris, which in the definitive version of *Reportatio Parisiensis* III-A ends prematurely at distinction 17. No known manuscript of this 'III-A' version contains the inception exercise of Giles of Longny. Rather, the Casale Monferrato and Valentia manuscripts that transmit the two inception questions belong to the version now designated *Reportatio Parisiensis* III-C. This family of manuscripts, as well as the Major edition, exhibit the above editorial practice of *additio* by supplying the missing distinctions 18–40 of book III, on which Scotus never lectured at Paris, with those from Oxford.[36] As just mentioned, Scotus gave the *Lectura* III at Oxford during his exile from Paris in the 1303–1304 academic year, and thus these lectures are later than the Parisian *Sentences*. All of this means, contrary to appearances, that Giles of Longny's two inception questions were in fact *not* inserted into the middle of Scotus's Parisian lectures. Rather, they were appended exactly at their end, positioned precisely at the seam where distinctions 18–40 of his Oxford *Lectura* III were joined to the end of distinctions 1–17 of *Reportatio Parisiensis* III in order to compile a complete copy of the third book according to the above method of *additio*.[37] Since at Paris book III was lectured on last, our inception questions were placed at the precise position where they in fact occurred, namely, after Scotus had completed the *Sentences*. The apparent purpose in such a careful insertion of this inception debate was to preserve a required act of Scotus's bachelor period at the chronological location where it actually occurred, namely, *after* he had completed his lectures on the *Sentences* at Paris. To respond at the *aula* of an inception *after* having lectured on the *Sentences* was a statutory requirement for promotion at Paris and had to be confirmed prior to the presentation of the candidate to the

36 *Lect.* III "Prolegomena," ed. Vat. 21, p. 12*: "Textus *Lecturae* III a Duns Scoti discipulis vel redactoribus adhibitus est ad lacunas libri III aliquarum *Reportationum* et ipsius *Ordinationis* complendas."

37 It will be noticed that the two inception questions have been slightly misplaced, inserted at the end of d. 18 q. 1 rather than after d. 17 q. 2. This probably arose from the frequent scribal confusion of where to copy material marked for insertion. Giles of Longny's inception questions were disputed more than a year after Scotus ended his own lectures at Paris. They would have been written on separate sheets (*cedulae*) and then later incorporated into this version of Scotus's own Parisian *Sentences*. Since the same misplacement occurs in all three extant witnesses, it must have occurred at the original stage of compilation. See Appendix I below for how the *in aula* debate was inserted at the termination of Scotus's Parisian lectures.

Chancellor for the license.[38] Of course, Giles's inception debate was no doubt preserved because of the importance of the disputants themselves.

4 The Disputants

As noted, the inception exercise comprised a "formed" bachelor, i.e., one who had completed all requirements for the degree, the incepting master, the presiding master, other attending masters of the faculty, and finally the chancellor or his representative. With the exception of Godfrey of Fontaines, all recorded disputants in the inception of Giles of Longny were Franciscans listed on Philip the Fair's above census of the convent taken at the end of June, 1303. In addition to the disputants themselves, of course, there would have been other attendants from the convent and university. Present from the convent would certainly have been two younger Franciscans, both of whom would become prominent disciples of Scotus: the above mentioned Aufredus Gonteri and William of Alnwick. The former is the Aufredus whom Longpré had wrongly made a *respondent* in the inception instead of Godfrey of Fontaines.[39] As Pelster had surmised, Aufredus was quite young, since he did not himself read the *Sentences* until some twenty years later, first at the *studium* in Barcelona 1322 and then at Paris in 1325. Despite Longpré's unfortunate misidentification, Aufredus nevertheless was certainly *present* at the inception, since he was the assistant (*socius*) of the presiding regent master, Alanus.[40] Aufredus attended Scotus's lectures on the *Sentences* and his other disputations while at Paris, as he later recalled that he had "heard Scotus for a long time." In his role as *socius*, it likely that Aufredus would have recorded or taken notes on this inception debate for the presiding Alanus. Another friar certainly present was William of Alnwick, who was in Paris as one the English province's four participants in the Order's lectorate program. Like Aufredus, Alnwick attended Scotus's disputations and lectures at Paris and even attested to recording one of his *Collationes*, a type of debate held among the bachelors within the convent. Alnwick would prove to be Scotus's most important literary executor. He compiled the *Additiones mag-*

38 *CUP* II, p. 702 n. 1189 (60): "Statuimus primo quod nullus magister deponat pro aliquo bacalario licentiando … nisi ipse responderit post lecturam *Sententiarum* et ante licentiam de tribus questionibus, scilicet aula, ordinaria, et Sorbonica …."

39 See above note 26.

40 Aufredus is so designated on the royal census of June, 1303; see Courtenay, "Early Scotists at Paris," p. 221 and note 97. On the duties of a *socius* in the Order, see A.G. Little, *The Grey Friars in Oxford* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1892), pp. 33–34.

nae, a redacted form of Scotus's Parisian lectures meant principally to supply a block of some ten distinctions missing from the middle of the second book of the Oxford *Ordinatio*. Aufredus and Alnwick thus deserve mention, since they are the most likely candidates—especially Alnwick—for having made a record of the inception debate and appended it to the end Scotus's Parisian *Sentences*. By this time in the careers, neither Giles nor Scotus would have had been appointed *socii* of their own, since they were no longer lecturing on the *Sentences*.

4.1 *Alanus*

The presiding master was Alanus.[41] He is recorded on the royal census of June, 1303 as an adherent to King Philip's petition, where he is identified as a master with an assistant (*socius*), namely, the above mentioned Aufredus Gonteri.[42] Alanus probably had been promoted to master earlier in the 1302–1303 academic year under the then regent Gonsalvus Hispanus, who is also listed on the royal census as master.[43] Gonsalvus, however, like most of the foreigners at the convent, was recorded as a non-adherent to Philip's petition against Boniface VIII and thus under royal order to leave France. Sent to Castile as Provincial and then elected Minister General the following May, Gonsalvus would never return to teaching at Paris.[44] Thus, Alanus succeeded Gonsalvus as regent master for the next academic year, 1303–1304. Circumstances, however, had disrupted the normal promotion sequence. In response to Philip's actions, Boniface VIII had recalled the authority of the Chancellor to grant the license at Paris in August, 1303, a privilege not formally restored until April 18, 1304 by Benedict XI.[45] This probably meant that Alanus continued as regent for the next academic year 1304–1305 and in this capacity served as the *magister aulator* for the present promotion of Giles in October, 1304. After his own regency, Alanus was made provincial minister of Touraine, which included Brit-

41 On Alanus, see Palémon Glorieux, *Répertoire des maîtres en théologie de Paris au XIIIe siècle*, vol. 2 (Paris: Vrin, 1933), p. 198 n. 339.

42 Courtenay, "Early Scotists at Paris," p. 221 n. 96.

43 For a reconstruction of the succession of regent masters at Paris during this period, see my above "John Duns Scotus's Life in Context," pp. 37–40. Unlike the Dominicans, who could have two concurrent regent masters of theology at Paris, the Franciscans were limited to one.

44 See Gonsalvus Hispanus, *Quaestiones disputatae et de quodlibet*, ed. León Amorós, Bibliotheca Franciscana scholastica Medii Aevi 9 (Quaracchi: Collegium S. Bonaventurae, 1935), pp. XXVIII–XXIX.

45 *CUP* II, pp. 113–114 n. 645. See my "Scotus's Life in Context," p. 33.

tany, suggesting that he was Breton like his above mentioned *socius* Aufredus.[46] As provincial, Alanus was appointed by Gonsalvus to a commission of prominent masters and ministers—Alexander of Alessandria, Vital du Four, Richard of Conington, Peter of Baldeswell, and James of Ascoli—that in 1310 authored the *Religiosi viri*, a lengthy response to Ubertino da Casale's *Rotulus* defending radical poverty.[47] It is possible that a series of some twenty-one disputed questions preserved by Prosper de Regio Emilia belong to him.[48]

4.2 *Giles of Longny*

Giles of Longny was from Longny-au-Perche (Loniacus in Pertico) and entered the Franciscan Order at Chartres. After his promotion and regency, he followed a typical, post-university career path in the Order and became minister of his home province of France.[49] Like his predecessor Alanus, Giles was also selected by Gonsalvus for a commission on the Spiritual crisis, this one convened by Pope Clement V in 1309. It included Alexander of Alessandria, the successor to Scotus at Paris and future minister general, Vital du Four, lector and provincial of Aquitaine, and Martin of Alnwick, master at Oxford.[50] Giles was still active at Paris in November, 1317, when he represented the chancellor in an action by masters of the Sorbonne to be considered regent in the faculty of arts.[51] He died at his home convent of Chartres on April 21, 1322. This inception is his only surviving academic disputation, although the first book of his now lost commentary on the *Sentences* apparently did enjoy some circulation.[52]

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46 Longpré had thought Alanus was from Tongres near Liège. This was questioned by Courtenay, "Early Scotists," pp. 189–190, who correctly inferred that he was instead from Brittany. Courtenay's surmise is confirmed by Alanus's appointment as Provincial.

47 Anicetus Chiappini, "Communitatis Responsio 'Religiosi Viri' ad Rotulum Fr. Ubertini de Casali," *Archivum Franciscanum Historicum* 7 (1914), p. 659.

48 These are preserved in Vat. lat. 1086, ff. 238^{r}–244^{r}, where they are attributed to a 'Magister All⟨anus⟩'. See Auguste Pelzer, *Codices vaticani latini. Codices 679–1134*, vol. II.1 (Rome: Typis Polyglottis Vaticanis, 1931), pp. 672–673, nn. 173–194.

49 Palémon Glorieux, *Répertoire des maîtres en théologie de Paris au XIIIe siècle*, 2 vols., Etudes de philosophie médiévale 17 (Paris: Vrin, 1933), vol. 2, p. 203 n. 342.

50 Franz Ehrle, "Zur Vorgeschichte des Concils von Vienne (Schluss)," *Archiv für Literatur und Kirchengeschichte des Mittelalters* 3 (1887), p. 19.

51 Palémon Glorieux, *Aux origines de la Sorbonne*, Études de philosophie médiévale 53–54 (Paris: J. Vrin, 1965), 1.210 n. 16.

52 Clement Schmitt, "Gilles de Legnaco," in *Dictionnaire de biographie française* (Paris, 1982), 91.49

4.3 *Godfrey of Fontaines*

The scholarly literature on Godfrey of Fontaines makes barely any mention of his role in the two inception exercises of Giles of Longny and nowhere considers the substance of his debate with Scotus in the *aula*.[53] In the case of the *vespers*, where Godfrey takes a principal role as the senior master, the scrubbing of his name in the John Major edition certainly accounted for this oversight, but little notice was taken even after Balić's corrections in light of manuscript C. More surprisingly, even Godfrey's substantial role in the *aula* dispute, where he is named in the Major edition, has gone unexamined. No doubt contributing to this blind spot in the literature was Longpré's own mistaken identification of Godfrey with Aufredus Gonteri in his edition of the royal census of the Parisian convent in 1303. Indeed, the persistent effect of Longpré's error can still be found nearly a century later, even in the recent volumes of the critical edition itself of Scotus's works![54] The few scholarly mentions of Godfrey's participation in the promotion of Giles concern only the biographical issues of whether he was ever Chancellor of the University or the dates of his late career.[55] But even on these biographical points, Godfrey's presence at the inception exercise is informative. The literature typically reports that Godfrey is documented in Paris on February 26, 1304 (new style) attending a meeting of the Sorbonne to confirm the procedure of electing the *procurator* of the College.[56] Since Godfrey's *Quodlibet* XV was not included on the stationer's list issued at that time on February 25, 1304, its disputation is assigned to the 1303/1304 academic year, which is then presumed to be the last of his regency.[57] In fact, however, God-

53 This probably resulted in a general way from the century-old view of Maurice De Wulf, *Un théologien-philosophe du XIIIe siècle: Étude sur la vie, les oeuvres et l'influence de Godefroid de Fontaines* (Bruxelles: M. Hayez, 1904), p. 124: "… le subtil Duns Scot, qui arrive à Paris au moment même où Godefroid disparaît de la scène universitaire …."

54 Cf. "Prolegomena: De discipulorum revisionibus," ed. Vat. 10, p. 45* note 85, where the Vatican editors, in discussing the inception of Giles of Loigny, follow Longpré's early study and refer to the participation of "a certain Godfrey" (*quemdam Godefridum*), seemingly unaware that the participant is Godfrey of Fontaines.

55 See, for example, John F. Wippel, *The Metaphysical Thought of Godfrey of Fontaines: A Study in Late Thirteenth-Century Philosophy* (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 1981), p. XVI n. 14.

56 Glorieux, *Aux origines de la Sorbonne* 1.206 n. 8. Note that the recorded year is 1303 old style, i.e., Easter New Year.

57 The last known documented presence of Godfrey at Paris is his attendance at a meeting of the Sorbonne in 1306 recorded by a late seventeenth-century manuscript containing a history of the college, *Domus et societatis Sorbonicae historia* in Paris, Bibliothèque de l'Arsenal, MS 1022, III, p. 83, which is cited by De Wulf, *Godefroid*, p. 31. See also Glorieux, *Sorbonne* 1.72 n. 6. On the sources and reliability of this document, see Sean L. Field, "The

frey's role as the senior master in both the *vespers* and *aula* of Giles confirms that he was still active as regent at Paris into the Fall of 1304 and presumably for the remainder of the 1304–1305 academic year. On the other hand, the substance of Godfrey's views themselves defended at the inception of Giles, especially in his direct disputation with Scotus on virtues in the will, remained wholly ignored in the scholarship.

4.4 *Duns Scotus*

While the literature on Scotus has given more attention to his role in the inception of Giles, interest has still been limited to facts of his academic career. Here the principal issue was the timing of Scotus's lectures on the *Sentences* at Paris. As mentioned, it had long been thought that during this period lectures on the *Sentences* at Paris occurred over two academic years. On this two-year view, Scotus would have left Paris by royal order in June, 1303 having completed only half of his required lectures on the *Sentences*. This invited all manner of scholarly speculation as to how, after an absence for part or all of the 1303–1304 academic year, Scotus could have returned to Paris and served as the responding bachelor at Giles's inception in the Fall of 1304.[58] The problem was, as noted, that statutes for licensing in theology required a bachelor to have fulfilled the statutory obligation to respond at an inception only *after* having completed his lectures on the *Sentences*. In reality, there was no difficulty, since, as also noted, it has now been established that by Scotus's time at Paris the *Sentences* were actually read in one year, not two. Accordingly, whenever Scotus returned to Paris, he did so as a 'formed bachelor' having completed his required lectures on the *Sentences* within the single 1302–1303 academic year.[59] On the other

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Master and Marguerite: Godfrey of Fontaines' Praise of *The Mirror of Simple Souls*," *Journal of Medieval History* 35, no. 2 (June 2009), p. 139 n. 13, who remarks that "This seems a less than secure source."

58 See the discussion of Duba and Schabel, "Myth of the Two-Year *Sentences*," pp. 166–173.

59 It should be noted that although Scotus's Parisian lectures end roughly midway through Book III at distinction 17, this was typical. Book III was lectured on last and close to the end of the academic year, so that only a few of the distinctions were covered or else covered very briefly in the lectures themselves, as these Franciscan commentaries from Paris show. For example, in the commentary of Landulfo Caracciolo, who read the *Sentences* at Paris in 1318–1319, Book III is only one-tenth the length of Book I. Francis of Marchia, who lectured the following year, covered only fifteen questions in his third book. William of Brienne, whose actual lectures on the *Sentences* from 1330–1331 survive, devoted only 12 of his 126 lectures to Book III. An even more extreme case is found in the *Sentence* lectures of the Franciscan Pastor de Serrescuderio, who lectured at Paris two years later and treats only five questions in Book III. On these commentaries, see respectively: Russell L. Friedman and Chris Schabel, "Francis of Marchia's Commentary on the *Sentences*: Question

hand, the substance of his inception debate with Godfrey has remained wholly unexamined in the literature. That debate ultimately turned to the question of whether there are virtues in the will, an issue on which Godfrey and Scotus could not have disagreed more.

5 The *disputatio in aula*

The question debated at the *aula* of Giles of Loigny was the following: "Is the habit of charity necessary in the soul of Christ to account for the act of beatific enjoyment?" (*Utrum sit necessarium ponere habitum caritatis in anima Christi propter actum fruitionis beatae*).[60] While there was a general consensus that the beatific acts of vision (*visio*) and enjoyment (*fruitio*) accompanied the Incarnation, the further question of whether these required grace emerged as a topic in Christology. As here formulated, the issue went back to Henry of Ghent, who denied that any supernatural virtue or grace, i. e., charity in the will, mediated the beatific act of enjoyment in Christ.[61] Henry argued that since the Incarnation brought Christ's rational powers into a union with a divine Person, any mediating disposition of grace would be rendered superfluous.[62] Franciscans generally rejected Henry's view, beginning with an almost immediate reaction at Paris by Raymond Rigaldus, followed by William of Ware and Vital du

List and State of Research," *Mediaeval Studies* 63 (January 2001), pp. 96–98; Christopher D. Schabel, "The Commentary on the *Sentences* by Landulphus Caracciolus, OFM," *Bulletin de Philosophie Médiévale* 51 (2009), p. 151; William Duba, *The Forge of Doctrine: The Academic Year 1330–1331 and the Rise of Scotism at the University of Paris* (Turnhout: Brepols, 2017), pp. 125–129, 131–133; William J. Courtenay, "Pastor de Serrescuderio (d. 1356) and MS Saint-Omer 239," *Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du Moyen Âge* 63 (1996), pp. 347–348, 356.

60 For a history of the concept of beatific enjoyment in the period, see Severin Kitanov, *Beatific Enjoyment in Medieval Scholastic Debates: The Complex Legacy of Saint Augustine and Peter Lombard* (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2014).

61 Henry of Ghent, *Quod.* VI q. 6, "Utrum suppositum divinum posset assumere humanam naturam absque eo quod fruatur," ed. Gordon A. Wilson, Opera omnia 10 (Leuven: Leuven University Press, 1987), pp. 66–73. For a detailed examination of Henry's opinion and contemporary reaction, see Richard Cross, "Incarnation, Indwelling, and the Vision of God: Henry of Ghent and Some Franciscans," *Franciscan Studies* 57 (1999), pp. 79–130.

62 Henry of Ghent, *Quod.* VI q. 6, ed. Wilson, p. 70: "Nunc ita firmiter tenendum putamus quod omnem elevationem et habilitatem, quam potest facere habitus in potentia ut inclinetur in obiectum fruibile praesentatum, multo eminentius operatur ipsa unio cum ipso fruibili in personae unitate. … Quae quidem unio non solum inclinat potentiam in obiectum fruibile, immo necessario ipsum repraesentat sub ratione fruibilis."

Four.[63] Similarly, Scotus argued against Henry's position on two related points in book III of his *Sentences* when dealing with the Incarnation. First, in all versions of his commentaries at III d. 1 q. 2, Scotus rejected Henry's view that Christ's enjoyment necessarily followed his union to the Word.[64] Then, in III d. 13, q. 4 of his Oxford *Sentences*, Scotus also rejected Henry's attached position that Christ's union did not require the virtue of charity. However, in his Parisian *Reportatio*, which generally adhered to the structure and questions of his Oxford commentaries, Scotus omits q. 4 on whether Christ's enjoyment required charity.

***Lect.* and *Ord.* III d. 13 (Vat. 20.273–300; 9.385–421)**		***Rep. Par.* III-A d. 13 (Vivès 23.331–343)**	
Q. 1	Utrum animae Christi potuit conferri summa gratia quae potuit conferri creaturae.	Q. 1	Utrum possibile fuit conferri animae Christi summam gratiam conferibilem creaturae.
Q. 2	Utrum animae Christi fuerit collata summa gratia quae potuit creaturae conferri.	Q. 2	Utrum summa gratia sit collata animae Christi.
Q. 3	Utrum possibile fuit voluntatem animae Christi habere summam fruitionem possibilem naturae creatae.	Q. 3	Utrum possibile fuit animae Christi frui fruitione summa creata.
Q. 4	Utrum anima Christi potuit summe frui Deo sine summa gratia.	Q. 4	*Omitted but later disputed as the aula of Giles of Longny at Paris in 1305.*

The above omission of III d. 13, q. 4 from Scotus's Parisian lectures likely resulted from the mentioned disruption at the University near the end of the 1302–1303 academic year.[65] In an apparent effort to reach the end of his Parisian lectures

63 Raymond Rigaldus, *Quod.* VIII q. 4, "Utrum Christus absque omni habitu gloriae et gratiae possit frui," in Ferdinand Delorme, "Le *Quodlibet* I du cardinal Vital du Four," *La France franciscaine* 18 (1935), pp. 142–144; Vital du Four, *Quod.* I q. 1, "Utrum anima Christi ex puris naturalibus, sine gratia, posset elevari ad fruitionem et visionem Divinam," in Vital du Four, *Quodlibeta tria*, ed. Ferdinand M. Delorme (Romae: Pontificium Athenaeum Antonianum, 1947), pp. 1–4. For William of Ware, see Cross, "Incarnation, Indwelling."

64 See *Lect.* III d. 2 q. 1, ed. Vat. 20, pp. 77–92; *Ord.* III d. 2 q. 1 nn. 8–23, ed. Vat. 9, pp. 119–127; *Rep. par.* III d. 2 q. 2, ed. Wad.-Viv. 23, pp. 256–260.

65 On this and its effect on Scotus, see my "John Duns Scotus's Life in Context," pp. 29–40.

on the *Sentences*, Scotus had skipped several questions from Book III, including the above d. 13 q. 4.[66] Nevertheless, he was unable to complete Book III, which in all manuscripts ends at roughly the halfway point of d. 17, q. 2. This was owing to the above mentioned order of Philip the Fair on June 25, 1303 that expelled Scotus and all other foreigners refusing adherence to his petition against Pope Boniface VIII. Presumably, it was at this point that Scotus ended his lectures and, under the royal order, departed Paris for Oxford. Thus, when Scotus returned to Paris the following year as the responding bachelor in the inception of Giles of Longny, the main question chosen for the disputation *in aula* was one that he had left untreated in his above Parisian *Sentences*: III d. 13 q. 4 concerning the beatitude of Christ.

Given its Christological topic and apparent restriction to the theological issues of charity, Incarnation, and beatitude, Giles's *aula* question would not appear, at first glance, relevant to a discussion of whether there are moral virtues in the human will. To the contrary, this question seems chosen precisely to debate Godfrey of Fontaines' distinctive view, set out in his *Quodlibet* XI.4 (1294/1295), that while all of our *moral* habits exist in the sensible appetite, the *theological* virtue of charity exists in the will. Godfrey had allowed charity as the sole exception of a virtue in the will in order to account for affection, in different degrees, towards God. While charity is not the power itself that elicits such an act, Godfrey argued that it was required as a disposition to elevate the will and make possible an act of love concerning God when presented by the intellect. Such a virtue is required in the *will*, because the theoretical habit of metaphysics in the intellect, which also has the divine as an object, considers it with the dispassionate indifference of scientific knowledge that does not involve any affection toward God.[67] Given these circumstances, it could hardly have been by chance that at Paris, in the Fall of 1304, Godfrey of Fontaines would step in for the Chancellor at the inception of Giles of Loigny and directly

66 In addition to the here considered d. 14 q. 4, the Parisian *Reportatio* III-A is missing relative to the Oxford commentaries d. 11 q. 3 and d. 13 d. 4. It terminates at d. 17 q. 2 in all manuscripts, for which see Appendix II below.

67 Godfrey of Fontaines, *Quod.* XI q. 4, PB 5, pp. 22–31. For Scotus's criticism of Godfrey on this issue as set out in his *Sentences*, see Marilyn McCord Adams, "Scotus and his Predecessors on the Metaphysics of Habits," in *Housing the Powers: Medieval Debates about Dependence on God* (Oxford: University Press, 2022), pp. 201–208, which originally appeared as "Scotus on the Metaphysics of Habits," *Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association* 88 (2014), pp. 71–83. As indicated, Adams was not aware of the present text. Similarly, the doctoral thesis of Ian Drummond, "John Duns Scotus on the Role of the Moral Virtues" (Toronto, University of Toronto, 2016), pp. 129–130, did not treat the present discussion.

debate the responding bachelor, Duns Scotus, on the very issue of whether charity was necessary in the will.

5.1 *Response of Scotus*

As its title indicates, the question concerns the act of 'enjoyment' that accompanies beatitude (*fruitio beata*) and thus requires the presence of God to the desiring subject. Scotus elsewhere allows that there is a weak sense of *fruitio* possible in our present state, which is simply the love of the divine nature for itself according to the Anselmian 'love of friendship.'[68] Clearly, this is not the *fruitio* at issue in the *aula* disputation. Scotus then disambiguates the question according to the traditional distinction in 'necessity' set out by Anselm in addressing the Incarnation.[69] Of course, Christ's act of beatific enjoyment does not require the habit of charity by absolute necessity. God can effect such a beatific act directly and immediately in the soul without any intervening disposition, for the will as a power is no less receptive of an act of enjoyment than it is of the corresponding habit of charity. Obviously, then, this is not the sense of 'necessity' under debate. Rather, at issue is 'necessity' in the sense of need (*necessitas indigentiae*), that is, whether charity is required in the will to render its beatific act of enjoyment (*fruitio*) more perfect and efficacious. Given these refinements, Scotus argues from the basic Aristotelian structures of powers, habits, and acts that the soul of Christ requires the virtue of charity to attain a perfect act of beatific enjoyment.[70]

> Given this understanding of the question, I maintain that the soul of Christ requires the habit of charity for beatific enjoyment. The reason is that every power by its nature is capable of a habit that disposes it to a perfect act. But it is the nature of the will of Christ to be perfected by charity, which disposes it to a perfect act of enjoyment.[71]

Scotus sees the major premise as following directly from these fundamental Aristotelian concepts. A power is simply the capacity for action of a determi-

68 On the two senses of *fruitio*, which Scotus says differ as species and not merely in degree, see Scotus, *Rep. Par.* IV d. 49 q. 4 n. 6, ed. Wad-Viv. 24, p. 638; *Ord.* IV d. 49 p. 1 q. 5 nn. 289–301, ed. Vat. 14, pp. 362–364.

69 Anselm, *Cur Deus Homo* II c. 17, ed. Schmitt, 2.122–126. Scotus's more proximate source is Matthew of Aquasparta, *Quaestiones disputatae de Incarnatione* q. 7 (Quaracchi: Collegium S. Bonaventure, 1957), pp. 132, ll. 14–17.

70 *Q. in aula*, [5] ll. 24–29.

71 *Q. in aula*, [5] ll. 29–33.

nate kind. For excellent operation, a power requires virtue, described by Aristotle as "that which perfects the one who has it and renders action good" (*EN* II.5, 1106^{a} 15–17) and as "an inclination for the best" (*Ph.* VII.3, 246^{b} 23–24).[72] Although elsewhere Scotus quotes these same texts of Aristotle in support of the much stronger thesis, which he ultimately rejects—that moral virtue functions as the *efficient cause* of the rectitude of a moral act—there is no reason to question his endorsement here of these two standard authorities for the weaker claim that charity is in the will.[73]

While Scotus treated the major premise as evident, he saw its application in the minor to the specific case of beatific enjoyment (*fruitio*) in the will of Christ as more involved, given recent disagreements over the matter. In general, at issue was the status of the theological virtues in beatitude, which was the presumed state of Christ. As indicated above, on one side was Henry of Ghent, who argued that Christ's hypostatic union to the Word rendered all of the theological virtues—and charity in particular—wholly redundant. On the other was Aquinas, who held more broadly that faith, taken generically as a habit of belief, persisted into beatitude along with charity, even though no act of faith could ever be exercised in the beatific state.[74] In the present context of a public inception at Paris, Scotus could hardly have failed to take account of these major positions and therefore defended the minor premise for both *in via* and *in patria* conditions.

First, Scotus argues for the minor premise concerning the *in via* state based on the evident principle that, "things of the same nature have the same perfections." As a matter of faith, we hold that Christ's nature, and therefore his faculty of will, are the same in essence as our own. In the present life, however, we as *viatores* require charity to render our actions meritorious, as asserted by the Pauline authority, "Unless I have charity, I am nothing." Scotus then concludes that the virtue persists into the beatific state (*in patria*), adducing Paul's ensuing text that "Charity never passes away," (1 *Cor.* 13:1–3). In this regard, charity is distinct from the other theological virtues, because it is *necessary* for beatitude. Then, addressing the unmistakable position of Aquinas, Scotus argues that, for

72 *Q. in aula*, [6] ll. 34–39. This second Aristotelian authority is not found in the Greek text but only in the medieval Latin translations of the *Physics* by James of Venice (*translatio vetus*) and its revision by William of Moerbeka (*translatio nova*). See Aristoteles Latinus, VII.1, p. 266 ll. 5–6: "Dispositiones enim quaedam perfecti ad optimum sunt." It is also in Averroes's commentary, ed. Iunt. 4, f. 319^{v} I, M.

73 See Scotus, *Ord.* I d. 17 p. 1 qq. 1–2 nn. 56–57, ed. Vat. 5, p. 161.

74 Aquinas, *ST* I–II.67.5 Resp., ed. Ottawa, 2.1065^{b}: "Et sic patet quod nihil idem numero vel specie quod est in fide remanet in patria, sed solum idem genere."

this reason, the virtue of faith, unlike that of charity, does *not* remain in the beatific state. To the contrary, faith does not persist in beatitude as a virtue precisely because, as Aquinas himself admits, it can never issue in an *act* of belief, for assent by faith is contradictory to the face-to-face vision of the beatific state, which is itself eternal.[75] It is thus pointless for faith to persist for all eternity as a disposition without any possibility of exercise, for the very function of a habit is to enable a power to act in a certain way. Thus, the reason that the habit of faith does not remain in beatitude is *not* because it is destroyed by the beatific vision. The reason is rather that vision and an assent by faith are incompatible acts, so that the former eternally impedes any act of the latter, thereby rendering its corresponding virtue futile. Having made this case for the human will, Scotus directly concludes from the major premise that it equally holds for Christ, who shares our same human nature.[76]

Scotus then briefly addressed the above described view of Henry of Ghent, who took the position at the other extreme, that the soul of Christ did not possess even the virtue of charity, since such was rendered redundant by the hypostatic union of his human nature to the second Person of the Trinity. Rather, Henry argued, the union itself to the Word supplied all such perfections to the assumed nature. Consistent with his rather minimalist theory of the Incarnation, Scotus summarily rejects Henry's position, asserting his own, distinctive view that the union of a human nature to the Word posited no further perfections in the soul of Christ than it would have, if it were not so united.[77]

5.2 *Initial Objections and Replies*

As noted, the special protocol of inception required Scotus, as the responding bachelor, to assume the magisterial responsibilities of disputation by giving a solution to the question itself, as recounted above, and then to defend it against the initial objections posed by the other attending bachelors. Notable here is that Scotus provides two solutions to each of the opening objections according as the will is taken to be either a passive or an active power. Perhaps Scotus followed this procedure owing to the participation of Godfrey, who held that the will was passive or, more likely, to show that his own solution was neutral to either competing theory of the will. The two objections together canvas both

75 Aquinas, *ST* I–II.76.3 Resp., ed. Ottawa, 2.1063$^{a–b}$: "Unde manifestum est quod impossibile est quod fides maneat simul cum beatitudine in eodem subiecto."

76 *Q. in aula*, [7–8], ll. 39–56.

77 *Q. in aula*, [9], ll. 57–62 and the references cited there to Scotus's *Sentences*, where he rejects Henry's position.

causal possibilities of enjoyment in beatitude. In the first, God is considered as immediately causing *fruitio* in the will, while the second covers the possibility that God causes *visio* in the intellect, which in turn causes in *fruitio* in the will. Both opening objections make the same fundamental point against Scotus's position: the act of beatific enjoyment (*fruitio*) is so effected in the created will by God that no intervening habit of charity is required.

The first objection argues that, owing to the required proportionality between cause and effect, the most excellent effect must issue directly from the most excellent cause. Clearly, the beatific enjoyment is the most excellent effect, and so it must immediately result from a direct union with God as the correspondingly excellent cause. Therefore, no mediating or facilitating habit is required.[78]

The second accounts for the possibility that beatitude involves more than one cause. The argument here is that when two effects are inseparable according to a fixed order, either the first effect is the cause of the second, or they are both ordered effects of a common cause. For example, the heating of air and its expansion are inseparably so ordered. Accordingly, either the heating causes the expansion, or both the heating and expansion are jointly caused by whatever source heats the air. In present case, the beatific vision in the intellect and the state of enjoyment in the will are causally ordered. Either, then, the beatific vision in the intellect causes the ensuing enjoyment in the will, or both vision and the ensuing enjoyment are jointly caused by the divine nature as beatific object. In neither case is an intervening habit of charity causally required.[79]

As indicated, Scotus gives two replies to this first objection according as the created will is assumed to be purely passive in its act of enjoyment or actively elicits it. On the passive account, God as the highest cause would immediately effect in the creature both beatific acts, namely, vision of divine essence in the intellect and the ensuing affective enjoyment in the will. But from this, Scotus argues, it does *not* follow that charity is unnecessary for beatific enjoyment. For example, a natural agent causes not only the ultimate, completed form in a subject, but also the necessary, antecedent dispositions required for the reception of that form. So too, a supernatural agent that elevates the blessed to a perfect, supernatural state causes not only the act itself of beatific enjoyment, which is a second act, but also the disposition required for that beatitude, namely, charity, which is a first act. In this way, the beatified subject is brought to its highest state of perfection, for it is more perfect to have both the act and the disposi-

78 *Q. in aula* [n. 2].
79 *Q. in aula* [n. 3].

tion for the act rather than the act alone. Thus, if beatitude is the most perfect state, it must consist of both.[80]

Alternatively, if the will is active in beatitude so as to elicit its act of enjoyment, then Scotus says that charity must still inform the will in order to render its act more perfect. Behind this argument, of course, is the basic Aristotelian idea of virtue as a characteristic excellence in action. Scotus bluntly rejects, however, the minor of the argument that "beatitude is the most excellent effect." This is a category mistake, for the act of enjoyment is not itself a substance, but rather an accidental property that presupposes a substance for its existence. It thus cannot be the primary effect of God. To the contrary, the most excellent effect is the highest angel, which can only be caused by God directly. The act of beatific enjoyment itself is instead the most noble *operation* belonging to a creature, as it unites a creature to God as the most noble object.[81]

To the second objection Scotus also provides separate responses for the will taken as either a passive and active power, but he is here more negative in his assessment. If the will is passive, Scotus concedes that both beatific acts—vision in the intellect and enjoyment in the will—would be caused immediately by God. But, as just explained in response to the first objection, the virtue of charity would still be required for the greater perfection of the soul.[82] On the other hand, if the will is an active cause of enjoyment, then Scotus says that the principle invoked as the major premise for this position—when two effects are ordered and inseparable, one is caused by the other or both are effects of a common cause—is false.[83] Of course, a false major premise means that the argument has failed at the level of a general principle and thus cannot be salvaged.

To support his rejection of the major, Scotus adduces two standard counterexamples drawn from Aristotle. The first is the downward motion of a heavy object upon the removal of an impediment to its descent. The downward fall of a stone and the removal of what prevents it from falling—say a column or a beam—are inseparably ordered. Nevertheless, an antecedent agent that removes the obstacle, such as a person who topples the column or breaks a supporting beam, does not itself cause the downward motion of the stone except incidentally. Similarly, neither does the first effect of that antecedent cause—the removal of the column or beam—itself move the heavy object

80 *Q. in aula* [n. 10].
81 *Q. in aula* [n. 11].
82 *Q. in aula* [n. 12].
83 *Q. in aula* [n. 13].

downward. Rather, the essential cause of its falling is its inherent, natural heaviness instilled by the generating agent.[84] A second counterexample, again taken from Aristotle, also shows that the antecedent motion of putting an agent into contact with the patient is not itself a cause of an ensuing effect. Thus, while the lighting of a fire follows upon a motion that brings a flame into contact with the kindling, that prior motion itself does not cause ignition, but only brings such a cause into proximity to act. In support of this, Scotus cites Aristotle's principle that locomotion is not *itself* a cause but rather only what introduces or removes the actual cause.[85] Accordingly, neither is the source of that locomotion, such as a person who places the fire in contact with wood, a cause of the heating, except again incidentally. Therefore, Scotus says, the major premise is false.

Scotus concludes by showing how his above two responses, which appealed to analyses of *physical* change, can apply to the immaterial, supernatural states of beatific vision and enjoyment. For the intellect to 'not consider' an object constitutes an impediment to the will's acting, since then nothing would be present to the will about which it could elicit an act of desire and thereby incline the agent. When the intellect actively considers an object, that impediment is removed, and it is then available for the will to seek or reject. From this, however, it does not follow, says Scotus, that the intellect, its act of apprehension, or even the object itself presented by the intellect is a *cause* of such a willing. These are not causes of willing, says Scotus, anymore than one who removes an impediment to a stone is the cause of its downward motion or who puts a flame in proximity to the kindling is the cause of the burning, except incidentally.[86]

Quite notable in Scotus's above responses is an analysis of the voluntary act that reflects his position on the will set out in his Parisian lectures on the *Sentences* given in the Spring of 1303, about a year-and-a-half prior to the present inception debate in the Fall of 1304.[87] Unlike in his earlier Oxford *Lectura*, where he argued that the intellect and will were essentially ordered co-causes of volition, Scotus maintained in the corresponding treatment of his

84 Aristotle, *Phys*. VIII c. 4, 256ª23–31; cf. Averroes, *In Ph*. VIII c. 4 t.c. 32, Iunt. 4, f. 371ᵛ G-H: "Deinde dedit exemplum, et dicit 'verbi gratia, si aliquis homo,' etc. id est, verbi gratia, si aliquis homo aufert columnam sustenantem pondus, tunc ille homo movebit illud pondus ad inferius per accidens. […] Et ita dicitur illud quod aufert impedimentum movere lapidem per accidens, et quod generat ipsum movere ipsum essentialiter."

85 Aristotle, *De Gen. et Corr*. II c. 10 336ª16–17, AL 9.2, AL Database: "Latio enim faciet generationem actualiter, quia adducit et abducit generans."

86 *Q. in aula* [n. 16].

87 See my, "Did Duns Scotus Change His Mind on the Will" (Cf. n. 5 supra).

later Parisian *Sentences* that the will alone was the total cause of its own act, while the object in the intellect functioned merely as a cause *sine qua non*.[88] This more voluntarist, Parisian account of the intellect-will relation is clearly at work in Scotus's above responses to the two initial objections posed in the inception debate. Both replies construe the intellect as removing an impediment to the will's own act of volition, thereby functioning, as Scotus's counterexamples show, in the role of an incidental rather than essential co-cause of the voluntary act.

5.3 *Response of Giles of Longny*

In line with the above outlined procedure, Giles of Loigny, as the incepting bachelor, was the first respondent to Scotus. Giles gives two arguments against and then one in support of Scotus's position, consistent with the dialectical and probative nature of the exercise. His first reply amounts to a restatement of Henry of Ghent's position that the hypostatic union of Christ renders charity unnecessary. If the will of Christ is united to what contains in an eminent way every perfection of charity, then it is capable of any perfection that it would have with charity. The soul of Christ is conjoined to the divine essence, and thus its will does not require the habit of charity for such acts.[89]

Giles's second objection is more involved, holding fundamentally that, since God directly causes the act of beatific enjoyment in the will, no antecedent habit is required. His argument is that no natural agent is capable of a supernatural effect. Accordingly, since the act of beatific enjoyment is supernatural, it is caused by God alone. The soul of Christ thus does not require a habit of charity to dispose it to such enjoyment, since it is not itself capable of eliciting that act. In support of the major premise, Giles argues that the supernatural act of *fruitio* is either (1) immediately created by God in the subject, and so the intended premise is proven, or else (2) is elicited by a power belonging to the subject itself (i.e., in the soul). In the latter case, there are two possibilities. Either that power is natural, to which would correspond a natural agent. The

88 Scotus, *Rep. Par.* II-A d. 25 q. un. n. 20, ed. Wad.-Viv. 23, p. 127[b]: "Dico igitur ad quaestionem, quod nihil creatum aliud a voluntate est causa totalis actus volendi in voluntate." Cf., *Lect.* II d. 25 nn. 69–74, ed. Vat. 19, pp. 253–255, where the main solution is stated: "Ideo teneo viam mediam, quod tam voluntas quam obiectum concurrunt ad causandum actum volendi, ita quod actus volendi est a voluntate et ab obiecto cognito ut a causa effectiva." Unfortunately, Scotus's later *Ordinatio* is missing all of distinctions 15–25 (ed. Vat. 8, pp. 269–271) for the second book, and thus the corresponding question on the will. See my article cited in previous note.

89 *Q. in aula* [n. 17].

resulting act of *fruitio* would then itself be natural, i.e., concerned with created goods, which is false. Alternatively, the act is elicited from an 'obediential potency' to divine power, and consequently arises again from the direct action of God, who alone has dominion over all creation as "that which all things must obey." In this case, obviously, no prior disposition or habit is required owing to divine omnipotence.[90]

5.4 *Reply of Scotus to Giles*

To the first objection from Giles, Scotus responds that since God contains every perfection in an pre-eminent way, the divine nature can directly elicit in a created will any act that would ordinarily require the habit of charity. Scotus adds, nevertheless, that this holds true only for God's absolute power, because the divine nature itself cannot be a formal principle for the action of a creature. Rather, invoking Augustine, Scotus says that God has arranged the world so that things themselves act through their own capacities. Accordingly, the will requires charity as the form that enables it to have the beatific act.[91]

To Giles's more substantial second objection—that the created will does not require charity for beatitude, since it does not itself elicit the beatific act, which is rather supernaturally caused by God—Scotus responds that, to the contrary, the will *does* elicit its act of beatitude by means of its natural power. From this, however, it does not follow that the beatific act is merely natural. Scotus here deploys his earlier analysis of the supernatural set out in the prologue of his *Ordinatio*, where he distinguished two relevant senses of 'potency': one in the *subject* for receiving an act, and the other in the *agent* for causing it. From the viewpoint of the receiving subject, Scotus claims that *no* act is supernatural. Rather, from this perspective, an act is either that to which the subject is inclined (natural), contrary to such inclination (violent), or indifferent. In the second sense of potency, an agent is supernatural that imparts a form to a subject in which it does not naturally occur.[92] In line with this *Ordinatio* discussion, Scotus here responds to Giles that a supernatural act is not distinguished from a natural one by the power into which it is received, but rather by the object acting upon such a power. Thus, from the viewpoint of the receiving subject, beatitude is natural—indeed natural in the highest degree (*summe naturaliter recipit*)—but is supernatural relative to the object, namely, the divine nature,

90 *Q. in aula* [n. 18].

91 *Q. in aula* [n. 20].

92 *Ord.* I prol. q. 1 nn. 57–65, ed. Vat. 1, pp. 35–40; cf. Allan Wolter, "Duns Scotus on the Necessity of Revealed Knowledge," *Franciscan Studies* 11 (1951), pp. 231–272 for translation and analysis.

causing the beatific act in that subject. Scotus adds that this does not prevent some disposition or assistance from being supernaturally bestowed on a power, which once possessed, is then subsequently used in a natural way.[93]

5.5 *Response of Master Alanus*

As the Franciscan regent, Alanus was the first master to reply to Scotus. His main objection is that our act of beatific enjoyment (*fruitio*) does not entail a *habit* of charity in the will. The argument is that just as an act of faith by the intellect of the 'wayfarer' gives rise to a proportional act of love (*dilectio*) for God in the will, so in beatitude the perfect intellectual vision of God is followed by a corresponding beatific act of enjoyment. But the wayfarer does not require a *habit* in the will to have an act of *dilectio* toward some good presented in faith to the intellect. Correspondingly, then, neither does the blessed require a habit of charity in the will for its act of *fruitio* consequent upon vision of God given in beatitude.[94]

In defending his premises, Alanus takes the major to be evident from the proportionality of the cognitive acts of faith and vision in the intellect to their corresponding affective states in the will. In support of the more contentious minor, he argues that if every act of enjoying God following an act of faith also entailed the presence of charity in the will, then we would be able to infer with certainty when we are in possession of a divinely infused virtue.[95] Of course, it was generally denied that we could discern by our natural powers the presence of such supernaturally infused states.[96]

A second objection posed by Alanus is that no additional habit or disposition is required as intermediate between a form and its inclination. But, on the common view, 'willing' (*velle*) simply *is* the inclination of the will to act. Therefore, no intermediate habit of charity is needed for any act of willing.[97]

5.6 *Reply of Scotus to Master Alanus*

To Alanus's first objection, Scotus answers that, assuming only a knowledge of God given in faith, our will in the present state can experience the act of enjoyment, but very imperfectly. It is nevertheless capable of a more perfect act if

93 *Q. in aula* [n. 21].
94 *Q. in aula* [n. 22].
95 *Q. in aula* [n. 23].
96 For example, Aquinas, *ST* I–II q. 113 a. 5, ed. Ottawa, 2:1378[a]13–16: "Alio modo homo cognoscit aliquid per seipsum, et hoc certitudinaliter. Et sic nullus potest scire se habere gratiam."
97 *Q. in aula* [n. 25].

informed by the virtue of charity. Similarly, in the state of beatitude consisting of the intellectual vision of God, our will is capable of enjoying the divine nature without charity, but not so perfectly as it would with that virtue. Consequently, without charity such an act of enjoyment would not be properly beatific, since it would not correspond in affection to the perfect intellectual apprehension of the divine nature given in beatitude.[98]

Alanus, however, immediately intervenes with a follow-up response to exploit Scotus's now apparent concession that the will *can* have enjoyment in beatitude *without* charity, albeit imperfectly. If the will can have some enjoyment of God following the beatific vision but without charity, then is that act of enjoyment natural or supernatural? If it is supernatural, then the habit of charity is not required, and so there can be a supernatural act without a supernatural habit, which is Alanus's above position. Nor can it be claimed that the resulting act is natural, since then a supernatural object would be attainable through a natural act, which is impossible, since the act of a natural power must be commensurate with its proper object.[99] In response to Alanus, Scotus here once again appeals to his prior analysis of the supernatural set out in his *Ordinatio* prologue, as described above. As applied to Alanus's present hypothetical case, the beatific act of enjoyment would be partly supernatural and partly natural. It would be natural in relation to the subject in which it inheres, since relative to the subject, nothing can be supernatural. Relative to the object, namely, the divine nature itself, such an act would be supernatural, since no one can cause that object to be present as it is in itself.[100]

To Alanus's other objection, Scotus replies that the inclination of a form adds nothing absolute (as opposed to a mere relation) over and above the form itself, maintaining instead, for example, that the inclination of a heavy object downwards simply is the form of heaviness. Since the operation of a form arises from that form itself, a form's operation is *not* its natural inclination. Therefore, Scotus concludes, the major premise of Alanus's objection—that willing is only the inclination of the will to act—is false.[101]

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98 *Q. in aula* [n. 27].

99 *Q. in aula* [n. 28].

100 *Q. in aula* [n. 29].

101 *Q. in aula* [n. 31]. See, for example, references in the edition below at ll. 171–172: Aquinas, *ST* I q. 105 a. 4 corp., ed. Ottawa, 2:1378^{a}13–16: "Velle enim nihil aliud est quam inclinatio quaedam in obiectum voluntatis, quod est bonum universale." Henry of Ghent, *Quodl.* IX q. 5, ed. Macken, p. 123: "Si vero secundo modo illa inclinatio sit aliqua volitio, ut huiusmodi inclinatio non sit nisi quoddam velle, quemadmodum dicit Augustinus super illud

5.7 *Response of Godfrey of Fontaines*

Finally, there is the culminating response of Godfrey of Fontaines, who addresses three nested points: **(1)** whether, in general, an act of the will requires a habit; **(2)** whether it requires a habit for the specific act of beatific enjoyment; and finally, the main issue under dispute, **(3)** whether Christ requires such a habit for his act of enjoyment in the hypostatic union. Godfrey's comprehensive reply to Scotus is three times longer than those advanced by either Aegidius or Alanus and goes beyond their isolated objections to set out systematically an alternative account of affective virtue. Importantly, this is the only known text where Godfrey gives express *arguments* for his position that no moral virtues are in the will, to which Scotus, who holds to the contrary that all moral virtues reside in the will, here responds in live debate. Godfrey's argument that **(1)** there are no habits in the will is the following:[102]

Major	Any power whose act follows naturally and necessarily from the act of another power does not require a habit.
Minor	But an act of will follows naturally and necessarily from an act of the intellect.
	Therefore, an act of the will does not require a habit.

In defense of his major premise, which appears at first glance uncontroversial, Godfrey cites Aristotle's argument in *Ethics* II that moral habits cannot be endowed by nature, since nothing can be habituated to act contrary to its natural impulse, anymore than a rock can be trained to ascend when dropped by repeatedly tossing it upward.[103] It is rather the minor premise, and Godfrey's defense of it, that go to the heart of the present issue. Godfrey argues that since the sense appetite naturally and necessarily follows the apprehension of the senses, it cannot avoid desiring what the senses present as pleasurable. Correspondingly, Godfrey continues, the will necessarily pursues what is presented by the intellect, since nothing within the will can impede it from such an act. It would be difficult to find a stronger statement of medieval 'intellec-

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Psalmi: 'Inclina cor meum in testimonia tua. Quid est inclinatum cor ad aliquid habere nisi velle?' " For a parallel treatment of the above point by Scotus, see *Ord.* III d. 17 q. un. n. 13, ed. Vat. 9, pp. 566–568, where he makes the same point as above: "Sed primum credo esse falsum, scilicet quod inclinatio lapidis ad centrum sit aliud absolutum a gravitate et alia potentia, quae potentia habeat aliquam operationem in centrum, ut aliqui imaginantur." (pp. 567, ll. 78–80)

102 *Q. in aula* [nn. 32–34].

103 Aristotle, *EN* II c. 1, 1103^{a}18–23.

tualism'.[104] This, of course, is in fact Godfrey's own settled position, which he set out with stark clarity in his *Quodlibet* XIV held just a few years prior to the present debate:

> But because in the argument the question seems to arise as to where, in the sense of a subject, justice should be placed, namely, should it be in the will or the sensitive appetite, even though this has been touched upon elsewhere, nevertheless, to make this clear, it should be understood that, just as has been said several times elsewhere, I say again that with respect to things naturally suited and possible for us, no habit is required—essentially, primarily or principally—to dispose and enable the will, so that it is promptly and correctly inclined to what is apprehended by right reason.[105]

Against his above argument, Godfrey himself raised the expected, theological objection. Owing to our Fall, a contrary inclination exists within the will, namely, a concupiscence resulting from original sin (*fomes peccati*) and the subsequent "burden of a corrupted body" (*Sap*. 9:15). That is, even when presented with an object of desire by the intellect, the will itself has, as the result of our fallen state, its own competing inclinations that can redirect volition to lower things and possibly impede the influence of the intellect. In response, Godfrey maintains that his position is valid at least *ex puris naturalibus*—i.e., in our sinless, prelapsarian state—since in that condition, the will had no such impediments to acting in accord with a judgment of reason. Given this, Godfrey additionally concludes that since *ex puris naturalibus* the human will was more free than it is now—or at least it was not less free in that prior state—the definition of 'freedom of the will' (*ratio libertatis voluntatis*) does *not* exclude its being moved necessarily to act. Indeed, Godfrey argues that unless freedom of the will includes being so moved by the intellect, then God could be seen clearly by the intellect in the beatific vision and yet not subsequently loved by the will,

104 See Tobias Hoffmann, "Intellectualism and Voluntarism," in eds. Cristina van Dyke and Robert Pasnau, *The Cambridge History of Medieval Philosophy*, 2nd ed. (Cambridge University Press, 2014), pp. 414–427, especially, pp. 421–424.

105 *Quod*. XIV q. 3, PB 5, p. 342: "Sed quia in argumento videtur inquiri in quo debet poni iustitia ut in subiecto, scilicet utrum sit in voluntate vel in appetitu sensitivo, licet autem de hoc alibi aliquid sit tactum, ad eius evidentiam tamen est intelligendum quod, sicut alias pluries dictum est, iterum dico quod respectu eorum quae nobis sunt possibilia et convenientia ex naturalibus, per se primo et principaliter non requiritur aliquis habitus disponens et habilitans voluntatem ad hoc quod prompte et recte inclinetur in illud quod apprehenditur a recta ratione. …"

which is false. Also, it would mean that the will could chose differently without a prior judgment by the intellect, thereby rendering choice irrational.[106]

(2) Having shown that in general no act of the will requires a habit, Godfrey then applies this result to the specific case of beatific enjoyment (*fruitio*) in two further arguments. The first (numbered in the text as the second conclusion of Godfrey's reply) is based on Aristotle's *dictum* that, "ends in matters of action correspond to first principles in matters of demonstration." First principles of theoretical reasoning do not require a habit, since the intellect assents to them immediately upon grasping their terms, as Godfrey puts it, "as if having thought about them for a hundred years". So too, in the affective order, the will does not require a habit to exercise its corresponding act of enjoyment of the ultimate end.[107]

Godfrey's second argument on this point (again, numbered third overall in the reported text at [39]) defends his central claim that *no habit* is required in the will for the beatific act of *fruitio*, which he then develops in four proofs for its minor premise. Godfrey appears to argue by identifying beatific enjoyment (*fruitio*) with the role of pleasure (*delectatio*; *hēdonē*) set out by Aristotle in his culminating treatment of happiness as theoretical contemplation at the end of his *Ethics*. There Aristotle explicitly says that pleasure is not itself a habit, but rather what completes or perfects the antecedent act of theoretical contemplation, which properly constitutes happiness: "Perficit autem operationem *delectatio*, *non habitus qui inest*, sed ut *superveniens* quidam finis, velut iuvenibus pulchritudo."[108] Godfrey is clearly here construing the Augustinian term *fruitio* as Aristotle's *delectatio* (*hēdonē*) against the background of above text, although without express citation. This is not an *ad hoc* interpretation constructed by Godfrey for the sake of responding in the present debate. It is rather his settled view, in which he assigns a subordinate role to *fruitio* in beatitude, as his *Quodlibet* VIII, q. 16, disputed more than a decade earlier, plainly asserts:

> For this reason, enjoyment (*fruitio*) is also attributed to the appetite itself, not because any act of the will whereby we enjoy the beatific object is the principal act in which beatitude chiefly consists, but rather because insofar as it pertains to the will—whether it be called a passion, such as pleasure, or an action, such as love—beatitude is in a certain way completed,

106 *Q. in aula* [nn. 35–37].

107 *Q. in aula* [n. 38].

108 *EN* X c. 5, 1174^{b}31–33, 1177^{a}22; AL 26, pp. 570, ll. 27–28; pp. 576, ll. 22: "Perficit autem operacionem, delectacio, *non habitus qui inest*, set ut superveniens quidam finis, velud iuvenibus pulcritudo .... Existimamus oportere delectacionem admixtam esse felicitati."

> insofar as such pertains to it, not primarily and principally or essentially but concomitantly and, in a certain sense, incidentally.[109]

Returning, then, to the present argument, Godfrey's main response is the following: an act that is not primarily intended, but merely a consequence of such, does not require a habit. *Fruitio* is such an act, namely, one that ensues in the will as the immediate consequence of the intellectual vision of the divine nature, which vision itself constitutes beatitude. Accordingly, the resultant act of *fruitio* does not itself require a habit, which is the proposed claim. Godfrey takes the major premise to be evident, and then gives three proofs for the minor that *fruitio* and similar affective acts are *not* those of beatitude itself, since no such acts are ultimate.[110]

First, quoting Augustine and the *Psalms*, Godfrey argues that enjoyment implies peace, satisfaction, and joy. But these are affective states (*passiones*) consequent upon the beatific act proper, which is the intellectual vision of the divine essence, and so such affections cannot be identified with beatitude. Second, love leads to a further act, since, as the proverb goes, "Friends like and dislike the same things." Therefore, one loves another, so that they may do and enjoy the same things. An act of the intellect, on the other hand, does not extend in this way to further operation but rather is itself the end. Therefore, since enjoyment (or love) is for the sake of something else, it cannot be an ultimate action. Third, any act elicited by means of a virtue in the appetite is the result of choice, for all moral habits are the product of choices, as Aristotle argues in his *Ethics*. But every choice is made for the sake of something else, since "choice concerns the means to an end" rather than the end itself.[111] In a final support of the minor premise, Godfrey adduces a separate authority of Augustine from the *De Trinitate* that asserts the contemplation of God is the ultimate end, which is no doubt intended to blunt the charge that his position is purely that of Aristotle.[112]

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109 Godfrey of Fontaines, *Quod.* VIII q. 16, PB 4, p. 144: "Propter quod etiam ipsi appetitui attribuitur fruitio, non sic quidem quod actus aliquis voluntatis sit actus principalis in quo principaliter consistit beatitudo qua obiecto beatificativo fruimur, sed sic quia in eo quod ad voluntatem pertinet, sive dicatur passio ut delectatio sive actio ut amor vel dilectio, aliquo modo completur et terminatur ipsa beatitudo secundum id quod ad beatitudinem pertinet, non primo et principaliter ac essentialiter, sed concomitative et aliquo modo accidentaliter."

110 *Q. in aula* [n. 39].

111 *Q. in aula* [nn. 40–42].

112 *Q. in aula* [n. 43].

In the fourth and concluding article of his response, Godfrey finally addresses the specific question in dispute of whether the habit of charity is necessary for Christ to have beatific enjoyment. Here he fundamentally disagrees with Scotus and adopts the reply of Henry of Ghent, namely, that Christ did not require the habit of charity for his act of beatitude, since his human nature was elevated in its assumption by the Word, thus rendering grace unnecessary. But a nature cannot be elevated apart from its powers and their operations. Otherwise, the Son could have assumed an irrational nature, or one subject to sin, with the consequence that Christ could have been damned, and other such things absurd to the faithful.[113]

5.8 *Response of Scotus to Godfrey*

In the final and most significant exchange of the dispute, Scotus formally replies to Godfrey, who in turn interjects with a brief defense of his position. Altogether, Scotus's response here occupies a third of the entire debate, which, as far as is known, records Godfrey's last academic disputation of his twenty year career as regent master at Paris. More significantly, we witness at this juncture in the proceedings a direct and express confrontation between the two fundamental moral psychologies of the medieval period, intellectualism and voluntarism, each asserted in their robust versions.[114]

Scotus begins by denying the major premise of Godfrey's principal argument, namely, that a power does not require a habit, if its own act follows immediately and necessarily from that of another power. Worse still, Scotus continues, Godfrey himself must concede that his present major is false. Here Scotus quotes from Godfrey's own conclusion in his *Quodlibet* XIV.3 that, "All moral virtues are in the sense appetite, which is a power whose act follows naturally (i.e., necessarily) upon the act of sense apprehension."[115] Therefore, Scotus says, even if an act of the will necessarily ensues from that of the intellect, a habit is still required in the will for the perfection of its initial acts, just as Godfrey himself holds for the sense appetites.[116]

Godfrey directly responds that the cases of the will and sense appetites must be distinguished, so that Scotus's objection does not apply. Moral virtues are required in the sense appetite because of its resistance to reason. The will, however, is not rebellious in this way against reason and, consequently, does not

113 *Q. in aula* [n. 44].

114 See Tobias Hoffmann, "Intellectualism and Voluntarism," pp. 414–427.

115 Godfrey of Fontaines, *Quod.* XIV q. 3, PB 5, pp. 341, 343; cf. Apparatus in *Q. in aula* [n. 45].

116 *Q. in aula* [n. 45], responding to [nn. 32–33].

require habituation, even if the lower appetites require such for their moderation. Of course, this merely reasserts Godfrey's conviction that the will necessarily pursues the object of desire presented to it by reason, i.e., as arrived at through the process of deliberation, and therefore has no acquired habits. With this response, Godfrey's participation in the debate ends, which was his last known disputation at Paris.[117]

Scotus answers, first of all, that just as the sense appetite rebels against reason, so too the will has difficulty in pursuing the good. Consequently, the will requires a habit as much as the sense appetite. But, Scotus adds, even assuming that habits are needed only in the lower appetites, Godfrey's major premise is still false, unless it is properly qualified. Scotus then repairs Godfrey's major, suggesting the following revision: "A habit is not required for an act that follows necessarily from the act of another power, especially if that power is not rebellious." Accordingly, for any power whose act is so determined, no habit is needed. Continuing with his restatement of Godfrey's argument, Scotus says that a heavy object does not need a habit to move downwards, since it cannot be habituated to the contrary, as it will never rise upward upon release, even if had been thrown upward ten thousand times. On the other hand, the sensitive appetite is *not* so completely determined (i.e., as a falling rock) to an act or its opposite, but rather has a certain indeterminacy. It thus requires a habit in order to act according to the dictates reason in a better manner or more readily. Similarly, the power of the will is not so determined to one or another act, even though it might have a greater inclination to accord with a judgment of the intellect. Quite apart from its capacity for different acts, the will also requires a habit to be more inclined in various ways to a given act, again, such as doing so more readily or effectively. Of itself, then, the will cannot be so utterly determined to its acts as a heavy object is to falling downward. Scotus thus concludes that Godfrey's major premise is false, however it be construed. As for Godfrey's minor premise that the act of the will necessarily and naturally follows that of the intellect, Scotus says that this is also false. The reporter of the debate, however, has noted that Scotus said (*dixit*) he would not reply to this part the argument in the interest of time.[118] Obviously, this remark incidentally confirms that the present text is a live report of the debate.

Responding to Godfrey's second line of attack—that just as the intellect immediately grasps the first principles of demonstration without a habit, so

117 *Q. in aula* [n. 46].

118 *Q. in aula* [nn. 47–48] responding to [n. 34].

the will does not need a habit in order to desire the ultimate end—Scotus concedes that Aristotle's dictum holds for both first principles in the theoretical order and the ultimate end taken universally in matters of action. Nevertheless, Scotus dismisses this as irrelevant, since the present issue instead concerns our supernatural, beatific knowledge and love of the divine nature as it is in itself (i.e., in its individuality) and not as grasped merely in a general concepts.[119] Thus, just as the intellect must be elevated by a supernatural habit of glory to see the divine nature perfectly in the act of the beatific vision, so too the will correspondingly requires the supernatural habit of charity to have complete, affective enjoyment of the divine nature so perfectly known.[120]

To Godfrey's third argument, that no habit is required for *fruitio*, since it is not the principal act of beatitude itself but rather a consequence of such, Scotus first replies that this equivocates on the concept of *fruitio*. He sees Godfrey here as wrongly identifying Augustine's concept of beatific enjoyment (*fruitio*), which is the act of beatitude, with the role of pleasure (i.e., *delectatio*; *hēdonē*) that Aristotle describes as attending beatitude or happiness itself, which, on his view, is properly the act of theoretical contemplation.[121] This, Scotus says, is simply to equivocate on the term *fruitio* as deployed here.[122]

Scotus rejects Godfrey's further claim that since no act of love can be ultimate, it cannot be that of beatitude itself, for love is always for the sake of something else, just as friends love one another for the sake of doing and enjoying the same things. To the contrary, Scotus argues, the act of love primarily and essentially wills what is good for a friend. That two friends share feelings and do the same things are consequences that arise from reflecting on love, but these are not acts of love itself.[123] That is, love is not ordered to any further operation—whether interior or exterior—as its end. From this, Scotus adds, it is also clear that a science is not 'practical' because it concerns reasoning

119 For Scotus the divine nature is "of itself individual" (*de se haec*) and thus cannot be properly grasped by a universal concept. Cf. *Lect.* I d. 5 n. 102, ed. Vat. 16, pp. 449, l. 14: "… essentia divina habet ultimam actualitatem et unitatem, ideo de se 'haec' est …"; *Ord.* I d. 1 q. 2 n. 46, Vat. 2, pp. 31, l. 12: "Essentia autem divina est de se 'haec' et actu exsistens …" This corresponds to Aquinas's depiction of God as 'subsistent existence itself': "… Unde, cum Deus sit ipsum esse subsistens …." *ST* I.4.2 corp.

120 *Q. in aula* [n. 49] responding to [n. 38].

121 Cf., *EN* X c. 5, 1174^{b}31–32; AL 26, pp. 570, ll. 26–27: "Perficit autem operationem *delectacio* non sicut habitus quae inest, sed ut superveniens quidam finis velut iuventibus pulcritudo."

122 *Q. in aula* [n. 50] responding to [n. 39].

123 *Q. in aula* [n. 51] responding to Godfrey's position above at [nn. 41–42].

directed toward some external act or production as its end, as Godfrey maintains. Rather, a science is called practical, because it is a type of thinking aimed at regulating the will, so that its act will be correct.[124]

To Godfrey's argument that no act of will can be ultimate, since what is voluntary is chosen, and choice results from deliberation about means to an end rather than about the end itself, Scotus responds that not every act of will is a choice in the narrow and strict sense of determining the means to an end. Rather, an act of will can concern the end itself, just as the habit of theoretical principles retains the name of the power of which it is the habit. That is, Aristotle uses the term 'intellect' to refer not only to the rational power but also to its habit of first principles in the theoretical order.[125] Correspondingly, then, the 'will' (*voluntas*) can concern the end itself, and regarding that end it is better for the will to be perfected by a habit, just as there is a habit of first principles called "intellect" (*intellectus*).[126] Therefore, Scotus says, it is not true that every act of the will elicited by a habit is properly the result of choice, because to hold this—that there is only a habit of the means and not of the end itself—is to beg the question, for that is precisely the issue in dispute. Nevertheless, Scotus adds, it was Aristotle's view that the only habits in the appetite were those generated through choice, because he did not recognize that the virtue of friendship existed beween us and the gods but rather only a type of derivative pleasure. As Christians, however, we hold that the affective virtues of charity and friendship exist in our will even with respect to God, and that these are more important than those towards our neighbors, who are related to the divine as means to an end.[127]

Turning then briefly to Godfrey's attempt to support his position with the Augustinian authority of *De Trinitate* that the "contemplation of God" is our ultimate end, Scotus simply points out that later in that work at book XII Augustine places contemplation in the superior part of reason, which, according to Augustine himself, includes both the intellect *and* will.[128] This is because,

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124 *Q. in aula* [n. 52]. For Scotus on the nature of practical science and that theology itself is such, see *Ord.* I prol. p. 5 qq. 1–2, ed. Vat. 1, pp. 151–237.

125 For the latter usage, see *EN* VI c. 7, 1141^{a}7–8; AL 26, pp. 483, ll. 16–17: "Relinquitur ergo intellectum esse principiorum."

126 *Q. in aula* [n. 53].

127 *Q. in aula* [n. 54].

128 Scotus seems to have in mind Augustine, *De Trinitate* XII c. 3, CCSL 50, p. 358: "Et sicut una caro est duorum in masculo et femina, sic intellectum nostrum et actionem, uel consilium et exsecutionem, uel *rationem et appetitum rationalem*, uel si quo alio modo significatius dici possunt, una mentis natura complectitur ut quemadmodum de illis dictum est: 'Erunt duo in carne una,' sic de his dici possit: 'Duo in mente una'."

Scotus observes, there would be little point in contemplating God, unless it resulted in a love for the divine.[129]

Finally, Scotus addresses the above position taken by Godfrey himself in the question, namely, that the soul of Christ does not require the habit of grace for beatitude, since his assumed nature was elevated by its union with the divine Word. Godfrey had argued that a nature cannot be elevated without a corresponding expansion of its powers, for a nature is nothing other than a principle of operation. Otherwise, Godfrey claimed, the Son of God could have assumed a non-rational nature, or one subject to sin, so that Christ could have been damned, among other such consequences absurd to the faithful.[130]

Scotus replies in line with his strong views on divine omnipotence. He admits that, owing to its union with the Word, the assumed human nature is elevated and enjoys beatitude. This, however, was not necessary but merely a fitting state for Christ. Thus, Scotus concedes that God, by an absolute power, could have assumed a non-rational nature, or even a rational nature that, if left to itself, would be capable of sin. But from this it does not follow that such a nature would sin, since it could be strengthened by grace and beatitude, just as the angels in beatitude are presently. If, however, grace and glory were removed, and the human nature remained, then, just as the angels had sinned, so too could the human nature of Christ. From this, Scotus adds, no absurdity arises, because those ensuing defects—sinning, being damned, and such—would not belong to God except by reason of the assumed human nature, just as we presently attribute suffering and dying to God only by reason of Christ's humanity. Thus, Scotus concludes that, although it would not have been fitting for Christ to have sinned or been damned, it would not have affected the present argument.[131]

6 Conclusion

What conclusions can be drawn from this remarkably preserved debate recorded at Paris between the two major figures of Godfrey of Fontaines and Duns Scotus, who differed so fundamentally on the nature and role of the will in the moral life? First, and importantly, it is clear that Godfrey and Scotus were here *not* arguing in a merely dialectical way on the issue of whether

129 *Q. in aula* [n. 55].
130 *Q. in aula* [n. 44].
131 *Q. in aula* [n. 56].

charity and, more generally, the moral virtues, resided in the will. Rather, we find Godfrey here defending his established view that moral virtues are in the sensitive appetite and Scotus responding with his opposed position that all such moral virtues are in the will. Indeed, while the academic role of bachelors was to supply arguments for both sides of a question, the office of the master was to determine the issue, which Scotus does here formally for the first time and Godfrey apparently for the last. The present disputation between these two masters was therefore not merely a dialectical exercise but a substantive defense of their own, well-established and opposed views on moral psychology and human happiness.

Here it could be objected that, to the contrary, Godfrey had indeed allowed in his earlier *Quodlibet* XI.4 that charity *was* a virtue in the will, as noted above. Therefore, he should be seen in the present debate as only arguing dialectically that there are no moral virtues in the will, contrary to Scotus's own view. This would be a mistaken interpretation. In his *Quodlibet* XI.4, Godfrey is clear that charity in the will functions as a virtue in a distinct and unique way. Its limited role is to expand the scope of the will so as to make God a possible object of affection, compensating for the otherwise general lack of interest that human beings have in such abstract, theological matters so detached from the affective pleasures and pains of our moral and social lives.[132] With this move, Godfrey appears to address Aristotle's observation that happiness, in the elevated sense of theoretical contemplation, seems "a life too high for us."[133] In sum, Godfrey's prior assertion on the unique and limited role of charity in the will does not compromise his more general arguments about the location of the moral virtues in the present debate.

At root, the opposed views of Godfrey and Scotus arise from a deep difference on the nature of beatitude itself, which align with those of Aristotle and Augustine, respectively. For Godfrey, as noted above, happiness consists in theoretical contemplation of the divine and any affective enjoyment or *fruitio* is given the diminished role assigned by Aristotle to a type of concomitant pleasure (*delectatio*; *hēdonē*). Scotus, to the contrary, holds with Augustine that beatitude essentially consists in the affective act of enjoyment (*fruitio*) in the will, a thesis that he independently defends at some length at the end of his *Ordinatio*.[134] Given this divergence between the two on the nature of happiness, a corresponding difference on the nature of virtue was unavoidable.

132 Godfrey of Fontaines, *Quod.* XI q. 4, PB 5, p. 21.

133 Aristotle, *EN* X c. 7, 1177^{b}16–26.

134 Scotus, *Ord.* IV d. 49 qq. 4–5, ed. Vat. 14, pp. 332–365.

7 The Edition

So far as is known, the inception of Giles of Longny survives in two witnesses, where it is found appended to the end of Scotus's Parisian lectures on the *Sentences*, which in reality terminated at III d. 17: Casale Monferrato, Biblioteca del Seminario Vescovile MS B 2, ff. 110^{rb}–111va [= **C**] and the *editio princeps* of John Major printed by Jean Granjon (Paris, 1518), [= **M**].[135] According to Major's testimony outlined above, his text was printed from an unidentified manuscript that he had discovered in Paris. As indicated, the Major edition printed this Parisian witness as 'corrected' by the theologians Jacques Rufin and Pierre du Sault, who were at Paris with Major. It was then reprinted by Guido Bartolucci (Venice, 1597), Hugh Cavellus (Cologne, 1635), and Luke Wadding (Paris, 1639; rpt. Paris: Vivès, 1894). At least for the present question, these ensuing reprints do not appear to have had any recourse to additional manuscript witnesses but simply conveyed the omissions and misreadings of Major's edition, while attempting to repair *ad sensum* some of its more corrupted passages. None of these emendations actually restored Scotus's original text, while others outright conflicted with it. For example, in his response to Giles of Longny outlined above, Scotus deploys his distinctive theory that no act is supernatural with respect the subject in which it inheres, but only in relation to the object causing that act. The text of the Major edition, however, states exactly the opposite. This corruption occurred when Major's Parisian editors attempted to repair what was, unknown to them, an omission by homeoteleuton in their Parisian copy of this passage. Their ensuing emendation of inserting a '*non*' into their Parisian text had the effect of directly contradicting one of Scotus's most distinctive positions, as discussed above, that no act is supernatural with respect to its receiving subject but only in relation to the object causing it. This fundamental doctrinal error is then transmitted in all subsequent editions of the passage.

135 William O. Duba, Russell L. Friedman, and Chris Schabel, "Henry of Harclay and Aufredo Gonteri Brito," in *Mediaeval Commentaries on the Sentences of Peter Lombard*, ed. Philipp W. Rosemann, vol. 2 (Leiden: Brill, 2010), pp. 263–368. Recall that the lectures on the *Sentences* at Paris in this period were given in the order of I–IV-II-III.

Manuscript C, f. 110^{vb}; ed., ll. 142–145	**Major (1518), f. 30^{rb}; Bartolucci (1597), f. 307bC; Cavellus (1635), f. 379^{a}; Wadding (1639) 11.493^{b}; Vivès (1894), 22.396^{a}**
Sed dicitur actus supernaturalis, **quia est respectu obiecti supernaturalis. Unde actus supernaturalis non** distinguitur a naturali per comparationem ad potentiam in qua recipitur, sed in comparatione ad obiectum.	Sed dicitur actus supernaturalis |---------- ---------- *om. per hom.* ----------| **ut** distinguitur a naturali, ut per comparationem ad potentiam in quam recipitur, sed **non** in comparatione ad obiectum.

Other omissions by homeoteleuton in the Major printing rendered the text incoherent, forcing *ad hoc* insertions or changes by the ensuing editors that were not part of the original, particularly in the later Wadding-Vivès edition. For example, in the case below, there has been a homeoteleuton in the Major printing caused by a skip from the phrase *ratione alicuius formae* to *ratione formae*, resulting in the loss of the major premise. The solution of the later Wadding-Vivès edition was simply to eliminate the dangling phrase *ratione formae* that originally induced the line skip and then insert *supernaturalis* into the major premise. The text so revised loses the force of its original argument as a fully general claim about cause and effect and instead restricts the major premise to only supernatural operations. It then deleted the dangling phrase *ratione formae*, thereby erasing the occasion of the original error. This example makes clear that the texts printed subsequent to the Major edition did not have access to other manuscript witnesses but merely worked from the defective Major text and attempted to emend it *ad sensum*, all with disastrous results.

Manuscript C, f. 111ra; ed., n. 26 (ll. 174–177)	**Major (1518), f. 30va; Bartolucci (1597), p. 307bE–308aF; Cavellus (1635), p. 379^{a}**
Contra: operatio sequitur suppositum ratione alicuius formae; **ergo sicut operatio naturalis sequitur suppositum ratione formae naturalis, sic operatio supernaturalis ratione formae** supernaturalis; fruitio est operatio supernaturalis; ergo, etc.	Contra: operatio sequitur suppositum ratione alicuius formae |---------- ---------- ---------- *om. per hom.* ----------| supernaturalis; fruitio est operatio supernaturalis **ratione formae**; ergo, etc.

(*cont.*)

	Wadding (1639) n. 9 p. 493[b]; Vivès (1894) n. 9 p. 397[a]
	Contra: operatio **supernaturalis** sequitur suppositum ratione alicuius formae |---------- ---------- ----------| supernaturalis; fruitio est operatio supernaturalis; ergo, etc.

More catastrophic still are defective passages in the print editions that actually contradict what is in fact Scotus's original argument. For example, in the following text the early editions substitute '*non*' for '*natura*', followed by a long omission by homeoteleuton on *elevatur*, yielding a text that says precisely the opposite of Scotus's intended reply. The Wadding and Vivés reprints for some reason add an extra *non* in the second clause saying it was *not* fitting that Christ be blessed in the union, contradicting both Scotus and medieval Christology in general.

Manuscript C, f. 111[va]; ed. n. 60, (ll. 348–350)	**Major (1518), f. 31[vb]; Bartolucci (1597), p. 309[a]; Cavellus (1635), p. 380[b]–381[a]**
Ad quartum dicendum quod ex illa unione **natura** elevatur per hoc, quod assumitur ad personalitatem divinam et de congruo elevatur, quia decet quod talis fit beatus, sed non ex necessitate absoluta.	Ad quartum dicendum quod ex illa unione **non** elevatur |---------- *om. per hom.* ----------| quia decet quod talis fit beatus, sed non ex necessitate absoluta.
	Wadding (1639) n. 16, p. 495[b]; Vivès (1894) n. 16 p. 400[b]
	Ad quartum dicendum quod ex illa unione **non** elevatur |---------- *om. per hom.* ----------| **non** quia decet quod talis fit beatus, sed non ex necessitate absoluta.

Of course, C itself is not totally free from its own occasional mistakes, as the homeoteleuton on *potest aliter* below illustrates. Overall, however, for the present question the Major edition has twice as many omissions as C, not to mention many additional misreadings that adversely affect sense.

> [37] Tum quia voluntas non potest aliter [**eligere nisi quia intellectus potest aliter** *om. per hom.* C] sententiare, quod non esset nisi actus voluntatis necessario sequeretur actum intellectus.

Consequently, the present editorial procedure will take manuscript C as the base text and then collate it against the *editio princeps* of John Major. Accordingly, the text will be established from C, except in cases of its own errors or omissions, when resort will be taken to Major. This has resulted in a greatly improved text over that of the Major print and its descendants. As the above examples indicate, collation of the editions after that of Major is unnecessary, since these simply reprint an originally flawed text only to add their own, further degradations.

8 The Manuscript

As noted, in addition to the *editio princeps* of John Major and its reprints, the present text exists in the single manuscript of **C** = Casale Monferrato, Biblioteca del Seminario Vescovile, MS B 2, ff. 136: parchment, bound in wood, measuring 337×248 mm and written in two columns in a single Gothic hand of northern *textualis*, a script typical of university texts in the early fourteenth century at Paris, where in fact the manuscript was purchased. Marginal annotations and identifications have been added by a second smaller, more cursive hand.[136]

136 For a description of this manuscript and an inventory of the Harclay section, see William O. Duba, Russell L. Friedman and Chris Schabel, "Henry of Harclay and Aufredo Gonteri Brito," pp. 263–339. The following questions have been edited from the Harclay portion of the manuscript, which I list here noting their location in manuscript C: Francesco Fiorentino and Christopher David Schabel, "Henry of Harclay's Prologue to his *Sentences* Commentary, Question 1: Theology as a Science," *Recherches de théologie et philosophie médiévales* 78 (2011), pp. 97–159 (C ff. 1ra–6^{vb}); Francesco Fiorentino, "The Last Two Questions of the Prologue of Henry of Harclay," *Franciscan Studies* 72 (2014), pp. 305–371 (C ff. 6^{vb}–9ra); Alessandro de Pascalis and Giacomo Fornasieri, "What is It to be *Naturally* Loved? Henry of Harclay on Fruition: Edition and Philosophical Commentary of I *Sententiarum*, d. 1, qq. 1–4," *Studi sull'Aristotelismo medievale* (*secoli VI–XVI*) 1 (2021), pp. 120–171 (C 11^{vb}–14^{rb}); Hermann Köstler, *Gotteserkenntnis im Sentenzenkommentar Heinrichs von*

Title and attribution are added in a larger script on upper margin of opening folio: Henrici Cancel⟨larii⟩ Uxon⟨iensis⟩ in I. Sent⟨tentiarum⟩.

The first part of C (ff. 1–84^{rb}) contains book I of the *Sentences* of Scotus's younger contemporary, Henry of Harclay, on which most of the scholarly attention devoted to the manuscript has focused. The second part (ff. 85ra–136^{rb}) is the third book of Scotus's *Reportatio Parisiensis* in the version now designated 'III-C', which terminates at d. 17, as outlined below. The remaining distinctions 18–40 of book III in this manuscript and printed in the Wadding edition have been supplied from Scotus's Oxford *Lectura* III commentary on the *Sentences*. According to the Vatican editors, *Lectura* III commentary in fact comprises lectures given by Scotus, not at Paris, but during his enforced return to Oxford in 1303, when he fell under the order of explusion by Philip the Fair for refusing to adhere to the King's petition against Pope Boniface VIII.[137] As outlined in the appendix below, it is precisely at this seam in the codex—where Scotus's *Reportatio Parisiensis* III ends and the remaining distinctions of the third book have been appended from his Oxford *Lectura*—that his *aula* disputation of Giles of Loigny was preserved, recording his last required act as a bachelor at Paris prior to his own promotion. There is, however, no indication of Scotus's authorship in the codex. To the contrary, the bill of sale of the manuscript to Robert Debardius recorded at Paris on August 14, 1331, attributes the lectures on both books I and III to Harclay, who is referred to as Chancellor of Oxford, as does as a later annotation to the *explicit* of Book III itself:

> In isto libro continetur primus et tertius *Sententiarum* [sententiarum *rep. sed del.*] magistri Henrici de Harcle Cancellarii Oxoniensis; est Roberti Debardii de Florentia, decani Glasguensis; emit ipsum Parisiis, 14 die mensis Augusti anno 1331, pro viii florenorum de Florentia de auro. (C, f. 136)

Harclay (Diss. Innsbruck, 1977), cf. *Zeitschrift für Katholische Theologie* 100 (1978), p. 686 (C 17^{vb}–20^{rb}, 21^{rb}); Russell L. Friedman, "Trinitarian Theology and Philosophical Issues: Trinitarian Texts from the Late Thirteenth and Early Fourteenth Centuries," *Cahiers de l'Institut du moyen âge grec et latin* 72 (2001), pp. 89–168 (C ff. 36^{r}–37^{v}); Maria Sorokina, "Henri de Harclay sur l'ontologie des nombres: à l'origine d'un désaccord entre Pierre Auriol et Thomas Wylton," *Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du Moyen Âge* 89 (2022/1), pp. 35–94 (C ff. 56ra–57^{vb}); Mark G. Henninger, "Henry of Harclay's *Quaestio* on Relations in His *Sentences* Commentary: An Edition," in *Greek and Medieval Studies in Honor of Leo Sweeney*, S.J., edd. William J. Carrol and John J. Furlong (New York, P. Lang, 1994), pp. 237–254 (C ff. 67va–68va); Chris Schabel, "Aufredo Gonteri Brito secundum Henry of Harclay on Divine Foreknowledge and Future Contingents," *Disputatio* 2 (1997), pp. 159–196 (C ff. 77ra–79va).

137 See the "Prolegomena" in ed. Vat. 21, p. 12*.

The above identification in the record of sale doubtless stems from the contemporary annotation, made by a second hand to the original *explicit* of the third book, that also misidentifies it as also belonging to Harclay, itself no doubt induced by his genuine authorship of the first book recorded in the upper margin of the opening folio. (f. 136^{rb}):

> Explicit liber tertius *Sententiarum*. Deo gratias.
> (Editus a magistro Henrico Hercle cancellario Uxoniensis *add. a. m.* C)

In the edition, the spelling, paragraphing, and punctuation have been normalized; all variants are recorded and cited sources identified.[138]

Appendix 1: Insertion of the *aula* of Giles of Longny

Rep. par. III-A d. 17 (ed. Major, f. 26ra–27ra; reprint Vivès 23.375–378):

> Q. 1 Utrum in Christo sint duae voluntates.
> Q. 2 Utrum Christus aliquid voluit vel aliquid oravit quod non fuit factum.
>
> [*Scotus's Rep. par. III-A ends here at d. 17, as its manuscripts attest. The remaining dd. 18–40 appended at this juncture and treated in the older printed editions as Rep. par. III, are in fact a compilation drawn from the Oxford Lectura III, according to the Vatican editors. On their reconstruction, Scotus's Oxford Lectura III is later than his corresponding Parisian Reportatio III-A. Cf. Vat. 20.xii and 160–163, where, according to the editorial note, Scotus refers to his Parisian lectures.*]

Lectura III d. 18 q. un. (Vat. 21.1–23) but printed in older editions as *Rep. par.* III d. 18 (ed. Major, f. 27ra–29^{rb}; reprint Vivès 23.379–390):

> Q. un. Utrum Christus meruit in primo instanti suae conceptionis.
>
> [*After the above single question of Lectura III d. 18, manuscripts C (f. 100ra) and V (f. 113^{rb}) of Reportatio III-C and the Major edition insert the two incep-*

138 I wish to thank Tobias Hoffmann (Sorbonne Université), Giorgio Pini (Fordham University) and Garrett Smith (University of Bonn) for their many helpful corrections and suggestions.

tion questions of Giles of Longny. They are preceeded in C and V by an explanatory annotation that identifies the two questions as belonging to the inception of Giles and not to the commentary. The Major edition and all its ensuing reprints omit the annotation found in C and V and instead treat these two questions as part of Rep. par. III d. 18 by numbering them qq. 2 and 3 and suppressing the names of Giles and Godfrey as respondents in q. 2. C does not number them as questions 2 and 3, confirming that they in fact do not belong to d. 18. V transferred the questions themselves to the end of the codex as not belonging to the commentary, from where they were either lost or in fact never copied.]

Nota quod duae quaestiones sequentes non sunt de lectura tertii, sed fuerunt in principio fratris Aegidii magistri nostri, de quarum prima respondet dictus Aegidius in vesperis, de secunda vero frater Joannes Scotus in aula. Prima est haec *C* | Require in fine *V sed qq. non inveniuntur*.
Utrum Deus potest remittere culpam mortalem sine infusione gratiae ....
Utrum sit necessarium ponere habitum caritatis in anima Christi propter actum fruitionis beatae .... Sic finis disputationis in aula.

Lectura III d. 19 (Vat. 21.25–38) but printed in Major and subsequent editions as *Rep. par.* III d. 19:

Q. un. Utrum Christus meruit omnibus nobis gratiam et gloriam.

Appendix 2: Manuscripts and Editions of *Reportatio parisiensis* III A–D[139]

***Rep.* III-A** (ed. Paris, 1517; Cologne, 1635; Venice, 1597; Wadding-Vivès, 1891–1895, vol. 23.)

– Oxford, Balliol College MS 206, f. 105^{r}–141^{r} (d. 1 q. 1–d. 17 q. 2) [Manuscript lacks initial folio. Text begins in middle of d. 1 q. 1 at "[apti]-tudinis essendi in centro ..." = Vivès 23.237^{b} line 9.]

139 On the various versions of Scotus's *Reportatio parisiensis*, See Barnabas Hechich, "Il problema delle 'Reportationes' nell'eredità dottrinale del B. Giovanni Duns Scoto, OFM," in *Giovanni Duns Scoto: studi e ricerche nel VII centenario della sua morte in onore di P. César Saco Alarcón*, ed. Martín Carbajo Núñez, 2 vols. (Roma: Antonianum, 2008) 1.59–128. See also *Lectura* III d. 5, ed. Vat. 20, p. 160, for the *Rep. par.* as source for the later *Lect.* III, according to the Vatican editors.

– Oxford, Merton College MS 62, f. 228^{r}–258^{v} (d. 3 q. 1–d. 17 q. 2) [Manuscript lacks several initial folios and begins in middle of d. 3 q. 1 at "et tamen non est ibi quies media …" = Vivès 23.262^{a} line 3.]
– Worcester, Cathedral Library MS F 69, f. 132^{vb}–157va, 159^{r} (dd. 1–17 q. 2).
– Worcester, Cathedral Library MS F 39, f. 89ra–106^{vb} (dd. 1–17). [f. 106^{vb}–137^{vb} supplied from *Ord.* III dd. 16–40, including the interpolations of dd. 18–25.]

***Rep.* III-B** (Unedited)
– Barcelona, Archivo de la Corona de Aragón, Ripoll MS 53, f. 1ra–70ra.
On f. 43^{rb}, Parisian commentary ends at d. 17 with following annotation: "Usque huc legit frater Iohannes Duns Parisius; aliud de Anglia."

***Rep.* III-C** (Unedited. According to Hechich, "Il problema delle *Reportationes*," p. 74: "e una compilazione anonima, con molti elementi tratti dalla *Lectura* III e dalla *Rep.* III B".)
– **C** = Casale Monferrato (Alessandria), Biblioteca del Seminario Vescovile MS b 2.
f. 110ra = d. 18. Contains annotation and inception of Giles of Longny.
– Praha, Archiv Prazského Hradu, Knihovna Metropolitní Kapituly MS C.XXI.4 (439), f. 3^{r}–78^{v}.
f. 32va = d. 18. No annotation or inception of Giles of Longny.
– **V** = Valencia, Biblioteca de la Catedral MS 439 (*olim* 178), f. 81ra–131^{rb}.
f. 113^{rb} = d. 18. Contains the annotation but the text of the inception of Giles of Longny according to the marginal note by the scribe says that the questions were moved to the end. They were, however, either then lost or in fact never copied. Not listed in the tabula at the end of the manuscript given on f. 130ra–131^{rb}.

***Rep.* III-D** (Unedited)
– Troyes, Médiathèque du Grand Troyes (*olim* Bibliothèque municipale) MS 661, f. 56ra–89^{vb}.
f. 70va: = *Lectura* III d. 18 exact. No annotation or inception of Giles of Longny.

C 110^{rb}
M 29^{vb}

[Principium Aegidii de Lignaco Quaestio in aula]

[1] Utrum sit necessarium ponere habitum caritatis in anima Christi propter actum fruitionis beatae.

[2] Videtur quod non:

Quia effectus nobilissimus est a causa nobilissima; fruitio est talis effectus;
C 110va ergo est a Deo immediate. Maior patet, ut sit proportio inter | causas et effectus. Probatio minoris, quia fruitio coniungit et unit obiecto nobilissimo.

[3] Secundo sic: quando aliqui effectus sunt inseparabiliter ordinati, unus est ab alio vel ambo a causa communi, ut patet de calefactione et rarefactione aeris, quia consequenter et inseparabiliter se habent, et ideo rarefactio est a calefactione vel utraque a calefaciente aerem; sed visio beata et fruitio sunt inseparabiliter ordinatae; ergo fruitio est a visione vel ambae ab obiecto beatifico viso; sed sive sic sive sic, non est a caritate; ergo non est necessaria.

[4] Contra:

Operatio non est delectabilis nisi sit a potentia proportionata obiecto; sed fruitio est operatio maxime delectabilis, ⟨quia⟩ obiectum beatificum est supernaturale; ergo oportet voluntatem, quae est potentia naturalis, perfici per caritatem, habitum supernaturalem, per quam proportionatur obiecto tali.

[Respondet Scotus ad quaestionem]

[5] Respondeo exponendo intellectum quaestionis quod non quaerit de potentia absoluta, quia Deus sic posset causare in voluntate Christi, et cuiuscumque alterius, actum fruitionis sine omni habitu medio, quia voluntas secundum se est receptiva fruitionis sicut et caritatis. Intelligitur ergo quaestio de necessitate indigentiae, ut scilicet anima sit perfectior et efficacior in actu fruitionis. Et secundum hoc dico quod anima Christi indiget habitu caritatis respectu fruitionis beatae. Cuius ratio est quia omnis potentia nata est habere habitum

---

1–2 Principium … in aula] Nota quod duae quaestiones sequentes non sunt de lectura tertii, sed fuerunt in principio fratris Aegidii magistri nostri, de quarum prima respondet dictus Aegidius in vesperis, de secunda vero frater Joannes Scotus in aula *praem.* (*f.* 110ra23) C 3 Utrum] Tertio quaeritur utrum M 4 beatae] verae M 8 obiecto] subiecto M 9 inseparabiliter] inseparatum C 11 quia … inseparabiliter] qui consequentur et separatur C | consequenter] contingenter M 12–14 aerem … sic] ergo fruitio C 18 ergo oportet] *inv.* M 21 Respondeo] Respondet Scotus *in marg. add.* C^2 22 Deus sic] *inv.* M 23 alterius] alteri C | omni] actu *add. sed del.* C 24 quaestio] *om.* M 26 indiget habitu] *inv.* C 27 beatae] verae M 27–173.1 quia … disponentem] *om.* C

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disponentem ad actum perfectum; sed voluntas Christi est nata perfici caritate disponente ad actum perfectum fruitionis; ergo etc.

[6] Maior patet I *Ethicorum*, quia "virtus habentem perficit, et opus eius bonum reddit."[1] | Item, "virtus est dispositio perfecti ad optimum,"[2] id est, M 30ra potentiae ad actum perfectum. Omnis autem potentia est nata perfici aliqua perfectione, ex qua eius operatio redditur melior; indiget illa perfectione; ergo etc.

[7] Minor patet, quia perfectibilia unius rationis nata sunt perfici perfectionibus eiusdem rationis; sed fide tenemus voluntatem Christi esse eiusdem speciei cum nostra. Viator autem indiget caritate ad merendum, ut fide tenemus et dicit APOSTOLUS I ad Cor. 13: *Si linguis hominum loquar*, etc.; *caritatem autem non habuero, nihil sum*.[3]

[8] Item, eodem capitulo dicitur quod *caritas numquam excidit*;[4] ergo in patria manet. Sed non maneret nisi esset necessaria ad actum fruitionis, quia propter hoc dicitur quod 'fides non manet in patria':[5] non propter incompossibilitatem eius ad visionem, quia per nullum actum in nobis possumus corrumpere habitum supernaturalem (unde nec caritatem corrumpimus nisi demeritorie), sed ideo non manet fides in patria quia non est necessaria ad aliquem actum qui sit ibi. Unde si esset ibi, frustra esset, quia non posset exire in actum propter incompossibilitatem cum visione clara, quae semper ibi est, cum qua non stat actus fidei, licet possit stare habitus.[6] Non ergo manet fides, quia si esset, esset otiosa; sed caritas manet; ergo est necessaria propter actum fruitio-

1 perfectum] indiget illo actu *add.* C *om.* M | sed] scilicet C 6 eius] omnis M 6–8 indiget … Minor] *om.* C 9 fide] fidem C | Christi] Christum C 10 Viator] Nostra M | caritate] caritatem C 11 et] quia M | I] primo C primae M | loquar] loquentia *fort.* C et angelorum *add.* M 14 patria manet] patriam remanet C 15 patria non] primam nisi C 16 possumus] possimus C 17–18 demeritorie] demitorie *sic* C 18 patria] prima C | necessaria] necessarii C 19 sit] sunt C | Unde] ut C 21–22 si esset] *om.* C

1 ARISTOT., *Eth. Nic.* II c. 5, 1106a 15–17; AL 26, pp. 402, ll. 13–14.

2 ARISTOT., *Phys.* VII c. 3, 246b 23–24; AL 7[1], pp. 266, ll. 5–6; *Auctoritates Aristotelis*, ed. HAMESSE, PhM 17, p. 155, n. 186.

3 I Cor. 13:1–3.

4 I Cor. 13:8.

5 Cf. I Cor. 13:8.

6 De evacuatione fidei, cf. SCOTUM, *Lect.* III d. 31 q. un. nn. 10–12, ed. Vat. 21, pp. 246–247: "Sed tunc est dubium hic, quae est ratio evacuationis istorum [sc. fidei et spei]: aut quia sunt incompossibiles alicui in intellectu vel in voluntate (et dicunt aliqui, videlicet propter formalem incompossibilitatem eorum cum beatitudine), aut quia non sunt necessariae, sed superfluae? … idcirco non est ponenda in patria ista duplex virtus, quia non est ibi necessaria …."

nis beatae. Si igitur necessaria est in aliis, ita et in anima Christi vel voluntate eius, cum sint eiusdem speciei omnes.

[9] Nec valet si dicatur quod non indiget propter unionem ad Verbum, quae omnia supplet, quia haec unio est naturae humanae ad suppositum.[7] Suppositum autem divinum, ex hoc quod terminat istam unionem, nullam perfectionem absolutam ponit in anima Christi. Et ideo cuiuscumque perfectionis est receptiva secundum se, si non esset Verbo unita, sic eiusdem est receptiva, ut est Verbo unita.[8]

[Ad argumenta principalia]

[10] Ad primum argumentum[9] secundum duas vias:[10]

Primo, si voluntas est pure passiva respectu fruitionis, tunc dico quod tam visio quam fruitio est immediate a Deo agente ut a causa nobilissima. Sed non sequitur quin caritas sit necessaria propter fruitionem, quia sicut agens naturale non solum inducit formam ultimam vel perfectionem sed etiam dispositionem necessariam vel congruam ad hoc, ita agens supernaturale constituens beatum in esse perfecto beatifico et supernaturali non solum causat actum beatificum, qui est actus secundus, sed etiam dispositionem, id est, caritatem, quae est actus primus quo natus est perfici beatus, cum sit omnino perfectus sicut natus est perfici. Perfectior enim est habens simul utrumque quam alterum solum.

[11] Si autem voluntas eliciat actum fruitionis, tunc caritas necessaria est, ut informata ipsa melius agat. Et cum dicitur "effectus nobilissimus," scilicet, supremus angelus, non potest esse nisi a Deo. Sed fruitio non est nobilissimus

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1 igitur] ergo C 2 cum … eiusdem] *om.* C 4 naturae humanae] *inv.* C 4–5 Suppositum] *om.* C 6–7 est receptiva] *inv.* C 7 sic] *om.* C 11 quod] *om.* C 14 etiam] in C et M 16 beatum] hominem C | beatifico] beatitudo C | causat] terminat M 18–19 beatus … perfici] *om. per hom.* C 19 est] habitus *add.* M | simul] *om.* M 22 agat] agit CM | nobilissimus] simpliciter *add.* M

7 Cf. Henr. de Gand., *Quod.* vi q. 6, Op. om. 10, ed. Wilson, p. 70: "Nunc ita firmiter tenendum putamus quod omnem elevationem et habilitatem, quam potest facere habitus in potentia ut inclinetur in obiectum fruibile praesentatum, multo eminentius operatur ipsa unio cum ipso fruibili in personae unitate."

8 Cf. Scotum, *Lect.* iii d. 6 q. 1 n. 22, ed. Vat. 20, p. 175; *Ord.* iii d. 17 d. un. n. 16, ed. Vat. 9, p. 569.

9 Cf. n. 2 supra.

10 Circa istas 'duas vias', cf. Scotum, *Ord.* iii d. 17 q. un. n. 17, ed. Vat. 9, pp. 569–570.

effectus nisi secundum quid, id est, qui potest convenire creaturae rationali, talis enim est accidens. ("Substantia enim nobilior est accidente.")[11] Ergo fruitio est operatio nobilissima conveniens creaturae, quia unit obiecto nobilissimo.

[12] Ad secundum[12] secundum primam viam, scilicet, si voluntas sit passiva, concedo quod visio et fruitio sint a Deo im|mediate agente, sed non sequitur C 110^{vb} ulterius quin caritas requiratur propter causam dictam, ut scilicet anima sit magis perfecta.

[13] Si vero voluntas sit activa respectu fruitionis, tunc maior est falsa habens ad propositum duas instantias:

[14] Prima in motu gravis qui sequitur remotionem prohiben|tis, quia motus M 30^{rb} gravis et remotio prohibentis sunt effectus ordinati inseparabiliter, et tamen removens prohibens, ut frangens trabem, non movet grave nisi per accidens ex VIII *Physicorum*;[13] nec effectus primus, scilicet remotio prohibentis, movet grave.

[15] Alia est instantia in applicatione activi ad passivum. Nam ad motum localem quo applicatur ignis ligno sequitur calefactio ligni, non tamen motus localis causat illum calorem in ligno—"Motus enim localis solum adducit generans" ex II *De generatione*[14]—nec etiam applicans lignum igni generat calorem, nisi per accidens.

[16] Ergo illa maior est falsa. Et ad propositum sunt istae duae instantiae, quia 'non considerare' est impedimentum voluntatis ne sit in actu volendi et ne obiectum voluntatis applicetur voluntati, ut ipsa possit agere. Per hoc autem quod intellectus considerat, amovetur impedimentum et applicatur obiectum voluntati per ostensionem eius. Ideo non sequitur quod intellectus vel intellectio sit causa volitionis, nec etiam obiectum, sicut dictum est de removente prohibens et applicante ignem ligno.

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1 nisi] *om.* C | id ... qui] *om.* C 2 enim nobilior] *om. et spatium rel.* C 2–3 fruitio est] *inv.* C 3 conveniens] uniens C | quia] quae C 8 maior] *om.* M 9 propositum] oppositum C 10 quia] *om.* M | motus] motio M 12 ut] et C 15 instantia] et *add.* C 16 non tamen] *p. c.* C 17 causat] generat M | enim] non C 18 nec etiam] et M | igni] igitur C non *add. M* 20 illa ... Et] maior illa falsa est C 21 ne] ut M 23 amovetur] rem motus C 24 voluntati] bonum C

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11 AVER., *In De an.* II (412^{a} 6–11) com. 2, ed. CRAWFORD, pp. 130, l. 18; cf. *Auct. Aris.*, ed. HAMESSE, PhM 17, p. 183 n. 113.

12 Cf. n. 3 supra.

13 ARISTOT., *Phys.* VIII c. 4, 255^{b} 24–27; AL 7^{1}, pp. 295, ll. 14–17.

14 ARISTOT., *De gen. et corr.* II c. 10, 336^{a} 16–18; AL 9^{1}, pp. 74, ll. 7–8.

[Frater Aegidius contra Scotum]

[17] Sed contra hoc arguit frater Aegidius primo sic: illud quod continet eminenter omnem perfectionem caritatis, coniunctum voluntati, potest in omnem perfectionem sine caritate quam potest voluntas cum caritate; essentia divina est huiusmodi et animae Christi coniuncta est; ergo, etc.

[18] Secundo sic: nulla forma supernaturalis potest ab agente creato produci, quia nullum agens naturale potest in effectum supernaturalem; sed fruitio est supernaturalis sicut actus beatificus; ergo est a solo Deo. Ergo caritas non est animae Christi necessaria propter huiusmodi actum, cum ipsum non eliciat. Maior probatur, quia actus supernaturalis vel creatur, et sic habetur propositum, aut de potentia sui subiecti educitur. Et tunc vel de eius potentia naturali, et sic ei corresponderet potentia activa naturalis et esset per consequens fruitio naturalis, quod falsum est; aut educitur de potentia obedientiali, et sic solum a Deo, quia nullum creatum potest supra potentiam obedientialem, sed solus Deus cui omnia obediunt.

[19] Contra arguit idem Aegidius sic: subiectum perfectibile forma disponente ad operationem indiget illa forma vel dispositione; sed caritas disponit voluntatem ad fruitionem, quia facit animam Deo gratam. Essentia autem divina, licet unita sit animae Christi, quia non est dispositio formaliter inhaerens, nec potest esse, non potest animam Christi disponere formaliter tali dispositione. Ergo caritas est ei necessaria ad talem operationem.

[Respondet Scotus ad Aegidium]

[20] Ad primum[15] dicitur quod Deus continet eminenter omnem perfectionem. Ideo posset active elicere in voluntate quidquid posset cum caritate voluntas—'absolute' dico, quia cum essentia divina non potest esse princi-

2 Sed] Contra arguit Aegidius *in marg. add.* C² | hoc arguit] arguat C 3 omnem] *om.* M | caritatis] voluntatis C | voluntati] illi M 3–4 omnem perfectionem] communem comparationem M 4 quam … caritate] *om. per hom.* M 5 est] *om.* M 7 fruitio] finitus C 8 beatificus] habitus M 9 Christi] *om.* M 10 actus supernaturalis] *inv.* M 11 subiecti] *om.* C 12 corresponderet] correspondet C | potentia] potentior C 12–13 et … naturalis] *om. per hom.* M 13 aut] *om.* C | obedientiali] obedibili M 14 a] *om.* C | quia] quod C | obedientialem] obedibilem M 15 obediunt] *corr. ex* obeunt *in marg.* C 16–17 forma disponente] ad formam disponendae C 18 animam Deo] Deo ea C 19 sit] si C | Christi] *om.* M | dispositio] animae Christi *add.* M 23 eminenter] *fort.* C

15 Cf. n. 17 supra.

pium agendi formale ipsi voluntati, et "Deus sic res administrat," secundum Augustinum, "ut proprios motus eas agere sinat,"—[16] ideo caritas necessaria est voluntati, ut sit ei formalis ratio agendi talem operationem beatificam, quia voluntas non esset omnino perfecta sine caritate.

[21] Ad secundum[17] dico quod iste actus beatificus sic a voluntate elicitus educitur de potentia naturali voluntatis, nec sequitur quod sit naturalis. Immo potentia naturalis summe inclinatur secundum naturam suam in summam perfectionem suam, quam habere non potest ex puris naturalibus; hanc tamen summe naturaliter recipit. Sed dicitur actus 'supernaturalis', quia est respectu obiecti supernaturalis. Unde actus supernaturalis non distinguitur a naturali per comparationem ad potentiam in qua recipitur, sed in comparatione ad obiectum,[18] et quia forte | ad actum illum naturalem indiget potentia auxilio M 30va vel habitu dato supernaturaliter, quo tamen habito postea utitur potentia naturaliter.

[Magister Alanus contra Scotum]

[22] Tunc arguit Magister Alanus primo sic: sicut se habet voluntas ad dilectionem praesupposita fide in viatore, sic se videtur habere ad actum fruitionis praesupposita perfecta visione patriae; sed voluntas viatoris non requirit habitum ut fruatur bono ostenso sibi per fidem, sed sine caritate potest frui tali bono; ergo, etc.

[23] Maior est evidens ex proportione actus ad actum. Probatio minoris, quia nisi voluntas sine cari|tate posset ferri in bonum vel frui bono sibi ostenso C 111ra per fidem informem, posset quis scire certitudinaliter quando est in caritate et quando non. Quia quando actus non potest haberi sine aliquo principio elici-

1 formale] *om.* C 2 necessaria] *ut vid.* C 3 formalis] formaliter C 5 quod] si M | iste] ille M | sic] sit M 6 nec] non C 6–7 Immo ... naturalis] quia M 8 suam] *om.* M | quam] cum *add.* M | puris] peccatis C 9–10 quia ... supernaturalis] *om. per hom.* M 10 non] ut M | naturali] ut *add.* M 11 comparationem] compositionem C | qua] quam M 13 vel] pro C | postea] *om.* M | potentia] potentior C 16 Tunc] Arguit Alanus contra Scotum *add. in marg.* C2 | se] *om.* C 20 bono] bona C 21 proportione] portione C 22 frui] in *add.* C 23 scire certitudinaliter] habere certitudinem M 24 quando] aliquis *add.* M | principio] *om.* C

16 Augustinus, *De civ. Dei* VII c. 30, CCSL 46, pp. 212, ll. 38–39.

17 Cf. n. 18 supra.

18 De ratione supernaturalis, cf. Scotum *Ord.* I prol. p. 1 q. un n. 57, ed. Vat. 1, p. 35; *Ord.* IV d. 49 p. 1 q. 5 n. 304, ed. Vat. 14, p. 365.

tivo, sciens se posse exire in illum actum, scit se habere principium elicitivum, quia non potest sciri utrum astra sint paria vel imparia sine medio demonstrativo. Ideo percipiens se non posse in illum actum scit se non habere medium, et si perciperet se posse exire in actum sciendi illam conclusionem, sciret se habere medium. Ergo si nullus posset frui bono sibi ostenso per fidem informem nisi haberet caritatem, cum possit scire quando elicit actum fruitionis et quando non, posset scire quando est in caritate et quando non.

[24] Secundo arguitur quod ratio positionis non concludit, quia secundum Magistrum *Sententiarum* primo libro, caritas necessaria in via non est nisi Spiritus Sanctus et non aliquis habitus,[19] quo supposito, positio non valet.

[25] Tertio sic: inter formam et eius inclinationem non requiritur habitus medius; sed "velle non est nisi inclinatio voluntatis in actum," ut dicitur communiter,[20] ut patet in appetitu sensitivo; ergo propter actum volendi quemcumque non requiritur habitus medius caritatis.

[26] Contra: operatio sequitur suppositum ratione alicuius formae; ergo sicut operatio naturalis sequitur suppositum ratione formae naturalis, sic operatio supernaturalis ratione formae supernaturalis. Fruitio est operatio supernaturalis; ergo, etc.

[Respondet Scotus ad magistrum Alanum]

[27] Ad primum[21] dicendum quod voluntas in via, praesupposita cognitione fidei, potest in actum aliquem fruitionis, sed imperfectum nimis; sed in perfectiorem posset cum caritate. Sic etiam in patria, viso Deo clare, voluntas posset frui ipso sine caritate, sed non aeque perfecte sicut si esset informata caritate.

1–2 scit … sciri] sit (*pro* sic) se haberet illud principium ut quia intellectus non potest scire C 3 habere] et *add.* C 5 sibi] ibi C 10 non] nisi C | supposito] supponendo C supposite M | positio] potentia C *om.* M 15 operatio] oppositio C 15–17 ergo … formae] *om. per hom.* M 17–18 supernaturalis] ratione formae *add.* M 20 praesupposita] suppositis C 21 potest] *om.* C | aliquem] aliquam C 22 Sic] sicut C 23 non] *om.* C

19 Petrus Lombardus, *Sent.* I d. 17 c. 2, ed. Bonv., 1, p. 142: "His autem addendum est quod ipse idem Spiritus Sanctus est amor sive caritas, qua nos diligimus Deum et proximum."

20 Cf. Thom. de Aq., *ST* I q. 105 a. 4 corp.: "Velle enim nihil aliud est quam inclinatio quaedam in obiectum voluntatis, quod est bonum universale;" Henr. de Gand., *Quodl.* IX q. 5, Op. om. 13, ed. Macken, p. 123: "Si vero secundo modo illa inclinatio sit aliqua volitio, ut huiusmodi inclinatio non sit nisi quoddam velle, quemadmodum dicit Augustinus super illud Psalmi: 'Inclina cor meum in testimonia tua. Quid est inclinatum cor ad aliquid habere nisi velle?'"

21 Cf. n. 22 supra.

Et per consequens talis actus non esset proprie beatificus, quia tunc solum fruitio est actus beatificus quando est adaequatus cognitioni, ita quod tantum ametur summum bonum quantum proportionaliter cognoscitur.

[28] Sed contra: si voluntas sine caritate Deo viso clare posset frui, illa fruitio esset naturalis vel supernaturalis? Si supernaturalis, ergo propter actum supernaturalem non oportet ponere habitum supernaturalem, quod est propositum. Nec potest dici actus naturalis, quia tunc per actum naturalem posset attingi obiectum supernaturale, quod falsum est, quia actus elicitus ex puris naturalibus non est nisi respectu obiecti proportionati, quod non est obiectum supernaturale.

[29] Dicit quod si poneretur talis hypothesis, ille actus esset partim supernaturalis et partim naturalis: naturalis quidem in comparatione ad potentiam in qua est; supernaturalis in comparatione ad obiectum, quia nullus ex puris naturalibus potest facere illud obiectum sibi praesens ut est in se.

[30] Ad secundum[22] dicitur quod opinio MAGISTRI non tenetur, si sic intellexit ut videtur in littera sonare.

[31] Ad tertium[23] dicendum quod inclinatio formae nihil absolutum addit supra formam ipsam, ut inclinatio gravis deor|sum non est aliud a forma gravitatis.[24] Et quia operatio formae est a forma, ideo operatio formae non est eius inclinatio naturalis. Ideo maior est falsa, scilicet quod velle non est nisi inclinatio voluntatis. M 33^{vb}

[MAGISTER GODEFRIDUS CONTRA SCOTUM]

[32] Deinde arguit Magister GODEFRIDUS primo sic: quod in voluntate nullus est habitus propter actum quemcumque voluntatis, quia ad illum actum, qui

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1–2 tunc ... quando] non M 4 sine caritate] Deo causante C | posset] posse C 5 Si supernaturalis] *om.* C 6–7 quod ... naturalis] *om. per hom.* M 8 puris] peccatis *fort.* C 11 esset partim] *inv.* M 12 et] *om.* M | quidem] quod C 13 supernaturalis] *p. c.* C | quia] quod M | puris] peccatis *ut vid.* C 14 praesens] prius C 15 secundum] secundo C | secundum] secundo C | opinio] operatio C | si sic] sicut C 16 in] *om.* M 18 aliud a] nisi M 19 a forma] ad formam C | operatio] praeparatio C | est] *om.* C 20–21 Ideo ... voluntatis] *om. per hom.* M 20 velle] universale C 23 Deinde] Contra Scotum arguit Godofredus *in marg. add.* C^2 | Magister] *om.* M | primo] post M 24 quemcumque voluntatis] *om.* M | quia] sed C

22 Cf. n. 24 supra.

23 Cf. n. 25 supra.

24 Cf. SCOTUM, *Ord.* III d. 17 q. un. n. 13, ed. Vat. 9, p. 567: "Sed primum credo esse falsum, scilicet quod inclinatio lapidis ad centrum sit aliud absolutum a gravitate et alia potentia, quae potentia habeat aliquam operationem in centrum, ut aliqui imaginantur ...."

necessario et quasi naturaliter sequitur actum alterius potentiae, non requiritur habitus; sed actus voluntatis sequitur necessario actum intellectus et quasi naturaliter; ergo, etc.

[33] Maior patet, quia ad ea quae necessario insunt, non indigemus habitibus, II *Ethicorum*.[25]

[34] Minor probatur, quia sicut actus appetitus sensitivi sequitur naturaliter et necessario actum sensus apprehensivi, quia non habet appetitus sensitivus aliquid unde impediatur, quin feratur concorditer in apprehensum per sensum ut conveniens, ita actus voluntatis necessario et inseparabiliter sequitur actum intellectus, quia non habet voluntas unde impediatur a tali actu.

[35] Quod si dicatur quod in voluntate est impedimentum a fomite peccati et pro corpore corrupto aggravante, saltem in homine exsistente in puris naturalibus actus voluntatis necessario sequitur actum intellectus, cum in illo non sit impedimentum. Et cum voluntas hominis exsistentis in puris naturalibus sit magis, vel saltem non minus, libera quam modo est, non erit de ratione libertatis voluntatis quod non moveatur necessario ad actum ad motionem intellectus ad actum suum.

[36] Tum quia si actus voluntatis non necessario sequitur actum intellec-
C 111^{vb} tus, | tunc Deus posset videri ab intellectu clare et non diligi a voluntate, quod falsum est.

[37] Tum quia voluntas non potest aliter eligere nisi quia intellectus potest aliter sententiare, quod non esset nisi actus voluntatis necessario sequeretur actum intellectus.

[38] Secundo sic: quod non sit habitus in voluntate fruentis, quia secundum PHILOSOPHUM II *Physicorum* "Fines in agibilibus sunt sicut principia in demonstrabilibus;"[26] sed propter actum speculandi prima principia non indiget intellectus habitu, quia statim assentit intellectus apprehensis terminis sicut si ruminans ea centum annis; ergo similiter ad fruendum ultimo fine non indiget voluntas habitu.

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1 necessario] necesse C 2 quasi] actus C 4 indigemus] digemus *sic* C 6 probatur] tum *add.* C | appetitus] et *add.* C 7 apprehensivi] apprehensivum M 8–9 per … ita] et per secundum inconveniens in C 11 impedimentum] impeditum C 12 puris] *corr. ex* peccatis C 13 in … non] illo nullum C 14 cum voluntas] tamen voluntatis C 15 magis] magister C | non] hoc C 17 ad … actum] *om. per hom.* M 18 Tum quia] tamen C | voluntatis] *om.* C 21–22 eligere … aliter] *om. per hom.* C 22 sententiare] sentire C | sequeretur] sequitur M 24–25 secundum] *om.* C 25 II] et C | Physicorum] Ethicorum M | in … sunt] *transp.* M 27 intellectus] *om.* C | apprehensis terminis] notis sanctis C 28 ruminans] numerasset M

25 ARISTOT., *Eth. Nic.* II c. 1, 1103^{a} 18–26; AL 26, pp. 396, ll. 1–13.

26 ARISTOT. *Phys.* II c. 9, 200^{a} 15–24; AL 7^{1}, pp. 93, ll. 4–11.

[39] Tertio sic: ad illum actum, qui non est principaliter intentus sed consequens operationem principaliter intentam, non oportet ponere habitum; fruitio est huiusmodi; ergo etc. Maior patet.

[40] Minor probatur:

Tum quia fruitio importat quietationem satietatem et laetitiam. Unde AUGUSTINUS IX *De Trinitate*, "Fruimur cognitis in quibus voluntas delectata conquiescit;"[27] ergo importat quietationem. Unde Psalmus *Satiabor cum apparuit gloria tua*;[28] ergo importat satietatem. Item, Psalmus *Adimplebis me laetitia cum vultu tuo*;[29] ergo dicit laetitiam sive delectationem. Istae autem passiones consequuntur operationem beatificam principaliter intentam; ergo, etc.

[41] Tum quia actus amoris tendit in alium actum, nam "amicorum est idem velle et idem nolle,"[30] ideo aliquis diligit alium, ut idem sapiant et idem agant vel operentur. Actus autem intellectus non sic tendit in aliam operationem, sed est ultimus simpliciter et per consequens beatificus et principaliter intentus. Fruitio autem seu amor, cum sit propter aliud, et ideo non ultima operatio, non est principaliter intenta.

[42] Tum quia actus quicumque elicitus mediante virtute in appetitu est electivus, quia omnis habitus in appetitu est electivus, IV *Ethicorum*;[31] sed omnis actus electivus est propter alterum, quia "electio est eorum quae sunt ad finem";[32] sed amare est huiusmodi actus; ergo est propter aliud et per consequens non principaliter intentus, sed intellectio.

[43] Et confirmatur per AUGUSTINUM I *De Trinitate* capitulo ⟨8 de magnis vel 23⟩ de parvis, | "Contemplatio Dei est finis omnium bonarum operationum M 31ra

1 Tertio] Secundo M 2 operationem principaliter] principaliter compositionem C 2–5 fruitio ... quia] Ergo C 5 quietationem] quietatem *sic* C | satietatem] satientem M 6 *post* Trinitate] *spat.* C 7 Psalmus] Psalmista M | apparuit] apparuerit M 8 ergo ... satietatem] *om.* M | Item] Idem M | Adimplebis] Adimplebit C 9 delectationem] dilectionem C 11 tendit] intendit C 11–12 idem velle] *inv.* M 12 aliquis] quis C | alium] illum M | ut] et C 13 operentur] operantur C 15 et ... ultima] et ideo M non ultima C 15–16 non est] *inv.* M 17 elicitus] *om.* M 18 IV] X C 19 actus] habitus M | est] esse C 20 actus] *om.* C 20–21 per consequens] *om.* C 21 principaliter intentus] propter principalem intentum C 22–23 Et ... parvis] Et con- *et tunc proximam lineam om.* M | 8 ... 23] *om. et spat. rel.* C 23 Dei] *om.* M

27 AUGUST., *De trin.* X c. 10, CCSL 50, pp. 327, ll. 23–24.
28 Ps. 16: 15
29 Ps. 15: 11
30 Auctoritas ista Tullio ascribitur; cf. THOM. DE AQ., *De ver.* q. 23 a. 8, ed. Leon. 22, pp. 430, ll. 54–55.
31 Cf. Rectius ARISTOT., *Eth. Nic.* VI c. 1, 1139a 23–24; AL 26, pp. 479, ll. 14–15.
32 ARISTOT., *Eth. Nic.* III c. 4, 1111b26–27; AL 26, pp. 414, ll. 20–21.

vel actionum et requies sempiterna."[33] Contemplatio autem pertinet ad superiorem rationis portionem; ergo, etc.

[44] Quarto arguit specialiter quod anima Christi non indiget habitu propter fruitionem, quia ex unione naturae ad Verbum sufficienter elevatur natura assumpta; sed non potest natura elevari nisi eleventur potentiae ad operationem; ergo, etc. Aliter enim Filius Dei potuisset assumpsisse naturam irrationalem vel rationalem peccato subiectam, et per consequens Christus posset damnari, quae omnia absurda sunt fidelibus.

[Respondet Scotus ad Godefridum]

[45] Ad primum[34] dicitur quod maior est falsa, quia secundum Godefridum "virtutes morales sunt in appetitu sensitivo,"[35] qui tamen "naturaliter sequitur," ut dicit, "actum apprehensivum sensus."[36] Ergo licet actus voluntatis necessario sequeretur actum intellectus, tamen adhuc esset necessarius habitus in voluntate ut potentiae sint perfectae in actibus primis.

[46] Sed contra hoc dicit Godefridus quod non valet, quia in appetitu sensitivo ponuntur virtutes propter rebellionem ad rationem. Voluntas autem non est sic rebellis; ideo non requiritur habitus in voluntate licet in appetitu sensitivo requiritur.

[47] Ad quod dicit primo: sicut rebellio est in appetitu sensitivo, ita in voluntate est difficultas ad bonum, et ideo sicut habitus requiritur in appetitu sensitivo, sic et in voluntate. Vel dato quod in solo appetitu sensitivo, adhuc est etiam falsa maior universaliter sumpta. Sed sic sumatur quod ad illum actum non

2 portionem] portationem C 3 Quarto] x° C 4 fruitionem] tum *add.* C | naturae] *om.* C | sufficienter] sufficit C 5 eleventur] elevetur C | ad] levationem *add.* C 6–7 irrationalem] r°r^{lem} C 7 vel] et C 8 quae … fidelibus] *om.* M 10 Ad] Respondet Scotus ad primum *add. in marg.* C^2 12 licet] hic C 13 tamen … necessarius] requiritur tamen C 15 Sed] Contra arguit Godofredus *add. in marg.* C^2 16 ponuntur] ponunt C 17 licet] vel C 19 Ad] Responsio Scoti *add. in marg.* C^2 | primo] quod *add.* M 20 appetitu] *om.* C 21 et] *om.* M | etiam] *om.* M 22 falsa] *corr. interl.* C^2

33 August., *De trin.* I c. 8, CCSL 50, pp. 50, ll. 80–81: "Haec enim nobis contemplatio promittitur actionum omnium finis atque aeterna perfectio gaudiorum." Pro capitulis omissis 'de magnis' et 'de parvis', cf. Baconthorpe, I *Sent.* d. 1 q. 1, ed. Cremona, 47 C–D, col. 2.

34 Cf. n. 32–33 supra.

35 Cf. Godefridum, *Quod.* XIV q. 3, PB 5, p. 341: "… virtutes omnes morales sunt in appetitu sensitivo …." Cf. ibid. PB 5, p. 343: "Est ergo iustitia et omnis virtus moralis ponenda in appetitu sensitivo."

36 Cf. Godefridum supra, ll. 216–217.

requiritur habitus, "qui necessario sequitur" etc., maxime quando est a potentia non rebelli, et tunc dicit quod in potentia omnino determinata non requiritur habitus. Unde grave nullo habitu indiget ut deorsum moveatur nec ignis ut sursum, quia "numquam assuescit decies millies proiectus," II *Ethicorum*.[37] Unde in appetitu sensitivo non est determinatio totalis ad alteram partem sed indeterminatio, et ponitur ibi habitus ut melius et facilius moveatur secundum dictamen rationis. A simili, cum potentia volitiva non sit determinata ad hoc vel illud, et licet inclinationem maiorem haberet ad hoc quod sequeretur actum intellectus, tamen requireretur habitus ad magis inclinandum et promptius et melius, de se enim non potest dici ita determinata ad unum sicut grave deorsum. Sic igitur falsa est | maior quocumque modo sumpta. C 111va

[48] Ad minorem[38] etiam posset dici quod falsa est, quia actus voluntatis non necessario sequitur actum intellectus, cum ad illa⟨m⟩ non dixit propter brevitatem.

[49] Ad secundum[39] dixit quod propositio PHILOSOPHI debet intelligi de principio primo in speculabilibus et fine ultimo in universali in agibilibus. Et tunc concedo quod, sicut non indigemus ⟨habitu⟩ ad cognoscendum principium primum universale simplex vel complexum, sic nec ad diligendum finem in universali, scilicet ipsum bonum. Tamen sicut intellectus indiget habitu gloriae ad videndum primum principium ut est in se clare et perfecte, sic indiget voluntas habitu caritatis ad perfecte fruendum eo in speciali et clare viso.

[50] Ad tertium[40] dicendum quod fruitio dicitur proprie operatio principaliter intenta, non propter aliud, secundum AUGUSTINUM: "Frui est amore inhaerere alicui propter se."[41] Si vero quandoque extendatur nomen fruitionis ad delectationem sequentem, tunc est aequivocum.

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1 sequitur] requiritur CM | etc] et cum C 2 non] *om.* M | omnino] non M 3–4 ignis ... sursum] ut *et spat. relinq.* C 4 millies] millesies M | II] *om.* C 6 et] ideo *add.* M 7 volitiva] nobilia *fort.* C 8 illud] aliud C 9 tamen] cum CM | requireretur] sequeretur M 10 non] *om.* M 12 etiam] *om.* M | quod] *om.* C 13 actum] *om.* C 13–14 intellectus ... brevitatem] *om.* M 15 dixit] dicit M 16 universali in] nulli C 17 quod] quia M 17–18 principium primum] quantum principium C 18 simplex] simpliciter C | complexum] incomplexum M 19 universali] universaliter C 20 est] *om.* C 21 viso] visio M 22 dicitur] Dei *fort.* C | operatio] operationem C 23 intenta non] intentam C | aliud] quia *add.* M 25 delectationem] *ut vid.* C

37 ARISTOT., *Eth. Nic.* II c. 1, 1103a21–22; AL 26, p. 396 l. 8.
38 Cf. n. 34 supra.
39 Cf. n. 38 supra.
40 Cf. n. 39 supra.
41 AUGUST., *De doc. chris.* I c. 4, CCSL 32, pp. 8, ll. 11–12.

[51] Sed cum dicitur[42] quod actus amoris est propter aliud, dico quod falsum est; immo amicus primo et per se vult amico bonum. Quod autem concorditer
M 31rb idem operantur et | sentiunt et huiusmodi, hoc est ex consequenti reflectendo ad amorem. Unde amor non ordinatur ad aliam quamcumque operationem, sive interiorem sive exteriorem—amor, dico, perfectus—per modum finis, sic quod aliquid aliud sit finis amoris, scilicet certe per modum efficientis causae et imperantis, et hoc est nobilitatis in amore.

[52] Ex quo etiam patet quod scientia non dicitur proprie 'practica', quia actio intellectus ordinatur ut ad finem ad opus extrinsecum, cum multo nobilior sit intellectio vel speculatio quam quodcumque opus extrinsecum; sed magis dicitur scientia practica, quia ordinatur speculatio ad regulandum voluntatem, ut recte velit.

[53] Ad aliud,[43] quod non omnis actus voluntatis est electivus, sed solum ille qui est circa ea quae sunt ad finem, loquendo proprie de electione et stricte. Sed voluntas dicitur esse ipsius finis, sicut respectu principiorum habitus dicitur nomen potentiae retinens.[44] Sic respectu finis, actus vel habitus potest dici voluntas, et respectu finis bene est habitus ut sit perfectior, sicut principiorum bene est aliquis habitus, qui dicitur intellectus.

[54] Non ergo est verum quod omnis actus elicitus a voluntate mediante habitu sit proprie electivus, quia dicere hoc, quod tantum eorum quae sunt ad finem sit habitus et non respectu finis, est petere; hoc enim quaerit quaestio. Philosophus tamen non posuit in appetitu habitum nisi electivum, quia respectu finis ultimi non posuit amicitiam virtutem, ut patet viii *Ethicorum*, sed potius quamdam complacentiam.[45] Nos autem ponimus habitum caritatis

1 cum] tamen C | falsum] factum C 2 vult amico] ut scilicet velit sibi C | Quod] Quidam M 3 operantur] operatur C | et ... est] *om.* C 5 sic] *om.* C 6 scilicet] sed M | causae] *om.* M 7 est] *om.* C 9 actio] agcio *sic* C | multo] multum C 10–11 quam ... speculatio] *om. per hom.* C 12 ut] non C 13 non] ut C 13–14 ille ... est] *om.* C 14 stricte] scriptae C 16 potentiae] positive M | retinens] tendens C 17 et] sic *add.* C | sit] actus ut C | principiorum] principium certe C 18 aliquis] aliquid C 20 tantum] est *add.* C | quae] quem C 21 quaerit] quaeritur C 22 tamen] cum C | electivum] elicitivum C 24 complacentiam] *p. c.* C2

42 Cf. n. 41 supra.

43 Cf. n. 42 supra.

44 Cf. Th. de Aquino, iii *Sententiarum* d. 35 q. 2 a. 2, qun. 1 corp. n. 139, ed. Moos 3, p. 1198: "Primo ergo modo intellectus potentia est; sed secundo modo accipiendo, habitus principiorum dicitur."

45 Aristot., *Eth. Nic.* viii c. 14, 1163b 15–17; al 26, pp. 541–542, ll. 25–27; cf. Scotum, *Lect.* iii d. 27 q. un. nn. 2, 60, ed. Vat. 21, pp. 201, 215–217; *Ord.* iii d. 27 q. un. nn. 2, 68–69, ed. Vat. 10, pp. 49, 79–80.

et amicitiae in voluntate respectu Dei, et principalius quam respectu eorum quae sunt ad finem, ut proximorum.

[55] Ad AUGUSTINUM[46] dico quod per contemplationem non solum intelligit actum intellectus sed voluntatis, ut patet XII *De Trinitate*,[47] ubi ponit contemplationem in superiori parte rationis, quae comprehendit intellectum et voluntatem, ut patet ibi, et parum valeret contemplari Deum nisi contemplando diligeretur.

[56] Ad quartum[48] dicendum quod ex illa unione natura elevatur per hoc quod assumitur ad personalitatem divinam et de congruo elevatur, quia decet quod talis fit beatus, sed non ex necessitate absoluta. Unde concedo quod Deus de potentia absoluta posset assumere naturam irrationalem et etiam naturam rationalem peccabilem, non tamen oportet quod peccaret, quia confirmata esset per gratiam et gloriam, sicut angelus beatus non potest modo peccare. Sed amota gratia et gloria et remaneat natura, igitur sicut et angelus ita et natura humana Christi posset peccare de potentia absoluta, si sibi derelinquitur; nec sequeretur inconveniens, quia illi defectus non convenirent Deo, puta peccare, damnari et huiusmodi, nisi ratione naturae assumptae, sicut pati et mori, quae nunc dicuntur de Deo tantum ratione naturae humanae. Et sic de aliis, licet hoc non deceret, quia ad nihilum valeret, si sic peccaret vel damnaretur. Ideo non valet.

Et sic finis disputationis in aula.

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3 contemplationem] complacentiam C 4 XII] XIII M 5 contemplationem] complacationem *fort.* C | in] cum C | intellectum] actum C 6 contemplari Deum] contemplanti *fort.* C 8 natura] non M | elevatur] non *add.* M 8–9 per … elevatur] *om. per hom.* M 10 fit] sit M 11 irrationalem … naturam] *om. per hom.* C 12 tamen] *om.* C 13 modo] *om.* C 14 igitur] sibi C | sicut] prius *add.* C 15 si] sic C | derelinquitur] delinquitur C 16 sequeretur] sequitur M | quia] quod C | non] *om.* C 17 et] *om.* M 18 tantum] *om.* C | naturae humanae] *inv.* C | Et] *om.* C 19 non] *om.* C | ad nihilum] a nihilo non C | valeret] valent C | vel] non C

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46 Cf. n. 43 supra.

47 AUGUST., *De trin.* XII c. 1–4, CCSL 50, pp. 356–358.

48 Cf. n. 44 supra.

6

John Duns Scotus in the Eyes of His Fellow Regent Masters in 1306–1307: John of Pouilly, Henry of Friemar the Elder OESA, and the *Gandavistae*

Christopher Schabel

There are still open questions about John Duns Scotus and the functioning of the Faculty of Theology at the University of Paris in the early fourteenth century.* Recently William O. Duba and I were lucky enough to be in a position to demonstrate—we believe—that lectures on the *Sentences* at Paris in Scotus' day were delivered in one academic year, not two.[1] One still wonders precisely when lecturing on the *Sentences* became a requirement for all bachelors of theology, when and how principial disputations among the bachelors of the *Sentences* arose, how the bachelors' participation in magisterial disputations was fixed and regulated, and so on. For masters, we would still like to know exactly how the inception procedure worked at that time, whether only reigning masters could conduct *quodlibeta*, and what other opportunities there were for masters to react to the determinations of their peers. This paper will focus on Scotus' period as master, and here the specific queries are as follows: When was Scotus regent master, when did he hold his *Quodlibet*, and to what extent was Scotus the focus of attention of his fellow regent masters, especially the secular John of Pouilly and the Augustinian Henry of Friemar?

* This paper was written at the IRHT in Paris under the aegis of the ERC-Cog-DEBATE 771589. Tobias Hoffmann is currently editing several quodlibetal questions on the will from John of Pouilly, a book project to which I shall contribute a detailed study of Pouilly's *Quodlibeta*, and this is the basis for the second half of this paper. I thank again William J. Courtenay and Stephen D. Dumont for pertinent information provided years ago and for continuing discussion with Dumont.

1 William Duba and Christopher Schabel, "Remigio, Scotus, Auriol, and the Myth of the Two-Year *Sentences* Lecture at Paris," *Recherches de Théologie et Philosophie médiévales* 84 (2017), pp. 143–179; see also Christopher Schabel, "Ockham, the *Principia* of Holcot and Wodeham, and the Myth of the Two-Year *Sentences* Lecture at Oxford," *Recherches de Théologie et Philosophie médiévales* 87 (2020), pp. 59–102.

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1 Regent Masters in 1306–1307

Despite the old claim, repeated by Richard Cross and Thomas Williams in the authoritative books on Scotus from Oxford and Cambridge University Presses respectively, that the Franciscan Minister General Gonsalvus of Spain "appointed" Scotus as Franciscan "regent master" at Paris on 18 November 1304,[2] at present all we really know about Scotus' time as master at Paris is that he was licensed and incepted at some point *after* the beginning of 1305 and he probably left Paris for the 1307–1308 academic year, since Alexander of Alessandria was acting as Franciscan regent master at Paris by 25 October 1307 and on 20 February 1308 Scotus was already lector at the Franciscan *studium* in Cologne, where he died later that year, probably on 8 November.[3] Following Giles of Longny's inception, Gonsalvus' letter of 18 November 1304 urging that Scotus be presented to the University for promotion was sent from Ascoli, so it probably would not have arrived in Paris until January in our 1305, although it was still 1304 in Paris, where the year began at Easter. Moreover, Gonsalvus wrote that if the chancellor would permit two Franciscans to be licensed at once, then Albert of Metz should incept first.[4] Inductive reasoning and a later statute reflecting earlier practice allowed William J. Courtenay to determine that at that time the normal practice was to license in every other year during academic years that began in an odd year, and to incept somewhat later, often three to six months, but sometimes longer.[5] If these rules were followed in Sco-

2 Richard Cross, *Duns Scotus* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), p. 4; Thomas Williams, "Introduction: The Life and Works of John Duns the Scot," in *The Cambridge Companion to Duns Scotus*, ed. Thomas Williams (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), pp. 1–14, at p. 2.

3 A.G. Little, "Chronological Notes on the Life of Duns Scotus," *English Historical Review* 47 (1932), pp. 568–582, at p. 582.

4 *Chartularium Universitatis Parisiensis. Tomus II, sectio prior: ab anno MCCLXXXVI usque ad annum MCCCL* (= CUP II), ed. H. Denifle and A. Chatelain (Paris: Delalain, 1891), pp. 117–118, no. 652, translated in Little, "Chronological Notes," pp. 577–578, who gives evidence on p. 579 that at some point Albert was licensed and did incept.

5 CUP II, p. 692, no. 1188: "Item, nota quod bachalarii qui legerunt Sententias debent postea prosequi facta facultatis per quatuor annos antequam licentientur, scilicet predicando, argumentando, respondendo; quod verum est nisi papa per bullas vel facultas super hoc faceret eis gratiam, immo et per quinque annos aliquando expectat, scilicet quando annus jubileus non cadit in quarto anno post lecturam dictarum Sententiarum." See William J. Courtenay, "Theological Bachelors at Paris on the Eve of the Papal Schism. The Academic Environment of Peter of Candia," in *Philosophy and Theology in the Long Middle Ages: A Tribute to Stephen F. Brown*, eds. Kent Emery, Russell L. Friedman, Andreas Speer, with Maxime Mauriège (Leiden: Brill, 2011), pp. 921–952, at p. 939 n. 67 and *passim*; William J. Courtenay, "Francis Caracciolo, the Paris Chancellorship, and the Authorship of Two *Quodlibeta* in Vat. lat. 932," *Archives d'histoire*

tus' case, he would not have been licensed during the 1304–1305 academic year, but rather at some point during the following year, 1305–1306, with inception later, perhaps after Albert of Metz, making it unlikely that Scotus was regent master that year, which was probably the regency of Giles of Longny in any case. This leaves 1306–1307 as Scotus' year as regent master and Advent 1306 or Lent 1307 as the only plausible times for his *Quodlibet*.

This volume has been planned in part in the hopes that Scotus' contemporaries can shed light on his career, as well as on his context and reputation among his colleagues. Compared to the earlier period of the troubles between Pope Boniface VIII and King Philip the Fair and the later trial of the Templars, we know less about the make-up of the Faculty of Theology at Paris in 1306–1307.[6] Among the regent masters in 1306–1307 were the chancellor of Notre-Dame Simon of Guiberville and canons Thomas of Bailly, John of Ghent, and (perhaps) William Alexander, the secular Henry Amandi, the Cistercian monk James of Thérines, the Benedictine monk Peter of Saint-Denis, the Austin Canon Gerard of Saint-Victor, and the Carmelite friar (and prior general) Gerard of Bologna. We have the names of a couple of other possible regent masters that year, and perhaps Romeo of Bruguera was the Dominican master. As we shall see, some of the above have left pertinent writings, but the focus here will be on the Austin Hermit Henry of Friemar the Elder and the secular John of Pouilly, from whom have surviving quodlibetal and ordinary questions from that year.

John of Pouilly and Henry of Friemar were both, like Scotus, new Parisian masters of theology in 1306–1307, although this revises the traditional dating for both of them. Henry of Friemar's sole extant *Quodlibet* bears the date 1306 in the only complete manuscript, Padova, Bibliotheca Antoniana, 662.[7] Again, since the year 1306 at Paris began at Easter, after the completion of the Lent

doctrinale et littéraire du moyen âge 80 (2013), pp. 49–83, at pp. 67–69; and William O. Duba, "Masters and Bachelors at Paris in 1319: The *lectio finalis* of Landolfo Caracciolo," in *Schüler und Meister*, eds. Andreas Speer and Thomas Jeschke (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2016), pp. 315–370, at pp. 346–347.

6 The following list is compiled from Palémon Glorieux, *Répertoire des maîtres en théologie de Paris au XIII^e siècle* (Paris: J. Vrin, 1933), and William J. Courtenay, "The Role of University Masters and Bachelors at Paris in the Templar Affair, 1307–1308," in *1308: Eine Topographie historischer Gleichzeitigkeit*, eds. Andreas Speer and David Wirmer (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2010), pp. 171–181.

7 Partially edited in Clemens Stroick, *Heinrich von Friemar. Leben, Werke, philosophisch-theologische Stellung in der Scholastik* (Freiburg im Breisgau: Herder, 1954), pp. 191–246. The explicit is on p. 246: "Et in hoc completur Quodlibet disputatum et determinatum Parisius per fr. Henricum de Alemania Ord. Fr. S. Aug. anno Domini 1306."

quodlibetal session, which for them was still in 1305, the 1306 date in the Padua manuscript entails that Friemar's *Quodlibet* was held during the 1306–1307 academic year, and below I will demonstrate that it dates to Lent 1307. As Stephen D. Dumont has shown, in Friemar's *Quodlibet* he refers to the first of his seven *Quaestiones ordinariae de Verbo* as in the past, while in his *Quaestiones ordinariae* 5 and 6 he cites his *Quodlibet* as still in the future. Thus six and perhaps all seven of Friemar's *Quaestiones ordinariae* preceded his *Quodlibet*. The first *Quaestio ordinaria* is related to Friemar's inception procedure as master, which Dumont dates to 1305 based on the 1306 date of the *Quodlibet*,[8] but this entails that the inception probably took place in the first half of what we would call 1306. *Quaestio ordinaria* 3 refers seven times to the previous question 2 and once to question 1, but never to later ones, so questions 2 and 3 may also come from Friemar's inception procedure or soon afterwards, but questions 4 through 6 and perhaps 7 are from early 1307, as I will show.

To reinforce the 1305 (i.e., 1306) date for Friemar's inception, Dumont cites Friemar's participation as master in the inception procedure of John of Pouilly.[9] In replying to Pouilly's request to receive the fruits of his benefice in the church of Saint-Géry in Cambrai while teaching at Paris, Pope Clement V referred to Pouilly as regent master on 7 September 1307.[10] Since Clement was responding in Poitiers to Pouilly's earlier supplication from Paris, and in any case it was before the 1307–1308 academic year had begun, it seems that Pouilly was regent master in the 1306–1307 academic year and had been licensed in the previous year. Internal citations reveal that the first five of Pouilly's eleven *Quaestiones ordinariae de scientia Dei* predate his first *Quodlibet*, which I can now date more securely to Advent 1306, and that *Quaestiones ordinariae* 6 and 7 stem from disputations held between *Quodlibet* I and *Quodlibet* II, number 7 being from the summer of 1307. *Quodlibet* II probably dates to Advent 1307, but certainly after Scotus' departure.[11]

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8 Stephen D. Dumont, "The Authorship of the *Quaestiones septem de Verbo* Attributed to James of Viterbo," in *A Companion to James of Viterbo*, eds. Antoine Côté and Martin Pickavé (Leiden: Brill, 2008), pp. 357–375, at pp. 363, 366–367, and 374–375.

9 Dumont, "The Authorship of the *Quaestiones septem de Verbo*," p. 375.

10 CUP II, pp. 123–124, no. 662; ASV, Reg. Vat. 54, f. 89r, no. 437: "Dilecto filio magistro Johanni de Poylliaco, canonico ecclesie Sancti Gaugerici Cameracensis … Cum itaque, sicut ex tenore tue petitionis accepimus, tu in theologica facultate, in qua magister existis, Parisius regere dinoscaris …" The CUP edition, besides containing minor errors, is partial, missing the phrase "cotidianis distributionibus dumtaxat exceptis."

11 This makes more certain the dating proposed in Christopher Schabel, "John of Pouilly's *Quaestiones ordinariae de scientia Dei*," *Recherches de Théologie et Philosophie médiévales* 81 (2014), pp. 237–272, at p. 259.

Three things seem clear from the above. First, since it appears that in the same year one bachelor could incept and then participate as master in the inception procedure of another bachelor, and indeed A.G. Little has shown that licensing and inception occurred at various times of the year in this era,[12] Henry of Friemar, John of Pouilly, and John Duns Scotus were regent masters at Paris in the 1306–1307 academic year. Second, Friemar and Pouilly each composed seven ordinary questions and one *quodlibet* as co-masters with Scotus before Scotus left Paris. Third, a portion of their ordinary questions stemmed from their inception procedures.

The secular theologian John of Pouilly was exciting, in part because he was polemical, and the only reason his works remain largely unedited, Ludwig Hödl once asserted, is because the critical edition of the *Opera omnia* of the leader of Pouilly's main adversaries, Henry of Ghent, is not yet complete.[13] Besides his five *Quodlibeta* and his *Quaestiones ordinariae*, Pouilly also wrote a large number of disputed questions *De virtutibus* and some *De relationibus Dei ad creaturas* and *De habitibus*.[14] Although Karl Ubl and William J. Courtenay have recently drawn more attention to his active role in the dissolution and even execution, in some cases, of the Templars,[15] Pouilly was in the Middle Ages, and still is, most famous for his long and eventually losing battle with the mendicant orders over such matters as confession, which culminated in Pope John XXII's condemnation of Pouilly's position in 1321.[16] I have just discovered

12 Little, "Chronological Notes," pp. 578–579 and n. 3.

13 Ludwig Hödl, "The *Quodlibeta* of John of Pouilly († ca. 1328) and the Philosophical Debates at Paris 1307–1312," in *Theological* Quodlibeta *in the Middle Ages. The Fourteenth Century*, ed. Christopher Schabel (Leiden: Brill, 2007), pp. 199–229, at p. 204.

14 See N. Valois, "Jean de Pouilly, théologien," *Histoire littéraire de la France* 34 (Paris: Imprimerie Nationale, 1914), pp. 220–281, at pp. 267–270, with some corrections in Schabel, "John of Pouilly's *Quaestiones ordinariae de scientia Dei*," p. 267.

15 William J. Courtenay and Karl Ubl, *Gelehrte Gutachen und königliche Politik im Templerprozeß* (Hannover: Harassowitz Verlag, 2010), and Karl Ubl, *"Haeretici relapsi*. Jean de Pouilly und die juristischen Grundlagen für die Hinrichtung der Tempelritter," in *1308*, pp. 161–170. See also Valois, "Jean de Pouilly, théologien," pp. 223–231.

16 Valois, "Jean de Pouilly, théologien", pp. 232–260; Josef Koch, "Der Prozess gegen den Magister Johannes de Polliaco und seine Vorgeschichte (1312–1321)," *Recherches de théologie ancienne et médiévale* 5 (1933), pp. 391–422; J.G. Sikes, "John de Pouilly and Peter de la Palu," *English Historical Review* 49 (1934), pp. 219–240; Rainer Zeyen, *Die theologische Disputation des Johannes de Polliaco zur kirchlichen Verfassung* (Frankfurt: P. Lang, 1976); Ludwig Hödl, "Dignität und Qualität der päpstlichen Lehrentscheidung in der Auseinandersetzung zwischen Petrus de Palude († 1342) und Johannes de Polliaco († post 1321) über das Pastoralstatut der Mendikantenorden," in *Bonaventura. Studien zu seiner Wirkungsgeschichte*, ed. Ildefons Vanderheyden (Werl: Dietrich-Coelde-Verlag, 1976), pp. 136–145; Ludwig Hödl, "Der Jurisdiktionsprimat des Papstes in der Auseinandersetzung des Herveus Natalis O.P.

that Pouilly died as cantor of Cambrai by 22 October 1324, after Ubl showed that Hödl's inference that a manuscript dated 1328 was part of Pouilly's legacy to the Sorbonne is conjecture.[17] Pouilly claimed to have been a student of Thomas Aquinas, which, if true, entails that Pouilly was born in 1251 at the latest and became master of theology at the age of at least 54.[18]

Although famous in his own day, for example as a great sermonist, the Augustinian Henry of Friemar the Elder is quite obscure now. The fact that there was another contemporary Augustinian named Henry of Friemar confuses things, but the Elder died in 1340, supposedly in his 90s, which would mean that he became master of theology around the age of 60. He authored treatises *De adventu Verbi in mentem*, *De quattuor instinctibus*, and *De decem praeceptis*, as well as a commentary on the *Ethics*, in addition to his *Quodlibet* and *Quaestiones ordinariae*. In 1954 Clemens Stroick brought out his book *Heinrich von Friemar*, with a partial edition of the *Quodlibet*, but Friemar's *Quaestiones ordinariae* had not yet been identified.[19]

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mit den errores des Johannes de Polliaco (1312–1315)," *Jahrbuch für internationale Germanistik* 31.2 (1999), pp. 87–111; L. Hödl, "Der unfehlbare Lehrentscheid des Papstes im Prozess gegen Johannes de Polliaco (1318–1321)," *Freiburger Zeitschrift für Philosophie und Theologie* 47 (2000), pp. 52–76; L. Hödl, "Die Glosse des Johannes Monachus zur Konstitution *Super cathedram* Bonifaz' VIII. (vom 18.02.1300) und deren Kritik durch Petrus de Palude OP (Cod. Vat. lat. 869, f. 125r–128r, ed.)," *Zeitschrift der Savigny-Stiftung für Rechtsgeschichte* 87 (2001), pp. 269–305; L. Hödl, "Die doppelte Disputation der Irrtümer des Johannes de Polliaco an der Kurie in Avignon (1318–1321)," *Zeitschrift der Savigny-Stiftung für Rechtsgeschichte* 89 (2003), pp. 338–362.

17 C. Schabel, "A Lost *Vidimus* of the Revocation of Jean de Pouilly's Errors and the Faculty of Theology at Paris in the Summer of 1321," forthcoming; Courtenay and Ubl, *Gelehrte Gutachen und königliche Politik im Templerprozeß*, pp. 68–69, modifying Hödl, "The *Quodlibeta* of John of Pouilly," p. 203. Robert of Coucy had replaced Pouilly as cantor of Cambrai by 20 December 1324, and Pouilly died on 22 October (in 1321 at the earliest). Besides his benefice in Saint-Géry in Cambrai, by mid-1318 Pouilly also had a benefice in the collegiate church of Saint-Quentin: ASV, Reg. Vat. 69, f. 149r, no. 457, but there is no record of anyone succeeding Pouilly in these benefices in the summarized registers of Popes John XXII (1316–1334) and Benedict XII (1334–1342), and I had found nothing in a rather thorough search through the manuscripts of Clement VI's (1342–1352) largely unpublished registers. Note that ASV, Reg. Vat. 73, ff. 509v–510r, no. 1503, dated 13 June 1322, addressed to Johanni de Poihy, canon of Saint-Symphorien, who also had the parish church of Sainte-Vertu in the diocese of Langres, does not concern our Pouilly, because the benefices do not match and he is not called master.

18 Iohannes de Polliaco, *Quodlibet* I q. 5, redactio B, Vat. lat. 1017, f. 14ra: "quo modo doctores excellentissimi, scilicet Albertus, Thomas, Aegidius, et Godofridus, sibi dant testimonium … Et ista dico non quia curam de Aristotele in se, et longe illos doctores plus personaliter dilexi quam Aristotelem, quia Aristoteles Graecus fuit mihi non contemporaneus, illi mihi contemporanei et conterranei fuerunt et etiam doctores mei …"

19 His published works are as follows: *Quodlibet*, partial ed. Stroick, *Heinrich von Friemar*,

Since John of Pouilly's set of ordinary questions concerns divine knowledge, while Henry of Friemar's focuses on the divine Word, Pouilly and Friemar included questions on divine foreknowledge and the procession of the Holy Spirit respectively, topics of professional interest to me and on which Scotus himself eventually helped redirect the scholarly dialogue. I published Pouilly's question a few years back and I have prepared an edition of Friemar's question for this paper, printed in an appendix.[20] What do these questions tell us about Scotus and the debate on these divisive topics during their time as masters at Paris?

2 Foreknowledge and the *Filioque*

Henry of Friemar and John of Pouilly did react to the doctrines of John Duns Scotus during Scotus' time as master at Paris, and from what has been investigated so far, they were not impressed. As Dumont notes, in Lent 1307 Friemar was among the first to respond to Scotus' doctrine of univocity, although without mentioning his name, in the following words: "Although the common view of all philosophers and saints and even doctors, both *moderni* and *antiqui*, is that nothing is said of God and creature univocally, nevertheless some people, delighting in novelty, assert the contrary, moved by certain sophistical arguments."[21] For his part, after the Subtle Doctor's death, Pouilly commented on Scotus' defense of the Immaculate Conception of the Virgin Mary, later citing *Iohannes Scotus* by name: "One cannot state or hold with probability as a proba-

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pp. 191–246; *Ethics* commentary, fragment ed. Stroick, *Heinrich von Friemar*, pp. 246–264; *Henrici de Frimaria Tractatus ascetico-mystici. 1: Complectens tractatum de adventu verbi in mentem, tractatum de adventu Domini, tractatum de incarnatione verbi*, ed. A. Zumkeller (Würzburg: Augustinus Verlag, 1975); *Henrici de Frimaria Tractatus ascetico-mystici. 2: Complectens tractatum de septem gradibus amoris et tractatum de occultatione vitiorum sub specie virtutum*, ed. A. Zumkeller (Rome: Augustinianum, 1992); eds. R.G. Warnock and A. Zumkeller, *Der Traktat Heinrichs von Friemar über die Unterscheidung der Geister* (Würzburg: Augustinus Verlag, 1977); *De decem preceptis*, ed. B.-G. Guyot (Pisa: Scuola Normale Superiore, 2005).

20 Christopher Schabel, "Parisian Secular Masters on Divine Foreknowledge and Future Contingents in the Early Fourteenth Century, Part 1: John of Pouilly's *Quaestio Ordinaria* 1," *Recherches de Théologie et Philosophie médiévales* 78 (2011), pp. 161–219.

21 Dumont, "The Authorship of the *Quaestiones septem de Verbo*," p. 375, quoting from Henricus de Frimaria, *Quodlibet* q. 17, ed. Stroick, p. 241: "Dicendum quod … licet communis sit sententia omnium philosophorum et sanctorum et etiam doctorum tam modernorum quam antiquorum quod nihil dicatur de Deo et creatura univoce, quidam tamen novitate gaudentes contrarium asserunt moti quibusdam rationibus sophisticis."

ble opinion that the Blessed Virgin *de facto* did not contract original sin. Rather, *salva cuiusquam reverentia*, it seems that this ought to be deemed heretical."[22]

These are among Scotus' most characteristic doctrines, and it is not surprising that he provoked an early reaction. Historians have also devoted much attention to Scotus' discussion of the procession of the Holy Spirit from the Son and, especially, to his position on divine foreknowledge and future contingents, but in these cases Scotus was more clearly developing the thought of Henry of Ghent and the earlier Franciscan tradition. Eventually these teachings became more and more associated with Scotus himself, both by Scotists and anti-Scotists, but what about in the period when Scotus was still in Paris as master of theology?

Before we begin, since the questions I will be discussing may stem from promotion procedures, definitely in the case of Pouilly and possibly in the case of Friemar, we need to ask how Scotus could have been involved. Past scholars disagreed about this, because we have no clear statement in the sources. We do know that the disputation part of the procedure began in the evening with the *vesperiae*, in which the candidate acted for the final time as bachelor, and it concluded in the *aula* or hall of the bishop the next day, in which the new master performed for the first time in his new role. Thus, in the case of the Franciscan Giles of Longny from 1304, we have two questions in Casale Monferrato B2, the first in which Giles answers as bachelor in his vesperies and the second in which Scotus responds as bachelor *formatus* in the new Master Giles' *aula* disputation.[23]

The candidate proposed four questions in advance. For the vesperies, the masters chose two of the questions and the other two were dealt with in the *aula*. According to later statutes, the first vesperies question involved the presiding master, a bachelor *formatus*, and the candidate, while in the second, two masters and the candidate participated. In the *aula*, the first question again involved a bachelor *formatus*, in addition to the new master and other masters, and the fourth and final question was exclusive to masters. At some later

22 Iohannes de Polliaco, *Quodlibet* III q. 3 a. 1, ed. Carlo Balić, *Ioannis de Polliaco et Ioannis de Neapoli, Quaestiones disputatae de Immaculata Conceptione Beatae Mariae Virginis* (Šibenik 1931), p. 2.5–13: "Primo volo declarare quod non potest dici probabiliter nec teneri pro opinione probabili quod beata Virgo de facto non contraxit originale peccatum. Immo salva cuiusquam reverentia videtur quod debeat haereticum reputari, quia illud quod est contra omnem scripturam, scilicet contra scripturam canonis, contra scripturam sanctorum, et contra scripturam doctorum, non potest probabiliter teneri seu pro opinione probabili, et in quantum est contra scripturam canonis debet haereticum reputari. Falsum enim in fide et scriptura haereticum dicitur."

23 Little, "Chronological Notes," p. 578, and Stephen D. Dumont's paper in this volume.

point the new master gave his overall *resumptio*. The statutes go into greater detail, but since they evolved over time and we are rarely told whether we are dealing with the first, second, third, or fourth question, it is sufficient to know that a bachelor *formatus* disputed in the vesperies and also in the *aula*, that the number of masters was probably restricted in the vesperies, and that the *aula* provided an opportunity for more masters to dispute.[24]

This gives us a general idea of what possible roles Scotus could have played in the vesperies and *aula* of Friemar and Pouilly, whether he incepted before them, as is most likely, or after them. In any case, Scotistic arguments could have been given by other bachelors and masters, who could even have been Franciscans, or by Friemar and Pouilly themselves. Since these other participants were role-playing, however, they did not necessarily have to hold the position that they defended. None of this oral disputation would have been taken verbatim from Scotus' writings, but the questions of Friemar and Pouilly as they have come down to us are not raw *reportationes*, so they could also have turned to Parisian *reportationes* of Scotus' *Sentences* lectures.

2.1 *John of Pouilly on Divine Foreknowledge*

John of Pouilly's *Quaestiones ordinariae de scientia Dei* are preserved in four manuscripts, but in two or three redactions for most questions.[25] The first question, stemming from Pouilly's vesperies on the eve of his inception, concerns future contingents: "Does God have knowledge of future contingents?" The question survives in three redactions of around 760, 670, and 450 lines, as Pouilly progressively polished his text. In the first redaction, we first have some arguments explicitly directed at what the *respondens* "said" (*dicebat respondens*) and then what "was argued" (*arguebatur*) against this, going on in the imperfect, a little in dialogue form, and then a long list of arguments against the *respondens*. Afterwards there is brief section starting "It is argued to the opposite, and it was shown that …" (*Ad oppositum arguitur, et ostendebatur quod …*), then a section beginning "I respond" (*Respondeo*), and concluding with a refutation of the arguments against the *respondens* in the present tense in which

24 See Josef Koch, *Durandus de S. Porciano O.P. Forschungen zum Streit um Thomas von Aquin zu Beginn des 14. Jahrhunderts* (Münster: Aschendorff, 1927), pp. 160–168; Ludwig Hödl, "Die Aulien des Magisters Johannes von Polliaco und der scholastische Streit über die Begründung der menschlichen Willensfreiheit," *Scholastik* 35 (1960), pp. 57–75; S.D. Dumont's paper in the volume.

25 See Schabel, "John of Pouilly's *Quaestiones ordinariae de scientia Dei*." The manuscripts are Nürnberg, Stadtbibliothek, Cent. III.75, and Paris, Bibliothèque nationale de France, lat. 3228, 14565, and 15731.

at one point we read "as the *respondens* seemed to posit" (*ut respondens ponere videbatur*), and the *respondens* is defended against how the *opponens* understands (*accipit*) the issue. Cross-references inform us that this question is from the vesperies, and in what appears to be the third and last redaction the question begins, "Supposing from the preceding question that God has knowledge of things other than Himself, it is asked secondly by the masters …" (*Supposito ex praecedenti quaestione quod Deus habeat scientiam aliorum a se, quaeritur secundo a magistris …*). Since this is thus the second question from the vesperies, then probably masters played the role of *respondens* and *opponens*.[26]

Now, if there is one thing that Ludwig Hödl taught us about the doctrine of John of Pouilly in the late German scholar's many publications on the secular master, it is that Pouilly often opposed Henry of Ghent and despised his followers, known as the *Gandavistae*.[27] It is therefore surprising to see that Pouilly gradually adopted some of what was distinctive about Henry of Ghent's doctrine of divine foreknowledge. Thomas Aquinas had accepted the Augustinian-Boethian vision of divine eternity to explain how God knows what is future to us, although he sometimes also maintained that God can have certitude of contingent futures by knowing their causes. Dominicans disagreed about Aquinas' meaning and about knowledge through causes, but many Franciscans and others rejected Aquinas' particular version of the eternity explanation. In combination with much from these earlier views, Henry of Ghent added the assertion that God's intellect has certain knowledge of future contingents through knowing the determination of the divine will.[28]

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26 Iohannes de Polliaco, *Quaestio ordinaria* 1, redactio 1, ed. Schabel, pp. 166.18, 167.29, 172.219, 173.234, 182.546–547 and 551; redactio 3, 206.1–2. For the cross-references, see Schabel, "John of Pouilly's *Quaestiones ordinariae de scientia Dei*," pp. 260–261.

27 Summarized in Hödl, "The *Quodlibeta* of John of Pouilly," but see below.

28 The literature on this story is immense, but see Julian Groblicki, *De scientia Dei futurorum contingentium secundum S. Thomam eiusque primos sequaces* (Kraków 1938); Calvin Normore, "Future Contingents," in *The Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy*, eds. Norman Kretzmann, Anthony Kenny, and Jan Pinborg (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), pp. 358–381; John F. Wippel, "Divine Knowledge, Divine Power and Human Freedom in Thomas Aquinas and Henry of Ghent," in *Divine Omniscience and Omnipotence in Medieval Philosophy*, ed. Tamar Rudavsky (Dordrecht: Springer, 1985), pp. 213–241; Maarten J.F.M. Hoenen, *Marsilius of Inghen. Divine Knowledge in Late Medieval Thought* (Leiden: Brill, 1993), pp. 157–175; Harm J.M.J. Goris, *Free Creatures of an Eternal God: Thomas Aquinas on God's Foreknowledge and Irresistible Will* (Utrecht: Peeters, 1996); John Marenbon, *Le temps, l'éternité et la prescience de Boèce à Thomas d'Aquin* (Paris: J. Vrin, 2004); Simo Knuuttila, "Medieval Theories of Future Contingents," in *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, ed. Edward N. Zalta (Winter 2015 edition).

In his Oxford treatments of the issue, Scotus follows the Franciscan rejection of Aquinas and expresses Henry of Ghent's position succinctly but with his own characteristic instants of nature, before tweaking the theory by inserting the divine essence to reduce an element of what he considered "discursiveness" in the process of divine knowledge of the future. In the *Reportatio* I-A, however, Scotus deemphasizes the instants of nature element, although it is still there, and slightly weakens his tweaking by introducing it with "Or if this way is not pleasing" and then "it can be said in another way that …," followed by "So if one speaks in the first way or the second," although he then favors his own tweaking.[29] In addition, The famous discussion of synchronic contingency in this context in Scotus' Oxonian treatments is split off from the above in the Parisian *Reportatio* I-A, but the claim that unless the divine will acted contingently *ad extra* all would happen of necessity is still there.[30]

In Pouilly's first redaction, the arguments of the *respondens* and *opponens* revolve around the position of Aquinas and his detractors, both within and outside the Order of Friars Preacher. Although this includes Franciscan objections, nothing in particular belongs to Scotus. Among the masters who opposed

29 Iohannes Duns Scotus, *Reportatio* I-A d. 38 qq. 1–2, in *The Examined Report of the Paris Lecture. Reportatio I-A*, ed. and trans. Alan B. Wolter and Oleg V. Bychkov, vol. 1 (St Bonaventure, NY: Franciscan Institute Publications, 2004), pp. 458–459, §§ 40–41: "Vel si iste modus non placet, tum quia videtur ponere discursum in intellectu divino, tum quia secundum hoc videretur quod intellectus divinus acciperet notitiam suam a voluntate et moveretur ab ea et non ab obiecto vel essentia sola (cuius oppositum dictum est supra, quia dictum est prius quod a sola essentia divina movetur immediate intellectus ut a primo obiecto)—si iste, inquam, modus non placet propter praedicta, potest dici alio modo quod voluntate acceptante alteram partem contradictionis determinate, facta est unio in esse volito istorum terminorum contingentium voluntati praesentatorum, et complexio vera determinate; et tunc essentia divina est ratio intelligendi illam complexionem esse veram apud intellectum. Sive ergo dicatur primo modo vel secundo …"

30 In the *Reportatio* I-A, Scotus divides his question into two separate distinctions, first d. 38 and then d. 39, to which is attached the discussion on predestination from d. 40; the discussion of the cause of contingency begins in d. 39 on p. 473 of the Wolter-Bychkov edition. On Scotus' position, see, e.g., Hermann Schwamm, *Das göttliche Vorherwissen bei Duns Scotus und seinen ersten Anhängern* (Innsbruck: Rauch Verlag, 1934); William L. Craig, *The Problem of Divine Foreknowledge and Future Contingents from Aristotle to Suarez* (Leiden: Brill, 1988), pp. 127–145, notes on pp. 259–262; A. Vos, H. Veldhuis, A.H. Looman-Graanskamp, E. Dekker, N.W. den Bok, *John Duns Scotus, Contingency and Freedom. Lectura I.39* (Dordrecht: Springer, 1994); and J. Söder, *Kontingenz und Wissen. Die Lehre von den futura contingentia bei Johannes Duns Scotus* (Münster: Aschendorff, 1999). On Tobias Hoffmann's online Scotus bibliography one found in 2019 129 items on freedom, 68 on contingency, 19 on foreknowledge, 14 on future contingents, 13 on predestination (version of August 2022: https://abelard.hypotheses.org/scotus-bibliography).

Pouilly during the inception procedure were Henry of Friemar himself and secular masters John of Ghent and Thomas of Bailly. If they were involved in the question on foreknowledge, it would suggest that Scotus' position had not yet had much of an impact outside his order.

In his *responsio*, Pouilly accepts much of Aquinas' position, in stark contrast to Scotus, and Pouilly retains his defense of Aquinas in the second and third redactions. Yet Pouilly also borrowed from the opposing Franciscan tradition that was evolving at the time. In his *responsio* in the first redaction, Pouilly gives the divine will and its determinations a role that they had not played in this context among the Dominicans, relating that God knows a future contingent "as it includes the determination of the will that freely chooses and determines the thing toward being in itself according to some time."[31] This and other brief references to the divine will indicate than Pouilly's initial view was already clearly in the Gandavian tradition, without any indication of specific Scotist coloring. In the second redaction, Pouilly is more open about the causal mechanism:

> And so by knowing the determination of His will, God also knows that such beings are determined toward existing according to some time. But this, His will or the determination of the will, is the completely certain and immutable and the completely sufficient cause of all those things that are from Him according to any time … So although in some way the divine intellect knows by simple intelligence both those things that are future and that He will make and those things that are not going to come about but are possible, before—according to our way of understanding—the will determines them toward existing at this time or that and not other things, nevertheless, insofar as the divine intellect knows them by the knowledge of vision, namely as they are to come about as determined toward existing at this time or that, the divine intellect does not know them except by the preceding—according to our way of understanding—determination of the will itself.[32]

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31 Iohannes de Polliaco, *Quaestio ordinaria* 1, redactio 1, ed. Schabel, p. 173.255–256: "… sed ut includit determinationem voluntatis libere eligentis et determinantis rem ad esse in se ipsa secundum aliquod tempus."

32 Iohannes de Polliaco, *Quaestio ordinaria* 1, redactio 2, ed. Schabel, p. 201.474–477 and 497–503: "Et sic sciendo suae voluntatis determinationem scit etiam talia entia determinata ad esse secundum aliquod tempus. Hoc autem sua voluntas sive voluntatis determinatio est omnino certa et immutabilis et omnino sufficiens causa omnium eorum quae sunt ab ipso secundum quodcumque tempus … Unde licet intellectus divinus et illa quae sunt futura et quae ipse est operaturus, una cum non fiendis, possibilibus tamen, simplici intelligentia noscat quodammodo secundum rationem nostram intelligendi antequam voluntas hoc

This may look like Scotus, but it is Henry of Ghent's position and almost his very words.[33] Perhaps there might be a hint of Scotus' presentation in the third redaction, where we read that this "knowledge of vision" is "solely of those things of which the divine essence is representative, presupposing the determination of the will,"[34] but even here Scotus was developing Henry's ideas.[35] None of what is distinctive to Scotus appears in Poully's discussion.

Although Henry of Ghent was often John of Pouilly's main opponent, albeit a dead one, Pouilly must have known that he was leaning toward becoming a *Gandavista* on this issue. Some later authors would associate Henry of Ghent's position more with Scotus than with Henry, even if Scotists retreated to a Gandavian version of some aspects of their theories. Most of these later authors were Franciscans, however, while Dominicans were content to stay within their order in arguing over the correct interpretation of Aquinas. True, Augustinians, Carmelites, and seculars were more open to outside influence here. Indeed, the contemporary English secular Henry of Harclay, who seems to have lectured on the *Sentences* at Paris after Scotus' own lectures and before Pouilly's regency,[36]

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determinet ad esse tunc vel tunc, et non alia, in quantum tamen ea cognoscit scientia visionis, ut scilicet fienda ad esse pro tunc vel tunc determinata, non novit nisi praecedente secundum rationem nostram intelligendi determinatione ipsius voluntatis."

33 Henricus de Gandavo, *Quodlibet* VIII q. 2, ed. Venice 1613, vol. 2, f. 3va–b: "Secundo autem modo scit res sciendo determinationem suae voluntatis. Quia enim et quae determinat voluntas Dei facienda et hoc modo quo ea determinat, scit intellectus eius ea esse facienda et sic facienda, et non econverso, ut in hoc voluntas potius sit ratio et causa scientiae et intellectus Dei quam econverso … Unde licet intellectus divinus illa quae sunt operanda et similiter modos omnes operandorum a sua voluntate novit quodammodo priusquam voluntas ea determinet esse operanda … inquantum tamen operanda sunt non novit nisi quasi praecedente determinatione voluntatis … Et per hoc eadem uniformi scientia Deus scit … omnes possibiles fieri sub specie sive non fiendas a Deo, quas communiter novit scientia simplicis notitiae, sive aliquando fiendas, quas determinavit futuras, et novit scientia visionis." (4^{rb}): "intellectus divinus scit operanda inquantum operanda sciendo determinationem suae voluntatis, quae omnino est invariabilis … secundum determinationem simplicem et invariabilem divinae voluntatis."

34 Iohannes de Polliaco, *Quaestio ordinaria* 1, redactio 3, ed. Schabel, p. 210.136–138: "… notitia vero visionis huiusmodi determinationem voluntatis includit aut praesupponit, et ideo solum est illorum quorum divina essentia est repraesentativa determinatione voluntatis praesupposita."

35 Henricus de Gandavo, *Quodlibet* VIII q. 2, ed. Venice 1613, vol. 2, 5^{rb}: "… scit omnia talia sciendo invariabilem essentiam et invariabilem voluntatis determinationem … Quia enim circa instantia temporis determinavit singulis in quibus ea esset facturus et conservaturus, sciendo suam essentiam cum voluntatis suae determinatione invariabili, simul et aequali invariabilitate scit futura esse futura …"

36 For the latest estimation of the date of Harclay's *Sentences* lectures, around 1304–1306, see Courtenay, "Francis Caracciolo," pp. 56–57.

knew Scotus' treatment, as did their junior Breton secular contemporary Radulphus Brito. But there is no evidence that Pouilly was even aware of Scotus in this context.[37]

2.2 *Henry of Friemar on the* Filioque

I once tried to locate and edit as many questions on divine foreknowledge from the early fourteenth century as possible, in order to be sure about the context of any given question, but there was just too much. Russell L. Friedman faced a similar problem in preparing his giant book on trinitarian theology and intellectual traditions at the medieval university.[38] While discussing the Augus-

37 On the early reception and non-reception of Scotus' doctrine, see Schwamm, *Das göttliche Vorherwissen bei Duns Scotus und seinen ersten Anhängern*; Hoenen, *Marsilius of Inghen*, pp. 175–184; C. Schabel, *Theology at Paris, 1316–1345: Peter Auriol and the Problem of Divine Foreknowledge and Future Contingents* (Aldershot: Routledge, 2000), esp. pp. 183–188 and 214–220 for early Augustinians; C. Schabel, R.L. Friedman, and I. Balcoyiannopoulou, "Peter of Palude and the Parisian Reaction to Durand of St. Pourçain on Foreknowledge and Future Contingents," *Archivum Fratrum Praedicatorum* 71 (2001), pp. 183–300; C. Schabel, "Early Carmelites Between Giants: Questions on Future Contingents by Gerard of Bologna and Guy Terrena," *Recherches de Théologie et Philosophie médiévales* 70 (2003), pp. 139–205; M. Rossini and C. Schabel, "Time and Eternity among the Early Scotists. Texts on Future Contingents by Alexander of Alessandria, Radulphus Brito, and Hugh of Novocastro," *Documenti e Studi sulla tradizione filosofica medievale* 16 (2005), pp. 237–338; C. Schabel, "Early Franciscan Attacks on John Duns Scotus's Doctrine of Divine Foreknowledge," in *What Is 'Theology' in the Middle Ages? Religious Cultures of Europe (11th–15th Centuries) as Reflected in Their Self-understanding*, ed. M. Olszewski (Münster: Aschendorff, 2007), pp. 301–328; C. Schabel, "Parisian Secular Masters on Divine Foreknowledge and Future Contingents in the Early Fourteenth Century, Part II: Thomas Wylton's *Quaestio ordinaria* 'Utrum praedestinatus possit damnari'," *Recherches de Théologie et Philosophie médiévales* 78 (2011), pp. 417–479. For Harclay's more independent doctrine later at Oxford, see Mark G. Henninger, "Henry of Harclay's Questions on Divine Prescience and Predestination," *Franciscan Studies* 40 (1980), pp. 167–243, and Henricus de Harclay, *Quaestiones ordinariae* III–IV, ed. M.G. Henninger and trans. R. Edwards, 2 vols. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), vol. 1, pp. 132–199.

38 Russell L. Friedman, *Intellectual Traditions at the Medieval University. The Use of Philosophical Psychology in Trinitarian Theology among the Franciscans and Dominicans, 1250–1350*, 2 vols. (Leiden: Brill, 2013) (with edition of a question of Eustace of Arras at vol. 2, pp. 900–930); see also his *Medieval Trinitarian Thought from Aquinas to Ockham* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011). For Friedman's editions on the *Filioque* and related issues, see his "Francis of Marchia and John Duns Scotus on the Psychological Model of the Trinity," *Picenum Seraphicum* 18 (1999), pp. 11–56; the five-part article "Trinitarian Theology and Philosophical Issues" in *Cahiers de l'institut du Moyen Âge grec et latin*: "I: Trinitarian Texts from the Late Thirteenth and Early Fourteenth Centuries," *CIMAGL* 72 (2001), pp. 89–168 (Ware, Harclay, Nottingham, Cowton, Sutton), "II: Trinitarian Texts from the Franciscan Trinitarian Tradition, ca. 1265–1285," *CIMAGL* 73 (2002), pp. 21–40 (Abbeville,

tinian James of Viterbo's trinitarian views, Friedman mentions in brief the third *Quaestio de Verbo* on the procession of the Holy Spirit in Bologna, Biblioteca dell'Archiginnasio, A.971, writing that he and I plan to edit the question in the future.[39] Luckily we had not done so before the invitation to the conference on which this volume is based arrived, because Stephen D. Dumont has now shown that the *Quaestiones disputatae de Verbo* contained in the Bologna witness and ascribed to James of Viterbo for a century are actually the *Quaestiones ordinariae* of James' junior confrère Henry of Friemar the Elder.[40] Dumont made the discovery when he saw that the titles of several questions in Toulouse, Bibliothèque d'Étude et du Patrimoine, 739, explicitly labelled as the *Quaestiones ordinariae* of an Augustinian named Henry, match those in the Bologna manuscript. As Dumont notes, in 1957 Franz Pelster had actually identified the Toulouse questions as those of Friemar, without of course drawing the connection to the Bologna witness, but this was three years after Clemens Stroick published *Heinrich von Friemar*, and thus little attention has been paid to Friemar's ordinary questions, although Stroick himself had noticed a verbatim parallel passage in Friemar's quodlibetal question 3 and what he thought was James of

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Aquasparta), "III: Oxford 1312–1329: Walsingham, Graystanes, Fitzralph, and Rodington," 74 (2003), pp. 33–88 (with C. Schabel), "IV: English Theology ca. 1300: William of Ware and Richard of Bromwich," 75 (2004), pp. 121–160 (with Schabel), and "V: Oxford Dominicans: William of Macclesfield and Hugh of Lawton," 76 (2005), pp. 31–44 (with Schabel); "Dominican Quodlibetal Literature, ca. 1260–1330," in *Theological Quodlibeta in the Middle Ages. The Fourteenth Century*, ed. Schabel, pp. 401–492 (Bernard of Auvergne, pp. 481–488, and Robert of Orford, pp. 489–491); and finally (with C. Schabel and F.S. Pedersen) "Matthew of Aquasparta and the Greeks," in *Philosophy and Theology in the Long Middle Ages*, pp. 813–854. Besides the texts of these 18 authors, Friedman has many others he hopes to publish in the future.

39 Friedman, *Intellectual Traditions at the Medieval University*, 1, p. 354, n. 31. Although Friedman's book focuses on the development of Dominican and Franciscan traditions in trinitarian theology, he finds interesting tendencies in the Augustinian Order (esp. vol. 1, pp. 352–355; vol. 2, pp. 809–831, 845–867, and 878–882), and of course we have just seen that the secular theologians had something of a school or schools themselves on some issues. My own recent research has also uncovered some unusual strands in Augustinian trinitarian thought in the fourteenth century from the 1320s to the 1370s: "Pope, Council, and the *Filioque* in Western Theology, 1274–1439," in *Medieval Encounters* 21 (2015), pp. 191–213, at pp. 200–202, and "Tolerating the Greeks? Augustinian Hermits on the *Filioque* from the Black Death to the Great Schism", in *Toleration and Concepts of Otherness in Medieval Philosophy*, ed. Michael W. Dunne and Susan Gottlöber (Turnhout, Brepols), pp. 25–53. Thus it will be interesting to see how Henry of Friemar fits into this tradition, although doing a propter job will ultimately require editing more of Friemar's *Quaestiones ordinariae*.

40 Dumont, "The Authorship of the *Quaestiones septem de Verbo*," pp. 361–368.

Viterbo's third question *De verbo*.[41] Dumont's revelation means that instead of some questions by James of Viterbo dating to the mid-1290s and surviving in one manuscript, we have a work by Henry of Friemar preserved in two manuscripts that stems from the period when Scotus was master.

According to the edition of the third question, published below, the Bologna and Toulouse manuscripts are independent and together provide a fairly clean text that is not too far from what Friemar intended. Bologna appears to stem from a minor revision, such that verbs describing the oral debate are often shifted from present to past tense or from past to pluperfect.

First we must determine the genre of the original disputation from which the surviving question derives. Given the seven references to the previous question, number 2 [in the appendix, §§ 13, 15 (2×), 35, 54, 62, 85], as well as one citation of the first question [§ 82], which Ciriaco Scanzillo published from the Bologna manuscript and which comes from the *resumptio* of the *aula* disputation,[42] all three questions seem closely linked and may all relate to the inception procedure. In the third question, Friemar begins his *determinatio* with caution more characteristic of a bachelor: "But as long as we walk through faith [i.e., in this life] it is not easy to see which of these opinions is truer … Yet with all due reverence and without prejudice, the second opinion seems to me more apparently true (*videtur verisimilior*) than the first …" [§ 36]. As we shall see, although his *determinatio* is confident enough, Friemar ends it all ambiguously.

Friemar explains these opinions succinctly immediately after the title of the question: "Would there be a personal distinction of the Word from the Holy Spirit if the Holy Spirit did not proceed from Him?":

> It should be said that there are various ways to speak on this question. All doctors commonly converge in that all distinction in the divine occurs through relations, nevertheless they diverge in that some posit that this distinction occurs only through opposing relations, but others [posit] that it not only occurs through opposing [relations], but also through disparate [relations]. And this is the root of the diversity of opinions in this

41 Stroick, *Heinrich von Friemar*, p. 201 n. 13.

42 C. Scanzillo, "La prima *Quaestio disputata 'De Verbo'* del codice A.971 della Biblioteca dell'Archiginnasio di Bologna," *Asprenas* 19 (1972), pp. 24–62, at pp. 41–62, esp. p. 41: "Nam primo ex dictis in aula resumam (reassumam *ed.*) quandam distinctionem … ut patet ex determinatione habita in aula." The edition, with no textual divisions or paragraphs, should be redone with the Toulouse witness, but the passage transcribed from Bologna in Dumont, "The Authorship of the *Quaestiones septem de Verbo*," p. 363, shows that the edition also suffers in other ways.

> question, because those who hold that distinction in the divine occurs only through opposing relations say that the Holy Spirit would not be personally distinguished from the Word if [the Holy Spirit] did not proceed from Him, but those who hold that distinction occurs there through disparate relations say that [the Holy Spirit] really would be distinguished even if [the Holy Spirit] did not proceed from Him. [§ 1]

A good, clean start. No contemporary names are given anywhere in the question, but the Dominicans along with their champion Aquinas were the ones insisting on opposing relations, such that in order for two persons to be distinct one had to come directly from the other, in which case the persons had opposing relations of origin: the Father's paternity is opposed to the Son's filiation and the Father's and the Son's active spiration is opposed to the Holy Spirit's passive spiration. In response, some Franciscans and seculars, notably Gerard of Abbeville and Henry of Ghent, argued that, if the Holy Spirit did not proceed from the Son, there would still be a distinction between them because of their differing relations with the Father, the Son's filiation being different from the Holy Spirit's passive spiration.[43] In Paris, Scotus went so far as to assert that

43 The theological and philosophical problems of the Trinity have long been important topics among western medievalists—see, e.g., the papers collected in *Trinitarian Theology in the Medieval West*, ed. P. Kärkkäinen (Helsinki: Luther-Agricola-Society, 2007)—but the *Filioque* in the West after Aquinas and before the Council of Florence had been largely neglected until the works of Friedman cited above, n. 38. The classic Michael Schmaus, *Der "Liber propugnatorius" des Thomas Anglicus und die Lehrunterschiede zwischen Thomas von Aquin und Duns Scotus, II Teil: Die Trinitarischen Lehrdifferenzen* (Münster: Aschendorff, 1930), contains a wealth of pertinent information, but for Schmaus and even for Friedman the issue is of secondary or even tertiary importance. See also my pertinent studies: "A *Tractatus* on the Distinction of the Holy Spirit from the Son by a Master of the Val des Écoliers," *Mediaevalia Philosophica Polonorum* 35 (2006), pp. 184–214; "Attitudes toward the Greeks and the History of the *Filioque* Dispute in 14th-Century Oxford," in *The Fourth Crusade Revisited*, ed. P. Piatti (Vatican City: Libreria editrice Vaticana, 2008), pp. 320–335; "Richard FitzRalph on the *Filioque* before and after His Conversations with Barlaam the Calabrian," in *Richard FitzRalph, His Life, Times, and Thought*, ed. M.W. Dunne and S. Nolan (Dublin: Four Courts Press, 2013), pp. 128–155; (with S. Delmas) "Eustache d'Arras et le *Filioque*," *Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du moyen âge* 80 (2013), pp. 247–275; "Cistercian University Theologians on the *Filioque*," *Archa Verbi* 11 (2014), pp. 124–189; "Pope, Council, and the *Filioque* in Western Theology"; "Nicholas of Dinkelsbühl and the *Filioque* at Vienna on the Eve of the Council of Florence", in *Nicholas of Dinkelsbühl and the* Sentences *at Vienna in the Early Fifteenth Century*, ed. Monica Brînzei (Turnhout: Brepols, 2015), pp. 15–83; "Why Was the *Filioque* Formula Changed at the Second Council of Lyon?" in *Contra Latinos et Adversus Graecos. The Separation between Rome and Constantinople from the Ninth to the Fifteenth Century*, ed. Alessandra Bucossi and

the Dominican position entailed that the "modern Greeks," who denied the *Filioque*, "would be heretics" for effectively denying the Trinity, which accusation Scotus rejected along with the Dominican position itself.[44]

Friemar continues promisingly at first, stating that getting to the root of the distinction between the two opinions will show which is more probable, because their arguments follow from the root like conclusions from principles [§ 1]. His *divisio quaestionis*, however, indicates that the clarity will cease. Friemar will first present the arguments of those who support disparate relations and then show that they fail; second he will give the strongest arguments for both sides; and third, without prejudice, he will choose one of them (this will be the Dominican side) and solve the arguments of the other (that is, the Franciscan side) [§ 2]. Since Friemar will opt for the 'Dominican' position against the 'Franciscan' opinion, this means that he first presents arguments for the Franciscan view [§§ 3–6], then refutes them [§§ 7–22], again gives arguments for the Franciscan view [§§ 23–27], gives arguments for the Dominican view [§§ 28–40], refutes the second Franciscan arguments [§§ 41–54], and finally refutes more Franciscan arguments [§§ 55–95]. Often the Franciscan arguments overlap, so it is clear that Friemar tried to clean up his question but failed to finish the job. In fact, after the third article, Friemar refutes the opening arguments as normal [§§ 55–95], except, as we have seen, we are given no opening arguments, only a declaration that there are two opinions and a *divisio quaestionis*! Friemar refutes them by number, the last one being 22, but it is not certain how many there were, since not every argument is solved.[45] Friemar quotes enough of these arguments for the reader to be able to follow, however, so perhaps this was the product of revision. Along the way, Friemar mentions several of the replies that the *respondens* gave to these arguments [§§ 55–57,

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Anna Calia (Leuven: Peeters, 2019), pp. 359–370; "James of Metz and William of Peter of Godin on the Procession of the Holy Spirit (and the Generation of the Son)," in *The* Lectura Thomasina *in Its Context. Philosophical and Theological Issues*, ed. Francesca Bonini, Andrea Colli, and Andreas Speer (Leuven: Peeters, 2019), pp. 209–290.

44 Iohannes Duns Scotus, *Reportatio* I-A d. 11 q. 2, ed. Wolter-Bychkov, pp. 418–419, § 46: "Unde non video istam consequentiam esse necessariam nisi ratione materiae, quia si ratione formae teneret consequentia, Graeci moderni essent haeretici, quia plane inferretur contra eos negatio Trinitatis. Unde dico quod Pater distinguitur paternitate a Spiritu Sancto et a Filio, et eodem modo si Spiritus Sanctus non procederet a Filio, distingueretur ab eo, et per idem distinctivum quo modo distinguitur, scilicet filiatione; et sic per relationem disparatam, non oppositam relative, quia spiratio activa non est de ratione formali Spiritus Sancti, sed tantum spiratio passiva."

45 Friemar deals with numbers 1, 2, 4, 5, 6, 9, 10, 14, 16, 17, 18, 20, 21, and 22—perhaps along with 3, although it is not marked as such.

60, 62–63, 65–66, 68, 76, 80, 84–85, 89], and this is the first indication that we have that the question stems from a disputation, except for one passage early in Friemar's *determinatio* [§ 42].

We can reconstruct the session as follows: the *opponens*, aware of Friemar's thesis, had to attack the thesis and he defended the Franciscan view with at least 22 arguments. This *opponens*, assuming there was only one, was probably not a Dominican, nor an Augustinian, but more likely a Franciscan or a secular. Then the *respondens*, probably a bachelor from Friemar's school, did his best to dissolve the arguments in favor of disparate relations and against the necessity of relations of opposition. On a few occasions, however, Friemar indicates that the first session did not end with the *respondens*, but continued with counter-attacks either from the same *opponens* or from someone else [§§ 58, 60, 66–67, 76, 80, 84]. Judging from the structure, if it was part of the inception procedure, this could be a vesperies question, which would explain the caution, but it also fits the style of an ordinary disputation. This part of the disputation does not survive as such, but only insofar as it is reflected in Friemar's *determinatio*.

Beyond refutations of the arguments of the *opponens* and sometimes corrections to the reasoning of the *respondens* [§§ 43, 59, 89], it is hard to say what Friemar's original *determinatio* involved. The question as it stands is chaotic. In article 1, Friemar asserts that those who hold the opposing view give three arguments [§ 3], which he then presents before rejecting the position itself and refuting the three arguments [§§ 7–17], with a small digression on the analogy with human fathers having more than one son, employing Albertus Magnus [§§ 18–21]. Then, in article 2, Friemar begins by saying that those who hold the opposing view have many arguments, but he takes what he considers the three most effective [§ 23], the third of which, on incommunicability, includes the strength of many arguments [§ 27]. After Friemar offers the three strongest arguments for the view that he will adopt, he proceeds to his *determinatio* proper, which seems to reflect what happened in that part of the disputation.

For some reason, after over 50 paragraphs refuting the arguments of those, like Henry of Ghent and Scotus, who claim that disparate relations suffice for a distinction between the Son and the Holy Spirit, Friemar concludes the entire question as follows: "And these are what was argued. But it was argued to the contrary in two ways" [§ 95]. Friemar quickly gives two garbled arguments and proceeds directly to the next question, another testament to the unpolished state of the text and perhaps even his indecision.

Now, Friedman does show that Scotus made a decisive and distinctive contribution to pertinent issues of trinitarian theology, yet on the specific question of whether the Holy Spirit would still be distinct from the Son without proceeding from Him, Scotus' response was in line with the Gandavian and Franciscan

tradition.[46] The arguments of Friemar's adversary or adversaries do not appear to be distinctively Scotistic, or at least Friemar never lets on that the other of the two opinions has been modified recently by a new voice. In the parallel question in Scotus' *Reportatio* IA, *Utrum Spiritus Sanctus, si non procederet a Filio, posset realiter distingui ab eo*, probably the closest text to what Henry of Friemar could have heard from Scotus on this issue, the Subtle Doctor employs classic quotations from Anselm and Augustine that Friemar omits, and indeed Friemar never even cites Augustine's *De Trinitate*. Certain phrases in crucial places in Scotus' comparatively brief question, such as *fecunditas spirativa*, are missing in Friemar, as are examples, such as *animalitas*.[47]

There were two basic positions, and all we have as far as evidence of Friemar's awareness of Scotus on this issue is Friemar attacking the position to which Scotus adhered and defending the one that Scotus opposed. Thus, in his edition of the related question 3 of Friemar's *Quodlibet*, *Utrum prima persona constituatur formaliter in esse personali per relationem originis*, where Friemar remarks that *omnia supposita constituta in divinis sunt relativa, ergo constituuntur formaliter per proprietates relativas originis*, Clement Stroick simply notes, "Ita sententia communis, cui solum multi theologi scholae franciscanae contradicunt," seeing no need to mention Scotus. In the same question, but on a different issue, Stroick does identify a *quidam* by vaguely citing in the notes Scotus' quodlibetal question 3, *Utrum ista duo possint simul stare: quod relatio ut comparata ad oppositum sit res, et ut comparata ad essentiam sit ratio tantum*, but even if Scotus is the source it could relate to the quodlibetal debates from Lent 1307.[48]

If John of Pouilly's question on foreknowledge and Henry of Friemar's on the *Filioque* are any indication, it seems that on these important issues, early on, Scotus did not make a big enough splash to soak anyone outside the Franciscan Order.

3 Measuring Scotus' Splash: Pouilly vs. the *Gandavistae*

So who among Scotus' contemporaries active at Paris in 1306–1307, according to those same contemporaries, deserved to be thrown out of the swimming

46 John Duns Scotus is cited more than any other theologian in Friedman, *Intellectual Traditions at the Medieval University*, but see especially vol. 1, pp. 341–416.

47 Iohannes Duns Scotus, *Reportatio* I-A d. 11 q. 2, ed. Wolter-Bychkov, pp. 412–421.

48 Stroick, *Heinrich von Friemar*, p. 198 and n. 10 for the Franciscan position, and p. 200 and n. 11 for Scotus, citing also d. 2 of the *Ordinatio in primum*.

pool? John of Pouilly would have said, first of all: the *Gandavistae*! Ludwig Hödl has shown that the term *Gandavistae* used for the imitators of Henry of Ghent in question 5 of Pouilly's first *Quodlibet* is found in only one manuscript, a flawed one, but it demonstrates that when the scribe could not decipher what was in front of him he employed a term that had become familiar: *Gandavistae*.[49] These rude people caused Pouilly all sorts of problems, defending Henry of Ghent instead of the excellent doctors Albert, Thomas, Giles, and Godfrey. In his *Quodlibeta*, Pouilly refers explicitly to Henry of Ghent or his *Quodlibeta* around 50 times, with Aquinas close behind. In contrast, in his survey of John of Pouilly's *Quodlibeta*, Hödl mentions John Duns Scotus only twice, once mentioning the Franciscan's "affinity with Henry of Ghent" on relations and once on the Immaculate Conception.[50] Pouilly thus generally ignored Scotus, aiming his attacks at the followers of Henry of Ghent, especially Master John of Ghent. Below are two illustrative examples in Pouilly's writings from Scotus' year as regent master.

3.1 *The Production of the Word and Divine Knowledge of Creatures*

When Pouilly incepted as master, after responding to the two questions that the masters chose for his vesperies in his final evening as bachelor of theology, he was probably able to sleep in peace. In the bishop's *aula* the next day, however, his first day as master of theology, things did not go so smoothly. The topic of one or both of the remaining questions involved the relationship between the will and the intellect, an issue that had significant repercussions for everything from the modal status of the current world to the basics of Trinitarian theology, and which was of great interest to John Duns Scotus.

As a secular theologian, Pouilly was joining the largest group of masters of theology and the oldest tradition at the University of Paris, coming from the

49 Hödl, "The *Quodlibeta* of John of Pouilly," pp. 228–229. For Pouilly's battle with the *Gandavistae*, see also L. Hödl, "Die Diskussion des Johannes de Polliaco über die Lehrentscheidung der Pariser Theologen von 1285/86: *Non est malitia in voluntate …*," *Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du moyen âge* 66 (1999), pp. 245–297; L. Hödl, "Die Unterscheidungslehren des Heinrich von Gent in der Auseinandersetzung des Johannes de Polliaco mit den *Gandavistae*," in *Henry of Ghent and the Transformation of Scholastic Thought. Studies in Memory of Jos Decorte*, eds. Guy Guldentops and Carlos Steel (Leuven: Leuven University Press, 2003), pp. 370–386; and L. Hödl, "Die Opposition des Johannes de Polliaco gegen die Schule der *Gandavistae*," *Bochumer philosophisches Jahrbuch für Antike und Mittelalter* 9 (2004), pp. 115–178.

50 I have counted the references in a complete read-through the manuscripts of the *Quodlibeta*. For Hödl's references to Scotus, see Hödl, "The *Quodlibeta* of John of Pouilly," pp. 211 and n. 41 and 225.

Arts Faculty, which encompassed the vast majority of the students and teachers. But the secular masters of theology were often divided between the many disciples of late Henry of Ghent and the fewer partisans of the soon-to-be-late Godfrey of Fontaines. On doctrinal questions related to the will and intellect, Henry tended to emphasize the will and Godfrey the intellect, a split that also characterized the main mendicant orders, with the Dominicans generally in the camp of Godfrey—or vice-versa, since they followed Thomas Aquinas—and the Franciscans supporting Henry, who would eventually be replaced as standard-bearer by Scotus.

Ludwig Hödl has studied what he calls the "uproar" in which the *aula* session ended, based on John of Pouilly's own remarks.[51] Since Pouilly did not publish his *aula* questions as such, we can piece together what happened from scattered remarks in his written *Quodlibeta* and *Quaestiones ordinariae*. Pouilly himself was a student of Godfrey, taking over the Sorbonne chair of theology shortly before Godfrey's death. Pouilly definitely supported Godfrey and Thomas Aquinas and opposed Henry on many topics, although, as we have seen, in his vesperies he was independent enough that he incorporated some of Henry's salient ideas while presenting a basically Thomist position. Henry's adherents, in Pouilly's view, as Hödl emphasized, were not so flexible. In *Quaestio ordinaria* 7, from the summer of 1307, Pouilly looks back on the *aula* from the previous year. When presenting his own opinion on a matter connected to the intellect and will, he was unable to continue: "This is what I meant to say in the bishop's *aula*, but I could not, because I was impeded":

> I intended to prove this, but some people—I do not really know what motivated them—with their shouting one after the other so impeded me that I was unable to get a word in, in the way that the Sadducees and Pharisees did against Christ. So concerning Matthew 22 … Chrysostomos says: "When the Pharisees withdrew, the Sadducees approached, perhaps with the plan that, if they could not overcome Him with reason, at least through persistence they would subvert his perception." Then in the same place …: "The Pharisees came together so that with a multitude they would defeat Him Whom they had been unable to overcome with reason. Those who armed themselves with a multitude [thereby] professed themselves to be stripped of the truth." But God forbid that they had this intent. Nor do I say that I cannot be overcome with reason—God

51 Hödl, "Die Aulien," but the "uproar" remark is in Hödl, "The *Quodlibeta* of John of Pouilly," p. 201.

> forbid! But it could be said that [my] opinion cannot be overcome with arguments … And this is an argument for the falsity [of the other opinion]: because it cannot be supported with arguments, they want to support it with words and shouts … Thus because Muhammad knew that his law was false, he ordered that those arguing against it be put to death immediately. And because those who defend [my] opinion against those preaching the other cannot be killed with swords, they are killed with tongues.[52]

"Here, however," Pouilly related in the context of his own classroom as master, "by God's grace I am not impeded. But there," that is, in the bishop's hall, "the venerable master whose task it was to argue against me formulated strong arguments against me."[53] According to a marginal comment, this was Henry of Friemar, but, as the "one after the other" remark suggests, Friemar was not alone, for audience members would not let Pouilly finish. Thus Pouilly attacked the arguments that Friemar gave in performing his proper role in the procedure, but he also complained about the improper behavior of overzealous audience members who did not let him speak as they were obliged.

Before *Quaestio ordinaria* 7, John of Pouilly had held his first *Quodlibet* in Advent 1306. Pouilly's five *Quodlibeta* survive in five manuscripts, which carry two redactions of the first three *Quodlibeta*. For *Quodlibet* 1, for the questions

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52 Iohannes de Polliaco, *Quaestio ordinaria* 7, Paris, BnF, lat. 14565, f. 209^{vb}, quoted in Hödl, "Die Aulien," p. 62, n. 13: "… alias probare intendebam. Sed quidam, nescio bene qua intentione ducti, suis clamoribus unus post alium sic me impedierunt quod non potui dicere verbum, per modum quem faciebant Sadducaei et Pharisaei circa Christum. Unde Matthaei 22[:23] super illo verbo *In illo die accesserunt ad eum Sadducaei*, dicit Chrysostomus sic: quando recedebant Pharisaei, accedebant Sadducaei forte tali consilio, si ratione eum non possent superare, saltem per ipsam frequentiam subverterent sensum eius. Et consequenter ibidem, super illo verbo *Pharisaei autem audientes quod silentium praeposuisset Sadducaeis convenerunt in unum*, dicit Chrysostomus sic: convenerunt in unum Pharisaei ut multitudine vincerent quem ratione superare non poterant, a veritate nudos se professi sunt qui se multitudine armaverunt. Sed absit quod ipsi talem intentionem habuerint, nec dico me a ratione insuperabilem, immo absit. Sed posset dici quod ista opinio est insuperabilis rationibus … Et hoc est argumentum falsitatis eius, quia non potest sustineri rationibus, volunt eam utcumque sustinere verbis et clamoribus vel forsan minis terrando tenentes et pro motibus seu promissis inducendo aliquos ad hoc. Unde quia Machomet scivit legem suam esse falsam, praecepit quod contra eam ponentes statim interficerentur. Et quia sustinentes hanc opinionem contra aliam praedicantes non possunt interfici gladiis, occiduntur linguis."

53 Iohannes de Polliaco, *Quaestio ordinaria* 7, Paris, BnF, lat. 14565, f. 213ra: "Hoc fuit quod volui dicere in aula episcopi, sed non potui, impeditus. Hic autem, per Dei gratiam, non impedior. Sed ibi venerabilis magister cui incumbebat arguere contra me fortia argumenta fecit contra me …"

preserved in two redactions, usually the second redaction merely adds a section containing the continuation of the debate after the Advent session, and these sections contain valuable information.[54] It seems that question 2 of *Quodlibet* I, of which there are two redactions, is the first place where Pouilly discusses the theme of the *aula* uproar, although this has not yet drawn much if any attention from scholars. The question asks "Whether the intellect of the Father understands creatures before He produces the Son," which is actually more vague in the Latin, *Utrum intellectus paternus prius intelligat creaturas quam producat Filium*, especially because in the trinitarian theology of the thirteenth and early fourteenth century the divine attributes intellect and will were linked to the production of the Son and Holy Spirit respectively. Pouilly supports the negative, writing that, "without prejudice to anyone, asserting nothing, but reasoning with probability as if concerning a question about which I have no opinion either way, I say that, at present, it seems more probable to me that the production of the Son in the Father qua Father is necessarily understood before the cognition of creatures."[55] If this is what Pouilly actually said, obviously he was rather cautious.

Whether he was being honest or not, and regardless of whether the question was prearranged or even modified or added after the quodlibetal debate, Pouilly uses it as an opportunity to reject the arguments of those who have the opposite view. At first he identifies these *aliqui* in the margin of Nürnberg, Stadtbibliothek, Cent. III.75: "Namely Thomas of Bailly and Henry the Augus-

54 The primary witness to the first redaction is Paris, BnF, lat. 14565, containing just the first three *Quodlibeta*. The second redaction survives in Firenze, Biblioteca Nazionale Centrale, II.I.117; Paris, BnF, lat. 15372; and Vat. lat. 1017. Nürnberg, Stadtbibliothek, Cent. III.75, carries a mixed text for the first three *Quodlibeta* and the standard text for the last two, but it is missing several quires and adds a question that it calls a sixth *Quodlibet*. L. Hödl, "Die Kritik des Johannes de Polliaco an der philosophischen und theologischen *ratio* in der Auseinandersetzung mit den averroistischen Unterscheidungslehren (Eine historische Studie zu den *Quaestiones quodlibetales* und *Quaestiones ordinariae* des Johannes de Polliaco)," in *Miscellanea Martin Grabmann. Gedenkblatt zum 10. Todestag*, ed. M. Schmaus (Munich: Hueber, 1959), pp. 11–30, first drew attention to the complex redactional tradition of the *Quodlibeta* and *Quaestiones ordinariae*, following Grabmann's identification of the Nürnberg witness, but see also Prospero T. Stella, *"Intentio Aristotelis, secundum superficiem suae litterae*. La *Replicatio contra Magistrum Herveum Praedicatorum* di Giovanni di Pouilly," *Salesianum* 23 (1961), pp. 481–528, and Hödl, "The *Quodlibeta* of John of Pouilly," pp. 202–204, which I am correcting on some points in a more exhaustive study for a book on Pouilly co-authored with Tobias Hoffmann.

55 Iohannes de Polliaco, *Quodlibet* I q. 2, Vat. lat. 1017, f. 2^{vb}: "Et dico, sine praeiudicio cuiuscumque, nihil asserendo, sed probabiliter ratiocinando tanquam de quaestione de qua quasi neutro modo opinor, quod mihi ad praesens videtur probabilius quod productio Filii necessario in Patre ut Pater est praeintelligitur cognitioni creaturarum …"

tinian, who just adduces the arguments of the aforesaid Thomas."[56] A bit later, discussing the attributes more generally, in the first redaction Pouilly writes, "From this it is clear that, since the act by which the divine intellect distinguishes the attributes is a secondary act, the distinction of the attributes in God cannot precede the emanation of the Word. Thus the argument is invalid by which *aliqui* …," and this time both Nürnberg and Paris, BnF, lat. 14565 have the same marginal comment: "These two arguments are John of Ghent's, but the others [from above] are Thomas of Bailly's."[57]

Although John of Ghent's works have not been identified, there is, sure enough, a lengthy discussion on this topic in the first question of Thomas of Bailly's final *Quodlibet* VI, *Utrum dicere Verbum specialiter in divinis sit idem quod intelligere*.[58] Glorieux's edition of the six *Quodlibeta* is not much more than a transcription identifying the explicit citations, only four of which refer to authors after 1200, one each to Alberus Magnus and Henry of Ghent and two to Bonaventure, none of them living, although Glorieux does put Godfrey in the *apparatus fontium* at one point.[59] Glorieux divides the second of the two principal sections into three, and half of the entire question is devoted to the third part, refuting those who hold that *non oportet productioni Verbi praeintelligi in Patre notitiam actualem suae essentiae et creaturarum in ea*, precisely the issue at hand.[60] Glorieux had placed *Quodlibet* VI in the 1306–1307 academic year. Starting from his dating of *Quodlibet* IV to Advent 1304 based on citations of the constitutions of Benedict XI, and assuming one session per year, Glorieux dated Thomas of Bailly's six *Quodlibeta* one per year from 1301–1302 to 1306–1307.[61] Robert Lambertini has pointed out, however, that the constitution

56 Iohannes de Polliaco, *Quodlibet* I q. 2, Nürnberg, Stadtbibliothek, Cent. III.75, f. 2^{vb}, *mg.*: "Scilicet Th⟨omas⟩ de Balli et H⟨enricus⟩ Aug⟨ustiniensis⟩, qui non induxit nisi ratione⟨m⟩ Th⟨omae⟩ praedicti."

57 Iohannes de Polliaco, *Quodlibet* I q. 2, Paris, BnF, lat. 14565, f. 6o^{ra}; Nürnberg, Stadtbibliothek, Cent. III.75, f. 3ra: "Ex quo patet quod, cum actus quo divinus intellectus attributa distinguit sit actus secundus, quod distinctio attributorum in Deo non potest praecedere emanationem Verbi. Unde non valet argumentum quo aliqui [*mg.*: Istae duae rationes sunt J⟨ohannis⟩ de G⟨andavo⟩, aliae vero Thomae de Bailli] sic arguunt …"

58 Thomas de Bailly, *Quodlibet* VI q. 1, in *Quodlibets*, ed. P. Glorieux (Paris: J. Vrin, 1960), pp. 420–440.

59 Thomas de Bailly, *Quodlibeta*, ed. Glorieux, pp. 47 (Henry), 155 (Albert), 297 (Godfrey), and 325 and 332 (Bonaventure).

60 Thomas de Bailly, *Quodlibet* VI q. 1, ed. Glorieux, p. 429, pp. 429–439 being devoted to the issue.

61 P. Glorieux, *La littérature quodlibétique de 1260 à 1320*, 2 (Paris: J. Vrin, 1935), pp. 273–277. The citations are in Thomas de Bailly, *Quodlibet* IV, q. 14, ed. Glorieux, pp. 325, 332, and 334–335.

Inter cunctas in question dates from 17 February 1304 and Bailly's discussion refers to that privilege to the friars as *de novo concessum* and implies that Benedict is still alive.[62] Since the pope died on 7 July 1304, that would fix Bailly's *Quodlibet* IV at Lent 1304, and if we follow Glorieux's admittedly weak reasoning, *Quodlibet* VI would then date to Lent 1306. Since that is probably right around the time of John of Pouilly's *aula* quarrel, it is hard to say who started this round, Bailly or Pouilly, but in any case, it must have begun in the spring of 1306.

Aside from a couple of small but significant changes, the first and second redactions of Pouilly's *Quodlibet* I, question 2, are the same, except that, after eight columns in the most uniform manuscript, Vat. lat. 1017, following the normal refutation of the opening arguments, when the manuscripts of the first redaction, Nürnberg and Paris 14565, move on to a new question, those carrying the second redaction continue, adding 22 columns of text, almost three times as much as the original question. Nürnberg and Paris 14565 do have the following marginal comment: "For the *replicationes* made against what was said here and their *reprobationes*, look in the *Quaestiones ordinariae*, question 7, from the solution of argument 15 until the solution of [argument] 19 and afterwards, where the things that were said here *multum concludantur*."[63]

As we have seen, there is indeed a discussion in *Ordinary Question* 7, which asks *Utrum scientia qua Deus scit alia a se sit practica vel speculativa*. The length of this question varies considerably in the four witnesses, from 7.5 columns in Paris, BnF, lat. 3228 (ff. 122^{vb}–124^{vb}) to 66 columns in Paris 14565 (ff. 204^{rb}–222^{rb}).[64] Hödl remarks that this was the subject of one of the *aula* questions as well, which Pouilly then worked into the version of *Quaestio ordinaria* 7 in Paris 14565.[65] Editing just this question would be quite a chore, but Pouilly also has material pertinent to the issue in *Quaestio ordinaria* 10, *Utrum scien-*

62 R. Lambertini, "Political *Quodlibeta*," in *Theological Quodlibeta in the Middle Ages. The Thirteenth Century*, ed. C. Schabel (Leiden: Brill, 2006), pp. 439–474 at p. 459; see also S.D. Dumont, "Godfrey of Fontaines and the Succession Theory of Forms at Paris in the Early Fourteenth Century," in *Philosophical Debates at Paris in the Early Fourteenth Century*, eds. Stephen F. Brown, Thomas Dewender, and Theo Kobusch (Leiden: Brill, 2009), pp. 39–125, at p. 96.

63 Iohannes de Polliaco, *Quodlibet* I q. 2, Paris, BnF, lat. 14565, f. 61^{rb}; Nürnberg, Stadtbibliothek, Cent. III.75, f. 4ra (*mg. infra*): "Replicationes factas contra dicta hic et earum reprobationes quaere in quaestionibus Ordinariis, quaestione 7 [VIII^{a} A], in solutione 15 argumenti usque ad solutionem 19 [recte pagina 102 *add.* A] et deinceps ubi multum concludantur dicta hic."

64 In Paris, BnF, lat. 14565 there is no f. 211 and part of question 8 is on ff. 205$^{ra–vb}$.

65 Hödl, "Die Aulien".

tia speculativa in Deo sic excellentior quam practica. Perhaps Pouilly was never satisfied with his *Quaestiones ordinariae*, however, which survive in two, three, or perhaps more redactions depending on the question in the four surviving manuscripts, and maybe this is why Pouilly added the 22 columns to the three manuscripts containing the second redaction of *Quodlibet* I, question 2, beginning thus: "But although the things said above seem to be well said, nevertheless it was argued against them *multipliciter* afterwards, first in an ordinary disputation, and there *quadrupliciter* …"[66]

Venturing a preliminary reconstruction of the debate, we can say that there was a big argument over the will and the intellect in (a) John of Pouilly's *aula* disputation, and Pouilly was not allowed to finish, according to his later remarks in his *Quaestio ordinaria* 7 from the summer of 1307. Between his *aula* and his *Quaestio ordinaria* 7, Pouilly held (b) his first *Quodlibet* in Advent 1306 and asked in question 2 "Whether the intellect of the Father understands creatures before He produces the Son," against what seem to be some of the same perpetrators, Thomas of Bailly, Henry of Friemar, and John of Ghent, on a related topic. After his *Quodlibet*, according to the added section, four individuals or groups argued (c) against what Pouilly had said in question 2, with *replicationes*, to which Pouilly responded (d) with *reprobationes*. In *Quaestio ordinaria* 7, to which the marginal reference in Nürnberg and Paris 14565 directs our attention, we have another marginal note in Paris 14565 saying that we have here "*replicationes* made against the things said in the first *Quodlibet*, question 2, and their *reprobationes*."[67] In the text of *Quaestio ordinaria* 7 itself, Pouilly remarks that, "These were touched upon in disputation," meaning his first quodlibetal disputation, "but then *aliqui* doctores also argued against the things that were said, and first Henry the Augustinian, speaking thus …"[68] After presenting Friemar's *replicationes* and giving his own *reprobationes*, Pouilly turns to the next group: "But *alii*, namely Thomas of Bailly, argued thus …" Pouilly returns to Friemar and Bailly, and then goes after the *replicationes* of the Cistercian master James of Thérines.

66 Iohannes de Polliaco, *Quodlibet* I q. 2, redactio B, Vat. lat. 1017, f. 4va: "Sed quamvis praedicta videantur esse bene dicta, nihilominus contra ea multipliciter argutum fuit postea, primo in disputatione ordinaria, et hic quadrupliciter …"

67 Iohannes de Polliaco, *Quaestio ordinaria* 7, Paris, BnF, lat. 14565, f. 219va *mg. infra*: "Replicationes factae contra dicta in primo *Quolibet*, quaestione 2 (pagina 4 et deinceps) et reprobationes earum."

68 Iohannes de Polliaco, *Quaestio ordinaria* 7, Paris, BnF, lat. 14565, f. 219va: "Ista fuerunt tacta in disputatione. Sed doctores aliqui etiam contra dicta tunc arguerunt, primo Henricus Augustiniensis, sic dicentes …"

So, getting back to the added section in Pouilly's *Quodlibet* I, question 2, the first individual or group of theologians, in an ordinary disputation (Pouilly is vague about how the other three individuals or groups responded), replied to Pouilly's oral performance in his first quodlibetal disputation. According to the report in Pouilly's *Quaestiones ordinaria* 7, this first individual was Henry of Friemar. Internal references allow us to connect the first of Friemar's *Quaestiones ordinariae* to his own *aula* disputation, which took place at some point before Pouilly's, and we have seen that the next five of Friemar's *Quaestiones ordinariae*, at least, were redacted before Friemar's first *Quodlibet*. The title of question 4 is *Utrum productio Verbi in divinis praesupponat in Patre cognitionem creaturarum*, again, precisely the issue that concerns Pouilly's debate with Friemar in Pouilly's *Quodlibet* I, question 2 from Advent 1306. It thus appears that Friemar decided to reply to Pouilly's quodlibetal statements in an ordinary disputation in early 1307, which would entail that Pouilly held his first *Quodlibet* before Friemar held his, so we can date Friemar's first *Quodlibet* to Lent 1307, in which quodlibetal disputation Friemar asked a similar question, number 5, *Utrum productio creaturarum de necessitate absoluta praesupponat in divinis causaliter emanationem personarum*. After that, in the summer of 1307, Pouilly held the ordinary disputation that produced *Quaestio ordinaria* 7, in which he replied to his adversaries' arguments from the *aula* and from their *replicationes* to *Quodlibet* I, question 2, although we cannot know how much of the huge, 66-column question in Paris 14565 stems from an oral performance. Later, Pouilly went back and made a second redaction of *Quodlibet* I, question 2, adding *replicationes* and *reprobationes*, which, if they had any basis in disputation, it was not in the first *Quodlibet*.

Unfortunately nothing seems to be pertinent in James of Thérines' *Quodlibet* I from Advent 1306 (or his second one, from Advent 1307 or slightly later), and it seems that Thomas of Bailly's participation was in the spring of 1306, unless his *Quodlibet* VI actually took place in Lent 1307 or later. Either way, the debate did continue in other *quodlibeta*, since in Advent 1307 Scotus' successor, the Franciscan Alexander of Alessandria, asked in question 7 of his *Quodlibet Utrum cognitio creaturarum in Patre praecedat cognitionem Verbi*, the Dominican Hervaeus Natalis' question 3 of his *Quodlibet* I was *Utrum notitia creaturarum in Patre praecedat secundum rationem intelligendi productionem Verbi*, and the Carmelite Gerard of Bologna's question 4 of *Quodlibet* III was *Utrum productio creaturarum praesupponat productionem personarum divinarum*.[69] In this

69 For these dates, aside from what was discussed above, see the introduction to Jacques de Thérines, *Quodlibets I et II*; Jean Lesage, *Quodlibet I*, ed. P. Glorieux (Paris: J. Vrin, 1958), p. 11, and the following chapters in *Theological* Quodlibeta *in the Middle Ages. The Fourteenth*

way, it appears, an *aula* disputation in early 1306 among an Augustinian and three secular masters of theology continued in the *quodlibeta* of Advent 1306, Lent 1307, and Advent 1307 and involved the Cistercian, Franciscan, Dominican and Carmelite regent masters. Someone should look into this.[70]

Rarely does one find all four mendicant orders, the Cistercians, the Sorbonne, and two other secular chairs of theology represented at the same time in debate over a single topic. Unless I have missed something, something is missing: John Duns Scotus.

3.2 *The Debate over a Third Distinction*

These were not the only occasions on which John of Pouilly battled his colleagues during the 1306–1307 academic year, and Ludwig Hödl focused on question 5 of the same *Quodlibet* 1,[71] in which, as in question 2, the first redaction ends as normal and then the second redaction adds 6.5 columns, beginning, "And although the things said above seem to be well and *probabiliter* said, some people, however, namely John of Ghent, wanted to attack me …,"[72] and then adding an entirely new question immediately afterwards, continuing the quarrel.[73] Pouilly became so angry that Grabmann could not resist quoting him for two pages some 90 years ago.[74] These disagreements were not very

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Century, ed. Schabel: Thomas Sullivan, "The *Quodlibeta* of the Canons Regular and the Monks," pp. 359–400, at p. 392; Friedman, "Dominican Quodlibetal Literature," pp. 401–491, at pp. 434–436; C. Schabel, "Carmelite *Quodlibeta*," pp. 493–543, at pp. 510–513; William O. Duba, "Continental Franciscan *Quodlibeta* after Scotus," pp. 569–649, at p. 580. For the titles of the questions, see Glorieux, *La littérature quodlibétique de 1260 à 1320*.

70 For example, Garrett R. Smith, who in "*Esse consecutive cognitum*: A Fourteenth-Century Theory of Divine Ideas," in *Contemplation and Philosophy. Scholastic and Mystical Modes of Medieval Philosophical Thought: A Tribute to Kent Emery, Jr.*, eds. Roberto Hofmeister Pich and Andreas Speer (Leiden: Brill, 2018), pp. 477–527, deals with a related issue, links it to Scotus' *Quodlibet*, and edits the slightly later Iacobus de Aesculo, *Quaestio ordinaria* 4, *Utrum notitia actualis creaturae praesupponatur in Deo notitiae habituali eiusdem*, where the pertinent issue arises in a. 4, with Alexander of Alessandria's *Quodlibet*, question 7, quoted in the *apparatus fontium* on p. 523.

71 Hödl, "The *Quodlibeta* of John of Pouilly," pp. 205–209.

72 Iohannes de Polliaco, *Quodlibet* 1 q. 5, redactio B, Vat. lat. 1017, f. 12^{vb}: "Et quamvis predicta videantur bene et probabiliter dicta, quidam tamen, scilicet J. de Gandavo, volentes invehi contra me …"

73 Iohannes de Polliaco, *Quodlibet* 1 q. 6^{b} (*redactio B only*), Vat. lat. 1017, ff. 14va–15^{rb}: "Secundo iuxta hoc quaeritur utrum essentia sive esse essentiae distinguatur realiter ab esse existentiae." The question was edited by Władysław Seńko, in *Opera philosophorum medii aevi* II (1978), pp. 121–125, but I have not had access to this.

74 M. Grabmann, *Mittelalterliches Geistesleben*, vol. 2 (Munich: Max Hueber, 1936), pp. 101–102, on the subject of Aristotle as authority for Pouilly, for which see also M.-B. Borde, "Jean de Pouilly est-il antithomiste?" *Revue Thomiste* 108 (2008), pp. 81–104.

polite. Hödl maintained that the extra venom on the side of Pouilly had an underlying cause:

> The secular schools in Paris were particularly affected by the condemnation [of 1277], since, according to the course of study, their teachers came from the arts faculty. The spokesman for the secular masters in the last quarter of the thirteenth century was Henry of Ghent, one of the advisors (*assessores*) to the Parisian bishop [Étienne Tempier] in the condemnation. But as *magister artium* (and thus of philosophy), he was familiar with the influence and impact of philosophy and the arts masters on theology. He wanted to stem this influence and to bring theology back to the patristic tradition. His followers in the schools, the *Gandavistae*, swore by the words of their teacher and would tolerate no contradiction. The ecclesiastical condemnation (under cover of the authority of Holy Scripture) and Henry's reputation within the walls of the University enticed and seduced these followers into academic intolerance, which John of Pouilly at times bemoaned bitterly.[75]

Hödl then gives an illustrative quotation from *Quodlibet* II, question 13, "Whether the freedom of the will has a rational foundation as free choice," which Henry of Ghent and the *Gandavistae* anathematized. For Hödl, John of Pouilly was a champion of scientific freedom. Hödl also asserted that often Pouilly was merely attacking Henry's followers, who misunderstood Henry, and indeed this is a another theme that runs through Pouilly's *Quodlibeta*. As the Dominicans were doing with Thomas Aquinas, choosing him as their teaching doctor, enforcing compliance, and yet arguing over Aquinas' meaning, Pouilly shows that the seculars were doing something similar with Henry of Ghent. Pouilly was often inspired by Henry, but fought the coercive approach of his dogmatic followers. We thus see a secular parallel with the Dominicans, among whom the liberal James of Metz and Durand of Saint-Pourçain were persecuted by Hervaeus Natalis, Pierre de la Palud, and others, even if the correct interpretations of Aquinas were not always obvious. The Dominican enforcers' preferred means of censure were the anti-treatise and investigation by a panel of Thomists. Without a separate institutional umbrella, the seculars turned to quodlibetal and ordinary disputations, and the Dominicans Hervaeus and Palud themselves had to attack the secular Pouilly in *quodlibeta* and separate treatises.[76]

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75 Hödl, "The *Quodlibeta* of John of Pouilly," pp. 199–200.

76 See above, n. 16. For the censures of Durand, see J. Koch, *Kleine Schriften*, 2 vols. (Rome:

Still, Pouilly also had a belligerent personality. In the section added to *Quodlibet* I, question 2, we read remarks such as these:

> Let them fabricate *imaginationes*, and let them form arguments from them, and they will be good arguments for them, and not for me … It is magisterial for us to form many arguments, but good ones. So if, having seen my above arguments, they consider theirs conclusive, they don't have much judgment. But if they do not reckon that they are conclusive absolutely, but they think they are conclusive for me, they don't think much of me … And I am amazed that they reply with this argument and similar ones, since I already solved it. At least they should have disproven the solution and touched on it in some way … So they spoke irrationally …[77]

In *Quodlibet* I, question 7, Pouilly accuses the *Gandavistae* of misunderstanding their own master and of claiming that Henry of Ghent had surpassed Aristotle as the "rule in nature," to which assertion Pouilly responded at length, remarking, among other things:

> Whom shall we follow? Aristotle with the greater insight, and who is reputed as the most learned in the human sciences, or those people, who have recently appeared and only serve to subvert science, as is clear to those who read their writings? I deem it safer to follow Aristotle, because … he is deemed to have said nothing without strong proof; but these people say almost (*) everything without proof, or if they induce a proof, it does not attain the level of a probable opinion.[78]

Edizioni di storia e letteratura, 1973), vol. 2, pp. 52–118. Hervaeus authored the *Reprobationes* against Durand in Reims, Bibliothèque Carnegie 502, ff. 112^{v}–116^{v} and 128^{v}–131^{v}; see I. Iribarren, *Durand of St Pourçain. A Dominican Theologian in the Shadow of Aquinas* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), pp. 200–206. He may have composed the anonymous *Correctorium* of James of Metz in Le Mans, Médiathèque Louis-Aragon 231, ff. 150ra–175^{rb}.

77 Iohannes de Polliaco, *Quodlibet* I q. 2, redactio B, Vat. lat. 1017, ff. 6^{vb}–7^{vb}: "Fabricent sibi magnas imaginationes, et ex his faciant rationes, et bonae erunt eis, et non mihi … [7ra] … Est igitur magisterium facere nobis multas rationes, sed bonas. Unde si visis dictis meis praedictis putabant rationes praedictas concludere, non habet magnum iudicium. Si vero non putabant eas concludere simpliciter, putabant tamen eas concludere mihi, modicum me reputabant … [7^{vb}] … Et miror quare hanc rationem et consimiles replicant, cum eam prius solverim. Saltem debuissent solutionem reprobasse et eam aliqualiter tetigisse … Unde isti locuti sunt irrationabiliter …"

78 Translated by W. Duba and O. Ribordy for Hödl, "The *Quodlibeta* of John of Pouilly," p. 209,

And in the context under discussion, *Quodlibet* I, question 5, Pouilly cannot resist turning to Islam again in his attack:

> And according to a certain proportion or likeness, there is a similar comparison of their doctrine in objects of pure speculation to the doctrine of Aristotle as of the law of Muhammad to the law of Christ, because just as the law of Muhammad is a corruption of the most true law of Christ, so also their doctrine is a corruption of all true or probable doctrine in objects of pure speculation.[79]

What was the all the fuss about in Pouilly's *Quodlibet* I, question 5, from Advent 1306? Pouilly first claims that all difference between two things is either *secundum rem* or *secundum rationem*, and there is nothing in between, "and all the *antiqui* posited this. But very recently in these days (*novissime istis diebus*) some people, believing their dreams to be real things, say that there is a middle between them." Modern students of Scotus might expect to read about the *formal* distinction, especially when the title of the question is *Utrum differentia aliquorum secundum rationem actualiter, **formaliter**, et complete possit praecedere omnem operationem intellectus*. They will be disappointed. Pouilly continues: "They say that some things differ by *intention*," and the marginal reference identifies this person as Henry of Ghent.[80] Pouilly first explicitly

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from the edition of Iohannes de Polliaco, *Quodlibet* I q. 7, in Hödl, "Die Opposition," p. 161.148–153, § 12: "Quem igitur sequemur, vel Aristotelem, quem qui magis intellexit, reputatus est magis sciens in humanis scientiis, vel istos, qui noviter advenerunt et nisi sunt ad subversionem scientiarum, ut apparet legentibus sua scripta? Aestimo quod Aristotelem sequi sit securius, quia secundum Commentatorem I *De generatione* nihil aestimatur dixisse sine forti probatione; isti autem sine probatione quasi (*) omnia dicunt, vel si inducant probationem, non attingit sermonem probabilem." The same question had already been edited in Adriaan Pattin, "La métaphysique de la relation chez Jean de Pouilly," in *Sapientiae procerum amore: Mélanges médiévistes offerts à Dom Jean-Pierre Müller O.S.B. à l'occasion de son 70ème anniversaire (24 février 1974)*, ed. Theodor Köhler (Rome: Editrice Anselmiana, 1974), pp. 415–437, with this quotation on p. 424.163–169. (*) Hödl apparently could not decipher the abbreviation for 'quasi' in the manuscripts, so he left it out.

79 Iohannes de Polliaco, *Quodlibet* I q. 5, redactio B, Vat. lat. 1017, f. 14$^{rb–va}$: "Et secundum quandam proportionem aut similitudinem, consimilis est comparatio doctrinae illorum in speculabilibus pure ad doctrinam Aristotelis sicut legis Machometi ad legem Christi, quia sicut lex Machometi est corruptio legis verissimae Christi, sic doctrina illorum est corruptio omnis verae doctrinae seu probabilis in speculabilibus pure."

80 Iohannes de Polliaco, *Quodlibet* I q. 5, redactio B, Vat. lat. 1017, f. 10va: "Et ita posuerunt omnes antiqui. Sed novissime istis diebus quidam [contra Henricum de Gandavo *mg.*], somnia sua veras esse res aestimantes, dicunt aliquid medium inter ista, dicentes aliqua differre intentione."

traces the development of Henry's intentional distinction in *Quodlibet* V, questions 6 and 12, then *Quodlibet* X, questions 7 and 11, before attacking Henry at length:

> And so they invent this third way [of distinction] in vain. So when they say that this middle way is baptized and dubbed 'differing according to intention', they speak badly. We say this because there is a rubric in law that baptism must not be repeated … Thus this change of name did not lead to knowledge, but ignorance and discord. Ignorance, indeed, because on account of the authority of someone speaking with less expertise [Henry of Ghent] they reckon that some things differ by a middle way, neither really or by reason. Discord and controversy via a simile in the change of names: In Confirmation, suppose that John has two sons, whom I know well, and no others, namely Walter and Godin. In his Confirmation, me being unaware, Godin changes his name and is called Robin. But you are aware of this change and will say to me: 'There's Robin, John's son!' Of course I'll say: 'No, it's Godin!' You'll say: 'No it's not!' I'll say: 'Wrong!' And we'll quarrel like that. In this way, because of their baptism and confirmation [of terms] these people have provoked a great quarrel among men, with some saying that these things differ by intention and others denying it, even though everyone would say and rightly that all such things differ by reason …[81]

Pouilly goes on to say that "I want to speak as people normally spoke and I have always heard speak, and if anyone speaks otherwise, he uses equivocation, which cannot be destroyed and with such a person one cannot have a

81 Iohannes de Polliaco, *Quodlibet* I q. 5, redactio A, Vat. lat. 1017, f. 12ra: "Et ideo frustra illum modum tertium fingunt. Cum igitur dicunt quod iste modus medius baptizetur et vocetur 'differe secundum intentionem', dicunt male, quod dicimus quia est rubrica in iure quod baptismus non debet iterari … Unde ista mutatio nominis non induxit scientiam, sed ignorantiam et discordiam. Ignorantiam quidem quia putant propter auctoritatem dicentis minus periti quod aliqua differant modo medio, nec re nec ratione. Discordantiam et controversiam per simile in mutatione nominum: in confirmatione, habeat Iohannes duos filios quos bene cognoscam, et non plures, scilicet Walterum et Godinum. Godino in confirmatione me nesciente mutatum est nomen et vocatus est Robinus. Tu vero qui scis hanc mutationem dices mihi: 'Ecce Robinum filium Iohannis'. Certe dicam: 'Non, immo Godinus'. Dices tu: 'Immo'. Dicam: 'Non'. Et sic altercabimus. Ita isti propter suam baptizationem aut confirmationem induxerunt inter homines magnam altercationem, quibusdam dicentibus illa differre intentione, aliis illud negantibus, cum tamen omnes dicerent et vere omnia talia differe ratione …"

discussion."[82] The entire question is full of such statements, and it deserves to be edited.[83] After Pouilly's quodlibetal session of Advent 1306, John of Ghent offered his *replicationes*, which we find along with Pouilly's *reprobationes* in *Ordinary Question* 7 from the summer of 1307, and we read about it again in the second redaction of Pouilly's quodlibetal question, where we find the reference to the *Gandavistae*.

In the middle of John Duns Scotus' year as regent master of theology at Paris, in a 16-column discussion of a distinction between real and rational, there is no mention of the formal distinction or its author, except for one vague phrase: "From this one concludes further that, if in God the attributes are distinguished formally *ex natura rei* without an operation of the intellect, then God really is a composite."[84]

4 Conclusion: Scotus in 1306–1307

Those who wish to fit the history of later medieval thought into a simple Aquinas-Scotus-Ockham narrative will be disappointed to learn that, for John of Pouilly, while Aquinas was extremely important, Henry of Ghent towered above John Duns Scotus and Pouilly was compelled to attack the *Gandavistae* along with a number of other contemporary masters among the seculars, Dominicans, Augustinians, and Cistercians, whom he mentions by name, reserving explicitly for Scotus the charge of heresy on the issue of the Immaculate Conception. Together, Henry of Friemar and John of Pouilly interacted with ten theologians active at Paris in 1306–1307, three of these being seculars, to whom we can add the recently departed Peter of Auvergne and the still living Godfrey of Fontaines.

John of Pouilly's aim in his first *Quodlibet*, both oral and written, was to deal with his fellow secular theologians, bachelors and masters, who had perverted

82 Iohannes de Polliaco, *Quodlibet* I q. 5, redactio A, Vat. lat. 1017, f. 12va: "Volo enim loqui ut communiter loquuti sunt et audivi semper loqui, et si quis aliter loquatur, aequivocatione utitur, quae non potest tolli nec cum tali potest collocutio haberi."

83 Hödl, "The *Quodlibeta* of John of Pouilly," pp. 205–208, maintained that Pouilly was attacking only Henry's followers here, who misunderstood Henry to be advocating an intermediate distinction, but this is precisely what Pasquale Porro claims Henry was doing: P. Porro, "Henry of Ghent," in *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, ed. E.N. Zalta (Fall 2014 Edition), § 4. We need a critical edition of Pouilly's question.

84 Iohannes de Polliaco, *Quodlibet* I q. 5, redactio A, Vat. lat. 1017, f. 12^{vb}: "Ex quo concluditur ulterius quod, si attributa in Deo distinguuntur formaliter ex natura rei absque operatione intellectus, quod Deus sit valde compositus."

the great tradition of the Faculty of Theology of the University of Paris, compounding Henry of Ghent's errors. Stephen Metzger has recently reminded us that the seculars were much more prominent in the Faculty of Theology than the relative paucity of their surviving manuscripts might lead one to believe.[85] Unlike the mendicants, the seculars did not have the institutional backing to copy and disseminate their writings among a ready group of young scholars. This makes the survival of the texts of the seculars that much more impressive, since they were copied on demand. Their authors were also significant in that they came from the huge ranks of the students in the Faculty of Arts and defended the received orthodoxy of the Faculty of Theology, in which they constituted by far the largest single group of masters. At the same time, especially with the rise of Godfrey of Fontaines, they were split into factions, and John of Pouilly, a student, follower, and successor in the chair of theology of Godfrey, inherited his master's opposition to Henry of Ghent.

In Scotus' day, there were three main groups, the Dominicans, the Franciscans, and the seculars, followed at a distance by the Augustinians, Carmelites, and everyone else. The Dominicans had adopted Aquinas as their champion, tried to stamp out dissent, but argued over the interpretation of their doctor. On a number of questions Pouilly reveals that the seculars had done something similar with Henry of Ghent, whose doctrine Pouilly thought the *Gandavistae* did not always comprehend.

John of Pouilly's silence regarding John Duns Scotus in the Advent 1306 quodlibetal session indicates that the Franciscan had not yet made such a name for himself outside his order through his earlier writings or his bachelor's lectures on the *Sentences*, which after all had mostly been completed in the late spring of 1303. Scotus' doctrine of univocity was known to the Augustinian Henry of Friemar the Elder by the quodlibetal session of Lent 1307, but since Scotus did not commit himself to the doctrine in his own *Quodlibet*,[86] Henry must have known it via another route. We do not yet seem to have any good evidence that Scotus' *Quodlibet* was held in Advent 1306, rather than Lent 1307. P.T. Stella has shown that by Advent 1307, on my dating, Pouilly was responding to Scotus in his second *Quodlibet*, initiating a debate with Hervaeus Natalis.[87] Here is a possible timeline:

85 Stephen M. Metzger, *Gerard of Abbeville, Secular Master, on Knowledge, Wisdom and Contemplation*, 2 vols. (Leiden: Brill, 2017).

86 See Garrett R. Smith, "Introduction," in Petrus Thomae, *Quaestiones de ente*, ed. G.R. Smith (Leuven: Leuven University Press, 2018), pp. xxxi–xxxii, who also notes that Gerard of Bologna had criticized univocity at Paris before Henry.

87 Stella, "*Intentio Aristotelis, secundum superficiem suae litterae*."

Early 1306
Henry of Friemar OESA, *Inception procedure*, *Quaestio ordinaria* 1
John of Poully, *Inception procedure*, *Quaestio ordinaria* 1
Lent 1306
Thomas of Bailly, *Quodlibet* VI
Gerard of Bologna, *Quodlibet* II
Spring–Fall 1306
Henry of Friemar OESA, *Quaestiones ordinariae* 2–3
John of Poully, *Quaestiones ordinariae* 2–5
Advent 1306
John of Pouilly, *Quodlibet* I
James of Thérines OCist, *Quodlibet* I
Gerard of Bologna OCarm, *Quodlibet* II
Early 1307
Henry of Friemar OESA, *Quaestiones ordinaria* 4–6
James of Thérines OCist, Thomas of Bailly, John of Ghent (?), *replicationes*
Lent 1307
Henry of Friemar OESA, *Quodlibet*
John Duns Scotus OFM, *Quodlibet*
Summer 1307
John of Pouilly, *Quaestio ordinaria* 7
Advent 1307
Hervaeus Natalis OP, *Quodlibet* I
John of Pouilly, *Quodlibet* II
Alexander of Alessandria OFM, *Quodlibet*
James of Thérines OCist, *Quodlibet* II
Gerard of Bologna OCarm, *Quodlibet* III

If Scotus did hold his *Quodlibet* in Lent 1307, making himself more generally known to his peers, the question for future research—via critical editions and studies of the texts of all these contemporaries—is to what extent Scotus' eventual fame was a propaganda victory for later Franciscans,[88] instead of the inevitable rise of an objectively Great Thinker. In 2026, when most of Aquinas', Henry's, and Scotus' ideas have long been discarded, answering such questions is the impossible challenge of the intellectual historian.

88 On this process, see now William O. Duba, *The Forge of Doctrine. The Academic Year 1330–1331 and the Rise of Scotism at the University of Paris* (Turnhout: Brepols, 2017).

5 Notes on the Edition

The edition of the Augustinian Henry of Friemar the Elder's *Quaestio ordinaria* 4 is based on the two known witnesses:

B Bologna, Biblioteca dell'Archiginnasio, A.971 (ff. 67ra–70ra)
T Toulouse, Bibliothèque d'Étude et du Patrimoine, 739 (ff. 79va–82^{rb})

The Bologna and Toulouse manuscripts each have seven large omissions *per homoeoteleuton* of five words or more:

Toulouse §§ 6, 8, 9, 39 (2×), 52, 69 (words: 5, 41, 8, 8, 10, 10, 17 = 99)
Bologna §§ 30, 49, 50, 69 (2×), 73, 75 (words: 17, 11, 26, 6, 10, 8, 13 = 91)

They are thus independent and together provide a fairly clean text. Toulouse commits numerous minor errors and the scribe has a tendency to correct himself by saying "vel" after his mistakes rather than crossing them out, as in, "I like to watch documentaries about World War Eleven, or Two." Toulouse seems to reflect an earlier version, while Bologna appears to stem from a minor attempt to polish the text later, such that in the *determinatio* verbs describing the oral debate are often shifted from present to past tense or from past to pluperfect, for example: dicit > dixit; respondet > respondit; probat > probaverat; dixit > dixerat; arguitur > arguebatur.

Bologna's text is cleaner, but it does have those large omissions, on two occasions Bologna has small *lacunae* where Toulouse has the correct reading (§§ 60 and 72), and Bologna makes its share of other minor errors. In the edition I have generally followed Bologna where the manuscripts differ but both have a sensible reading. The *apparatus criticus* is rather exhaustive.

Paragraphs are numbered for ease of reference. Regarding the *apparatus fontium*, refutations of earlier arguments are indicated after the paragraph numbers following an arrow, like this: [47→46]. In the many cases in the *determinatio* where the original argument is numbered but does not survive, I employ an asterisk, like this: [57→2*] *Ad secundum* … Not all the internal references are clearly verifiable in the text, so in the *apparatus fontium* I have noted the most pertinent places. For the reference to *Quaestio ordinaria* 1 in § 82 I have referred the reader to the pertinent section of Scanzillo's edition, but for the seven references to *Quaestio ordinaria* 2 (§§ 13, 15 [2×], 35, 54, 62, 84) I have not been more precise.

Henrici senioris de Frimaria *Quaestiones ordinariae de Verbo*, quaestio 3

Utrum Verbi ad Spiritum Sanctum esset personalis distinctio si Spiritus Sanctus non procederet ab eo.

[1] Dicendum quod de hac quaestione sunt diversi modi dicendi. Et licet doctores communiter in hoc conveniant quod omnis distinctio in divinis fit per relationes, diversificantur tamen in hoc quod quidam ponunt illam distinctionem fieri solum per relationes oppositas, quidam vero quod non solum fit per oppositas, verum etiam per disparatas. Et haec est radix diversitatis opinionum in ista quaestione, quia tenentes in divinis distinctionem solum fieri per relationes oppositas dicunt quod Spiritus Sanctus non distingueretur personaliter a Verbo si non procederet ab eo, tenentes vero ibi fieri distinctionem per relationes disparatas dicunt quod realiter distingueretur etiam si ab ipso non procederet. Et ideo quae istarum opinionum dicenda sit probabilior ex distinctione istius radicis potissime potest apparere. Procedunt enim motiva opinionum ex earum radice sicut conclusiones ex principiis.

[2] Unde in hac quaestione videtur sic procedendum: nam primo tangentur motiva doctorum qui ponunt in divinis distinctionem fieri per relationes disparatas sicut per oppositas, et ostendetur quod non concludunt. Secundo adducentur motiva probatoria utriusque opinionis de principali quaesito. Tertio sine praeiudicio praeeligetur una earum et solventur rationes alterius.

⟨Articulus primus⟩

⟨Opinio quod sic per relationes disparatas: tria motiva⟩

[3] Propter primum sciendum quod sustinentes in divinis distinctionem fieri per relationes disparatas ostendunt hoc triplici motivo.

[4] Primo sic: essentia divina propter suam illimitationem est per se ratio distinctionis diversarum proprietatum et terminorum productorum; sed ab ipsa essentia non solum fluunt proprietates oppositae, sed etiam disparatae;

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5 sunt diversi modi dicendi] diversi modi dicendi sunt T 7 diversificantur] diversificatur B | quod] quia T 7–8 illam distinctionem] istam distinctio T 8 solum[1]] *om.* T 9 oppositas] opposi[tas] B | disparatas] dispartitas B 12 tenentes] timentes T 13 distingueretur] distinguerentur *a.c.* T 15 potest apparere] possunt apparire B 17 videtur sic] *inv.* T 18 qui] quae B | distinctionem] distinctiones T 19 et … concludunt] *om.* B 20 adducentur] ostenduntur T | probatoria] probabiliora T | opinionis] opinionum T 21 praeeligetur] eligetur T 25 hoc] *om.* T 26 illimitationem] illitationem B

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ergo in divinis non solum distinguet relatio opposita, sed etiam disparata. Minorem supponunt tanquam notam. Maiorem probant dupliciter. Primo quia diversae proprietates non sunt nisi diversi fluxus ab eadem essentia, ergo proprietates ex hoc solum distinguuntur quod diversimode et disparate se habent ad essentiam. Secundo quia ab eodem formaliter habet aliquid suam entitatem et unitatem, et per consequens distinctionem; sed diversae proprietates non habent suam entitatem a terminis oppositis, quia, secundum PHILOSOPHUM,[1] unum relativorum non est causa alterius, nec a terminis disparatis, cuiusmodi sunt natus et spiratus, quia sunt posteriores proprietatibus, nam, secundum PHILOSOPHUM, VII *Metaphysicae*,[2] formae constitutivae praeintelliguntur constitutis per ipsas; ergo relinquitur quod suam entitatem habeant ab ipsa essentia, quia sunt diversi fluxus eiusdem essentiae; quare etc.

[5] Secundo sic: illud quod est ratio distinctionis in alio oportet prius intelligi esse distinctum in se ipso, ut patet de differentiis per quas species distinguuntur, quas prius oportet esse diversas, ut patet X *Metaphysicae*;[3] sed distinctio disparata est ratio distinctionis per opposita, quod patet, quia semper distinctio posterior reducitur in priorem tanquam in causam. Constat autem quod relationes oppositae posteriores sunt emanationibus, quia ex actibus innascuntur; et ideo oportet distinctionem per relationes oppositas reduci in distinctionem disparatam emanationum et illam ulterius in disparata principia, quae sunt intellectus et voluntas.

[6] Tertio sic: relatio in divinis, sicut et in creaturis, non distinguit nisi secundum realitatem eius quidditativam; sed realitas eius quidditativa non sumitur ab opposito, sed a fundamento; cum igitur in eodem fundamento in divinis non solum fundentur relationes oppositae, cuiusmodi sunt generare et generari, verum etiam disparatae, puta generare et spirare, oportet dicere quod in divinis non solum distinguat relatio opposita, verum etiam disparata. Minorem

1 etiam] *om.* B 3 eadem essentia] *inv.* T | ergo] per *add.* T 4 solum] solo T 5 habet] habent BT | aliquid] *om.* T 6 entitatem] identitatem T 6–7 proprietates] in divinis *add.* B 7 entitatem] entita^{tem} B; identitatem T 8 terminis] creaturis T 11 praeintelliguntur] primi intelliguntur B | constitutis] constitutivis T | quod] per *add.* T 14 intelligi] in *add.* T 20 et] *om.* T 21 illam] illa T 23 sic] fit* T | et] *s.l.* T; relatio *add.* T | distinguit] distinguitur T 24 realitatem] potentialitatem T 25 cum … fundamento] *om.* (*hom.*) T 26 fundentur] fundantur T 27 verum] *om.* B; nullum T | et] generari *add. sed del.* T

1 ARISTOT., *Cat.* c. 7, 7^{b}15–8^{a}12.

2 ARISTOT., *Metaph.* VII cc. 7–11, 1032^{a}12–1037^{b}7.

3 ARISTOT., *Metaph.* X c. 3, 1054^{b}23–31.

probant ex unitate relationis: si enim realitas quidditativa relationis non sumeretur ex fundamento, sed ex respectu ad oppositum, sequeretur quod realitas quidditativa relationis non esset una, sed plures. Consequens est falsum, quia "unum et ens convertuntur," IV *Metaphysicae*,[4] quare et antecedens. Consequentia probatur: constat enim unum patrem quandoque referri ad plures filios, si ergo realitas quidditativa relationis non sumeretur ex fundamento, sed ex respectu ad oppositum, sequeretur quod | vel in uno patre erunt plures B 67^{rb}
paternitates, | quod reprobatur V *Metaphysicae*,[5] vel una paternitas erit plures T 79^{vb}
paternitates, et ita paternitas non erit una, sed plures.

⟨Contra opinionem dicentem quod sic per relationes disparatas⟩

[7] Sed ista opinio dubia videtur et in se et in suis motivis. In se quidem quia non videtur quod relatio disparata in divinis possit distinguere, sed solum opposita, et hoc loquendo de distinctione quae est propria relationi. Cuius ratio est quia nulla forma distinguit nec constituit nisi secundum rationem eius formalem, sicut calor non distinguit nisi per rationem caloris; sed propria ratio relationis est ratio respectiva; ergo nulla relatio distinguit distinctione propria relationi nisi ab opposito quod respicit. Nunc autem relatio disparata non respicit et relative aliam disparatam, ut patet de similitudine et aequalitate; quare impossibile est quod relatio disparata distinguat distinctione propria relationi.

[8] Hoc idem patet, quia relatio disparata unde disparata non distinguit nisi vel ratione alietatis fundamenti, ut quia est in alio et alio fundamento, ut patet de aequalitate et similitudine, vel ratione alietatis suppositi, ut quia est in alio et alio supposito. Sed non potest poni quod in divinis distinguat ratione alietatis fundamenti, quia in divinis omnium relationum est id infinitum, ergo ibi ratione fundamenti distinguere non potest. Si autem distinguat ibi ratio alietatis suppositi, ergo iam supponit distinctionem suppositorum, et ita non erit

1–2 sumeretur ex fundamento] servetur ex finito B 1–3 sumeretur … non] *iter.* T (realitas] relationis *add. sed del. vice 2^{a}*) 3 sed plures] simpliciter T 4 quare et antecedens] *om.* B 6 sumeretur ex fundamento] servetur ex finito B 9 paternitates] *om.* T 11 ista] in T | quidem] est *add.* T 12 sed] *om.* T 15 per rationem caloris] pater coloris T 16 distinctione] distinctionem T 17 autem] dicto *add. sed exp.* T 18 et^{1}] *om.* T 19 relatio disparata] *inv.* T | distinctione] distinctionem T 21 hoc idem] item hoc T | unde] ut T 22 et alio] *om.* B 23 ratione] ratio B 23–27 ut … supposito] *om.* (*hom.*) T 26 ratione] ratio B (*def.* T) 27 iam] *om.* T

4 ARISTOT., *Metaph.* IV c. 2, 1003^{b}22–23; *Les Auctoritates Aristotelis. Un florilège médiévale*, ed. J. HAMESSE, PhM 17 (Louvain: Peeters, 1974), p. 122, no. 90.

5 ARISTOT., *Metaph.* V c. 15, 1020^{b}32–1021^{a}27.

prima ratio distinctionis suppositorum, sed eam per aliquam priorem distinctivam rationem praesupponet.

[9→4] Videtur etiam dubia in suis motivis, quia rationes non concludunt. Ad primum, dico per interemptionem maioris. Cuius ratio est quia impossibile est quod idem sub eadem ratione formali sit ratio oppositorum; sed ab ipsa essentia est ratio communicabilitatis; ergo impossibile est ut ab eadem sumatur ratio incommunicabilitatis. Sed ab eodem in divinis sumitur ratio incommunicabilitatis et distinctionis, quia per rationem incommunicabilitatis distinguuntur proprietates; quare ab ipsa essentia non sumetur ratio distinctionis proprietatum.

[10] Verum quidem est quod essentia divina est ratio originalis et fundamentalis diversarum proprietatum in quantum ex eius illimitatione et perfectione oriuntur et pullulant. Quod sic intelligo: quia sicut perfectio trianguli requirit tres angulos, sic illimitatio essentiae divinae requirit subsistentiam in tribus personis, et quia essentia non determinatur ad subsistentiam incommunicabilem in persona nisi per proprietatem, ideo ex perfectione sua sicut ex principio fundamentali dicuntur oriri et pullulare tres proprietates personales. Dico autem "sicut ex principio fundamentali" non quia essentia subiciatur proprietati sicut superficies albedini—quia sic essentia divina esset in potentia receptiva alicuius, quod est imperfectionis—sed quia ipsa essentia proprietati largitur subsistentiam, sicut et ea quae sunt in fundamento inhaerenter in creaturis subsistunt per ipsum, ideo dicitur proprietas esse in essentia sicut in fundamento, absque omni tamen informatione et inhaerentia. Sic ergo dico ad maiorem quod, licet essentia divina sit ratio subsistentiae et principium fundamentale diversarum proprietatum, non tamen est ratio distinctiva earum.

[11] Ad primam probationem, cum dicis quod "sunt diversi fluxus eiusdem essentiae," dico quod ibi improprie accipitur nomen 'fluxus', sed magis proprie possent dici diversae incommunicabilitates circa eandem essentiam quam diversi fluxus, nisi per 'refluxum' intelligamus ortum et pullulationem. Et tunc

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1 distinctionis] distinctorum T | eam] ei licet T 1–2 distinctivam rationem] *inv.* T; non *add.* T 3 etiam] esse *add.* T | in] ex T | motivis] motibus T 5–6 ipsa essentia] *inv.* B 6 est[1]] sunt B; staret* T | ut] *om.* B | eadem] eodem T | sumatur ratio] sumit B 7–8 sed … incommunicabilitatis] *om.* (*hom.*) T 8 quia] *om.* B 12 illimitatione] illitatione B 13 oriuntur] oriountur T | quod] et T | quia] quod T 14 illimitatio] illitatio B 15–16 incommunicabilem] communicabilem B 16 per proprietatem] *inv.* T | sua sicut] sui sive T 18 essentia] esse T | subiciatur] fundamentali *add. sed del.* T 19 sic] sicut T 20 ipsa] *om.* T 21 largitur] iungitur T | et] est B | quae] quidem* T | inhaerenter] inhaerent B | in[2]] *om.* T 22 dicitur] in *add. sed exp.* B; creaturis *add. sed del.* T | proprietas … in] esse proprietas sicut T 23 sic] sicut T 25 distinctiva] distincta T 26 dicis] dicitur B 29 refluxum intelligamus] reflexum intelliguamus T

dico quod diversae proprietates sunt diversi ortus et pullulationes a divina essentia, quae innascuntur modo actionis et passionis in quantum ibi attenditur ratio producentis et producti. Et quia ex actione et passione non innascuntur nisi relationes oppositae eius qui ab alio et a quo alius, ideo iste diversus fluxus non convincit, quia in divinis relatio disparata unde disparata non distinguat.

[12] Ad secundam probationem, dico quod maior est distinguenda, cum dicitur, "ab eodem habet aliquid formaliter suam entitatem" etc., nam in divinis est reperire duplicem unitatem et per consequens entitatem et distinctionem. Una est unitas essentialis, quae fundatur in entitate absoluta et implurificabili, communicabili tamen. Et hanc consequitur distinctio ab omni alia entitate diversa per essentiam ab essentia divina. Et hanc entitatem et unitatem habent omnes proprietates ab essentia divina, per quam etiam distinguuntur a proprietatibus creaturarum ab eis per essentiam diversis. Alia est unitas notionalis, quae fundatur in entitate relativa et plurificabili, incommunicabili tamen. Et hanc entitatem sive unitatem non habent ab essentia formaliter, sed solum originaliter, in quantum omnes proprietates oriuntur ab essentia, sed a se ipsis quaelibet habet talem unitatem formaliter in quantum quaelibet proprietas est de se formaliter incommunicabilis. Et hanc unitatem consequitur distinctio qua una proprietas distinguitur ab alia per propriam | et formalem rationem illius for- B 67va
mae incommunicabilis. Et quia formalis ratio cuiuslibet proprietatis in divinis est respectiva, ideo quaelibet earum distinguit solum ab ea ad quam habet oppositionem relativam.

[13] Et cum dicitur in minori quod "proprietates non habent suam entitatem a terminis oppositis," dico quod verum est formaliter, quia unum relativorum non est causa formalis alterius—quia sic unum referretur per aliud formaliter, et sic utrumque relativorum referretur per unam relationem, quod est falsum—sed solum terminaliter, in quantum unum relativorum terminat respectum alterius. Et cum addis, "nec a termino disparato," quia "formae con-

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1 diversi] fluxus *add. sed del.* T | a] et T 3 producti] productum T 4 iste] ille T 5 quia] quod T 7 secundam] tertiam *a.c. mg.* B; aliam T; a *add. sed del.* T | cum] et T 8 aliquid formaliter suam entitatem] suam entitatem formaliter T 9 reperire] recipere T | entitatem et distinctionem] *inv.* T 10–11 communicabili tamen] communicabilitas T 13 divina] et habent *add.* T 14 creaturarum] causarum T | notionalis] notoria B 15 relativa] ralativa B | incommunicabili tamen] tantum T 18 talem unitatem] *inv.* T 19 hanc unitatem] in hac unitate T 20 per] *s.l.* T 21 incommunicabilis et] communicabilis T 22 distinguit] distinguitur T 23 oppositionem] opinionem B 24 proprietates non habent] proprietas non habet T 26 aliud] et hoc *add.* T 27 referretur] referreretur T

stitutivae praeintelliguntur constitutis per ipsas," ut patet VII *Metaphysicae*,[6] concedo, quia oportet proprietatem incommunicabilem prius advenire essentiae secundum modum intelligendi quam constituatur persona incommunicabilis, licet in divinis, propter summam simplicitatem, idem sit persona constituta et proprietas constitutiva. Et cum infers, "ergo habet eam ab essentia," non sequitur nisi originaliter, ut visum est in quaestione praecedenti.[7] Formaliter autem quaelibet proprietas habet suam incommunicabilitatem a se et ex eius formali, quae, cum sit respectiva, de necessitate rationem oppositionis includit.

[14→5] Ad secundam, dico quod maior est vera de principio distinctivo formali, | non autem originali, sicut patet per probationem ad hoc inductam. T 80ra Quia enim differentiae sunt ratio et principium formalis distinctionis ipsis speciebus, ideo oportet earum distinctionem praeintelligi qua formaliter se ipsis distinguuntur. Et cum assumitur in minori quod "distinctio disparata est ratio distinctionis per opposita," dico quod illa est ratio duplex originalis et fundabilis istius, non autem formalis, quia distinctio formalis proprietatum ex earum formalibus rationibus innascitur, quae sunt rationes respectivae, et ideo solum distinguuntur ab opposito, non autem a disparato nisi in quantum disparatum vel terminatur ad oppositum vel coincidit in idem cum opposito.

[15] Ad probationem, cum dicitur, "distinctio posterior," quae est per relationes oppositas, "semper reducitur in priorem," quae est per relationes disparatas, dico consequenter dictis in praecedenti quaestione,[8] quod distinctio quae est per relationem disparatam est quidem ratio originalis et inchoativa distinctionis posterioris, quae est per relationes oppositas, sed distinctio posterior, quae est per relationes oppositas, est ratio formalis et completiva distinctionis prioris, quae est per relationem disparatam, quia, ut fuit deductum in praece-

1 constitutis] constitutivis B; confotis T 3 constituatur] constituitur T 4 summam] suam B 4–5 constituta] constitutiva T 7 a] ex T 8 quae] *om.* T | respectiva] res petva B 10 distinctivo] distincto T 11 non autem] et |80ra| non T 11–12 inductam quia enim] dictam quod etiam T 14 distinguuntur] distinguantur T | in minori] *om.* T | quod] ratio disparata vel *add.* T 15 illa] ista T | ratio duplex] qualis ratio B 18 a] *om.* T 19 vel] compositum ad *add. sed del.* T | oppositum] compositum T | coincidit] coincidunt T 20 cum] quando T 21–22 quae … disparatas] quod per relationes disparatas est T 22 praecedenti quaestione] praecedenti quasi B; *inv.* T 23 relationem] rationem B | quidem] quaedam T; ratio *add. sed del.* T 23–24 distinctionis] post *add. sed del.* T 25 ratio] *om.* T 26 quae] quia T | relationem] rationem BT

6 Aristot., *Metaph.* VII cc. 7–11, 1032a12–1037b7.

7 Henr. de Frimaria, *Quaestiones ordinariae de Verbo* q. 2.

8 Henr. de Frimaria, *Quaestiones ordinariae de Verbo* q. 2.

denti quaestione,[9] ipsae emanationes disparatae non essent realiter differentes nisi propter distinctionem formalem oppositionis relativae ad quam ordinantur.

[16→6] Ad tertiam, cum dicitur, "relatio non distinguit nisi secundum realitatem eius quidditativam," concedatur, quia alias personae in divinis realiter non distinguerentur nisi per relationem quidditativam realem. Et cum assumitur quod haec realitas quidditativa non sit alia a realitate fundamenti, dico per interemptionem, saltem in creaturis, quicquid sit in divinis, de quo infra videbitur.[10] Nam licet verum sit quod, sicut fundamentum est causa ordinis et relationis, sic etiam eius realitas sit causa realitatis relationis, non tamen est verum quod formaliter haec realitas sit illa. Est ergo minor vera si intelligatur causaliter, quia nisi fundamentum esset reale, non posset in eo fundari respectus realis. Non tamen est vera formaliter, quia non est eadem ratio quidditativa relationis et fundamenti, cum sint res diversorum praedicamentorum.

[17] Et cum probatur, "alias una relatio esset plures relationes," nego consequentiam.

[18→17] Tu probas, quia convenit patrem referri ad plures filios, et sic in ipso erunt plures relationes.

[19→18] Ad hoc dicerent aliqui quod non sequitur quod una relatio sit plures, sed quod in uno patre fundentur plures relationes respectu plurium filiorum. Nec hoc habent pro inconvenienti. Et quod dicit PHILOSOPHUS,[11] "accidentia eiusdem speciei, non possunt numerari in eodem subiecto," dicunt esse verum de accidentibus absolutis, non autem de respectivis. Et habent rationem pro se ad hoc ponendum: quod "cum relativa posita se ponant et perempta se perimant," ut patet in *Praedicamentis*,[12] oportet quod interempto filio interimatur paternitas in patre, sed cum adhuc maneat respectus eius ad alios filios, oportet quod in patre sint plures paternitates.

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2 relativae] realem T 5 concedatur] *om.* T 5–6 realiter non distinguerentur] non realiter distingueretur T 6 quidditativam] additativam T 9 nam] unde T 10 etiam] *om.* T 10–11 tamen est] *inv.* T 12 causaliter] realiter T | eo] deo T 14 quidditativa] quidditativae T 16 et cum probatur] *iter.* B 18 quia] *om.* T 21 plures] *om.* T 23 possunt numerari] numeri B | eodem] uno T 24 non autem] et non T 25 quod] quia T 27 maneat] manet T | eius] eiuus B

9 HENR. DE FRIMARIA, *Quaestiones ordinariae de Verbo* q. 2.

10 Hic infra, §§ 49–52.

11 ARISTOT., *Metaph.* V c. 10, 1018^{a}20–26.

12 ARISTOT., *Cat.* c. 7; *Auct. Arist.*, PhM 17, p. 303, no. 27.

[20→19] Sed hac ratione non obstante, magis intelligo communem sententiam, in qua concordant Simplicius[13] et Albertus,[14] quod videlicet in patre sit tantum una paternitas respectu plurium filiorum propter unitatem fundamenti, quod est vel potentia generativa vel forma substantialis generantis. Non enim actus generationis potest poni fundamentum paternitatis, quia actus transiens non potest esse fundamentum relationis permanentis, licet per ipsum actum talis relatio innascatur. Et ideo dico quod paternitas in patre respicit omnes filios ut unum formale obiectum, et ideo ad omnes una relatione reali refertur, licet filiatio in eis multiplicetur propter multiplicationem fundamen-
B 67^{vb} torum. Et huius ratio est quia, sicut non | est contra pluralitatem respectuum realium quod terminentur ad unum obiectum, ut patet in Deo respectu creaturarum, sic non est contra unitatem respectus realis ut terminetur ad plures terminos materialiter sumptos propter unitatem fundamenti, dum tamen sit una ratio formalis terminandi in omnibus ut est in pluribus filiis quibus accidit quod sint plures propter distinctionem materiae.

[21] Ratio autem ipsorum non concludit, nam, ut dicit Albertus,[15] ideo paternitas mortuo uno filio non destruitur quia manet sua causa adhuc in actum reducta respectu aliorum filiorum viventium. Ad cuius intellectum considerandum quod relativa formaliter et adaequate sumpta mutuo se ponunt et mutuo se perimunt, et quia omnes filii accipiuntur ut unum formale obiectum respectu paternitatis in patre, nec aliquis adaequat praecise paternitatem in patre, sed omnes simul, ideo mortuo uno filio non destruitur paternitas in patre, sed paternitas solum desinit terminari ad filium iam corruptum.

1 sed] etiam *add.* T 2 qua] quam B | concordant] concordat T | videlicet] licet T 3 tantum] tamen B | plurium] pluriorum B 4 forma] *om.* T 6 esse] poni T 8 ut] *om.* B 12 respectus] respectu T | plures] filios vel *add.* T 16 ratio] quomodo T | non] motiva *add. sed del.* T | concludit nam] *inv.* T 17 mortuo uno] motu T | manet] in *add.* T 18 reducta] reductu T 19 sumpta] sup' T 20 et mutuo] *om.* T 21 aliquis] aliquid T 22 omnes] ens T | uno] *s.l.* T 23 desinit] definit T

13 Simplicius, *De praed.* c. 7, trans. Guillelmus de Moerbeke, ed. A. Pattin, *Corpus Latinum Commentariorum in Aristotelem Graecorum* 5/1–2 (Leuven/Paris 1971–1975), p. 226.

14 Albertus Magnus, *De praed.* tract. IV c. 10, *Opera omnia* I, ed. A. Borgnet (Paris 1890), p. 242^{a}.

15 Albertus Magnus, *De praed.* tract. IV c. 10, ed. Borgnet, p. 242^{a}.

⟨Articulus secundus⟩

[22] Viso igitur quod relatio disparata non potest per se distinguere in divinis, restat secundo adducere motiva probatoria utriusque opinionis de quaestione posita.

⟨Tria motiva opinionis quod sic per relationes disparatas⟩

[23] Et primo eorum qui tenent Spiritum Sanctum posse realiter distingui a Filio etiam si ab ipso non procederet. Et licet habeant plures rationes, assumo tamen tres inter alias efficaciores.

[24] Prima talis: illo solo persona distinguitur personaliter a quacumque alia quo formaliter constituitur in esse personali— | licet enim possit alio modo T 80^{rb} distingui per aliqua principia posteriora, tamen solum distinguitur per illud quo formaliter in esse personali constituitur, quia illud est sibi ratio quare formaliter sit unum in se indivisum et ab aliis divisum; sed Filius solum filiatione constituitur formaliter in esse personali, non autem spiratione; ergo, cum per hypothesim remota spiratione adhuc staret filiatio, relinquitur quod ea personaliter adhuc distingueretur a Spiritu Sancto.

[25] Ex quo potest inferri corollarie quod ponentes Filium distingui a Spiritu Sancto per spirationem activam non salvant realiter distinctionem personarum, cum spiratio actio non sit proprietas personalis constitutiva personae.

[26] Secunda ratio talis est: quando in aliquo sunt plura principia distinctiva, unum essentiale et proprium, aliud commune et adventicium, sublato per impossibile communi et adventicio, adhuc potest remanere proprium et essentiale—exemplum de homine, qui, si per impossibile non esset risibilis, adhuc nihilominus esset rationalis et distingueretur a bruto per rationale; sed in Filio est ipsa filiatio tanquam ei essentialis et propria, spiratio vero tanquam communis et adventicia, quia est ei communis cum Patre et supervenit filiationi, quae est eius proprietas constitutiva et per consequens sibi propria; quare per impossibile remota spiratione adhuc distingueretur filiatione.

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2 disparata] *om.* T 3 probatoria] probabilia *a.c.* T; probabiliora *p.c.* T 6 spiritum sanctum posse] ipsum posse s. B 7 etiam si ab ipso] et licet etiam T 9 solo] solum T 11 tamen solum] qualiter cum solo B 12 quo] quod T | in esse] inesset T 13 filiatione] filiatio T 15 hypothesim] ypostasym B; ypo^{si} T 17 inferri] inferre B | corollarie] cor^{lo} T 19 actio] activa T 20 talis] tali T | est] *om.* B 20–21 distinctiva] distincta T 21 essentiale] est *add.* T | proprium] et *add.* T | adventicium] adventiii' B; adve^{ti} T 22 adventicio] antentio' B; adiii'tio T 23 impossibile] nam et *add. sed del.* T 24 nihilominus] esset *add. sed del.* T 25 ei] sibi T | vero] *om.* T 26 adventicia] adnoti^{a} T 26–27 filiationi] filium B 28 per impossibile] *om.* T | filiatione] similitudine* T

[27] Tertia ratio quorundam, complectens virtutem multarum rationum, talis est: distinctae relationes reales incommunicabiles propria incommunicabilitate et incompossibiles in eodem supposito sufficiunt ad distinguendum diversas personas; sed generari et spirari sunt huiusmodi; quare etc. Probatio minoris, et primo quod sint relationes distinctae patet, quia una earum formali ratione aliam non includit. Quod etiam sint reales patet, quia utraque est proprietas personalis, quam oportet esse realem. Quod etiam utraque sit incommunicabilis patet, quia sicut natura divina est singularitas quaedam, ita quod ex proprietate suae naturae non potest non esse nec intelligi non hoc, ita generatio divina et quaelibet emanatio per quam natura divina communicatur non potest non esse. Quod etiam sint incompossibiles in eodem supposito patet, quia impossibile est duabus perfectis productionibus eandem personam accipere esse. Cuius ratio est quia cuilibet productioni perfecte respondet perfectus terminus productus et subsistens, qui de necessitate est persona; sed in divinis sunt duae perfectae productiones realiter distinctae, ut probatum est;[16] quare etc.

⟨Tria motiva opinionis quod solum per relationes oppositas⟩

[28] Deinde adducendae sunt similiter tres rationes alterius opinionis inter illas probabiliores.

[29] Quarum prima talis est: omnis distinctio est per aliquam oppositionem, quia omnis incompossibilitas aliquorum in eodem ex aliqua oppositione innascitur. Nunc autem in divinis non potest esse aliqua oppositio contrarietatis, quia hoc requirit diversitatem in natura; nec privationis et habitus, quia alterum eorum est imperfectum; oppositio autem affirmationis et negationis, licet sit in divinis, non tamen sufficit ad distinctionem personarum, quia salvatur in his quae sola ratione differunt, personas autem divinas oportet realiter differre. Ergo relinquitur quod in divinis solum sit distinctio per oppositionem relativam. Sed oppositio relativa non est nisi personae procedentis ad suum principium productivum; quare si Spiritus Sanctus non procederet a Verbo, nulla esset sui ad ipsum oppositio, nec per consequens distinctio.

1 tertia] secunda *a.c. s.l.*[2] B | quorundam] q^{o} dum* T | rationum] rerum T 2–3 incommunicabilitate et incompossibiles] communicate et incommunicabiles T 3 sufficiunt] sufficit T 5 una earum] vita eorum T 6 aliam non includit] non includit aliam T 8 incommunicabilis] communicabilis T | singularitas] sig^{tas} B 9 non^{2}] includit *add.* T 11 incompossibiles] impossibiles T 15 perfectae productiones] *inv.* T 18–19 illas probabiliores] alias probabiles T 20 quarum] qua B; quare etc. T 22 nunc] sicut T | aliqua] *om.* T 24 autem] est *add.* T 25 quia salvatur] quae salvantur B 27 solum sit distinctio] sit distinctio solum T 28 relativa] divina T | procedentis] producentis BT 30 sui] ipsius *add.* T

16 Hic supra, § 5.

[30] Secunda ratio talis est: impossibile est in rebus immaterialibus ponere plura immediate procedere ab aliquo uno ex aequo et sine ordine. Dico autem 'in rebus materialibus', quia licet in rebus | materialibus possibile sit plures filios B 68ra ex aequo ab eodem patre procedere propter divisionem materiae et quantitatis, haec tamen in rebus immaterialibus non convenit. Dico etiam 'per originem', quia licet—secundum opinionem aliquorum probabilem et etiam articulum[17]—in rebus possent produci plura sub eadem specie per creationem, non tamen per originem. Ex quo accipitur haec propositio per se nota: quod impossibile est in divinis plures personas ab una procedere nisi aliquis ordo inter eas existat; nunc autem omnis ordo vel est perfectionis vel originis; cum igitur ordo perfectionis locum non habeat in divinis, quia iam tolleretur aequalitas personarum, relinquitur quod ibi sit ordo et distinctio originis. Sed distinctio originis solum est quando una persona est ex altera; quare si inter Filium et Spiritum Sanctum tollitur ordo originis, necessario tollitur ratio distinctionis.

[31→30] Nec valet si dicas quod est duplex ordo originis, unus quo alter directe est ex altero, alius quo alter indirecte potest dici ex altero, quia non procederet nisi praesupposito illo, et sic quodammodo indirecte sua emanatio in quantum necessario prima potest dici ratio emanationis illius. Licet ergo verum sit quod inter personas divinas distinguat ordo originis, non tamen videtur verum quod ibi solum distinguat talis ordo originis directe, sed etiam indirecte.

[32→31] Sed hoc non valet, primo quia talis ordo originis non est per aliquam oppositionem, quae sola potest esse causa distinctionis in divinis, sed per disparationem, quae distinctionem non causat, sed supponit, ut | dictum T 80va est.'[18] Secundo, cum ordo non sit nisi distinctorum, non videtur quod ordo sit prima ratio distinctionis aliquorum, sed de necessitate eam praesupponit ab aliqua causa priori. Tertio, quia hoc est contra intentionem AUGUSTINI, qui dicit in libro *Contra Maximinum*[19] ordinem originis solum reservari inter personas quarum una est ex altera, licet una non sit prior altera.

1–3 ponere ... materialibus[1]] *om.* (*hom.*) B 4 divisionem materiae] divisiones naturae T 5 convenit] concludit B; *ante* 'in rebus materialibus' T 6 probabilem] probabi[le'] B; et probabilitatem T 7 in rebus possent produci] possent produci in rebus T | sub] in T 9 ab una] in divinis T 10 nunc] sicut T 12 sed distinctio originis] originis distinctio T 15 nec valet] ut patet *a.c. s.l.* T | est] *om.* B 16 directe] directus B 18 ergo] hoc *add.* T 20 distinguat] distinguatur T | originis] scilicet *add.* B 22 sola] solum T 24 est] *om.* B 27 reservari] reservati T

17 *Articuli condemnati a Stephano episcopo Parisiensi anno 1277*, no. 81 (43), in *La condamnation parisienne de 1277*, ed. D. PICHÉ with C. LAFLEUR, Paris 1999, p. 104.

18 Hic supra, § 15.

19 AUGUST., *Contra Maximinum* II c. 14 n. 8, PL 42, col. 775.

[33] Tertio, ratio aliquorum talis est: distinctio disparata quae solum est inter generationem et processionem praesupponit distinctionem inter Filium et Spiritum Sanctum secundum relationes oppositas, ergo talis distinctio disparata non est causa sufficiens distinguendi Filium et Spiritum Sanctum, circumscriptis relationibus oppositis, quae sunt spirare et spirari. Consequentia patet, quia causa sufficiens alicuius effectus nullam aliam praesupponit ad esse talis effectus. Antecedens probatur: differentia realis quae est inter generationem et spirationem praesupponit tam generantem quam genitum esse spirantem, quod patet, quia ex hoc ostenditur spirare realiter differe a generare quia stat cum opposito ipsius generare, scilicet cum generari; sed generantem et genitum spirare importat utrumque habere oppositionem relativam ad spiratum secundum spirare et spirari; quare distinctio realis inter generationem et spirationem secundum disparationem praesupponit distinctionem inter genitum et spiratum secundum relationes oppositas, quae sunt spirare et spirari, quod fuit antecedens.

[34→33] Sed licet conclusio istius rationis vera sit, ratio tamen non concludit, propter duo. Primo, quia propositio assumpta in probatione antecedentis, scilicet quod illud quod stat cum opposito alterius differat ab eo realiter, non videtur vera in divinis, ubi idem indistinctum realiter potest stare cum oppositis proprietatibus propter suam illimitationem, ut patet de essentia divina, et pari ratione quaelibet proprietas quae est idem essentiae. Secundo, quia, dato quod esset vera, forma tamen arguendi non videtur bona. Non enim ex hoc aliqua differunt realiter quia unum potest stare cum opposito alterius, sed potius e converso. Verbi gratia, constat quod dulce stare cum opposito albi, puta cum nigro, non est causa quare dulce et album differant, sed solum signum. Ergo a simili in proposito, spirare stare cum opposito ipsius generare non erit causa quare spirare et generare realiter differant, sed solum signum, cum tamen consequentia non teneat nisi in antecedente sumatur quod distinctio disparata praesupponat distinctionem secundum relationes oppositas tanquam causam eius.

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1 ratio aliquorum] ratione alia quae T | solum] *om.* B 2 generationem et processionem] *inv.* T 3 secundum] sibi T 8 spirantem] spiratem B; spiratum T 9 realiter differe] inv. T; re *add. sed del.* T 9–10 quia² … scilicet] *ante* 'quia ex hoc' T 10 cum²] scilicet cum T 11 habere] hinc B; vel utrumque T; relationem *add. sed del.* T | oppositionem relativam] *inv.* T 12 spirare] formare T | quare] fuit accidens *add. sed exp.* T 13 disparationem] disparatam T 19 indistinctum realiter] in divinis realiter indistinctum T 21 idem] de ratione T 22 videtur] est T 24 converso] vera *add. sed del.* T | stare] potest *add.* T 25 nigro] cognitio *add.* T | differant] differunt T | ergo] et *add.* T 27 spirare et generare] *inv.* T 28 antecedente] generatur vel *add.* T | sumatur] summatur B 29 causam] causa T

[35] Et ideo melius potest dici consequenter dictis in praecedenti quaestione[20] quod ratio quare distinctio realis disparata praesupponit in divinis distinctionem per opposita tanquam causam eius est quod relatio disparata in divinis non distinguat nisi ubi induit rationem oppositi, ut etiam prius probatum fuit.[21]

⟨Articulus tertius⟩

[36] Istarum autem opinionum quae sit verior quamdiu per fidem ambulamus non est facile videre, quia, sicut dicit AUGUSTINUS, *Epistola* 32, 6 quaestione, in fine:[22] "Innumerabiles quaestiones sunt quae non sunt finiendae ante fidem ne finiatur vita sine fide. Sed plane, retenta iam fide, ad exercendum piam delectationem mentium fidelium studiosissime requirendae, et quod in eis eluxerit, sine typho arrogantiae communicandum; quod autem latuerit, sine salutis dispendio sustinendum."

⟨Opinio auctoris quod solum per rationes oppositas⟩

[37] Cum omni tamen reverentia et sine praeiudicio, videtur mihi secunda opinio verisimilior prima, et ad hoc moveor quia videtur dictis sanctorum magis consona et rationi meae magis consentanea. Constat enim quod sancti non ponunt pluralitatem personarum nisi per originem, quia | dicit HILARIUS in B 68rb
libro *De synodis*:[23] "Ponere plures ingenitos," hoc est non-procedentes ab alio, "est ponere plures deos." Pluralitas ergo personarum in divinis non est nisi per originem. Ordo autem originis, secundum AUGUSTINUM, *Contra Maximinum*,[24] solum attenditur ubi unus est ex alio. Et ideo sublata ratione originis huius ab hoc, videtur auferri omnis ordo et distinctio.

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3 causam] causa T | quod] quia T 4 distinguat] distinguit T 8 videre] iudicare T | dicit augustinus] *inv.* T; in *add.* T | 32] *om.* T | quaestione] 12 *add.* T 9 quaestiones] rationes T | fidem] finem BT 9–10 ne finiatur] nec sumatur T 10 plane retenta] plene recempta T | ad exercendum] ad extendum B; *om.* T 10–11 delectationem] dilectionem T 12 arrogantiae] arrogantem B | salutis] solutis T 15 omni tamen] enim omni T 17 consona] consonans T | meae] vitae T 18 ponunt] ponerent T | per] secundum T | dicit] *om.* B 19 non-procedentes] non-procedere *a.c. s.l.* T | alio] uno T 20 deos] dictus B | ergo] igitur T 22 unus] unum T | alio] altero T

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20 HENR. DE FRIMARIA, *Quaestiones ordinariae de Verbo* q. 2.

21 Hic supra, § 15.

22 AUGUST., *Epistola* 102 (*Sex quaestiones contra paganos expositiae*) q. 6 n. 38, PL 33, col. 385.

23 HILARIUS PICTAVENSIS, *De synodis* c. 38 no. XXVI, PL 10, col. 512, et c. 59 n. XXVI, PL 10, col. 521.

24 AUGUST., *Contra Maximinum* II c. 14 n. 8, PL 42, col. 775.

[38] Huius etiam sententiae, quod videlicet in divinis solum distinguat relationis oppositio, maxime fuit Anselmus, ut patet in *De processione Spiritus Sancti*, capitulo 2 circa principium, dicens:[25] "Supradicta relationis oppositio, quae ex hoc innascitur quod Deus est de Deo, prohibet Patrem et Filium et Spiritum Sanctum de invicem dici et propria singulorum aliis attribui."

[39] Et si dicatur quod loquitur de illa oppositione in relativis qua Filius et Spiritus Sanctus sunt de solo Patre, non Spiritus Sanctus sic de Filio, prout videtur innuere eodem capitulo circa finem, ubi dicit quod[26] "si per aliud non essent plures Filius et Spiritus Sanctus, per hoc solum essent diversi quia unus procedit nascendo, alter procedendo," hoc non valet, quia ibi loquitur disputative contra adversarium, volens quod ex sola suppositione duplicis processionis realis habetur quod in divinis personae procedentes realiter sunt distinctae. Distinctio tamen realis duarum processionum non esset nisi per originem qua unus productorum est ab alio. Et quod hoc sit sua intentio maxime patet per hoc quod in fine suae disputationis concludit eandem esse causam distinctionis Spiritus Sancti a Patre et a Filio, dicens sic:[27] "Si Pater et Filius et Spiritus Sanctus bini considerentur, liquet ex his quae dicta sunt, quoniam necesse est alterum ex altero aut esse, quia ille non est ex se, aut non esse, quia ille est ex se." Et hoc declarat, subdens: "Nam si conferamus Patrem et Filium, videbimus Filium esse de Patre, quia Pater non est de illo, et e converso Patrem non esse de Filio, quia Filius est de illo. Et similiter si consideremus Patrem et Spiritum
T 80^{vb} Sanctum, inveniemus Spiritum Sanctum | esse de Patre, quia Pater non est de illo, et e converso Patrem non esse de Spiritu Sancto, quia Spiritus Sanctus est de illo." Et hanc eandem regulam subdit de Filio et Spiritu Sancto, dicens: "Ita quoque, si Filius et Spiritus Sanctus quomodo sint alii ab invicem speculemur,

1 sententiae] finem T | distinguat] distinguit T 2 processione] processu T 3 dicens] enim* T 4 filium et] *om.* B 5 invicem dici et] vicem dici et B; in mentem dicitur T 6 in] *om.* B 7 solo patre] *inv.* T | sic] sit B 8 innuere] in numero T | circa finem ubi dicit] *om.* T | non] *om.* T 9 essent[2]] esset T 10 ibi loquitur] ostenditur T 11 duplicis] durentis* *a.c. s.l.*[2] B 12 habetur] requiritur T 14 productorum] productor T | maxime] *om.* T 15 disputationis] dispositionis T | esse causam] *inv.* T 16 a patre et] *s.l.* T 17 liquet] quia T 18 aut[1]] *om.* T 18–19 aut[2] ... se] *om.* (*hom.*) T 19 conferamus] consideremus T 20 de[1]] a T | et e converso] *ante* 'quia pater non est de illo' T 20–21 patrem ... illo] *om.* (*hom.*) T 22 esse] s. (*mg.*) B 23 et e converso] *iter.* T 24–25 ita quoque] itaque B; ita quod T

25 Anselmus, *De processione Spiritus Sancti* c. 1, *Opera omnia* II, ed. F.S. Schmitt (Edinburgh 1946), p. 179.27–30.

26 Anselmus, *De processione Spiritus Sancti* c. 1, ed. Schmitt, p. 185.10–11, 4.

27 Anselmus, *De processione Spiritus Sancti* c. 15, ed. Schmitt, 216.12–22.

intelligemus Spiritum Sanctum esse de Filio, quia Filius non est de illo, et e converso Filium non esse de Spiritu Sancto, quia Spiritus Sanctus est de illo."

[40] Sic ergo patet per ANSELMUM quod eadem est causa distinctionis Spiritus Sancti a Patre et a Verbo; sed constat quod non distinguitur a Patre nisi per oppositionem relativam suae originis qua procedit ab ipso; ergo nec distingueretur a Verbo si ab ipso non procederet.

⟨Ad rationes opinionis quod sic per rationes disparatas⟩

[41] Et per hoc potest responderi ad rationes alterius opinionis, quae utique sunt magnae apparentiae et probabilitatis.

[42→24] Ad primam, cum dicitur, "illo solo persona distinguitur personaliter a quacumque alia persona quo formaliter constituitur in esse personali," ad istam rationem dicit respondens quod illa est concedenda, si per illud principium constituatur persona in esse personali distinguibili a quacumque alia. Et cum assumitur in minori quod Filius constituitur in esse personali perfecto per nativitatem solum, respondet per interemptionem, quia per nativitatem Filius constituitur solum ut distinguibilis a Patre, per spirationem autem constituitur in esse personali distinguibili a Spiritu Sancto, ut sic imaginemur esse personale Filii integrari quodammodo ex duplici proprietate quarum neutra per se sufficeret ad constituendam personam Filii in esse perfecte distinguibili.

[43→42] Sed secundum hoc oporteret dicere quod communis spiratio esset proprietas personalis sicut paternitas et filiatio, cum concurrat in ratione constituitiva, perfecta, et distincta tam Patris quam Filii, quod repugnat communi sententiae doctorum, qui ponunt solum tres proprietates personales.

[44] Et ideo dico aliter quod haec ratio dupliciter potest solvi, primo quidem quia in ea videtur includi petitio principii. Nam maior propositio intelligitur quod principium formale constitutivum personae distinguit personaliter a quocumque, dummodo illud ponitur esse persona. Filiatio enim non distinguit Filium personaliter a sapientia, quia sapientia non est persona. Cuius ratio est quia formale principium constitutivum alicuius solum habet facere rem con-

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1 intelligemus] intll[9] T 1–2 converso] spiritum sanctum esse de filio *add. sed exp.* T 2 filium] filius T | non] *s.l.* T 3 per] quod B 8 et] *om.* T | responderi] respondi T | rationes] rationem B 10 illo] *iter.* B 10–11 personaliter] *om.* T 11 quacumque] qualibet T 12 dicit] dixit B | illa] ista T 13 constituatur persona] constit[ur] T 15 nativitatem[1]] mutationem T | respondet] respondit B | filius] *om.* B 16 solum] *post* 'interemptionem' B 17 imaginemur] imaginetur T 18 integrari] integrali T | duplici] dupla T 19 perfecte] perfecto T 20 esset] esse T 21–22 constituitiva perfecta] perfecta et constituitiva T 22 tam] causa T | quam] et T | quod] *om.* T 23 doctorum qui] dictorum quae B 25 includi] concludi T 26 personaliter] personam T 27 dummodo] de modo T | filiatio] filio B 29 constitutivum alicuius] *inv.* T 29–238.1 constitutam] constitutivam T

stitutam per se et primo esse unam et indivisam in se. Quod autem realiter vel personaliter distinguat ab alio, hoc concernit illud aliud esse rem vel personam, quia Sortes nec personaliter distinguitur ab albedine nec etiam realiter distinguitur a non ente. Nam sicut realis distinctio requirit utrumque distinctorum esse quid reale, ita personalis distinctio requirit utrumque distinctorum esse personam.

[45] Et cum assumitur in minori quod filiatio esset proprietas personalis Filii etsi Spiritus Sanctus ab eo non procederet, concedo, quia filiatio non dependet a processione Spiritus Sancti. Ergo sequitur in conclusione quod per filiationem Filius distinguatur a Spiritu Sancto, supposito quod Spiritus Sanctus sit persona processionis. Sed quia processio personarum solum est per originem, ideo, ex quo negas Spiritum Sanctum a Filio procedere, sequitur quod non sit persona distincta ab eo. Ex quo autem quod supponis eum esse personam procedentem, sequitur quod sit distinctus ab eo. Et ideo implicantur contradictoria et incompossibilia, videlicet quod sit procedens et non procedens, distinctus | et non distinctus. B 68va

[46→45] Sed ad hoc responderent illi qui sunt contrariae opinionis quod non sequitur Filium distingui secundum quid et non distingui simpliciter, sed distingui simpliciter et non distingui secundum quid. Non enim sequeretur quod Filius non distingueretur simpliciter, sed solum quod non distingueretur per spirare. Quo posito, adhuc posset distingui ut natus a spirato per alium modum procedendi. Nec etiam includuntur incompossibilia, quia tunc solum includuntur incompossibilia quando privatur aliquid quod est de principali significato ipsius positi, sicut si ponatur homo et non rationalis. Et quia spirare non includitur in significato nati, ideo ponendo natum non spirare, licet ponatur quoddam impossibile, non tamen ponuntur incompossibilia.

[47→46] Sed ista non valent, quia, ut ostensum est supra,[28] non potest Filius distingui a Spiritu Sancto realiter ut natus nisi sit spirans, et ideo ablato spirare, sequitur quod nullo modo realiter ab eo distinguatur.

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1 unam et indivisam] unum et indivisum T 2 illud] istud T 7 proprietas personalis] *inv.* T 8 etsi] acsi *a.c. s.l.* T | procederet] procederetur T | quia] quod T 9–10 quod per filiationem] per similitudinem quod T 10 sanctus] *om.* T 13 quo autem] eo enim T | eum] ipsum T 13–14 personam] per semet T 14 procedentem] procedentm *a.c. s.l.* B | ideo] sequitur vel *add.* T 15 incompossibilia] impossibilia T 17 responderent] responderet B; dicunt T | illi] aliqui T 18 secundum quid] *om.* B 19 simpliciter] *om.* B 22 procedendi] producendi B | incompossibilia] impossibilia T | tunc] *om.* T 26 ponatur quoddam] quod* ponatur T | tamen] *om.* B | ponuntur] ponentur T 27 ista non valent] *om.* T | ostensum] visum T 28 spirare] spirato T

28 Hic supra, § 42.

[48] Aliud etiam non valet, quia licet non sit de ratione Filii unde Filius quod sit spirans, est tamen de ratione eius unde realiter a Spiritu Sancto distinctus. Et ideo ponere hoc totum aggregatum, scilicet Filium a Spiritu Sancto realiter distinctum et quod non spiret, est privare aliquid de significato positi, sicut licet album non sit de ratione Sortis simpliciter, est tamen de ratione eius ut contrarie distinguitur a Platone nigro, et ideo ponere quod distinguatur contrarie ab ipso, et tamen non sit albus, est ponere opposita. Et est sciendum quod aliud est sequi contradictoria ex hypothesi et aliud ex natura rei, ut infra patebit.[29]

[49] Posset etiam dici secundo quod maior est vera in creaturis, ubi formale principium constitutivum est aliquid absolutum et ideo in eo includitur incompossibilitas ad quodcumque aliud, sive oppositum sive disparatum. In divinis autem, ubi pluralitas habetur solum per originem et distinctio solum habetur per relationem, ibi persona originata per suum formale principium constitutivum non distinguitur nisi a principio originante, quia suum formale principium constitutivum solum ad ipsum oppositum habet.

[50→26] Ad secundum, cum dicitur, "quando in aliquo sunt plura principia constitutiva, unum essentiale et proprium, aliud commune et | adventicium, T 81ra
sublato communi et adventicio, adhuc remanet proprium," concedatur. Cum assumitur, "sed unumquodque magis distinguitur ab alio per suum proprium quam per commune," haec est vera secundum quod in ipso essentiali principio includitur ratio distincta, et non aliter. Unde quia filiatio est propria Filio, non autem spiratio, ideo magis distinguitur a Patre filiatione quam spiratione quia filiatio habet oppositionem ad Patrem et non spiratio. Sed ex hoc non sequitur quod magis distinguatur a Spiritu Sancto per filiationem quam per spirationem, vel quod, remota spiratione, distinguatur ab ipso filiatione, quia filiatio non habet oppositionem ad Spiritum Sanctum, sed sola spiratio. Et ideo per spirationem magis distinguitur a Spiritu Sancto quam per filiationem. Et hoc maxime patet in Patre. Constat enim quod Pater non principalius distinguitur

2 sancto] divisus vel *add.* T 3 ponere hoc] *inv.* T | aggregatum] a spiritu sancto *add. sed del.* T | realiter] *om.* T 4 quod] cum B | positi] principali T 6 a platone] appellatione T 7 albus] album B 8 hypothesi] hypostasi B 9 ubi] ut B 10 in] ex *a.c. s.l.* T 10–11 includitur incompossibilitas] includuntur incompossibilitatis T 11 quodcumque] quod cum quia T | sive[1]] sit *add.* T | sive[2]]sit *add.* T 12 autem] *om.* T | pluralitas] personalitas *a.c.* T | solum[1]] *ante* 'pluralitas habetur' B | et distinctio] *om.* B 13 ibi persona] nam T | suum] solum B 14–15 non ... constitutivum] *om.* (*hom.*) B 15 ipsum oppositum] ipsam B 16 cum] quando T | plura] *om.* B 17 adventicium] adventurum T 18 communi et adventicio] quidem advenscero T 21–22 non autem] et non T 22 spiratione] spirare B 24 distinguatur] *om.* B 25 distinguatur] distinguitur B | ipso] filiatione spiratione *add. sed del.* T 27 distinguitur] distinguetur B | a] *om.* T

29 Hic infra, § 65.

a Spiritu Sancto per paternitatem, quae est sibi propria, quam per spirationem, quae est ei communis cum Filio, quod tamen oporteret si universaliter unumquodque magis distingueretur a quocumque per essentiale et proprium quam per commune et adventicium. Hoc enim solum veritatem habet in absolutis, ut visum est.[30] Nec tamen dicendum quod communis spiratio sit simpliciter adventicia, quia sic non esset naturalis proprietas. Sed quia supervenit secundum modum intelligendi proprietati personali, pro tanto adventicia potest dici. Si enim adventicium distinguatur contra naturale, sic spiratio non debet dici adventicia, cum sit proprietas naturalis. Si autem contra proprium et personale, sic potest dici adventicia.

[51→27] Ad tertiam rationem, quae continet vim multarum rationum, dico per interemptionem minoris. Ad probationem primi membri, "Tu probas quod sunt distinctae relationes, quia una formaliter aliam non includit," dico quod haec probatio laborat ab insufficienti. Ad dualitatem enim distinctam duarum relationum non sufficit quod una formaliter aliam non includat, quia licet ratio sapientiae non includat formaliter, sed solum identitate, rationem bonitatis, non tamen bonitas et sapientia sunt duae distinctae perfectiones in divinis. Quare a simili nec istae erunt duae relationes distinctae, licet una aliam non includat.

[52] Ad secundum membrum, cum dicitur quod sunt reales quia sunt proprietates personales, et ideo, cum personae sint quid reale et realiter distinguuntur, necesse est et huiusmodi relationes esse reales et realiter distinctas, dico quod verum est ex quo sunt proprietates personales, quia oportet eas realiter distingui. Sed tamen proprietates personales realiter distinctae non essent si una personarum ab alia non procederet. Quod patet per RICHARDUM, V *De Trinitate*, capitulo 10,[31] qui concludit ibidem quod "differentia proprietatum in solo consistit numero producentium, nam prima habet esse a nulla alia, secunda ab una sola, tertia vero a gemina."

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1 sibi] *om.* T 2 est ei communis] ei communis est T | tamen oporteret si universaliter] si oporteret videtur* T 3 distingueretur] distinguere B; distingui T 5 visum] ostensum T 6 adventicia] adiiii'ticia T | sic] sicut T | esset] est T 8 adventicium] adiiii'ticium T (*def.* B) 8–10 si … adventicia] *om.* (*hom.*) B 10 adventicia] adventiciam T (*def.* B) 11 tertiam] aliam T | vim multarum rationum] unum multa primo T 15 includat] intelligit B 16 bonitatis] voluntatis T 17 bonitas] voluntas T 18 istae] illae T 21 et[2]] *om.* T 23–24 sunt … tamen] *om.* (*hom.*) T 24 essent] eent T 25 richardum] 13 ch' T 26 concludit] convenit B 27 producentium] ab una sola *add. sed exp.* T | prima] persona B 28 secunda] vero *add.* T

30 Hic supra, § 49.

31 RICHARDUS DE SANCTO VICTORE, *De Trin.* V c. 10, ed. J. RIBAILLIER (Paris 1958), p. 208.23–25.

[53] Tertium membrum de incommunicabilitate concedatur, quia utraque, si ponatur, erit incommunicabilis, cum sit proprietas personalis.

[54] Ad quartum, cum probas quod "sunt incompossibiles in eodem supposito," "quia cuilibet productioni perfecte respondet in divinis terminus perfectus subsistens," et ideo "impossibile | est duabus productionibus eandem B 68vb personam accipere esse," dico quod ratio bene concludit, si ponantur in divinis duae productiones realiter distinctae, quod oportet poni eorum terminos realiter distinctos. Sed tamen duae productiones in divinis realiter distinctae non essent nisi includerent terminos per formalem oppositionem realiter distinctos, ut patet ex quaestione praecedenti.[32] Et ideo ratio petit propositum, quia ex quo negatur tertiam personam a secunda procedere, non potest salvari realis distinctio emanationum, quae tamen ab istis supponitur, cum ex earum distinctione inferant realem distinctionem terminorum productorum. Unde omnes tales deductiones et propositum petunt et opposita includunt, ut prius visum est.[33]

⟨Ad argumenta opponentis et solutiones respondentis⟩

[55→1*] Per hoc ad argumenta. Ad primum, cum dicitur quod "in aliquo sunt plura principia distinctiva, unum essentiale"[34] et intrinsecum, aliud adventicium, sicut prius,[35] ad hoc dixit respondens quod maior est vera ubi principium constitutivum distinguit personam a quolibet alio, non autem ubi distinguit solum ab hoc, puta filiatio solum distinguit Filium a Patre, non autem a Spiritu Sancto. Et ideo, licet spiratio sit adventicia Filio respectu Patris, a quo sufficienter filiatione distinguitur, non tamen respectu Spiritus Sancti, a quo solum per spirationem distinguitur.

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1 incommunicabilitate concedatur] communicabilitate concedo T 3 incompossibiles] compossibiles BT 6 concludit] personae distinctae *add. sed del./exp.* T 8–10 duae … distinctos] *iter.* T (nisi] termini *vice 1a*; non *vice 2a* || includerent] includentes *vice 1a*; includent *vice 2a*; realiter distinctos] *inv. vice 2a*) 10 quia] *om.* T 11 negatur] negat T 13 inferant] inferat T 14 tales] talis B; reales T | et] *om.* T 17 argumenta] argumentum BT 18–19 aliud adventicium] adnunticium T 21 solum] aliter T | ab] ad B 22 adventicia] adventitio B; adnunticio T 23 filiatione distinguitur] *inv.* T

32 Henr. de Frimaria, *Quaestiones ordinariae de Verbo* q. 2.

33 Hic supra, §§ 44–45.

34 Cf. supra, § 26, but this is not the referent; above it is number 2.

35 Cf. supra, § 50.

[56] Contra hoc quod arguebatur,[36] "per illud formaliter distinguitur aliquid personaliter a quocumque alio per quod formaliter constituitur in esse personali, sed Filius solum constituitur filiatione, quare etc.," responsionem respondentis require ubi supra, cum dubitatione inducta contra ipsam. Utrumque istorum solutum est in corpore solutionis.[37]

[57→2*] Ad secundum, cum dicitur, "generatio et processio sunt duae relationes reales, sed duae relationes, etsi possint fundari in eodem supposito agente de necessitate, tamen requirunt distinctionem realem terminorum, quare cum termini istarum relationum sint Filius et Spiritus Sanctus, videtur quod essent realiter distincti etiam si unus ab alio non procederet," ad hoc dicit respondens quod duae relationes requirunt talem diversitatem ex parte terminorum qualem habent ex parte principii, et ideo sicut ex parte principii compatiuntur se in eodem supposito, ita etiam ex parte terminorum se compatiuntur nisi unus ab alio procedat.

T 81^{rb} [58→57] Contra: ex parte principii | nulla est repugnantia quin idem suppositum perfectum habens ex se omnem fecunditatis plenitudinem possit plura producere; sed ex parte terminorum includitur repugnantia, quia termino per unam emanationem perfecte producto repugnat esse terminum alterius emanationis; quare non est simile.

[59→58] Dicendum quod verum est quod, supposita reali alietate ipsarum emanationum, quod uni producto repugnat esse terminum utriusque emanationis. Sed quia emanationes non essent distinctae realiter si unus productorum non esset ab alio, ideo ratio non concludit, sed perit. Dico ergo ad maiorem principaliter quod generatio et processio non essent duae relationes reales nec realiter distinctae si unus terminorum productorum ab altero non procederet. Sed concesso quod sint reales in solo Patre respectu productorum disparatorum ab ipso solo procedentium, oportet concedere quod ipsi termini sint realiter distincti, ut ostendebat deductio contra respondentem inducta.

[60] Deinde arguebatur contra rationem respondentis, quae talis erat: Filius distinguitur a Spiritu Sancto vel propter diversum modum procedendi vel quia

1 quod] *om.* T 1–2 formaliter … quocumque] aliquid distinguitur personaliter formaliter a quolibet T 2–3 personali] personae BT 3 sed] sicut B | filiatione] in esse personae per filiationem T 4 ubi] ut B | ipsam] ipsum ad T 6 dicitur] arguitur T | duae] processiones vel *add.* T 7 reales sed duae relationes] *om.* (*hom.*)T | etsi] ac si T 8 tamen] iii' T 9 istarum] illarum T 10 realiter distincti] *inv.* T | dicit] dixit B 11 quod] quo B 18 alterius] productionis vel *add.* T 20 reali alietate] realitate T 22 quia] quod T 23 perit] peccat T 25 altero] alio T 26 productorum] praedictorum B 28 inducta] reductum T 30 vel[1]] et B

36 Cf. supra, § 24, but this is not the referent; above it is number 1.

37 Cf. supra, §§ 42–44.

unus est ab alio; sed impossibile est dare alium modum nisi iste procedat ab alio; ergo impossibile ⟨est⟩ eos esse distinctos nisi unus procedat ab alio. Maior ab omnibus conceditur. Minorem probat, quia procedere per modum voluntatis convenit tripliciter intelligi: vel per modum libertatis arbitrii, vel per modum naturalis principii, vel per modum voluntatis ut distinguitur contra modum naturae in quantum processio per modum naturae nullam aliam praesupponit, per modum autem voluntatis praesupponit illam quae est per modum naturae ut est principium. Non potest dari primum, quia sic procedunt creaturae, quae possunt procedere et non procedere. Nec secundum, quia sic solum communicaretur Spiritui Sancto velle et amare eo quod nihil communicetur producto nisi quod in eius formali ratione includitur. Ergo relinquitur tertium membrum, quod procedit per modum voluntatis praesupponentis aliam productionem tanquam eius principium. Sicut enim voluntas oritur a natura, ita procedens per modum voluntatis oritur ab eo quod procedit per modum naturae.

[61→60] Contra secundum membrum arguitur sic: si Spiritui Sancto, quia procedit a voluntate ut natura sive naturaliter, non communicaretur nisi velle, ergo eadem ratione Filio procedenti ab intellectu naturaliter non | communicaretur nisi intelligere. Consequens est falsum; ergo et antecedens. B 69ra

[62] Praeterea, quia in divinis est idem esse intelligibile cum esse naturali, ideo Filio, cui communicatur esse intelligibile in quantum est conceptio intellectus paterni, communicatur esse naturale, ergo eadem ratione Spiritui Sancto, cui ex modo procedendi communicatur esse volubile, communicabitur esse naturale. Et haec concedenda sunt iuxta determinata in quaestione praecedenti,[38] ubi etiam illa ratio respondentis soluta est in solutione instantiae contra primum argumentum.

[63] Ad principale sic: si Spiritus Sanctus in divinis procederet a solo Filio, esset realiter distinctus a Patre, ergo eadem ratione si procederet a solo Patre, erit realiter distinctus a Filio. Consequentia patet, quia utrobique est eadem ratio distinctionis, scilicet relatio disparata. Antecedens probatur, quia si non,

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3 probat] probaverat B 4 arbitrii] *om.* (*lacuna*) B 7 illam] illa T 8 est] eius T | procedunt] procederent T 9 possunt] possent T | quia] quod B 10 eo] et T 11 tertium] mod' vel *add.* T 12 praesupponentis] praesuppositis B; praesuppositionis T | aliam] *iter.* B 14 voluntatis] procedit ab eo vel *add.* T 15 quia] *om.* T 16 ut] a *add.* T | communicaretur] communicatur* B 17 filio] filio T | non] communi *add.* B 19 est idem] *inv.* T 20 cui] *om.* T | conceptio] acceptio T 21 naturale] *om.* T 22 cui] t^2 B; est *add. sed. del.* T | modo] communicandi *add.* T | esse volubile] velle T 23–24 quaestione praecedenti] *inv.* T 27 procederet] procedat B 28–29 eadem ratio distinctionis] ratio distinctionis eadem B 29 quia] quare T

38 Henr. de Frimaria, *Quaestiones ordinariae de Verbo* q. 2.

tunc Spiritus Sanctus esset eadem persona cum Patre, et per consequens, sicut Filius procedit a Patre, ita procederet a Spiritu Sancto, quod est absurdum.

[64→63] Dico quod, sicut dixit respondens, quod consequentia non valet, quia in antecedente includitur contradictio. Cum enim sit eadem potentia productiva sicut et idem esse Patris et Filii, impossibile est aliquid procedere a Filio nisi procedat a Patre, et ideo, si ponatur aliquid procedere a solo Filio, sequitur quod procedat et non procedat.

[65→4*] Ad quartum, cum dicitur, "quaelibet persona in divinis ex hoc accipit esse distinctum quod ab alio procedit; sed non minus perfecte procederet Spiritus Sanctus a solo Patre quam nunc procedat a duobus; ergo non minus esset distinctus a solo Patre procedens quam si procedat ab utroque," dico quod, licet non minus perfecte procederet a solo Patre quam nunc procedat a duobus, per hoc tamen quod procederet a Patre non distingueretur a Verbo, quia persona procedens solum distinguitur in divinis a principio a quo procedit.

[66→5*] Ad quintum, cum dicitur, "supposita hypothesi, adhuc realiter distingueretur a Filio, quia aut uterque a Patre solo procederet aeque primo, quod esse non potest, cum actus voluntatis realiter praesupponat actum intellectus, aut ordinaliter, et sic prius ordine naturae procederet Verbum quam Spiritus Sanctus; sed impossibile est quod Verbum productum in priori signo naturae accipiat esse in posteriori correspondente actui voluntatis, quia sic idem esset prius et posterius se ipso; ergo relinquitur quod Spiritus Sanctus, cuius productio intelligitur terminari in posteriori signo, de necessitate sit alius distinctus ab alio realiter," dico cum respondente quod, posita hypothesi, istae emanationes essent omnino alterius rationis quam modo, et ideo non essent distinctae realiter, sed solum secundum rationem. Et per consequens inter terminos illarum emanationum nullus esset ordo realis, sed solum secundum rationem, qui non sufficit ad realem personarum distinctionem.

[67→66] Sed arguitur contra rationem respondentis dupliciter. Primo, quia videtur procedere ab insufficienti. Obmittit enim quartum membrum possibile, quod est quod modus voluntatis differt a modo intellectus, quia voluntas producit aliquem per modum expressionis, intellectus autem per modum
T 81va impressionis; sed iste | est alius a praedictis; quare etc.

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1 eadem persona] *inv.* T 3 valet] quia *add. sed del.* T 5 a filio] *om.* B 6 procedat] procederet T 9 quod] quia T | perfecte] *om.* T 10 nunc] non T 12 perfecte] profecte T 16 ad quintum] *om.* B | hypothesi] hypostasi B | realiter] *om.* T 17 aut] autem B | patre solo] *inv.* T 18 realiter] naturaliter T 23 intelligitur] intenditur T 23–24 distinctus ab alio realiter] realiter distinctus ab alio T 24 hypothesi] hypostasi B 25 rationis] r' B 27 qui] quod T 29 sed] 6 B; sexto T 32 aliquem] aliquid T

[68] Secundo, quia licet voluntas sit libera respectu finis, non est tamen arbitrio libera, quia de necessitate immutabilitatis terminabilis tendit in finem sicut intellectus in principia; sed haec necessitas est alia ab illa—quod patet, quia haec necessitas voluntatis consequitur actum ex ipso obiecto, quod ex plenitudine suae bonitatis immobilitat suam voluntatem, sed intellectus habet necessitatem praevenientem actum, quia praesente intelligibili de necessitate intellectus movetur in ipsum; ergo distinctio tua fuit insufficiens.

[69→67] Ad primum istorum dico cum respondente quod, sive intellectus et voluntas comparentur ad actus suos elicitos sive ad producta, neutro modo distinctio videtur habere veritatem. Quod patet: cum enim, secundum istam positionem, utraque potentia sit activa respectu sui actus, oportet quod, sicut intellectus causans actum intelligendi in se ipso imprimit sibi actum intelligendi per quem conformatur intelligibili, ita voluntas causans in se suum actum imprimit sibi actum volendi per quem tendit in rem volitam. Et ita, quantum est ex parte actus causaliter eliciti a potentiis, non magis intellectus agit per modum impressionis quam voluntas. Immo, si diligentius consideretur, cum actus intellectus sit similitudo obiecti, et non actus voluntatis, similitudo autem alicuius causata in altero dicatur in eo fieri per modum expressionis, sicut dicimus quod haec imago est similitudo Herculis expressa in lapide per actum artificis, secundum hoc magis proprie diceremus quod intellectus agit per modum expressionis quam voluntas.

[70] Si vero intellectus et voluntas comparentur ad ipsa producta, similiter videtur distinctio dubia. Dicunt enim quod intellectus paternus de se ipso quasi substantive et materialiter producit | Verbum per modum impressionis B 69^{rb} in quantum in se ipsum ut nudum imprimit notitiam simplicem secundum quam est in actu, voluntas autem de se ipsa quasi substantive et materialiter producit amorem intentum per modum expressionis. Hoc enim non capio. Quicquid producitur de aliquo quasi substantive et materialiter, oportet produci per modum impressionis. Semper enim agens in materia de qua substantive aliquid producit formam intentam imprimit. Et ideo, in quantum ex parte

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2 arbitrio] *om.* T | immutabilitatis terminabilis tendit] innumerabilis tamen B 4 haec necessitas] *inv.* T | quod] quia T 5 bonitatis] voluntatis B | suam] *om.* B 6 actum] intellectum T | praesente intelligibili] praesentem intellectui quia T 9 producta] praedicta BT 11 potentia] positio T 12 actum] actus T | imprimit] etiam primit T 13 quem] quam BT | intelligibili] intellectui T 14 quem] quam T 18 modum] impressionis vel *add.* T 22 intellectus] intelligit' B 22–23 similiter] simpliciter T 23 distinctio] positio T | paternus] prius T 24 substantive] subiective T 26 quam] quod T | substantive] subiective T 27 intentum] intentim B 27–29 hoc … impressionis] *om.* (*hom.*) T 27 capio] quia *add. sed exp.* B (*def.* T) 29 in materia] in materiale B; media T 29–30 substantive] subiective T 30 intentam] iniii'tam T | in] *om.* T

principii, de quo uterque producitur quasi materialiter, non plus imprimitur nec exprimitur unus quam alius. Nec etiam ipsa spiratio potest intelligi per modum expressionis in quantum spiratio est quidam flatus, quia ibi non debet intelligi flatus per modum emissionis alicuius ad extra, sed solum per modum spirationis ad intra, videlicet in quantum actus spirandi terminatur ad productum subsistens. Et sic, cum actus dicendi terminetur similiter ad productum subsistens, non minus dicetur Verbum produci per modum expressionis quam Spiritus Sanctus.

[71→68] Ad secundum, dico quod voluntas non minus habet necessitatem praevenientem actum quam intellectus, quia sicut intellectus naturaliter tendit in principia, ita voluntas in finem. In omni autem eo quod naturaliter tendit in aliud, oportet praeexistere naturalem habitudinem et inclinationem illius tendentiae. Et ideo ante omnem actum voluntatis oportet ponere quod in ea sit talis inclinatio quod ad praesentiam finis naturaliter, etiam immutabiliter, tendat in ipsum sicut intellectus in principia.

[72→6*] Ad sextum, cum dicitur, "solo Patre producente erunt productiones realiter distinctae, et per consequens termini productionum," antecedens probabat: "constat quod solo Patre producente esset in eo generatio et spiratio; sed istae sunt duae actiones reales, quia eliciuntur a principiis realibus; sunt etiam realiter distinctae, quod patet, quia ex quo sunt actiones duae, oportet quod distinguantur, alias non essent duae; aut ergo distinguuntur se ipsis aut per principia aut per terminos; si se ipsis, ergo, cum sint reales, realiter distinguuntur; si per principia, quaero de illis principiis: aut differunt se ipsis aut per alia; si se ipsis, cum sint realia, realiter distinguuntur; et eodem modo dicendum est de terminis; aut igitur erit processus in infinitum aut oportebit dicere quod talia se ipsis realiter distinguuntur," dico consequenter praemissis per interemptionem antecedentis quod, cum omnis distinctio realis in divinis sit per formalem oppositionem relativam, si solus Pater generaret et spiraret, quod nec inter ipsas emanationes, nec inter principia emanationum, nec inter terminos esset distinctio realis, sed solum secundum rationem.

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1 uterque] hoc *add.* T 3–4 quia ... flatus] *om.* (*hom.*) B 5 ad[1]] ab B | videlicet] ut T 6–7 et ... subsistens] *om.* (*hom.*) B 7 dicetur] diceretur T | produci] producti B 12 inclinationem illius] intellectionem alius T 13 voluntatis] intellectus T 14 talis inclinatio] *inv.* T | etiam] et T 15 tendat] tendit T 17–18 antecedens probabat] *inv.* T 18 constat quod] stat ex T | in eo generatio] generatio in eo T 19 istae] illae T 20 actiones] *om.* T 22 si] ex *add.* T 23 distinguuntur] et eodem modo dicendum est de terminis *add. sed exp.* T | quaero] quae sunt T | illis] *om.* B 25 igitur] *om.* B 26 se ipsis realiter] realiter se ipsis T 27 distinctio realis] *inv.* T | divinis] realis *add.* T 28 solus] solum T | generaret et spiraret] generare et spirari T

[73] Ad probationem, cum dicitur, "ex quo sunt duae, oportet quod distinguantur," dico quod eo modo distinguuntur quod sunt duae. Non sunt autem duae nisi secundum rationem, quod dupliciter potest intelligi: vel secundum rationem formalem a parte rei quantum ad illos qui ponunt in divinis distinctionem rationum attributalium formaliter a parte rei, quae tamen ad distinctionem personarum non sufficit, cum omnia attributa inveniantur in qualibet persona; vel, sicut communius dicitur, istorum distinctio et pluralitas attenditur secundum rationem intelligendi. Et ideo dico quod istae actiones in Patre solo non distinguuntur nisi secundum rationem intelligendi, sive accipiantur secundum se, sive recipiantur per respectum ad terminos, sive in habitudine ad ipsa principia. Nam sicut bonitas et sapientia sunt duae perfectiones reales in Deo, quia quaelibet earum est divina essentia, non tamen sunt perfectiones realiter distinctae, sed solum secundum rationem intelligendi, ita, licet quaelibet istarum actionum posset dici realis propter identitatem sui cum essentia, non tamen quaelibet earum esset distincta ab alia. Et ideo probatio ab insufficienti processit. Non enim sequitur: 'si sint duae actiones | et quaelibet earum T 81^{vb} sit realis, ergo sunt realiter distinctae', immo est ibi fallacia consequentis.

[74→9*] Ad nonum, cum dicitur, "sicut dicere se habet ad productionem Filii, ita spirare ad productionem Spiritus Sancti; sed dicere fundatur in intelligere essentiali sub ratione primitatis, et ideo solum est in Patre; ergo et spirare fundabitur in volitione essentiali sub ratione primitatis, et ideo solum est in Patre, scilicet quod solum Pater spirabit," dico quod propositio assumpta in maiori in hoc attenditur quod, sicut dicere est productivum Verbi, ita spirare Spiritus Sancti, non autem in habitudine ad actum essentialem sub ratione primitatis. Et ideo, cum assumitur in minori quod "dicere fundatur in intelligere sub ratione primitatis," hoc ideo est quia ista productio est prima et nullam aliam praesupponit. Et ideo debet inferri per oppositum quod, quia spiratio non est productio prima, ideo non potest fundari "in volitione essentiali sub ratione primitatis," sed sub ratione mutuae concordiae duorum in una voluntate.

[75→10*] Ad decimum, "si Spiritus Sanctus a solo Patre procederet, distingueretur a Filio realiter, ergo per hoc quod non procedat a Filio non tollitur

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2 distinguuntur] quo distinguantur T 3 potest] posset T 5 rationum attributalium] r' attributa^{lium} B 6 cum omnia] *om.* (*lacuna*) B 9 non] differunt vel *add.* T | sive accipiantur] si autem accipiatur T 10 recipiantur] accipiatur T 12 earum] illarum T 13 solum] sunt *add.* B 16 enim] tamen T | sint] sunt T 18 ad^{1}] a B | cum] *om.* T | dicere se habet] differentiae se habent B 19 sancti] *om.* T | fundatur] fundantur B 20 et^{2}] *om.* T 21 volitione] volutione T 21–22 ideo ... solum] ita solus (*ut corr. hom.?*) B 23 dicere] differentiae *a.c.* T 26 ideo] ratio T | ista] ibi T 27 oppositum] opposita T | quia] productio *add. sed exp.* T 28 volitione] volutione T 30–31 distingueretur] distinguerentur *a.c.* T

eius distinctio ab ipso," antecedens probatur: "quia si procederet a Filio, tunc
B 69va spiratio actio esset simul | in Patre et Filio; aut ergo realiter differret a paternitate aut secundum rationem; non secundum rationem, quia stat cum opposito generare, scilicet cum generari; illud autem quod stat cum opposito alterius oportet ab eo realiter differre; et sic suppositum Patris esset plura supposita, quia in divinis non est dare rem nisi subsistentem; unde si in Patre sint duo realia, Pater erit duo supposita," dico quod ista ratio petit an spiratio sit distincta res a paternitate et an quaelibet relatio realis in divinis possit dici res, de quo non est disserendum ad praesens. Sed quantum sufficit ad argumentum, dico quod ratio non concludit intentum, quia tota deductione concessa solum habetur quod Spiritus Sanctus non potest procedere a Filio, quia sic Pater esset duo supposita, si in eo essent duo realia subsistentia. Sed quod esset distinctus ab eo realiter, hoc non concludit. Unde dico ad formam quod antecedens non est verum.

[76] Ad probationem, dico quod per hoc quod spiratio stat cum opposito ipsius generare non habetur quod ab ipso generare realiter differat, ut dictum est prius.[39] Esto tamen quod spiratio ab ipsa paternitate realiter differat et utraque sit ex Patre, ex hoc tamen non sequitur quod Pater sit duo supposita, ut postea infertur.[40] Et cum probatur, quia "in divinis non est dare nisi rem subsistentem," dico quod, si generare et spirare comparentur ad suos terminos oppositos, sic sunt duae relationes reales propter diversitatem terminorum a quibus numerum recipiunt. Sed si comparentur ad Patrem in quo sunt tanquam in supposito, sic dico quod, licet quaelibet earum sit res subsistens quae est Pater, non tamen quaelibet earum est distincta res, quia utraque per identitatem est id ipsum quod est Pater, sicut, licet quaelibet perfectio attributalis in divinis sit res, non tamen quaelibet earum est distincta res. Unde non sequitur quod Pater sit duo supposita.

[77] Deinde, quia dixit respondens quod Spiritus Sanctus non procederet a voluntate ut voluntas est, sed in quantum continet perfectionem cuiuslibet

1 probatur] probabat B | tunc] cum T 2 differret] dicerent T 3 non secundum rationem] *om.* (*hom.*) T 4 generare scilicet] *inv.* T 5 ab eo] *om.* T | esset] essent (*p.c.!*) B 7 pater erit duo] supposita patre esset duo realia supposita T 8 realis] *om.* T 10 intentum] in tantum T | tota] tunc B 10–11 habetur] habere B 11 sic] si *a.c.* T 12 duo] *iter.* T | sed quod esset] secundum quod esse T 13 realiter] sed *add.* T | concludit] convenit B; includit T 15 stat] fuit T 16–17 ut … differat] *om.* (*hom.*) B 17 ab] a T (*def.* B) 18 ex[1]] in T 19 postea] prius est T | quia] quod T | est] *om.* T 20 ad] a T 21 duae] *om.* B 22 recipiunt sed si] praecipiunt si autem T 23 dico quod] *om.* B | licet] *s.l.* T | earum] licet *add.* B 25 id] illud T | attributalis] attributa[lis] B; attribuibilis T 28 dixit] dixerat B | procederet] procedit T

39 Hic supra, § 54.
40 Hic supra, § 75.

alterius attributi, contra hoc arguitur dupliciter. Primo, quia, secundum hoc, Filius non plus procederet per modum similitudinis quam Spiritus Sanctus, quod est falsum, cum Filius dicatur imago, non autem Spiritus Sanctus.

[78→77] Dico interimendo consequentiam. Non enim ex perfectione principii elicitivi istarum emanationum, nec etiam ex ratione termini per emanationem communicati, plus habet Filius quod sit similis quam Spiritus Sanctus, cum principium utriusque emanationis sit aeque perfectum, et etiam terminus communicatus utrobique est idem, scilicet natura divina. Sed ex hoc habet Filius procedere per modum similis quia procedit per modum naturae, de cuius ratione est similitudo speciei a quo procedit. Spiritus autem Sanctus procedit per modum amoris, de cuius ratione, in quantum huiusmodi, non est quod sit similis ei a quo procedit, sed solum quod similitudo sit ratio et principium amoris, licet etiam talis amor in divinis, in quantum subsistens est in eadem natura producentis, possit dici similis producenti.

[79] Secundo ad idem, nam illa emanatio secundum quam procedit Spiritus Sanctus aut adaequatur suo principio aut non. Si non, tunc possunt esse plures productiones similes. Si sic, tunc erit tantum una productio in divinis, et per consequens non erunt ibi duo producta realiter distincta.

[80→79] Dico quod emanationem adaequari suo principio potest intelligi dupliciter: vel quantum ad perfectionis communicationem, vel quantum ad fecunditatis terminationem. Primo modo verum est quod quaelibet emanatio perfecte adaequat suum principium, quia per eam omnis perfectio, sive formaliter sive identitate contenta in principio, communicatur producto. Secundo autem modo non adaequat, quia, cum ibi sit duplex fecunditas, non potest terminari et evacuari per unam emanationem quantumcumque perfectam.

[81] Contra respondentem, quod productio per modum voluntatis non habeat ordinem ad productionem Filii, arguitur sic: voluntas et ipsum velle praesupponit intelligere; sed aliquod est intelligere quod non est productivum Filii, sed intelligere essentiale; ergo virtute illius intelligere potest voluntas exire in actum spirandi ante productionem Filii.

[82→81] Dico quod intelligere essentiale non sufficit esse principium ut voluntas possit exire in actum | spirandi notionalem. Cuius ratio est quia eun- T 82ra
dem oportet esse ordinem in actibus notionalibus et essentialibus, et ideo, sicut

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1 arguitur] arguebatur B; quia *add. sed del.* T 2 procederet] produceret B 6 similis] communicatus T 7–8 terminus] in terminis T 8–9 habet filius] *inv.* T 12 et principium] *iter.* T 15 quam] quod T 16 sanctus aut] *inv.* T | tunc] cum T 19 emanationem] emanationum B; emanatio T 21 modo] *om.* B 23 communicatur producto] productivo communicatur T 24 duplex] dupliciter T 25 et] vel T 28 productivum] producᵛᵘᵘᵐ T 29 sed] sit T 32 notionalem] noᵃbiˡᵉᵐ B 32–33 eundem] eudem B

Pater non potest exire in actum essentialem volendi nisi praesupposita notitia essentiali, ita nec in actum notionalem spirandi nisi praesupposito actu dicendi.

[83→14*] Ad 14m, "si Pater et Filius producunt Spiritum Sanctum, aut in quantum unum aut in quantum plura; non in quantum plura, quia plura ut plura non concurrunt in actione una; nec in quantum unum, quia nec in quantum unum in natura, quia sic Spiritus Sanctus produceret se ipsum, nec in quantum unum in proprietate relativa, quia sic una proprietas numero esset in distinctis secundum speciem," dico quod ratio ab insufficienti procedit, quia nec producunt in
B 69vb quantum unum in natura nec in proprietate relativa— | quia proprietas relativa ex actu innascitur secundum modum intelligendi—sed in quantum unum in virtute spirativa, quae est voluntas mutua et concors duorum, ut patuit ex prima quaestione.[41]

[84] Et cum probatur quod una proprietas non possit esse in distinctis secundum speciem, dico quod, licet proprietates personales quasi specifice distinguuntur, supposita tamen constitutiva proper identitatem naturae communicatae non possunt in divinis distingui specie, sed numero solum, ut plenius alias poterit declarari.[42]

[85] Contra respondentem, qui dicit quod, si intellectus esset ratio productiva Filii, tunc Filio communicaretur tantum intelligere, contra: primo producto convenit procedere per modum intellectus; sed Filius est primum productum; ergo etc. Et sic Filio non communicarentur omnia quae sunt ipsius essentiae.

[86→85] Dico quod, sustinendo dictum respondentis, qui dixit quod nihil communicatur producto nisi quod formaliter includitur in ratione principii productivi, interimenda est maior. Sed quia in quaestione praecedenti[43] ostensum est quod non solum illud communicatur per principium productivum quod in ipso formaliter vel virtualiter includitur, verum etiam illud quod sibi virtualiter coniungitur vel quod identitate se habet ad ipsum, ideo, loquendo consequenter dictis, dico quod ista ratio contra praemissa non concludit.

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1 actum] notionalem *add. sed del.* T 1–2 notitia essentiali] *inv.* T 2 spirandi] spirativam T | actu] volendi vel *add.* T 7 in[1]] *om.* T 8–9 secundum] per B 9 producunt] productum T 10 in[1]] *om.* T 15 quasi] quia T 16 supposita tamen] *inv.* T 19 dicit] dixerat B 19–20 productiva filii] procede[a] filii productiva T 20 tunc] non B | primo] prima T 20–21 producto] productio B 21 procedere] *om.* T 21–22 productum] productiii' B; product[u] T 25 in] etiam B 26 productivi] producte' B; producti T | interimenda] interianda T | quia] *om.* T 28 quod[1]] quia B | sibi] *om.* T 30 ista] illa T

41 Henr. de Frimaria, *Quaestiones ordinariae de Verbo* q. 1 a. 2, ed. Scanzillo, pp. 45–48.

42 Perhaps Henr. de Frimaria, *Quodlibet* q. 4.

43 Henr. de Frimaria, *Quaestiones ordinariae de Verbo* q. 2.

[87→16*] Ad 16m, cum dicitur, "si a duabus personis produceretur tertia, pari ratione produceretur a tribus quarta et sic in infinitum; sed hoc est inconveniens; ergo et primum, quare relinquitur a solo Patre produci Spiritum Sanctum," dico quod, si essent plures personae productae in divinis quam duae, bona esset consequentia quod sicut tertia est a duabus, ita et quarta a tribus, quia personae non multiplicantur nisi per hoc quod prima est principium secundae. Sed quia ibi non est nisi fecunditas duplicis emanationis, ideo non sunt ibi nisi duae personae productae, quarum tamen una de necessitate est ab alia, et ideo consequentia non valet.

[88→17*] Ad 17m, "illa quae constituuntur per proprietates incompossibiles realiter distinguuntur etiam si unum ab alio non procedat; sed spirari et generari sunt proprietates incompossibiles; ergo etc.; minor declaratur, quia aut sunt incompossibiles, et sic habetur propositum, aut compossibiles, et sic possunt esse simul, et per consequens sunt simul, quia 'in aeternis non differt esse et posse,' III *Physicorum*,"[44] dico ad minorem per interemptionem. Licet enim ut nunc generari et spirari sint proprietates incompossibiles propter hoc quod constituunt duas personas realiter distinctas, si tamen una earum non esset ab alia, non remanerent duae personae realiter distinctae, et sic tolleretur incompossibilitas quae modo est inter eas.

[89→18*] Ad 18m, "illud quod est prius spiratione in Filio non est productum ab eo; sed Spiritus Sanctus est prior spiratione in Filio; ergo etc.; minor declaratur: quicquid est in non producto prius est eo quod invenitur in producto; spirare est in Patre; ergo prius quam in Filio; sed spirare et spirari sunt relativa; ergo prius quam Filius spiret, erit productus Spiritus Sanctus," dico per interemptionem minoris. Ad probationem, dico quod illa maior assumpta non est praecise vera, quia spirare non fundatur in virtute spirativa ut in Patre solo, sed ut concorditer est simul in Patre et Filio, et ideo non est verum quod "quicquid est in non producto sit prius eo quod invenitur in producto."

[90] Contra respondentem: "Illud quod advenit alicui in esse constituto non constituit ipsum; sed spiratio est huiusmodi; quare etc.," dico sicut in solutione primi argumenti dictum est, ubi eadem ratio tacta fuit.[45]

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1 duabus] tribus T | personis] *s.l.* T 2 produceretur a tribus] a tribus produceretur T 3–4 a … sanctum] quod a solo patre producitur spiritus sanctus T 4 quam] quare B 5 et quarta] quarta esset T 6 prima] persona T 7 sed] *om.* T 8 tamen] tantum T | de necessitate est] est de necessitate T 9 consequentia non valet] non valet consequentia T 13 sic[1]] *om.* B 16 ut] *om.* T | et] vel T 18 tolleretur] tollerentur T 19 quae] quo B 26 ut] *om.* T 27 simul] similis T | quicquid] illud quod convenit T 28 in] non *add.* T 30 quare] ergo T

44 ARISTOT., *Phys.* III c. 4, 203b30: *Auct. Arist.*, PhM 17, p. 148, no. 103.

45 Hic supra, § 55.

[91→20*] Ad 20m, "quod quiescit in alio non procedit ab ipso; sed Spiritus Sanctus quiescit in Filio; quare etc.," dico quod quiescere in alio potest esse dupliciter, vel tanquam in subiecto vel tanquam in obiecto amato. Quod primo modo quiescit in alio non procedit ab eo, maxime ut personaliter distinctum ab eo, quia subsistere in se et esse in alio substantive opposita sunt. Quod autem secundo modo quiescit in alio ut in obiecto amato nihil prohibet ab eo procedere et propriam subsistentiam habere. Sic autem Spiritus Sanctus quiescit in Filio, et ideo ratio non concludit.

[92→21*] Ad 21m, cum dicitur, "Anselmus in *De processione Spiritus Sancti*, capitulo 2,[46] dicit 'quod Filius a Patre nascendo, Spiritus Sanctus procedendo', 'et si per aliud non essent plures Filius et Spiritus Sanctus, per hoc solum essent diversi'," dicitur communiter quod dictum Anselmi verum est quod Filius et Spiritus Sanctus ex hoc sunt diversi quod diverso modo procedunt, sed tamen
T 82rb diverso modo realiter distincto non procederent nisi Spiritus Sanctus esset | a Filio.

[93→92] Sed diceret aliquis quod hoc non videtur esse secundum mentem Anselmi, quia Anselmus ibidem praemittit:[47] "Ut interim," inquit, "aliam causam dicam." Ergo videtur innuere quod diversus modus procedendi sit alia causa distinctiva ab ea qua unus procedit ab alio, et sic per consequens diver-
B 70ra sus modus procedendi istorum duorum a Patre posset | esse absque eo quod unus sit ab alio.

[94→93] Ad quod dicendum quod non intellexit Anselmus quod procedere diverso modo disparato sit alia causa distincta secundum rem ab ea quae est per formalem oppositionem relativam, sed intendit quod sit alia secundum opinionem Graecorum, qui nituntur salvare quod Spiritus Sanctus realiter distinguatur a Filio, licet negent ipsum procedere ab eo.

[95→22*] Ad 22m, cum arguitur, "quod est transcendens creatur; si Spiritus Sanctus spiraretur a Filio, quaero de spiratione: aut enim est res ut comparatur ad essentiam, aut est sola ratio, aut utrumque simul; non est ratio, quia sic non

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2 etc.] *om.* B 4 quiescit] ab *add. sed del.* T | alio] aliquo B | eo] ipso et T 5 substantive] subiective T | opposita sunt] *inv.* T 6 eo] alio B 7 et] ab eo *add. sed del.* T 8 concludit] convenit B 9 21m … processione] 30m contra anselmum in de processu T 10 filius] *iter.* B 17 ut interim] ubi iterum B; ubi utrumque T 18 dicam] dicet* T | alia] aliqua T 19 qua] quam T 20 absque] ab *a.c. s.l.* B | eo] hoc T 22 non intellexit] intelligit B 23 sit] ab *add.* T | distincta] distinctam B 25 salvare] solvere T 26 negent] neget B 27 22m] 12m T | cum arguitur] *om.* B | creatur] *om.* T 28 sanctus] procederet vel *add.* T | ut] aut B 29 aut2] *om.* T | non2] *om.* T

46 Anselmus, *De processione Spiritus Sancti* c. 2, ed. Schmitt, p. 185.3–4, 10–11.

47 Anselmus, *De processione Spiritus Sancti* c. 1, ed. Schmitt, p. 180.13.

esset principium actionis realis; nec res, quia sic esset distincta res ab essentia, cum non conveniat omnibus personis quibus convenit essentia; nec utrumque simul, quia, sicut illud quod est substantia non potest esse accidens, ita quod est res per comparationem ad unum non potest esse ratio per comparationem ad aliud; et sic videtur quod, cum spirare non sit aliquid, quod Filius nihil possit producere per ipsum," dico quod ratio non concludit, quia si Filius nihil potest producere per spirare, eo quod sit nihil, nec Pater. Et licet non concludat, petit tamen sibi solvi difficultatem quomodo relatio in divinis se habeat ad essentiam, de quo nihil ad praesens, quia de hoc inferius ex proposito inquiretur.[48] Et haec sunt quae arguebantur.

[96→95] Sed contra arguebatur dupliciter. Primo, unum oppositorum non distinguit illud cui inest nisi a suo opposito; sed spiratio non respicit opposite nisi spiratum; quare etc. Secundo, quia RICHARDUS, v *De Trinitate*, capitulo 12,[49] probat quod non potest esse nisi unus solus qui de se procederet, non habeat quod non esset si Spiritus Sanctus a Filio non procederet.

2 cum non conveniat] quod non convenit T 4 unum] unam T 5 aliquid quod] aliud quam T 6 producere per ipsum] per ipsum producere T 7 et] *om.* B

48 Perhaps HENRICUS DE FRIMARIA, *Quaestiones ordinariae de Verbo* q. 7.

49 RICHARDUS DE SANCTO VICTORE, *De Trin.* v c. 12, ed. RIBAILLIER, p. 210.15–18.

7

Gerard of Bologna's Critique of the Formal Distinction

Garrett R. Smith

Gerard of Bologna is the clearest example of a Parisian interlocutor of John Duns Scotus. In his first *Quodlibet* Gerard criticized two key features of Scotus' philosophy, the univocity of being and the formal distinction.[1] He also attacked Scotus' theological doctrine of the divine Word.[2] Scotus responded to the critique of the formal distinction, holding a special dispute on the subject in which he recounted the arguments of Gerard. This dispute survives under the names of *Quaestio logicalis* and *Quaestio … de formalitatibus quae dicitur Logica Scoti de distinctione attributorum*.[3] In what follows, I shall first consider Scotus' views on the formal distinction, Gerard's criticism, and conclude with Scotus' response to Gerard.

1 Duns Scotus on the Formal Distinction

The formal distinction of John Duns Scotus is without doubt among his most obscure and difficult contributions to philosophy. It is part of a general theory and classification of distinctions, a theory which he never fully explained or clarified. As a result, there have been controversies regarding the interpretation of the formal distinction during both the medieval and modern periods. Some of the modern debate is founded on disagreements over the chronology of Sco-

1 For Gerard's critique of the formal distinction, see section 11 below. For his critique of the univocity of being, see Stephen F. Brown, "Gerard of Bologna's Quodlibet 1, Quaestio 1: On the Analogy of Being," *Carmelus* 31 (1984), pp. 143–170.

2 Cf. Gerardus Boloniensis, *Quodlibet* 1 q. 7, in David Piché, *La théorie de la conaissance intellectuelle de Gérard de Bologne* (*Ca. 1240/50–1317*)*: Édition critique et étude doctrinale de quatorze* Quodlibeta (Leuven: Peeters, 2014), pp. 99–106. According to Piché, Gerard criticizes both the *Ordinatio* and the *Reportatio*.

3 This text has been critically edited; see Kent Emery Jr. and Garrett R. Smith, "The *Quaestio de formalitatibus* by John Duns Scotus, sometimes called the *Logica Scoti*," *Bulletin de philosophie médiévale* 56 (2014), pp. 91–182.

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tus' commentary on the *Sentences*.[4] My account presupposes a chronological sequence of *Lectura* to *Ordinatio* to *Reportatio*. The *Lectura* was composed at Oxford (I–II in the 1290's, III perhaps during Scotus' exile in 1303), the *Ordinatio* was begun at Oxford ca. 1300 but was in continuous revision until Scotus' death in 1308 and never completed, and the *Reportatio* was composed, revised, and examined at Paris, beginning as lectures delivered around 1302–1303. A complication arises with *Ordinatio* IV, which contains some remarks on the formal distinction, since it is thought to have been composed after *Reportatio* IV.[5]

Scotus' classification of distinctions varies between the Oxonian and Parisian periods of his career. At Oxford Scotus mentioned a variety of distinctions without defining them all. The basic division, though this is not explicit, is between distinctions that are caused by the intellect, distinctions of reason, and distinctions independent of the intellect, that the intellect discovers in things.[6] This division is exhaustive; on my interpretation at least, for Scotus there are no "middle" distinctions midway between distinctions of reason and real—'ex natura rei'— distinctions.[7] There are, however, degrees of distinction

4 For discussion of the chronology as it relates to the development of the formal distinction, see Stephen D. Dumont, "Duns Scotus's Parisian Question on the Formal Distinction," *Vivarium* 53 (2005), pp. 7–62, esp. p. 8 n. 2 and more broadly, pp. 8–14; Richard Cross, "Scotus's Parisian Teaching on Divine Simplicity," in *Duns Scot à Paris, 1302–2002*, eds. Olivier Boulnois, Elizabeth Karger, Jean-Luc Solère, and Gérard Sondag (Turnhout: Brepols, 2004), pp. 519–562, at pp. 521–527.

5 On the relation of *Ordinatio* IV to *Reportatio* IV, see [Carlo Balić,] *Les commentaires de Jean Duns Scot sur les quatre libres des Sentences* (Lovain: Bureaux de la Revue, 1927), pp. 207–208, p. 238; Antonie Vos, *The Philosophy of John Duns Scotus* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2006), p. 96.

6 Cf. Duns Scotus, *Ord.* I d. 2 p. 2 q. 1–4, ed. Vat. 2, p. 350 n. 390: "Et intelligo sic 'realiter', quod nullo modo per actum intellectus considerantis, immo quod talis entitas esset ibi si nullus intellectus esset considerans; et sic esse ibi, si nullus intellectus consideraret, dico 'esse ante omnem actum intellectus'."; Duns Scotus, *Quaestiones super Metaphysicam* VII q. 19, eds. Robert Andrews et al., OPh 4, p. 366 n. 31: "Differentia igitur rationis stricte loquendo est differentia posterior naturaliter actu intellectus possibilis considerantis idem obiectum sub alia et alia ratione. Et hoc, sive illa differentia sit obiecti exsistentis in intellectu in actu secundo; sive habitualiter, per habitum derelictum ex actu concipiendi—nam esse tale habituale est naturaliter posterious actu considerandi."; Ibid., OPh. 4, p. 368 n. 37: "… differentia prior natura omni actu intellectus, tam agentis quam possibilis, est realis."

7 Such a claim is, of course, controversial. Timothy Noone has revealed a tradition interpreting the formal distinction as midway between the real and rational distinctions that is as early as James of Ascoli and includes Leibniz among its later adherents; cf. Noone, "Ascoli, Wylton, and Alnwick on Scotus's Formal Distinction: Taxonomy, Refinement, and Interaction," in *Philosophical Debates at Paris in the Early Fourteenth Century*, eds. Stephen F. Brown, Thomas Dewender, and Theo Kobusch, (Leiden: Brill, 2009), pp. 127–149.

located under each member of the division, that is, there are multiple kinds of the distinction of reason and of the *ex natura rei* distinction. For the distinction of reason there are at least two kinds, one between different modes of conceiving the same formal object, and one between different formal objects in the intellect. Scotus' own examples of the first are the distinction between grammatical items, such as between the different cases of the Latin word 'homo', or logical terms, such as 'man' and 'this man'; elsewhere, he also gives 'wise' and 'wisdom' as examples of items that are only rationally distinct as modes of conception. The second kind of distinction of reason, between diverse formal objects, can obtain between objects that are distinct outside the soul, such as between a man and a donkey, or elements within one thing, such as color and the effect on color caused by light.[8]

The real distinction also comes in several varieties: one is a distinction between natures and supposits, a middle degree of distinction between natures in one supposit, and the lowest degree of real distinction is of diverse perfections unitively contained in one nature.[9] 'Real' means 'prior to the operation of the intellect'. The formal distinction is the lowest degree of the real distinction. That is, the distinction between items that are formally distinct is the smallest degree of distinction among things that are really distinct. In the *Ordinatio* Scotus argues for the formal distinction in God on the basis of the real distinction.[10] That is, he concludes to a lesser difference from a greater difference. This requires him to explain how best to label the formal distinction. According to Scotus, it is not an actual real distinction or a potential real distinction, since

8 Cf. Duns Scotus, *Ord.* I d. 8 p. 1 q. 4, ed. Vat. 4, p. 260 n. 191: "… inter perfectiones essentiales non est tantum differentia rationis, hoc est diversorum modorum concipiendi idem obiectum formale (talis enim distinctio est inter sapiens et sapientiam, et utique maior est inter sapientiam et veritatem), nec est ibi tantum distinctio obiectorum formalium in intellectum …"; *Ord.* I d. 2 p. 2 q. 1–4, ed. Vat. 2, p. 351, n. 392: "… distinctio una in intellectu est penes diversum modum accipiendi idem obiectum formale, et hoc sive concipiendo grammatice, ut 'homo', 'hominis', sive logice, ut 'homo' et 'hic homo'; alia distinctio, maior, est in intellectu, concipiendo duobus actibus suo obiecta formalia, et hoc sive illis correspondeant diversae res, ut intelligendo hominem et asinum, sive una res extra, ut intelligendo colorem et disgregativum."

9 Cf. Duns Scotus, *Quaestiones super Metaphysicam* VII q. 19, OPh. 4, p. 370 n. 44: "Sed realis differentia ponitur habere gradus. Est enim maxima naturarum et suppositorum; media naturarum in uno supposito; minima diversarum perfectionum sive rationum perfectionalium unitive contentarum in una natura."; *Ord.* I d. 2 p. 2 q. 1–4, ed. Vat, 2, p. 354 n. 396: "In re autem manifesta est distinctio rerum, et hoc duplex, suppositorum scilicet et naturarum; in intellectu manifesta est differentia duplex, modorum scilicet concipiendi et obiectorum formalium."

10 Cf. Duns Scotus, *Ord.* I d. 2 p. 2 q. 1–4, ed. Vat. 2, pp. 354–355 n. 398–399.

both such distinctions would involve positing a potency-act relation within the divine persons, a relation that is ruled out by divine simplicity.[11] Apparently with Bonaventure in mind, Scotus does allow that the formal distinction can be called a 'difference of reason', as long as by 'reason' one means not a difference caused by the intellect but rather a quiddity of a thing.[12] Scotus also allows the description of 'virtual difference' for the formal distinction.[13] This is because something that has such a distinction has it within itself; it is not between two things (*res*) as is the case with the "actual real" distinction. Some one thing contains formally distinct realities within it virtually or preeminently. Scotus also attempts to elucidate the formal distinction by contrasting it with formal identity: things have formal identity when they are included in the same formal or quidditative notion, in the first mode of per se predication.[14] Though he does not make the contrast explicit, his meaning is that two entities are formally distinct if, when they are defined, one does not fall into the definition of the other. The formal distinction thus obtains between definitional or quidditative notions in a single thing. The items that are distinguished are called formalities, realities, and entities.

From the foregoing it is clear that both the formal and real distinctions obtain *ex natura rei*, that is, prior to the operation of any intellect, and that they posit different degrees of separation between what is distinguished. But how do we differentiate between the formal and real distinctions? Is it in the *distinguenda*, such that a real distinction obtains between two things, *res*, and a formal distinction obtains between formalities or quidditative aspects of a single thing? One answer that is prevalent today is that real distinctions obtain between what is separable, in short, there is a 'separability criterion' for real distinction that states that two things are really distinct if they can exist separately, whereas a formal distinction obtains between formalities or notions that are inseparable from their subject.[15] The textual support for the separability cri-

11 Cf. Duns Scotus, *Ord.* I d. 2 p. 2 q. 1–4, ed. Vat. 2, p. 355 n. 400: "Sed numquid haec distinctio dicetur realis? Respondeo: non est realis actualis, intelligendo sicut communiter dicitur, 'differentia realis actualis' illa quae est differentia rerum et in actu, quia in una persona non est aliqua differentia rerum, propter simplicitatem divinam; et sicut non est realis actualis, ita non est realis potentialis, quia nihil est ibi in potentia quod non est in actu."

12 Cf. Duns Scotus, *Ord.* I d. 2 p. 2 q. 1–4, ed. Vat. 2, p. 355 n. 401.

13 Cf. Duns Scotus, *Ord.* I d. 2 p. 2 q. 1–4, ed. Vat. 2, pp. 355–356 n. 402.

14 Cf. Duns Scotus, *Ord.* I d. 2 p. 2 q. 1–4, ed. Vat. 2, pp. 356–357 n. 403: "Voco autem identitatem formalem, ubi illud quod dicitur sic idem, includit illud cui sic est idem, in ratione sua formali quiditativa et per se primo modo."

15 Richard Cross, *Duns Scotus on God*, p. 109: "Basically, Scotus believes that really distinct things are separable, or at least are the kinds of thing that either are capable of being

terion is not found in any of the classic discussions of the formal distinction, namely *Ordinatio* I d. 2 and I d. 8, but rather in *Ordinatio* II and the *Quodlibet*.[16] Thus, the difference between the formal and real distinctions on this common opinion is that formal distinctions obtain between items that are inseparable, whereas real distinctions obtain between what is separable.

The separability criterion for real distinction has been challenged.[17] The reason for this is that Scotus, like all other theologians of his time, holds that the

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independent *supposita* (absolutely non-instantiable or non-exemplifiable non-relational subjects of properties) or are uniquely properties of such things." See also Alan B. Wolter, "The Realism of Scotus," p. 43, p. 46; Jeff Steele and Thomas Williams, "Complexity without Composition: Duns Scotus on Divine Simplicity," *American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly* 93 (2019), pp. 611–631, at pp. 616–618.

16 Cross cites Duns Scotus, *Quodlibet* q. 3 a. 3, ed. Wad.-Viv. 25, p. 138 n. 15: "Universaliter enim quod convenit alicui sic quod omnimoda contradictio sit illud esse sine hoc, hoc est idem realiter illi, et per oppositum, ubi non est omnimoda contradictio, non oportet esse omnino …" and *Ord.* II d. 1 q. 4–5, ed. Vat. 7, p. 101 n. 200: "… nihil est idem realiter alicui, sine quo potest esse realiter absque contradictione …". See also *Ord.* II d. 1 q. 4–5, ed. Vat. 7, p. 129, n. 261. Two early Scotists, however, associate the separability criterion with the essential distinction instead of the real distinction; see Petrus Thomae, *Quaestiones de modis distinctionum* q. 1 a. 3, Wien, Österreichische Nationalbibliothek, Cod. 1494, f. 48^{rb}: "Ideo potest esse tertius modus dicendi fundatus supra dicto eiusdem Scoti in II in alia quaestione quod omne essentialiter distinctum vel est separatum actu ut in actualiter separatis vel potentialiter, quantum ad illa quae possunt separari, ut albedo et subiectum; potest enim subiectum existere sine albedine." Francis of Meyronnes, probably the most influential theorist of the formal distinction after Scotus himself, used the *via separationis* as one method among several to prove both the essential (a distinction between two quiddities taken with their acts of existence) and real distinctions; see Franciscus de Mayronis, *Conflatus* I d. 8 q. 2, ed. Mauritius Hibernicus (Venezia 1520), f. 44^{rb}. He did, however, attribute the separability criterion for real distinction to Scotus: Franciscus de Mayronis, *In Sent.* I ('ab oriente') d. 8 q. un. p. 2 a. 11, Città del Vaticano, Bibliotheca Apostolica Vaticana, Cod. Vat. lat. 896, f. 64va: "Ideo dicitur quod per separabilitatem solam potest investigare realis distinctio secundum Doctorem nostrum, quando unum potest esse, aut fieri, sine relinquo." On the other hand, Peter of Navarre posited seven conditions for a real distinction, none of which involved separability; see Petrus de Attarabia, *In Sent.* I d. 2 p. 2 q. 3, ed. Pius Sagűes Azcona (Madrid: Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Cientificas, 1974), pp. 164–165. Hugo de Novocastro posited five conditions for a formal distinction, also omitting separability; see Hugo de Novo castro, *Sent.* I d. 33 q. 2 (Paris, Bibliothèque nationale de France, Ms. lat. 15864, f. 44va). Transferring the separability criterion from the real distinction to the essential distinction allows one to avoid the objection that the persons of the Trinity cannot be really distinct, since they are not separable.

17 Joshua Blander, "Same as it Never Was: John Duns Scotus' Paris *Reportatio* Account of Identity and Distinction," *British Journal for the History of Philosophy* 28 (2019), pp. 231–250, at pp. 245–250.

persons of the Trinity are really distinct from each other. But if separability were a condition of real distinction, then one person could exist without another, an evident heresy that Scotus would deny. This objection has recurred throughout the history of Scotism.[18] The typical reply on behalf of the defenders of the separability criterion is that things can stand in a relation that is proportional to separability, and it is with this qualification that the persons of the Trinity are really distinct.[19] That is, those things are proportionally separable that stand in a certain proportion to things that are separated or separable, for example things related as producer and product, cause and effect, originator or originating. These admit of contradictory predications, even though they are inseparable. The persons of the Trinity also admit of contradictory propositions even if they are inseparable, propositions such as that the second person proceeds by means of the intellect, not the will, whereas the opposite is true of the third person. Another possible solution is that the separability criterion holds for things that are in act-potency relations or relations of informing and being informed, for example, the way accidents inhere in a substance. Divine simplicity would forbid the use of the separability criterion *in divinis*, since nothing in God stands in a relation of act-potency for informing-informed. This would account for the otherwise puzzling fact that Scotus does not discuss the separability criterion in conjunction with the formal distinction, since the passages where he treats the latter distinction are all part of his discussion of the Trinity, as well as the occurrence of the separability criterion in the late *Quodlibet*. Finally, there is also some foundation in the text of the *Ordinatio* for this, in which Scotus writes that one can determine the relation of something that is informing another by testing it with the separability criterion.[20] Scotus himself, however, never seems to have integrated his account of the separability criterion into his accounts of the formal and real distinctions during his years at Oxford, leaving the precise difference between the formal and real distinctions unclear.

18 Cf. Geoffrey Bridges, *Identity and Distinction in Petrus Thomae, O.F.M.* (St. Bonaventure, NY: The Franciscan Institute, 1959), pp. 84–86.

19 The textual support for this is Duns Scotus, *Ord.* II d. 2 p. 1 q. 2, ed. Vat. 7, p. 198 n. 94: "Accipio igitur quod nihil potest concludi 'distinctum ab alio' nisi vel propter separationem actualem, vel potentialem, vel propter proportionem istorum ad aliqua alia quorum alterum est ab altero separabile."

20 Cf. Duns Scotus, *Ord.* II d. 2 p. 1 q. 2, ed. Vat. 7, pp. 197–198 n. 92: "… distinctio aliquorum quorum unum proprie inest alteri, non concluditur nisi vel ex distinctione actuali, vel potentiali, vel quia sic se habent ad invicem sicut aliqua quorum unum est separabile ab alio."

A final issue from Oxford that is relevant for Scotus' later interactions with Gerard of Bologna is the problem of the 'reality' of the formal distinction. This amounts to the question whether formal distinction is equivalent to formal non-identity. If they are equivalent, then one can use the term 'distinct/distinction' of God without violating divine simplicity. If they are not equivalent, and formal distinction, given that it is an 'ex natura rei' distinction and thus is real, may posit too high a degree of distinction in something, such as God, because of divine simplicity. Thus, if formal distinction and formal non-identity are not equivalent, perhaps one cannot use the phrase 'formal distinction' of God, posit formal distinctions between the divine attributes, or use language implying a multiplicity of formalities in God.

In his earliest commentary on the *Sentences*, the *Lectura*, Scotus does not raise this issue, perhaps because the description 'virtual difference' was close enough to the common view that it did not require further explanation. In any case, in the *Lectura* Scotus expresses that he has no doubt that deity and paternity are distinguished as reality and reality.[21] In the *Ordinatio*, however, Scotus is reticent about the equivalency of formal distinction and formal non-identity. Raising the issue, he says that it is better to use the negative proposition 'this is not formally the same' than the affirmative 'such and such is distinct'.[22] Moreover, Scotus denies that the conditional '*a* et *b* non sunt idem formaliter, ergo sunt formaliter distincta' is valid. The reason is that the term 'formaliter' is negated in the antecedent and affirmed in the consequent. Despite this denial,

21 Duns Scotus, *Lectura* I d. 2 p. 2 q. 1–4, ed. Vat. 16, pp. 216–217 n. 275: "… unde ante operationem intellectus considerantis est realitas paternitatis et realitas deitatis, ita quod est ibi realitas et realitas, et haec non est formaliter illa, licet per identitatem sint idem; igitur de necessitate sequitur diversitas ante operationem intellectus …. Qui igitur potest capere, capiat, quia sic esse intellectus meus non dubitat."

22 Duns Scotus, *Ord.* I d. 2 p. 2 q. 1–4, ed. Vat. 2, p. 357 n. 404–405: "Numquid igitur debet concedi aliqua distinctio? Melius est uti ista negativa 'hoc non est formaliter idem', quam 'hoc est sic et sic distinctum'. Sed nonne sequitur, *a* et *b* non sunt idem formaliter, ergo sunt formaliter distincta? Respondeo quod non oportet sequi, quia 'formaliter' [formaliter = Dumont; formalitas = ed./codd.] in antecedente negatur, et in consequente affirmatur." For Dumont's emendation, see "Scotus's Parisian Question on the Formal Distinction," p. 37. This emendation is supported by William of Alnwick and Petrus Thomae, who use the phrase 'modus formalitatis' in their summaries of this passage, indicating that what is intended in the passage is not a formality, but a part of speech (modus). For the text of Alnwick, see below n. 25. For Petrus Thomae, see *Quaestiones de modis distinctionum* q. 5 a. 2, Wien, ÖNB, Cod. 1494, f. 57va: "… Scotus in I, distinctione 2, quaestione 4, dicit quod haec consequentia non valet: '*a* et *b* non sunt idem formaliter, ergo formaliter sunt distincta', et per consequens secundum ipsum negatio modi identitatis non arguit necessario distinctionem huius et huius."

however, Scotus does use the phrase 'formally distinct' when writing about God on several occasions.[23]

This passage in the *Ordinatio* regarding the equivalency of formal distinction and formal non-identity has served as the primary text by which to interpret Scotus' views for both medieval and modern interpreters. If one follows the view of the editors of Scotus' *Ordinatio* that this work has a superior authority over the Parisian *reportationes*, then this text will be Scotus' definitive solution.[24] William of Alnwick, a fellow Franciscan who was present at Scotus' debates and was involved in the dissemination of Scotus' works, refers to this passage as Scotus' "brief response" which he also considered the true one.[25] Moroever, if one posits that the *Ordinatio* is later than the *reportationes*, then once again the position expressed in the *Ordinatio* will be the final statement on the reality of the formal distinction, not the *Logica Scoti*.

At Paris Scotus reiterated some aspects of his earlier theory.[26] Thus he continued to hold that a distinction of reason is caused by the intellect, that an

23 Cf. for example Duns Scotus, *Ord.* I d. 7 q. 1, ed. Vat. 4, p. 129 n. 53; *Ord.* I d. 8 p. 1 q. 4, ed. Vat. 4, p. 242 n. 170; *Ord.* I d. 13 q. un., ed. Vat. 5, p. 108 n. 80.

24 Regarding the authority of the *Ordinatio*, see Charles Balić, "The Life and Works of John Duns Scotus," in *John Duns Scotus, 1265–1965*, eds. John K. Ryan and Bernardine M. Bonansea (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1965), pp. 1–27, at p. 20.

25 Cf. Guillelmus de Alnwick, *Quodlibet* q. 1, ed. Athanasius Ledoux, Bibliotheca Franciscana Scholastica, 10 (Ad Claras Aquas: Collegium Sanctae Bonaventurae, 1937), p. 192: "Haec videtur esse intentio Subtilis Doctoris, scilicet Ioannis Dons, distinctione namque secunda, primi Libri, q. 4, in *Ordinatione Oxoniensi*, quaerit sic: 'nonne sequitur "A et B non sunt formaliter idem, igitur sunt formaliter distincta"?' Respondet 'quod non sequitur, quia modus formalitatis in antecedente negatur et in consequente affirmatur'. Haec est sua responsio brevis, quam reputo veram propter praedicta."

26 Note that the essay by Jeff Steele and Thomas Williams, "Complexity without Composition: Duns Scotus on Divine Simplicity," does not take the Parisian teaching on the formal distinction into account, save for the notion of unitive containment in *Reportatio* II d. 16. However, these authors advance the controversial thesis (p. 616) that "… what is left in Scotus is not a mere tweaking of the doctrine of divine simplicity but rather a rejection of the doctrine in its traditional form. […] To put it another way, the mainstream doctrine of divine simplicity is precisely the denial that there is any plurality in the divine nature; Scotus affirms that there is, and must be, plurality in the divine nature. Therefore, though he affirms that God is simple, he flatly denies the doctrine of divine simplicity as he had received it." Unfortunately, detailed analysis of this claim and Scotus' doctrine of divine simplicity fall outside the scope of the present essay. At first glance, however, this claim is false as worded, since all Scholastics held that there was a plurality of divine persons. The Parisian doctrine of the formal distinction is especially relevant for evaluating Scotus' attitude towards divine simplicity, since divine simplicity was the motive for those attacking Scotus' doctrine of the formal distinction at Paris. If Scotus did indeed weaken his account in light of these criticisms, he would not be then flatly denying the

'ex natura rei' distinction obtains prior to any intellectual activity, and that formal distinctions obtain in God.[27] But he also reformulated the formal and real distinctions into what he called qualified (*secundum quid*) and unqualified (*simpliciter*) distinctions, respectively.[28] The *secundum quid* distinction admits of two varieties, the formal distinction with which we are already familiar, and the adequate distinction or adequate non-identity. This latter kind of non-identity comes about when one thing exceeds another or the unity of one thing exceeds that of another, for example, 'animal' exceeds 'human being', since it is applied to a wide range of species, whereas human being is a single species.[29] Another example is that of the divine essence and the personal properties of the Persons of the Trinity: the essence is infinite and thus exceeds the personal properties, which are not infinite, in power and perfection. Scotus continued to posit the formal distinction between the persons and the divine essence, and between different divine attributes such as intellect and will.[30]

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doctrine. Moreover, apart from the formal distinction, at Paris Scotus also endorsed the traditional Augustinian formula for divine simplicity, that God is what he has; see *Reportatio* I-A d. 8 p. 2 q. 4, eds. and trans. Alan Wolter and Oleg Bychkov, vol. 1 (St. Bonaventure, NY: Franciscan Institute, 2004), pp. 361–363. Finally, the authors idea of what constitutes "classical theism" and the "classical medieval view of simplicity" is overly restrictive and unable to account for the positions of thinkers such as Plotinus and Maimonides, who both deny that there even are divine attributes, and it also fails to account for the plurality of thirteenth-century positions, of which the conceptual distinction was but one of several. On the medieval debate, see Garrett R. Smith, The Problem of Divine Attributes from Thomas Aquinas to Duns Scotus, Ph.D. diss., Notre Dame 2014.

27 For the description of the distinction of reason as giving rise to grammatical or logical modes of understanding, see *Reportatio* I-A d. 33 q. 1, eds. Wolter and Bychkov, vol. 2 (St. Bonaventure, NY: Franciscan Institute, 2008), p. 317 n. 27.

28 On the background of this terminology in the literature on fallacies, see Dumont, "Scotus's Parisian Question on the Formal Distinction," pp. 40–41.

29 Scotus, *Rep.* I-A d. 33 q. 2, eds. Wolter and Bychkov, vol. 2, p. 330 n. 64. As Adams, "Ockham on Identity and Distinction," p. 27 n. 67, noted, adequate non-identity also appears in the *Ordinatio* at I d. 8 p. 1 q. 4, ed. Vat. 4, pp. 272–273 n. 215. Interestingly, however, the text Adams cites is a later addition to the primitive text of the *Ordinatio*, and thus could possibly postdate the discussion of adequate non-identity in the *Reportatio*. For another text from the *Ordinatio* on adequate non-identity, see II d. 1 q. 4–5, ed. Vat. 7, p. 128 n. 260: "… dico quod relatio ad Deum, communis omni creaturae, est idem realiter fundamento; non tamen idem formaliter, nec praecise idem (sive non identitate adaequata), ita quod fundamentum tantum sit relatio formaliter."

30 Cf. Duns Scotus, *Reportatio* I-A d. 33 q. 2, eds. Wolter and Bychkov, vol. 2, p. 330 n. 63; *Rep.* I-A d. 45 q. 1–2, eds. Wolter and Bychkov, vol. 2, pp. 546–552. Worthy of note, however, is William of Alnwick's claim that at Paris Scotus denied that the divine attributes are formally distinct. See Guillelmus de Alnwick, *Quodlibet* q. 2, ed. Ledoux, p. 237–238: "… non igitur attributa in Deo distinguuntur formaliter, et hanc puto fuisse intentionem Iohannis

Scotus explained the difference between the two kinds of distinctions by means of four conditions. These conditions are unique to Scotus' Parisian works. They are not found in the *Ordinatio* at all, but only in the *Logica Scoti* and the *Reportatio* in all its versions, namely I-A, I-B, I-C and the *Additiones magnae*. These texts are listed below:

***Reportatio* I-A (examinata) d. 33 q. 2 (ed. Wolter-Bychkov 2, 328 n. 60; cf. Wien, Österreichische Nationalbibliothek, Cod. 1453, f. 100va)**	***Reportatio* I-B d. 33 q. 2 (Worcester, Cathedral Library, Ms. F. 69, f. 52^{vb})**[31]	***Reportatio* I-C d. 33 q. 2 (Todi, Biblioteca Comunale Leoni, Ms. 12, f. 176^{vb}–177ra)**	***Additiones magnae* I d. 33 q. 2 (Città del Vaticano, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Cod. Vat. lat. 876, f. 276$^{rb–va}$; Oxford, Balliol College Library, Ms. 302, f. 191^{vb})**
"… ad hoc quod aliqua simpliciter distin-	… distinctio perfecta habet condiciones aliquas quae	… aliquae sunt condiciones perfectae	Hoc autem sic declaro: perfectae distinctionis

Dons, L. I, d. 15 et q. 2, in *Lectura Parisiensi*, ubi dicit quod haec 'sapientia est formaliter bonitas' est distinguenda, prout ly 'formaliter' determinat compositionem, et sic est falsa, quia bonitas non est de formali ratione sapientiae, vel prout determinat extremum compositionis, et sic est vera, quia sapientia est formalitas bonitatis, ex quo patet quod sunt una formalitas." Independent of William of Alnwick's comment, which is directed at *Rep.* I-A d. 45 q. 1–2, eds. Wolter and Bychkov, vol. 2, pp. 554–555 n. 50–52, is a text in *Reportatio* I-A d. 33 q. 2, eds. Wolter and Bychkov, vol. 2, p. 334, which states that the attributes are distinct only by reason: "Quarta est distinctio rationis absolutorum sive attributorum." This text is the last member of a list of an order of unities in God (cf. ibid., pp. 333–334 n. 73–76). The first order is a unity of *res* and *ratio* (the unity of divine essence), the second is a formal distinction between essence and property (a unity of true identity), the third is the real distinction of divine persons, and fourth, a distinction of reason of absolutes or attributes. To posit a distinction of reason among the divine attributes is contrary to Scotus' position in *Rep.* I-A d. 45 q. 1–2, eds. Wolter and Bychkov, vol. 2, p. 548 n. 31–32. The text is omitted from the list of unities found in the parallel passage in the *Additiones magnae* I d. 33 q. 2 (Oxford, Balliol College Library, Ms. 302, f. 192^{rb}), and *Rep.* I-B d. 33 q. 2 (Worcester, Cathedral Library, Ms. F. 69, f. 53ra) does not contain the list at all. Interestingly, *Rep.* I-C d. 33 q. 2 (Todi, Biblioteca Comunale Leoni, Ms. 12, f. 177^{rb}) records "creaturarum" in place of "attributorum": "… et quarto loco sequitur distinctio absoluta creaturarum." This suggests that "attributorum" in the I-A text is a mistake for "creaturarum." This is confirmed by *Rep.* I-A d. 10 q. 1, eds. Wolter and Bychkov, another passage about an order of unity and distinction: "Ultimo sequuntur entitates creaturarum formaliter finitae, ut rationes ideales factae ab intellectu divino." For discussion of errors in the text of *Reportatio* I-A, and whether they affect its "examinata" status, see the study by Stephen D. Dumont listed in the following note.

31 Note that John Major, who is thought to have published *Reportatio* I-B, has a different text: cf. *Reportatio* I-B, ed. Paris 1518, f. 49ra: "… distinctio perfecta habet conditiones tres requi-

(*cont.*)

***Reportatio* I-A (examinata) d. 33 q. 2 (ed. Wolter-Bychkov 2, 328 n. 60; cf. Wien, Österreichische Nationalbibliothek, Cod. 1453, f. 100va)**	***Reportatio* I-B d. 33 q. 2 (Worcester, Cathedral Library, Ms. F. 69, f. 52^{vb})**	***Reportatio* I-C d. 33 q. 2 (Todi, Biblioteca Comunale Leoni, Ms. 12, f. 176^{vb}–177ra)**	***Additiones magnae* I d. 33 q. 2 (Città del Vaticano, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Cod. Vat. lat. 876, f. 276$^{rb–va}$; Oxford, Balliol College Library, Ms. 302, f. 191^{vb})**
guantur, quattuor requiruntur condiciones. Prima est quod sit aliquorum in actu et non in potentia tantum, quomodo distinguuntur ea quae sunt in potentia in materia et non simpliciter, quia non sunt in actu.	requiruntur ad ipsam, quae tamen non perficiunt distinctionem simpliciter. Nam condiciones istae sunt quod distincta perfecte non sint entia in potentia tantum, immo oportet quod alterum sit ens in actu ut forma.	distinctionis, non tamen completivae, et sunt propter tres.[32] Prima est quod distinctio non sit tantum in potentia, ut sunt formae in potentia materiae.	sunt quattuor condiciones. Una est quod non sit potentialis sed actualis, ut aliquorum in actu et non solum in potentia, quo modo distinguuntur ea quae sunt in potentia materiae et non simpliciter.
Secunda est quod est eorum quae habent esse formale et non tantum virtuale, ut effectus sunt in sua causa virtualiter et non formaliter.	Item, alia distinctio quod non solum eis debeatur esse virtuale sicut effectus in causa non sunt distincta, quia in illo habent solum esse virtuale et non in effectu.	Secunda ut non sit distinctio secundum esse virtuale sed formale; esse autem virtuale dico ut effectus sunt in causa.	Alia condicio est ut non sit virtualis, scilicet eorum quae solum habent esse virtuale ut effectus habet esse in sua causa virtualiter.
Tertia condicio est quod est eorum quae non habent esse confusum ut extrema in medio et miscibilia in mixto, sed eorum quae	Tertia condicio est quod distincta perfecte non sint confusa, ut miscibilia sunt in mixto, ergo cum relatio in divinis sint in actu pro prima condicione, item non solum	Tertia quod extrema non sint confusa, ut sunt miscibilia in mixto.	Tertia condicio est quod non sit confusa sed distincta, non eorum quae habent esse confusum, ut extrema in medio et miscilibilia in mixto,

sitas, quae tamen non concludunt distinctionem simpliciter, et quartam completivam, quae cum praecedentibus, concludit distinctionem simpliciter. Prima requisita est quod quae distinguuntur non sint tantum entis in potentia sicut formae in materia. Secunda quod non tantem habeant esse virtuale sicut effectus in causa. Tertia quod non habeant esse confusum sicut miscibilia in mixto. Sed quarta est quod sit realiter non identitas vera." Regarding the versions of the I-B text, see Stephen D. Dumont, "John Duns Scotus's *Reportatio Parisiensis Examinata*: A Mystery Solved," *Recherches de Théologie et Philosophie Médiévales* 85 (2018), pp. 377–438, at p. 382 n. 12.

32 tres] *in ras. al. man.*; ("nota quattuor condiciones distinctionis" *mg. adnot.*)

(*cont.*)

***Reportatio* I-A (examinata) d. 33 q. 2 (ed. Wolter-Bychkov 2, 328 n. 60; cf. Wien, Österreichische Nationalbibliothek, Cod. 1453, f. 100va)**	***Reportatio* I-B d. 33 q. 2 (Worcester, Cathedral Library, Ms. F. 69, f. 52^{vb})**	***Reportatio* I-C d. 33 q. 2 (Todi, Biblioteca Comunale Leoni, Ms. 12, f. 176^{vb}–177ra)**	***Additiones magnae* I d. 33 q. 2 (Città del Vaticano, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Cod. Vat. lat. 876, f. 276$^{rb–va}$; Oxford, Balliol College Library, Ms. 302, f. 191^{vb})**
habent esse distinctum propriis actualibus.	virtualiter, immo in forma completa est item pro tertio in actu distincto non confuso ideo potest ibi esse distinctio secundum quid, non tamen est distinctio simpliciter, quia condicio quae facit distinctionem perfectam est non-identitas simpliciter, et ista condicio non est intra essentiam et relationem …		sed eorum quae habent esse distincta propriis actualibus.
Quarta condicio, quae sola est completiva est distinctionis perfectae, est non identitas …		Ubi ergo inveniuntur ista tria, invenitur aliqua distinctorum condicio, ut illa quae est secundum quid sed completivum perfectae distinctionis est non-identitas.	Quarta condicio, quae est completiva distinctionis perfectae, est non-identitas, ut patet per Philosophum X *Metaphysicae* ubi dicit divisum esse non idem.
Illa ergo distinguuntur perfecte, quae secundum esse eorum actuale, proprium et determinatum sunt non eadem simpliciter, et illa secundum quid distinguuntur, quae non habent non-identitatem simpliciter sed non-identitatem secundum quid. Diversitas autem in omnibus tribus primis condicionibus—salvata identitate—est distinctio secundum quid, quia non est non-identitas nisi secundum quid."			Illa ergo distinguuntur perfecte quae habent distinctionem secundum eorum esse actuale proprium et terminatum habentia non-identitatem simpliciter et illa distinguuntur secundum quid quae non habet non-identitatem simpliciter sed tantum habent non-identitatem secundum quid.

The four conditions are:

(1) that the distinction obtains between things in act

(2) the things distinguished have formal being, not virtual being

(3) the things distinguished have being that is distinct in its own proper actuality
(4) the things distinguished are non-identical.

If all four conditions are met, there is a *distinctio simpliciter*, which Scotus calls a perfect distinction. If only the first three conditions are met, the distinction is *secundum quid*, qualified. What is qualifed is the distinction itself, which is considered restricted or diminished with the absence of the fourth condition of non identity.[33] The effect of the first three conditions is quite striking: it allows for multiple actualities in numerically the same thing, actualities that are distinct and are directly 'part' of a thing, not virtually contained in it.

From the table above it is clear that all surviving versions of the text contain the four conditions, even if there are slight differences between them. This is significant because it means that they were formulated between the writing of the *Ordinatio*, ca. 1300 and when Scotus delivered his lectures on book I in Paris, around 1302. Consequently, the four conditions and the introduction of the language of the *secundum quid* and *simpliciter* distinctions did not arise from criticism that Scotus faced at Paris but were announced there for the first time. Also apparent from the table above are some differences between the versions of the text. *Reportatio* I-B and I-C, which are closer to the classroom lectures than are the I-A and *Additiones magnae* versions, initially announce only three conditions necessary for a *secundum quid* distinction, adding the fourth at the end with the note that a further condition is necessary for an unqualified distinction.

The introduction of the four conditions to Duns Scotus' theory of distinction clarifies the relation between the formal distinction and the real distinction. It may also answer the question regarding the separability criterion for real distinction: however it fits into Scotus' position defended at Oxford, the separability criterion was abandoned in favor of the four conditions in his ex professo discussion of distinctions at Paris. At Paris, the broadest kind of distinction is 'non-identity simpliciter', and this amounts to a real distinction; once the degree of the reality of the distinction has been diminished by a failure of one of

33 For literature on the four conditions, see Noone, "Ascoli, Wylton, and Alnwick on Scotus's Formal Distinction," pp. 132–133; Emery and Smith, "The *Quaestio de formalitatibus* by John Duns Scotus," pp. 112–123; Maurice Grajewski, *The Formal Distinction of Duns Scotus: A Study in Metaphysics* (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1944), pp. 59–62; Adams, "Ockham on Identity and Distinction," pp. 37–39; Michael Jordan, Duns Scotus on the Formal Distinction, Ph.D. Diss., Rutgers University, 1984, pp. 83–87; Tweedale, *Scotus vs. Ockham*, vol. 2, pp. 450–454; Cross, "Scotus's Parisian Teaching on Divine Simplicity," pp. 537–539.

the conditions to obtain, we are left with a qualified non-identity. Scotus does not explicitly discuss the equivalence of formal distinction and formal non-identity, though he seems to prefer the locution 'formal non-identity' to that of 'formal distinction'. Nor does the issue of a plurality of formalities arise in the *Reportatio*.[34]

The medieval controversy over the formal distinction concerned its theological applications.[35] All thinkers of the time agreed that the Persons of the Trinity are really distinct from each other. Scotus went further and posited a formal distinction between the divine essence and divine attributes, between different divine attributes, and between the personal properties of the Persons and the divine essence. Given that the formal distinction obtains *ex natura rei*

34 Relevant here are two notes in the lower margin of *Reportatio* I-C; the notes are written in different hands, neither of which is the hand that wrote the text of the *Reportatio*, so their provenance and authenticity is uncertain. See *Reportatio* I-C d. 8, Todi, Bib. com., Ms. 12, f. 148va. Note 1: "Iste doctor d. 3 in quaterno quae portabat vel scribat pro memoriali dicit quod differentia formalis non videtur necessario ponenda propter actiones, quia unum omnino sed illimitatum sufficeret ad actiones proprias multis limitatis, sed magis videtur ponenda propter convenientiam realem duarum naturarum simplicium, ut albedinis et nigredinis et personarum divinarum, et quia contracta in diversis continentibus mutuo se excedunt." Note 2: "'formaliter' idem puto quod 'primo modo per se' et sic 'formaliter' videtur esse modus propositionis, sicut 'necessario', 'contingenter' etc. non modus rei, ac per hoc propter huiusmodi modum dicendi non videtur esse ponenda aliqua variatio in re sicut nec propter modum intelligendi secundum Boethium *De Trinitate* cap. ult. in fine 'Pater et Filius et Spiritus Sanctus non dicuntur de divinitate substantialiter nec trinitas de Deo'. 'Substantialiter', id est 'formaliter' forte."

35 Indeed, even the scribes of the various versions of Scotus' Parisian *Reportationes* expressed concern about the formulation of distinction. In the text of *Additiones* I, where the text states that a relation in God has its own quiddity but does not mention any kind of distinction, the scribe of Città del Vaticano, Bibliotheca Apostolica Vaticana, Cod. Vat. lat. 876 expresses a preference for the *Reportatio* I-A text by means of a marginal annotation in his own voice; see Vat. lat. 876, f. 264ra: "Istud nimis dicit sed in Reportatione Parisiensis magis sobrie dicitur sic: 'ad propositum dico quod cum relatio secundum suam quidditatem maneat in divinis et distincta formaliter a quidditate essentiae non faciet' etc." This is a marginal comment written by the same hand and affixed next to the following text of *Additiones magnae* I d. 26 q. 2 (ibid.): "Ad propositum dico quod cum relatio sit alia quidditas ab essentia, sicut in divinis manet relationis quidditas, non video relatio cum essentia una(?) possit ferre conceptum unum per se unius suppositi, quia conceptus qui non est per se unius in se, non video quo est per se unus respectu alicuius, et ideo, licet res relationis sit simpliciter eadem cum essentia, non tamen eadem apud logicum faciunt unum conceptum per se unius suppositi, et ita non sic per se subicitur Pater sicut Sortes, ut secundum hoc non sit ista 'Pater est Deus' ita per se sicut ista 'Sortes est homo', licet sit verior." The marginal comment contains a quotation from *Rep.* I-A d. 26 q. 2, cf. eds. Wolter and Bychkov, vol. 2, p. 90 n. 75. Note that Vat. lat. 876 does not contain *Reportatio* I-A, but rather *Additiones* I. The scribe thus had access to more materials than he reproduced.

in both the Oxonian and Parisian versions of his theory, as does the real distinction, Scotus was vulnerable to the objection that he could not preserve divine simplicity.

2 Gerard of Bologna's Criticism of the Formal Distinction

Several theologians criticized the formal distinction while Scotus was in Paris. The Carmelite master Gerard of Bologna, as we shall see below, attacked the formal distinction in a *Quodlibet* from 1305. Another Parisian master, the Cistercian Jacques de Thérines, rejected the formal distinction in a *Quodlibet* from 1306.[36] Jean de Pouilly, a secular master, also criticized the formal distinction in a *Quodlibet* from 1306.[37] Hervaeus Natalis attacked it just after Scotus departed for Cologne in 1307.[38] The Franciscan regent master to follow Duns Scotus, Alexander de Alessandria, defended a version of the formal distinction in a *Quodlibet* held at Paris around 1307.[39] The formal distinction was, therefore, a matter of contention during Scotus' Parisian sojourn.[40]

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36 Cf. Iacobus de Therinis, *Quodlibet* II q. 3, ed. Palémon Glorieux (Paris: J. Vrin, 1958), pp. 212–218.

37 Ioannes de Polliaco, *Quodlibet* I q. 5, Città del Vaticano, BAV, Cod. Vat. lat. 1017, f. 12^{vb}: "Ex quo concluditur ulterius quod si attributa in Deo distinguuntur formaliter ex natura rei absque operatione intellectus quod Deus sit valde compositus. Nec valet si dicatur quod sunt idem identice sed distinguuntur ex natura sui sive rei secundum suas rationes formales quidditativas, quia qualemcumque identitatem tu des eis ex quo ex natura rei distinguuntur necessario faciunt compositionem in eo, cuius sunt perfectiones. Unde isti contradicunt quod non faciant aliquam compositionem realem et quod sint formaliter distincta ex natura rei, nec adinventiones nominum naturam rei mutabunt, quae enim compositionem realem non faciunt sunt omnino idem realiter, quae autem distinguuntur ex natura rei secundum se non possunt imaginari omnino idem realiter, quia idem et diversum seu distinctum opponuntur. Ex quo concluditur quod attributa in Deo, essentia et relatio, sola ratione distinguuntur." (Numerous corrections not noted.) Pouilly's question, however, despite the title, is largely directed against Henry of Ghent. On the dating of this text, see C. Schabel's contribution in the present volume.

38 Cf. Hervaeus Natalis, *Quodlibet* I q. 2. On the dating of Hervaeus' *Quodlibeta*, see Russell L. Friedman, "Dominican Quodlibetal Literature, ca. 1260–2330," in *Theological Quodlibeta in the Middle Ages: The Fourteenth Century*, ed. Christopher Schabel (Leiden: Brill, 2007), pp. 401–491, at pp. 431–449.

39 Alexander de Alexandria, *Quodlibet* q. 1. For an edition of this text, see Bernhard Jansen, "Beiträge zur geschichtlichen Entwicklung der Distinctio formalis," *Zeitschrift für katholische Theologie* 53 (1929), pp. 317–344, pp. 517–544, at pp. 538–543; on the dating of this text, see William O. Duba, "Continental Franciscan *Quodlibeta* after Scotus," in *Theological Quodlibeta in the Middle Ages: The Fourteenth Century*, pp. 568–649, at pp. 579–582.

40 Indeed, the debate continued long afterwards; T. Noone has studied the debate in the 1310's

Gerard of Bologna was the first Carmelite master of theology at Paris.[41] He became a Master in 1295. In 1297 he became the prior general of the Carmelite order, a position he held until his death on 17 April, 1317, at the papal court at Avignon. It was under Gerard's generalship that the Carmelites were officially recognized as an order by Boniface VIII in 1298. Gerard's surviving works are four sets of Quodlibetal questions, the first three of which are dated to 1305–1307 and were held at Paris, whereas the fourth may have been disputed at Avignon. Gerard also composed a set of thirteen *Ordinary Questions* on the topic of the theological virtues, dated to the time of his first *Quodlibet*, and a *Summa* of theology, that was begun after 1313 and remained incomplete at Gerard's death. None of these works have been edited in full.[42]

2.1 *Interpretation of the Formal Distinction*

Gerard criticizes the formal distinction in three questions from his first *Quodlibet*, namely questions 2, 5, and 6. Question 2 is a philosophical question about the distinction of the transcendentals, questions 5 and 6 concern the application of the formal distinction to God. Before we consider Gerard's arguments against Scotus, I will identify the location in the works of Scotus that Gerard criticizes.

In *Quodlibet* I q. 2 Gerard describes Scotus' position as that being and the good are formally distingushed apart from the operation of the intellect but not really distinguished.[43] He then provides three arguments in support of Scotus,

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in Noone, "Ascoli, Wylton, and Alnwick on Scotus's Formal Distinction," which study has been continued into the 1330's by Schabel and Duba. See Christopher Schabel and William Duba, "*Ni chose, ni non-chose*: The *Sentences*-Commentary of Hibertus de Garda, OFM," *Bulletin de philosophie médiévale* 53 (2011), pp. 149–232. Francis of Meyronnes reported that there was a controversy in the early 1320's over the formal distinction, and he himself defended it at Paris and later at the papal court at Avignon. Aufredo Gonteri reported that after charges of heresy were hurled, a commission of all Parisian masters studied the issue and decided in favor of the formal distinction. On these matters, see Duba and Schabel, "*Ni chose, ni non-chose*," pp. 194–195; Victorin Doucet, "Der unbekannte Skotist des Vaticanus Lat. 1113, Fr. Anfredus Gonteri O.F.M. (1325)," *Franziskanische Studien* 25 (1938), pp. 201–240, at pp. 230–231; Hannes Möhle, Formalitas *und* modus intrinsecus: *die Entwicklung der scotischen Metaphysik bei Franciscus de Mayronis* (Münster: Aschendorff, 2007), pp. 76–92.

41 On Gerard's life, see Chris Schabel, "Carmelite Quodlibeta," in *Theological Quodlibeta in the Middle Ages: The Fourteenth Century*, pp. 493–543, at p. 505.

42 For a list of editions, see Schabel, "Carmelite Quodlibeta," p. 505 n. 31, p. 506 n. 32, p. 507 n. 433–435, to which can be added David Piché, *La théorie de la conaissance intellectuelle de Gérard de Bologne*.

43 Gerardus de Bononia, *Quodlibet* I q. 2, in Stephen F. Brown, "Gerard of Bologna on the Nature of the Good," in *Die Logik des Transzendentalen. Festschrift für Jan A. Aertsen zum 65. Geburtstag*, ed. Martin Pickavé (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2003), pp. 283–303, at pp. 300–301.

but I have failed to locate them convincingly in Scotus' surviving works; there is a slight resemblance to arguments that Scotus advances against Henry's theory of divine attributes in *Ordinatio* I d. 8 q. 4.[44] Scotus at least recognized that the position under attack was his own, for he copied all of Gerard's arguments against the formal distinction, that immediately follow Gerard's summary of Scotus' position, into the *Logica Scoti*.[45]

The situation is different in *Quodlibet* I q. 5, devoted to the difference between the relations and essence in the Trinity. Here, Gerard gives three arguments for Scotus' position.[46] Though he is paraphrasing, Gerard's report of the first two arguments is closest to Scotus' discussion in the *Ordinatio*.[47] The third argument is too compressed to locate with certainty.[48] Following his report of these arguments, Gerard summarizes Scotus' four conditions for a *distinctio simpliciter*.[49] Though it is clear that Gerard is summarizing Scotus, his report

44 *Ord.* I d. 8 p. 1 q. 4, ed. Vat. 4, p. 248 ff.

45 See Duns Scotus, *Quaestio de formalitatibus*, eds. Emery and Smith, pp. 170–173.

46 Gerard characterizes Scotus' position in general as follows: Gerardus de Bononia, *Quodlibet* I q. 5, Paris, BnF, Ms. lat. 17485, f. 90va: "Et ideo est alia opinio in principali proposito quod relatio comparata ad essentiam non differt re, ita quod essentia et relatio aliam rem dicant, sed bene differt ab essentia ex natura rei."

47 Gerardus de Bononia, *Quodlibet* I q. 5, Paris, BnF, Ms. lat. 17485, f. 90va–b: "Quod probant primo sic: illa differunt ex natura rei quae differunt ante omnem actum intelligendi; sed sic differunt essentia et relatio, quia Pater ante omnem actum intelligendi habet essentiam communicabilem et proprietatem relativam incommunicabilem; sed communicabile et incommunicabile de necessitate differunt; ergo etc." (This corresponds to Scotus, *Ord.* I d. 2 p. 2 q. 1–4, ed. Vat. 2, pp. 350–351 n. 390–391) "Secundo sic: non est nisi duplex differentia ⟨in⟩ intelligendo. Una secundum diversos modos concipiendi idem formale obiectum, ut si dicatur 'homo' et 'humanitas', alia in concipiendo diversa obiecta formaliter quae sunt distincta a propriis rationibus, tamen sunt idem re ut sunt animalitas et rationalitas. Si ergo paternitas et essentia differunt primo modo, tunc non aliter different quam 'Deus' et 'deitas', quod non est possibile, quia 'Deus' et 'divinitas' non sic differunt quin utrumque sit communicabile, sed paternitas et essentia sic differunt quod unum est communicabile, reliquum incomunicabile. Si secundo modo, tunc sic visio Patris non est nisi rei praesentis, ergo si videntur illa duo a Patre ut obiecta formaliter distincta, sunt ante visionem vel actum intelligendi obiecta de se formaliter distincta." (This corresponds to Scotus, *Ord.* I d. 2 p. 2 q. 1–4, ed. Vat. 2, pp. 351–352 n. 392–393)

48 Gerardus de Bononia, *Quodlibet* I q. 5, Paris, BnF, Ms. lat. 17485, f. 90^{vb}: "Tertio sic: quod facit differre re ab aliquo, differt ex natura rei ab eo quod non facit re differre ab illo; paternitas facit differre Patrem a Filio re, non essentia; ergo ex natura rei differt ab essentia." (No clear correspondence).

49 Gerardus de Bononia, *Quodlibet* I q. 5, Paris, BnF, Ms. lat. 17485, f. 90^{vb}: "Concludunt igitur isti quod relatio differt ab essentia non realiter, nam relatio in divinis non est potentia sed actu, non confuse ut miscibile in mixto, non virtualiter sed formaliter, et secundum hoc tria quae pertinent ad distincta, scilicet non esse potentialiter tantum, sed alterum tantum actu, non virtute, nec confuse, quia talia non distincta ut sic sunt; ergo unum identice

is not especially close verbally to any of the surviving versions of the *Reportatio*. What is clear, however, is that since he has combined Scotus' discussions from the *Ordinatio* and *Reportatio* into a single account, Gerard does not consider Scotus to have changed his mind or altered his position on the formal distinction. And though he reports Scotus' conditions for a distinction, he does not report any of the descriptions from the *Reportatio* of the formal distinction as a qualified non-identity.

The structure of *Quodlibet* I question 6 is different than that of questions 2 and 5.[50] These questions considered Scotus' opinion along with a variety of other opinions. But question 6 is dedicated to refuting Scotus' application of the formal distinction to the divine attributes. No other opinions besides Scotus' are under consideration. Indeed, it contains only a brief statement of Gerard's own opinion. As is the case for question 2, here in question 6 there is no verbal correspondence with or quotations from the works of Scotus, though the material seems to be loosely based on *Ordinatio* I d. 8 q. 4, which discusses the divine attributes, and *Ordinatio* I d. 13, which treats the productions of the Trinitarian persons.

2.2 *Arguments against the Formal Distinction*

In addition to responding to each of the arguments for the position of Duns Scotus that he had reported, Gerard also lodges eleven arguments against the formal distinction. These arguments can be loosely organized around two points. The first is an attack on formalities, between which Scotus' formal distinction is supposed to obtain. The second point is an attack on Scotus' categorization of distinctions, in which Gerard denies that there is any meaningful difference between a distinction that is real and one that is ex natura rei, and then he reduces the formal distinction to either a real distinction or a distinction of reason.

Regarding the first point, Gerard argues along the following lines. A formality is either a thing or not a thing. If it is a thing, it is the same in re or in a thing with another formality, and thus according to Gerard this means that taken precisely

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non formaliter, quia unum non cadit in quidditativo conceptu alterius, si enim definieretur essentia, caderet in eius definitione dici ad se non aliud, si definieretur relatio, esset e converso, nec etiam adaequate, sicut enim animal excedit hominem color albedinem, sic essentia relationem et magis, quia animal excedit praedicatione, sed homo animal perfectione, quia plus includit, essentia vero excedit relationem praedicatione, quia est in tribus et ponitur de omnibus, non sic relatio, et est formaliter infinita, relatio autem non." Cf. Duns Scotus, *Rep*. I-A d. 33 q. 2, eds. Wolter and Bychkov, vol. 2, pp. 328–329 n. 60–61.

50 Cf. Gerardus de Bononia, *Quodlibet* I q. 6, Paris, Bnf lat. 17485, ff. 91ra–92va.

as a formality it is the same as another formalilty. Thus the formality of being is the same as the formality of the good. If a formality is not a thing, it is then nothing, given the Augustinian maxim that 'what is not a thing is nothing.'[51]

Along the same lines, Gerard argues that a formality is either nothing, a *ratio* or a thing (*res*). It is clear it cannot be nothing. It also cannot be a *ratio*, for a *ratio* is something on the side of the intellect, such as an intention. Thus it remains that a formality is a thing, and so the divine attributes differ from each other and the divine essence as thing and thing, a violation of divine simplicity.[52]

Regarding the second point, namely, Gerard's denial that there can be different kinds of distinctions *ex natura rei*, Gerard argues that the name itself 'ex natura rei' implies that the distinction is real, of a thing. Gerard agrees with Scotus that the notion whereby we divide different kinds of distinctions is whether they depend on the operation of the intellect or not. But contrary to Scotus, Gerard thinks that any distinction that does not depend on the operation of the intellect for its distinction is a real distinction, a distinction between a thing and a thing. Thus there can be no formal distinction.[53]

There is another argument that is of interest, though it occurs only once and does not constitute a theme. It is of interest because it exploits Scotus' notion of containment that he comes to associate with the formal distinction.[54] Gerard argues that there are two parallel relations in God that function in the same way. There is the relation between the reality of the divine essence and the reality of the divine attributes, and another relation beween the formal *ratio* of the divine essence and the formal *rationes* of the divine attributes. But the reality of the divine essence is such that it contains the realities of the divine attributes and is really the same with them. Such at least is what Scotus claims

51 Gerardus de Bononia, *Quodlibet* I q. 2, ed. Brown, p. 301: "Item, formalitas secundum quod formalitas, et ut a quocumque alio differt, aut aliqua est aut nulla res. Si aliqua, et est idem re cum alia formalitate, ergo praecise ut formalitas est idem alii formalitati, puta formalitas entis formalitati boni, et e converso. Si nulla res ut sic, ergo ut sic omnino nihil; contra: Augustinus, *De doctrina Christiana*, lib., cap. 2: 'quod nulla res est omnino nihil est'."

52 Gerardus de Bononia, *Quodlibet* I q. 6, Paris, BnF, Ms. lat. 17485, f. 91^{vb}: "Item, propria ratio formalis sapientiae, ut sic propria est et distincta ab aliis, aut est res aut ratio aut nihil; sed constat quod non est nihil, nec ratio, quia loquor de ratione ut est ens in anima et intentio vel attributa ab intellectu; ergo sequitur quod sit res; ergo distinguuntur ab essentia divina et ab aliis attributis ut res a re, et sic realiter non solum formaliter."

53 Gerardus de Bononia, *Quodlibet* I q. 5, Paris, BnF, Ms. lat. 17485, f. 90^{vb}: "Primo quidem, quia quae differunt ex natura rei videntur differre realiter, hoc enim videtur importari per ipsum nomen. Non enim quae differunt ex actu vel opere intellectus ut sic non differunt nisi ratione et non plus quam ratione, sic quae differunt ex natura rei videntur differre et non minus quam re."

54 Cf. Duns Scotus, *Ord.* IV d. 46 q. 3, ed. Vat. 14, p. 217 n. 74.

at *Ordinatio* IV d. 46.[55] Therefore it must also be the case that the formal *ratio* of the divine essence contains the formal *rationes* of the divine essence and is formally the same as them, contrary to Scotus.[56]

When we consider the numerous arguments of Scotus and the descriptions of his opinion that Gerard reports, the arguments that Gerard makes against the formal distinction and the notion of formality, and his replies to his reports of Scotus' opinion and counter-arguments against Scotus' arguments, Gerard emerges as the most significan critic of the formal distinction from Scotus' own lifetime, having devoted more attention to this aspect of Scotus' thought than did his other contemporary critics Richard of Conington at Oxford, or Hervaeus Natalis at Paris.

2.3 *Gerard's Position*

Given Gerard's position that the formal distinction is untenable and collapses into a real distinction, and that formalities are ultimately formally the same as each other, how are we to understand the distinctions between the divine attributes or between the divine essence and the Persons of the Trinity? We might expect a rival theory of identity and distinction to replace that of Duns Scotus, but in fact in this respect Gerard is disappointing. It is clear he thinks there is only one real distinction, that which obtains between a *res* and a *res*. He also indicates that he finds Scotus' twofold distinction of a distinction of reason insufficient, and that there are more kinds of distinctions of reason, but he does not elaborate on them in these questions of his *Quodlibet* nor indicate that he has discussed them elsewhere.

Gerard's position on the difference between the divine essence and the Persons of the Trinity adopts an element of Scotus' account, namely, that they are adequately non-identical. For Gerard, the divine essence enters into the quidditative concept, that is, definition, of a Person, and given its infinity, exceeds the Person. But all three persons taken together are adequately the same as the divine essence. But this answer is tentative. Gerard also allows that divine infinity could also explain the relation between the essence or the persons, even account for how there can be three Persons and one essence. Gerard also con-

55 Duns Scotus, *Ord*. IV d. 46 q. 3, ed. Vat. 14, p. 217 n. 74.

56 Gerardus de Bononia, *Quodlibet* I q. 6, Paris, BnF, Ms. lat. 17485, f. 91^{vb}: "Item, sicut se habet realitas essentiae divinae ad realitates attributorum, ita ratio formalis essentiae divinae ad rationes formales aliorum attributorum; sed realitas essentiae divinae sic est contentiva realitatum attributorum quod re sunt idem cum ea; ergo ratio formalis essentiae divinae sic est contentiva rationum formalium attributorum quod idem erunt formaliter cum ea, et per consequens ad se invicem."

siders another option, indeed prefers it. It is a more agnostic approach, in which the voice falls silent, not only his own, human voice, but also that of the choirs of angels, for such questions pertain to the "Peace of Christ that surpasses all understanding." Since the peace of Christ is beyond all understanding, so too are the issues pertaining to the Trinity such as the foundation of the emanations.[57] All that we can really say about the divine nature, it seems, is that Duns Scotus was wrong about it.

3 Duns Scotus' Reply: The *Logica Scoti*

As we have seen, Gerard criticized the four conditions of a *distinctio simpliciter* from the *Reportatio Parisiensis*. Scotus copied Gerard's arguments into a short, unfinished work on the formal distinction that is commonly now referred to as the *Logica Scoti*, and Adam Wodeham also cited it with the same title.[58] This text went by a variety of titles during the fourteenth century. In the Vatican manuscript (Vat. lat. 876) it is called the "Quaestio … de formalitatibus quae dicitur logica Scoti de distinctione attributorum." The work is also called the "Quaestio logicalis" in the single most authoritative manuscript (Balliol 208), and under this title it was cited by Walter Chatton. It is called "collatio 20" in another manuscript. The editors date the text to 1305–1307 and argue that this is Duns Scotus' final word on the formal distinction.

The *Logica Scoti* is the literary remnant of a debate Scotus held to defend his doctrine of the formal distinction against criticism he faced at Paris. Gerard of Bologna's critique of the formal distinction is the primary motivation for the treatise, given the long section of arguments that Scotus copied into the *Logica Scoti*. In addition to Gerard, Scotus may also be responding to Godfrey of Fontaines. Guido Terrena reports a series of arguments against the formal

57 Gerardus de Bononia, *Quodlibet* I q. 5, Paris, BnF, Ms. lat. 17485, f. 91ra: "Quomodo autem relationes distinguantur ab invicem re et personae per eas, essentia autem maneat una, quae idem est re eis? Potest autem et idem dici vel propter infinitatem essentiae vel propter inadaequationem relationis cum ea et idem est, vel vox silet, non mea tantum, sed angelorum supra potentes et supra angelos et supra cherubim et supra seraphim et supra omnem sensum est, quia scriptum est 'pax Christi quae exuperat omnem sensum.' Si pax Christi supra omnem sensum est, quia quomodo non est supra omnem sensum tanta generatio, ut Ambrosius dicit et habetur 9 d 1 *Sententiarum* c. viii."

58 For the critical edition of the *Logica Scoti*, see Emery and Smith, "The *Quaestio de formalitatibus*," pp. 153–182. After the publication of the edition, Stephen D. Dumont discovered another copy of the text in Città del Vaticano, BAV, Cod. Vat. lat. 6768, ff. 20$^{ra–vb}$ and 51$^{ra–va}$ (private correspondence).

distinction that are identified as originating with Godfrey by a marginal annotation.[59] But these arguments do not appear in the *Logica Scoti*. Furthermore, there is a treatise on the *Formalitates* ascribed to John of Ripa surviving in two manuscripts that describes several arguments as based on the "Fundamenta Godefridi"; these arguments are almost quotations of the *Logica Scoti*.[60] However, the ascription to Godfrey indicates that the *Logica Scoti* is not the direct source of the Ripian *Formalitates*. It should also be noted that one of the arguments in the list ascribed to Godfrey is one of Gerard's, so it may be the case that Gerard is borrowing arguments from Godfrey, or vice versa, or else somewhere in the transmission of the *Formalitates* a scribe misread "Gerardus" as "Godefridus." Finally, one of the arguments reported by the Ripian *Formalitates* is also employed by Jacques de Thérines. Jacques, like Gerard, lodged numerous objections against the formal distinction.[61] There is a second argument common

59 Cf. Guido Terrena, *Quaestio utrum differentia ex natura rei vel formalis sit ponenda praeter differentiam realem vel rationis*, in James P. Etzwiler, "Six Questions of Guido Terreni, O.Carm (†1342). Vat. lat. 901, ff. 140^{r}–145^{v}," *Carmelus* 35 (1988), pp. 138–177, at pp. 150–154. The marginal annotation, recorded by Etzwiler on p. 153, is "alius doctor scilicet Godefridus eciam arguit contra istud differre formaliter ex natura rei de attributis." Etzwiler, p. 139, dates the questions to between 1310 and 1321. For Guido's role in the debates regarding the formal distinction, see Schabel and Duba, "*Ni chose, ni non-chose*," pp. 167, 172–178.

60 Cf. *Formalitates magistri Iohannis de Ripa*, Assisi, Biblioteca del Sacro Convento, Ms. 659, f. 104^{v}–105^{r}: "Ad idem arguitur per fundamenta Godefredi … Praeterea, si differentia formalis non esset realis, sequeretur quod non sufficeret ad faciendum differre aliqua realiter; sed haec est falsum; ergo etc. Consequentia est de se evidens, sed probo falsitatem consequentis, quia Pater non differet realiter ab essentia per paternitatem, et tamen per paternitatem differt realiter a Filio. Praeterea, sic se habet res significata ad suam rationem formalem, ita res illa ad suam; ergo permutatim sic se habet res ad res, ita ratio formalis ad rationem formalem. Si igitur haec res est eadem simpliciter isti, et ratio formalis erit eadem similiter rationi formali, ergo simpliciter sunt eadem. Praeterea, si bonitas ligni non esset eadem ligno formaliter, ergo formaliter est sibi addita; sed consequens est falsum, quia si esset forma addita tunc esset substantialis et tunc unum substantiale erit duo substantialia aut erit accidentale, et tunc non erit idem realiter cum substantia, quia nullum tale est idem formaliter cum substantia; ergo etc."

61 Cf. Jacobus de Therinis, *Quodlibet* II q. 3, ed. Glorieux, p. 216: "Preterea si dicatur quod entitas differt formaliter a veritate et bonitate; contra: quia sicut impossibile est quid realiter differre a se nisi addatur sibi res aliqua, ita nec formaliter nisi addatur sibi forma alia. Aut ergo illa forma addita est substantialis, et tunc sunt plures formae substantiales in eodem, quod est impossibile; et cum hoc haberetur propositum quod idem est differre formaliter et differre realiter tamquam per rem additam. Si forma accidentalis adhuc haberetur propositum quantum ad pluralitatem rerum." The editors note the presence of this argument at "The *Quaestio de formalitatibus*," 123 n. 49, but did not include it in the critical apparatus since it was not a verbatim quotation as are most of the quotations of Gerard.

to the *Logica Scoti* and Jacques' arguments, but it is nearly identical with one of Gerard's.[62] It may be the case then that Jacques' critique was unknown to Scotus, and that Jacques is simply repeating earlier arguments by Gerard and possibly Godfrey.

The *Logica Scoti* enjoyed a limited reception in the fourteenth century. In addition to the aforementioned references by Walter Chatton, Adam Wodeham, and the *Formalitates* of John of Ripa, William of Alnwick discussed several arguments from the *Logica Scoti* in the first two questions of his *Quodlibet* from Oxford, around 1315.[63] Furthermore, an anonymous author discussed Scotus' position in the *Logica* and defended it from William of Alnwick's criticisms.[64]

The title of the question that the *Logica Scoti* treats is "whether everything intrinsic to God is entirely the same as the divine essence, apart from the consideration of an intellect." But despite the presence of a formal question-title, the internal structure of the *Logica Scoti* is not apparent.[65] There are no opening and closing arguments. Nor are there clear summaries of rival opinions with replies, or a magisterial reply to the question as a whole. What Scotus does instead is immediately launch into a discussion of six propositions. These propositions pertain to the relation of the persons of the Trinity to the divine essence. Within the evaluation of these propositions one finds a small *quaestio*-structure of the traditional kind, with an opening and opposing argument, a determination or solution regarding the validity of the proposition, and closing remarks responding to the initial arguments about the proposition. This structure is found in the treatment of all but the first proposition. Following the discussion of these propositions there is a series of doubts that Scotus raises and replies to, followed by a long series of objections to the formal distinction. It is here that we find Scotus' report of the arguments of Gerard of Bologna. Follow-

62 Idem, ibid.: "Preterea formalitas illa quam ponis veri et boni in ligno vel in quocumque alio, aut est res aut ratio aut nichil. Non nichil, quia nulla est differentia. Si ratio, ergo differentia tantum secundum rationem. Si res, ergo differentia realis; et utrobique habetur propositum."

63 For discussion of this point, see Dumont, "Duns Scotus's Parisian Question on the Formal Distinction," pp. 51–52, who speculates William may have been present at the original debate; Emery and Smith, "The *Quaestio de formalitatibus*," pp. 109–112; John H.L. van den Bercken, "William of Alnwick's Analysis of Scotus' 'Formal non-Identity'," *British Journal for the History of Philosophy* 29 (2021), pp. 435–452.

64 The beginning of this anonymous question is missing. See Padova, Biblioteca Antoniana, Ms. 295 Scaff. XIII, f. 83ra–85va. The existence of this question was previously noted by Athanasius Ledoux, *Fr. Guillelmi Alnwick O.F.M. Quaestiones disputatae*, xlix.

65 On the structure of the *Logica Scoti*, see Dumont, "Duns Scotus's Parisian Question on the Formal Distinction," pp. 23–24, p. 50.

ing these arguments Scotus discusses the nature of actuality and distinction for several paragraphs before starting another series of objections. The text ends abruptly. In outline form, the structure is as follows:

Article 1: Terms and Definitions (lost or never written)
Article 2: Propositions
2.1 Propositions:
- P1: *a* non est formaliter *b* (*a* non est formaliter idem *b*) (lin. 11–20)
- P2: *a* et *b* non sunt formaliter eadem (lin. 21–55)
- P3: deitas est formaliter distincta a paternitate, taken together with P4: deitas et paternitas sunt formaliter distinctae (lin. 56–137)
- P5: *a* habet distinctam formalitatem a formalitate *b* (formalitas *a* est distincta a formalitate *b*), taken with P6: *a* et *b* habent distinctas formalitates (formalitas *a* et formalitas *b* sunt duae, sive distinctae, formalitates) (lin. 138–258)
- Summary (lin. 259–269)

2.2 *Dubia* concerning term 'formaliter' (lin. 270–327)
- Arguments of William of Alnwick (?) against the formal distinction (lin. 275–317)
- Replies (lin. 327) [Lost or never written]

2.3 General Arguments against the Formal Distinction (lin. 328–441)
- Arguments against the formal distinction (lin. 328–425)
  - Gerard of Bologna's arguments (lin. 328–397)
  - Godfrey of Fontaines (?) arguments (lin. 357–362, 408–415)
  - Jacques de Thérines' arguments (lin. 412–415, 426–427)
- Replies to arguments against the formal distinction (lin. 430–441)

2.4 Discussion of Actuality and Unqualified Distinction (lin. 442–557)

In the edition of the text, the editors identify seventy lines of the text as quotations from Gerard. These lines are arguments against the formal distinction that Scotus copied sequentially from Gerard's *Quodlibet* I questions 2, 5, and 6. Though there is some paraphrasing, most of Gerard's arguments are copied nearly verbatim into the text of the *Logica Scoti*. Indeed, Scotus' representation of Gerard's text is much more accurate than is Gerard's presentation of Scotus' arguments. Given that all the arguments reported by Scotus that can be identifed come from Gerard of Bologna, it is the criticism of the latter that motivated Scotus to hold a special disputation at Paris on the formal distinction. Unfortunately, however, despite his extensive report of Gerard's criticism, Scotus did not respond to these arguments. As can be seen from the outline above, Gerard's arguments occur in section 2.3 of the *Logica Scoti*,

but following the objections Scotus abruptly starts rehearsing the four conditions for a *distinctio simpliciter* instead of directly responding to Gerard. There are also some scattered remarks on unitive containment,[66] and, as we have seen, Gerard did exploit this notion against Scotus, but Scotus does not clearly and directly respond to Gerard's arguments the way Gerard had responded to him. This does not mean, however, that what Scotus thought of Gerard's arguments must remain unknown, for we have the rest of the *Logica Scoti* to consider.

As discussed already, two points on which Gerard criticized Scotus was whether there was a plurality of formalities in God, and whether the various subdivisions of distinctions that obtain apart from the consideration of the intellect all collapse into a single real distinction. I shall discuss the second before the first, since the solution of the second depends on that of the first.

As we saw, Gerard denies there can be various subdivisions of the real distinction. We also saw, that Gerard reported Scotus' four conditions for a *distinctio simpliciter* without engaging them. Thus the burden would be on Gerard to explain why the conditions are insufficient and why the classic description of a real distinction as obtaining between *res* and *res* can still be maintained. So at the moment, it seems that Scotus and Gerard simply disagree over whether the real distinction can be subdivided. But at least in the *Logica*, Scotus offers more explanation for how the four conditions are related to the formal distinction and the formalities. In brief, again, the four conditions are that two items are present actually not potentially, formally not virtually, in their proper distinct *esse* not confusedly, and non-identically. If all four conditions are met, there is a *distinctio simpliciter*, which Scotus calls a perfect distinction. If only the first three conditions are met, the distinction is *secundum quid*, qualified. What is qualifed is the distinction itself, which is considered restricted or diminished with the absence of the fourth condition of non-identity. Applied to the Trinity, which is the topic of Gerard's critique and Scotus' defense, this means that deity and paternity are both actual *ex natura rei*, formal, in their proper *esse*, but what is lacking is the fourth condition, non-identity. Thus there is not a perfect and absolute distinction obtaining between paternity and deity, but a qualified distinction. Gerard's sense of the real distinction and the basis of his criticism would be classified by Scotus as a *distinctio simpliciter* and so Gerard's arguments would then miss their mark.[67]

66 Cf. Duns Scotus, *Quaestio de formalitatibus*, eds. Emery and Smith, p. 175 ll. 430–435, pp. 176–177 ll. 454–463.

67 Duns Scotus, *Quaestio de formalitatibus*, eds. Emery and Smith, pp. 165, ll. 234–240.

Scotus discusses the first point when he evaluates propositions 5 and 6. Proposition 5 is that 'A has a formality distinct from formality B', where the letters A and B stand for the divine essence and the personal property of paternity, respectively. Alternatively, one could formulate proposition 5 as 'formality A is distinct from formality B'. Proposition 6 has several formulations, the most important of which are 'A and B have distinct formalities or two formalities' and 'formality A and formality B are two formalities or distinct formalities'.[68] At this point in the *Logica Scoti*, Scotus has already conceded that formal distinction and formal non-identity are equivalent, depending on how one understands how the terms 'formaliter' and 'distinctum' operate in propositions. Thus, on this point at least, there is a development from the position expressed in the *Ordinatio*, where, as we saw above, Scotus did not accept the inference from formal non-identity to formal distinction. Propositions 5 and 6 of the *Logica Scoti* extend the analysis to whether a plurality of formalities can be conceded to be formally distinct from each other. What Scotus will deny with respect to these propositions is that one can posit a plurality of formalities at the same time as a *distinctio simpliciter*. He is willing to grant both propositions as long as the notion of distinction at play in them is diminished or restricted, or the logical mode that the term 'formaliter' introduces is negated by the negation included in the notion of distinction. Scotus is somewhat doubtful whether such can be accomplished with propositions 5 and 6 as they were originally formulated, but he does grant that if one rephrases them to 'formality A is formally distinct from formality B' they can be conceded.[69] In this case, the notion of the mode that the term 'formality' imports into the proposition is negated by the negation present in the notion of distinction and the proposition is allowed to stand. So although Scotus has a low level of confidence in the conclusion, in

68 Cf. Duns Scotus, *Quaestio de formalitatibus*, eds. Emery and Smith, p. 160 ll. 138–147.

69 Duns Scotus, *Quaestio de formalitatibus*, eds. Emery and Smith, pp. 162–163, ll. 195–211: "Hoc tenendo, consequenter dicendum esset quod ista est simpliciter falsa, 'formalitas *a* est distincta a formalitate *b*', immo et ista, 'formalitas *a* est distincta formalitas a formalitate *b*' …." Ibid., eds. Emery and Smith, p. 164 ll. 223–232: "Alius modus dicendi forte placet quibusdam, scilicet quod concederetur 'haec formalitas est distincta ab illa' vel saltem quod est distincta formalitas ab illa, sed tunc oporteret illas exponere qualiter posset haec distinctio diminui quantum ad rationem suam formalem per hoc quod est 'formalitas', quia in quocumque antecedente praeconcesso vel diminuitur distinctio vel negatur modus importatus per hoc quod est 'formaliter', saltem qui vult uti verbis minus dubiis ista forte potest concedere 'formalitas *a* est formaliter distincta a formalitate *b*' sed nec ista 'formalitas *a* est distincta a *b*' …." See also pp. 166, ll. 265–267: "Tertia propositio, scilicet quod 'formalitas *a* est distincta a formalitate *b*', simpliciter est neganda et praecise concedenda cum ista determinatione 'formalitas *a* est distincta formaliter a formalitate *b*'."

his final position at Paris, at the end of his career, he does grant a plurality of formalities in God under heavy qualification.

4 Conclusion

It is clear from the foregoing that Gerard of Bologna is an interlocutor in the sense that we have defined. He had at his disposal both a version of Scotus' Oxford commentary and a version of the Parisian commentary, as again is evidenced by the presence of the four conditions of a *distinctio simpliciter*. He criticized arguments from both commentaries in his first *Quodlibet*, and Scotus seems to have thought that Gerard's arguments were enough of a threat to his position that he held a special dispute to defend the formal distinction. The literary remains of this dispute is the *Logica Scoti*, and in this text Scotus copied some seventeen arguments from Gerard's *Quodlibet*. Unfortunately Scotus never responded to these arguments. This lack of response might make us wonder what Gerard's influence over Scotus ultimately amounted to, or given the sketch of Scotus' development on the formal distinction that I outlined above, how Gerard contributed to the development of Scotus' thinking on the formal distinction. One answer to this question can at least be given: one of the main criticisms that Gerard launched against Scotus was the presence of multiple formalities in God. Scotus had allowed them in the *Ordinatio*, but given Gerard's criticism, at the end of his career in the *Quaestio de formalitatibus* he is ultimately hesistant to admit them. It was not quite a change of mind on the part of Scotus, but Gerard's criticism led Scotus to reconsider his position in more detail than he had in his commentaries on the *Sentences*.

8

Nicholas Trivet on the Univocity of Being

Timothy B. Noone

The subject of the present paper is univocity as it is treated by Nicholas Trivet in his Scholastic works. The works in question are largely quodlibeta, six altogether, and some disputed ordinary questions, preserved mainly in a Basel manuscript, though the eleventh (or perhaps ninth?) quodlibet is extant in a Worcester Cathedral manuscript.[1] For our purposes, the most important texts are to be found in the quodlibetal questions found in the Basel ms.[2] The first of the quodlibetal questions is edited in its entirely in the dissertation of 1967 of Hermann Hauke,[3] but only a few of the questions from the other four quodlibets are edited in the same work. Other individual questions have been edited, but nothing other than the first *Quodlibet* is available in its entirety.[4] The dates of the quodlibetal questions have been explored both by Franz Cardinal Ehrle and Russell Friedman; both have concluded that the first five quodlibets belong to the early fourteenth century, but the eleventh probably does not appear until 1314. Friedman in particular argues that the first five quodlibets were disputed in the order of their enumeration and that they were disputed consecutively once a year, beginning in 1303.[5] This dating is especially relevant for our inves-

1 Worcester, Cathedral and Chapter Library, F.3, ff. 170–186. Description of the Worcester manuscript is available in R.M. Thomson, *A Descriptive Catalogue of the Medieval Manuscripts in Worcester Cathedral Library* (Cambridge: D.S. Brewer on behalf of the Dean and Chapter of Worcester Cathedral, 2001), pp. 3[b]–4[b]. For a listing of Trivet's works, see Richard Sharpe, *A Handlist of the Latin Writers of Great Britain and Ireland before 1540* (Turnhout: Brepols, 1997), pp. 394–398.

2 Basel, Universitätsbibliothek, ms. B.IV.5, ff. 1[ra] et seq.

3 Hermann Hauke, *Die Lehre von der beseligenden Schau nach Nikolaus Trivet*, Inaugural-Dissertation (München, 1967).

4 Michael Schmaus, "Nicolai Trivet Quaestiones de causalitate scientiae Dei et concurso divino," *Divus Thomas* 35 (1932), pp. 85–196; idem, *Der Liber Propugnatorius des Thomas Anglicus*, Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie und Theologie des Mittelaltes 29/1 (1930), pp. 117–127; Thomas Graf, *De subiecto psychico gratiae et virtutum secundum doctrinam scolasticorum usque ad medium saeculum XIV*, Studia Anselmiana, fasciculus II/IX (Romae: Libraria Herder, 1935), pp. *51–*54; and Mary L. Lord, "Virgil's Eclogues, Nicholas Trivet, and the Harmony of the Spheres," *Mediaeval Studies* 54 (1992), pp. 186–273; Richard C. Dales and Omar Argerami, *Medieval Latin Texts on the Eternity of the World* (Leiden: Brill, 1991), pp. 174–179.

5 Russell L. Friedman, "Dominican Quodlibetal Literature: ca. 1260–1330," in *Theological Quodli-*

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tigation inasmuch as the views of Scotus are very much being subject to examination in the first question of the first *Quodlibet* of Nicholas and the text being relied upon to expound Scotus's views is that of the *Ordinatio*. In a word, Trivet's criticism of Scotus begins in the Subtle Doctor's lifetime, and the possibility that Scotus was present at Trivet's 1303 quodlibetal session cannot be ruled out if, as seems likely, Scotus was still at Oxford in the late fall of 1303 and we assume that Trivet's quodlibetal questions of that year were held at the Advent, rather than the Lenten, penitential season.

The present paper is organized into two sections. In the first, by far the larger, I shall lay out Trivet's consideration and criticisms of Scotus's doctrine of univocity, relying chiefly upon the explicit discussion of univocity in the first question of the first Quodlibet of Trivet. In the second, I shall consider the scope and effectiveness of Trivet's criticisms of Scotus's doctrine.

1 Section 1: Trivet on Scotus's Doctrine of the Univocity of Being

The structural pattern in the written text of Trivet's quodlibetal question is similar to that found in Thomas Sutton's, Scotus's and Ockham's quodlibetal questions: one or two arguments are given siding with an affirmative reply to the question, usually just one on the other side, normally introduced by 'ad oppositum' in Trivet's case, and then the solution. This pattern may argue in each case to the text being revised considerably after the oral dispute and perhaps even to a preference for such a format among authors, but it is substantially in contrast to the structure of Thomas Sutton's *Quaestiones ordinariae* which often have multiple questions on either side and in which lengthy replies are often enough given to the objections. Indeed, in the case of Sutton's ordinary question that provides a doctrinal parallel to Trivet's first question in his first Quodlibet, q. 32, there are 33 arguments supporting univocity and Sutton replies to each one quite carefully.[6] As we shall see, Trivet either attended the ordinary lectures and disputes of Sutton or knew the literary by-product of the teaching, for he borrows certain materials of Suttton in crafting his own treatment.

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beta in the Middle Ages: The Fourteenth Century, ed. Christopher Schabel (Leiden: Brill, 2007) pp. 426–429; Franz Ehrle, "Nikolaus Trivet, sein Leben, seine Quodlibet und 'Quaestiones ordinariae'," ed. Franz Pelster, *Storia e Letteratura, raccolta di studi e testi* 50 (Roma: Edizioni di Storia e Letteratura, 1970), pp. 303–384, at pp. 306–307, pp. 330–336.

6 Thomas von Sutton, *Quaestiones ordinariae*, ed. Johannes Schneider (München: Verlag der Bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften in Kommission bei der C.H. Beck'schen Verlagbuchandlungen, 1977), pp. 870–895.

Trivet's first question asks whether being, understood in its broadest manner, is univocal to God and creature. The sole argument favoring the thesis of being as univocal is entirely taken from Scotus's *Ordinatio*, a point not noted, oddly enough, in Hauke's edition:

Nicholas Trivet, *Quodl.* 1 q. 1 (ed. Hauke, 7+)	**Scotus, *Ord.* 1 d. 3 pars 1 qq. 1–2 n. 27–29 (ed. Vat. 3, pp. 18–19)**
Et arguitur quod sic: Omnis enim intellectus certus de uno conceptu et dubius de duobus habet illum conceptum de quo est certus, alium ab illis, de quibus est dubius ⟨dubium Hauke⟩; ita patet, quia subiectum includit praedicatum, ut dicit opponens; alias intellectus de eodem esset dubius et certus.	Et univocationem sic intellectam probo quintupliciter. Primo sic: omnis intellectus, certus de uno conceptu et dubius de diversis, habet conceptum de quo est certus alium a conceptibus de quibus est dubius; subiectum includit praedicatum.
Sed intellectus intelligens Deum certus est quod est ens et dubius utrum sit ens creatum vel increatum, finitum vel infinitum, ut patet per philosophos qui fuerunt certi quod primum principium erat ens et ignorabant, utrum ens finitum vel infinitum.	Sed intellectus viatoris potest esse certus de Deo quod sit ens, dubitando de ente finito vel infinito, creato vel increato; ergo conceptus entis de Deo est alius a conceptu isto et illo, et ita neuter ex se et in utroque illorum includitur; igitur univocus.
Quia posuerunt aliqui primum principium esse ignem, aliqui solem, aliqui lunam, etc. et non fuerunt certi de talibus, quod erat principium, quia tunc fuissent certi de falso. Ergo conceptus entis est alius a creato vel increato, finito vel infinito. Cum igitur ens sit commune utrique, sequitur quod uno conceptu dicatur de utroque. Sed quod dicitur de diversis secundum unum conceptum est univocum. Cum ergo ens uno conceptu dicatur de creato vel in creato; de Deo, id est, et creatura, videtur quod univoce dicatur de Deo et creatura.	Probatio maioris, quia nullus idem conceptus est certus et dubius; ergo vel alius, quod est propositum, vel nullus—et tunc non erit certitudo de aliquo conceptu. Probatio minoris: quilibet philosophus fuit certus, illud quod posuit primum principium, esse ens,—puta unus de igne et alius de aqua, certus erat quod erat ensa; non autem fuit certus quod esset ens creatum vel increatum, primum vel non primum. Non enim erat certus quod erat primum, quia tunc fuisset certus de falso, et falsum non est scibile; nec quod erat ens non primum, quia tunc non posuissent oppositum.—Confirmatur etiam, nam aliquis videns philosophos discordare potuit esse certus de quocumque quod aliquis posuit primum principium, esse ens, et tamen propter contrarietatem opinionum eorum potuit dubitatur utrum sit hoc ens vel illud. Et tali dubitanti si fieret demonstratio concludens vel destruens aliquem conceptum inferiorem, puta quod ignis non erit ens primum sed aliquod ens posterius primo ente, non destrueretur ille conceptus primus sibi certus, quem habuit de ente, sed salvaretur in illo conceptu particulari probato de igne,—et per hoc probatur propositio, supposita in ultima consequentia rationis, quae fuit quod ille conceptus certus, qui est ex se neuter dubiorum, in utroque istorum salvatur.

The fact that Trivet only gives the famous argument from 'doubtful and certain concepts' affects how he discusses univocity: he focuses upon the psychological, logical, and epistemological aspects of this argument and he seems to imply that defeating this argument is sufficient for setting aside the thesis of univocity.

Trivet begins by remarking the question itself is common to the logician as well as the metaphysician, citing, naturally enough, Aristotle's comments that sophistry, dialectic, and 'first' philosophy all deal with being, after a fashion.[7] But there is a barb awaiting in Trivet's adducing this authoritative text; he tells us we should not be surprised, as a result of the close connection between sophistry and metaphysics, that questionable arguments enter into the discussion, that is, if 'sophistical arguments concerning being' (*sophisticationes*) have to be excluded as part of the inquiry into metaphysical truth.[8] From the standpoint of logical intentions, Nicholas tells us, if we grant that being has its own proper concept apart from the concepts of ten categories, we have to acknowledge that it is spoken of univocally in reference to the categories and that the name is not the only thing common to the categories, but the formula or concept of being is as well. Yet, even so he is unwilling to admit that if being were common to the categories, it would follow from that claim that being is common to God and creatures.[9] Perhaps Trivet is thinking of Scotus's own arguments that often align the knowability of substance through accident, the view that the concept of being is common to substance and accident, and the doctrine of univocity both in reference to the categories and in reference to God and creatures. For, often enough, Scotus expresses himself by saying that, if being were not univocal, we could not know either substance or God.[10]

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7 Aristotle, *Metaphysica* Γ c. 2, $1004^{b}22$–23 in Aristotelis, *Metaphysica*, ed. W. Jaeger (Oxonii: e Typographeo Clarendoniano, 1957), p. 63; AL XXV 3.2, p. 71: "Nam circa idem genus versatur et sophistica et dialectica cum philosophia, sed differ ab hac quidem modo potestatis, ab illa vero vitae prohaeresi."

8 Trivet, *Quodl.* I q. 1, ed. Hauke, 8+: "Et ideo non est mirum si contingant sophisticationes circa ens, quas per diligentem considerationem veritatis oportet excludere."

9 Trivet, *Quodl.* I q. 1, ed. Hauke, p. 8+: "Incipiendo igitur ab intentionibus logicis, dico quod si concedatur ens habere conceptum proprium praeter primos conceptus decem generum, non video quin oporteret concedere quod ens univoce diceretur de decem praedicamentis, quod non sit solum nomen commune habere, sed etiam rationem substantiae. Quia ratio substantiae non est aliud quam conceptus rei qui in his quae definiri possunt, per definitionem exprimitur, licet ex hoc non sequeretur quod diceretur univoce de Deo et creatura …".

10 Scotus, *Lect.* I d. 3 pars 1 qq. 1–2 n. 110, n. 113, ed. Vat. 16, pp. 265–266.

The text of the Hauke edition in the next section is a bit garbled and caused me some needless hermeneutical worries until I looked at the manuscript itself in the beautiful on-line reproduction available in **e-codices.** Here is the Hauke edition's version of the next passage:

> Non ergo ens quod est prius et secundum substantiam aliquod exprimit conceptum generis generatim (?) in praedicamento substantiae, quod est posterius. (question mark in original).

Here is what the manuscript has (Basel, Universitätsbibliothek, Hs. B IV 4, f. 1ra):



HTTPS://WWW.E-CODICES.UNIFR.CH/EN/LIST/ONE/UBB/B-IV-0004

The passage should read, accordingly:

> Sumo ergo ens, quod est prius, et substantiam secundum quod exprimit conceptum generis generalissimi in praedicamento substantiae, quod est posterius.

The general point that Trivet is making in this section is that if we take the notion of substance, the first of the categories, and ask how from the putatively proper notion of being we would get to the distinctive notion of substance as opposed to the other categories, substance as such would have to have something that would add to being. That additive could not be extensionally wider than the notion of being nor of the same extension as being; it would have to be narrower in scope than being. But that, in turn, would mean that being was part of the feature that, added to the putatively common notion of being, would yield out substance. Hence being would figure twice in the notion of substance: once in terms of the putatively proper notion of being and again in terms of the feature which added to the proper notion of being would result in substance.[11]

11 Trivet, *Quodl.* I q. 1, ed. Hauke, pp. 8+–9+.

Naturally, Trivet repeats the same move from the standpoint of additive rather than substance. The contracting additive itself would have to, on the one hand, have its own distinctive feature distinct from being, but would also have to fall under being and not be of any wider extension or be co-extensive. Consequently, it too would have to have being in its notion and thus we would have being thrice in the concept of substance: once for substance in reference to its distinctive element, twice, within the distinctive element qua distinctive element in its own constitution, and thrice because of the allegedly proper notion of being that belongs to substance and the other categories. Along these lines, Trivet suggests that his line of analysis could be extended indefinitely, resulting in an infinite repetition of being in each of the constituents.[12]

At this point, Trivet does consider a possible rejoinder: the item added to being might not include the concept of being within it. But, Nicholas observes, if that were so, it would itself be inconceivable and unintelligible, inasmuch as being is ground for all intelligibility, yet that would entail that nothing intelligible was added in the constitution of whichever category we might choose. Hence, if we are considering substance, being is just substance; if we considering one of the accidents, being is just that accident, say, quantity. In the case of each of the categories, being just is the category itself; the notion of being, though allegedly proper to it and yet common to substance and the nine accidental categories, turns out upon analysis to have no proper notion at all, but to be simply each of the categories. Hence, there is no concept such that it could be predicated univocally of substance and the other categories.[13]

Now this picture of the concept of being appears both to ourselves and to Nicholas himself as rather stark. To his credit, he tries to give the picture a little color, so to speak. What he proposes is his version of the 'disjunctive concept' hypothesis. If a spoken name is such that what is named is expressed by an exclusive disjunction in which there is no overlap between the disjuncts but both of them taken jointly exhaust the scope of the name, then there is no common notion that belongs to each of the disjuncts. Such is the case, Nicholas suggests, in the case of being: each of its disjuncts, substance and the nine accidents, each expresses a part of what the common name does, each does so in such a way that there is no overlap, and, jointly taken, they exhaust what is meant by spoken expression 'being':

12 Trivet, *Quodl.* I q. 1, ed. Hauke, p. 9+.
13 Trivet, *Quodl.* I q. 1, ed. Hauke, p. 9+.

> The same point is proven in a different manner as follows. That name does not have one proper concept that is common to the several items that fall under it when the whole meaning of the name is expressed in a disjunction one of whose parts one thing expresses and another of whose parts the other expresses of the items that are contained under the name. The major premise is clear, for a disjunction can only occur among diverse elements. But the total meaning of this name 'being' is only expressed in a disjunction, one of whose parts is expressed by substance and the other by accident; these are the items that are contained under 'being'.[14]

Then Trivet quotes John Damascene's *Logica* in its denial of the univocity of being and allows this discussion to suffice for the first major point of his question.

But immediately thereafter he acknowledges a doubt; namely, if being and substance both signify the same concept, they would have to be synonyms. He fully realizes that the objection lodged could be repeated for each of the categories: each of them would seem to be synonyms with being as well. One would not be hard-pressed, furthermore, to argue that since each of them is conceptually identical to being, then they would seem to be identical to each other with the lamentable, indeed, miserable consequence that all the categories are the same. Even Trivet admits the situation is difficult: '… et absque dubio hoc videtur difficilis evasio.'[15]

Yet he thinks there is a way out of this particular morass into which we seem to have fallen. His 'evasio' begins with the idea that some items are directly grasped by the intellect and such intelligibles may be grasped in reference to the same object, such as a species with reference to which we understand the genera and differentiae, whereas other objects may be said to be only indirectly grasped by the intellect, such as features properly belonging to sense and imagination, and are only indirectly intelligible. This distinction Trivet uses to claim that two spoken names may signify the same concept, but still differ themselves by reason in the sense that one of them may, thanks to its mode of signifying,

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14 Trivet, *Quodl.* I q. 1, ed. Hauke, p. 10+: "Istud idem probatur alio modo sic: quod illud nomen, cuius totalis intentio non determinatur nisi sub disiunctione, cuius unam partem capit unum et alteram partem aliud de his quae continentur sub eo, non habet proprium conceptum unum communem respectu illorum. Ita maior patet, quia disiunctio non potest cadere nisi inter diversa. Sed totalis intentio huius nominis, quod est 'ens' non determinatur nisi ⟨non B; *om.* Hauke⟩ sub disiunctione, cuius unam partem capit substantia et aliam accidens, quae immediate continentur sub ente."

15 Trivet, *Quodl.* I q. 1, ed. Hauke, p. 11+.

connote something that the other name does not. His examples of the type of case he has in mind are 'human' and 'Socrates'.

> So, for example, 'human' and 'Socrates' are not synonymous names, nor is it the case that whatever is said of one is said of the other. But nonetheless 'Socrates' does not express any other concept above 'human', for it adds nothing except the principles of singularity and individuation. Such is the case, too, with 'humanity' and 'human'. For they signify the same concept, but differ in their manner or mode of signifying, for one of them connotes in the manner of the concrete, though it is not directly intelligible, that the other does not. And so too is it the case with the name of 'substance' in regard to 'being'; for the name of substance, from the feature according to which the name is imposed, connotes a mode of actual existence that is outside the quiddity of the thing and, consequently, not directly intelligible by the intellect. Nor should this be understood such that we think that to whatever the name of substance belongs actual existence should also be true of that same thing, but rather we should think that to whatever the name of substance belongs that truly is apt by nature to exist in a certain way.[16]

We might think that the proposed 'evasio' accomplishes nothing, or at least nothing much. Indeed, we might wonder whether Nicholas has cooked up this kind of thing just to get around the alternative of univocity. But I do think we would be wrong to think the latter is the case.

Nicholas has a question, not edited by Hauke, that deals with the issue of whether the transcendental good is synonymous with being. After duly considering the many senses of 'synonym' that his wide reading in quite unusual sources allowed—Nicholas was, after all, a commentator on Boethius's *De con-*

16 Trivet, *Quodl.* I q. 1, ed. Hauke, pp. 11+–12+: "… sicut verbi gratia, homo et Socrates non sunt synonyma nomina, nec de quocumque dicitur unum, dicitur aliud. Et tamen Socrates non dicit alium conceptum ab homine, quia nihil addit directe intelligibile super hominem, quia non addit nisi principia singularitatis et individuationis. Sic est de humanitate et homine. Significant enim eundem conceptum, sed differunt in ratione significandi vel in modo, quia unum ratione concretionis connotat aliquid, licet non directe intelligibile, quod non connotat aliud. Et sic est de nomine substantiae respectu entis; nomen enim substantiae ex ratione a qua imponitur connotat quemdam modum actualis existentiae, qui est extra quidditatem rei et per consequens non est directe intelligibile ab intellectu. Nec hoc sic intelligendum est: quod cuicumque attribuitur nomen substantiae, quod illud actualiter ⟨existit *add.* ed. Hauke⟩, sed quod cuicumque attribuitur nomen substantiae, vere illud est aptum sic existere."

solatione philosophiae, Livy's history, the works of Seneca, and other Biblical and classical sources—, he comes down on the side that goodness and being are not synonyms if we allow that a simple difference of *ratio* may block complete convertibility and add that being predicable of the same subject is insufficient for synonymity. Trivet entirely acknowledges that Averroes uses the term 'synonym' in such a way that two features being convertible of the same subject is sufficient for synonymy in his sense, but adds this manner of speaking is not the common manner of speaking in his own time. Rather in the customary way of speaking of his own time not only must the same subject be the subject of both terms, but the *ratio* must match in such a way that nothing is expressed by the one that is not expressed by the other, such as is the case with 'ensis' and 'gladius' in Latin.[17]

So, Nicholas is not just cooking up this discussion to get around the univocity doctrine; he does have reflections on the philosophy of language into which his solution to the dilemma posed by Scotus in regard to univocity fits. But whether his criticisms are altogether effective will have to wait until the end of the paper.

17 Trivet, *Quodl* II q. 1, Basel, Universitätsbibliothek, B IV 4, f. 11va–b: "Si vero diversitas rationis non tollit mutuam invicem praedicationem nec convertibilitatem quoad supposita quantum est de proprietate vocabuli nihil prohibit talia dici synonyma, cum nihil sit cui unum nomen communicat cui simul non communicat aliud. Et isto modo accipiendum est dictum Commentatoris quando dicit quod unum est synonymum enti. Cum igitur tripliciter potest accipi, primus tamen modus non spectat ad praesentem quaestionem—non enim quaeritur utrum bonum diversis contentis dicatur synonyme /B=11^{vb}/ vel sit synonymum eis quod spectat ad primum modum. Sed utrum bonum sit synonymum enti, quod non potest esse nisi altero duorum modorum supra ⟨secundo B⟩ positorum, quorum primus est magis usitatus apud modernos loquentes, dicitur ⟨dub. B⟩ quod accipiendo synonymum secundum communem usum loquendi, secundum quod idem est quod polooimum vel plurivocum nullo modo dicendum est quod bonum sit synonymum enti. Quia quae sic sunt synonyma vel dicta de eodem faciunt nugationem eo quod nihil exprimitur per unum nomen quod non sit expressum per aliud; ut si dicatur 'hoc est ensis et gladius'; sed ens et bonum dicta de eodem non faciunt nugationem, quia alia ratio vel modus entitatis exprimitur per bonun quod non exprimitur per hoc quod dico ens. Et eodem modo cum dico ens et unum. Unde ⟨*add. sed exp.* cum non B⟩ Commentator super X *Metaphysicae* reprobat rationem Avicennae volentis probare quod si ens et unum dicunt eandem rem, quia tunc esset nugatio, dicendo ens et unum, quia hoc ⟨licet B⟩ ens et unum sunt unum secundum essentiam et substantiam, tamen differunt secundum modum—et similiter est de bono, et ideo sunt synonyma secundum modum praedictum. Sed accipiendo synonymum secundum modum ultimum concedi potest quod bonum sit synonymum enti quia ⟨qui B⟩ diversitas rationis inter ens et bonum nec ⟨ut B⟩ mutuam invicem praedicationem nec convertibilitatem impedit quantum ad supposita, sicut nec diversitas rationis inter ens et unum et ideo sicut a Commentatore conceditur unum esse synonymum enti, sic potest concedi quod bonum sit synonymum enti."

The second main point in Trivet's solution in his formal consideration of univocity is his counterfactual denial: his claim, adumbrated at the outset of the discussion, that being would not be univocal to God and creatures even if, contrary to what he takes to be fact, it were univocal to substance and accident. Curiously enough, Nicholas mentions, only to set aside, an argument that Thomas Suttton makes in his lengthy treatment of univocity, dismissing it, by implication, as too loose and insufficiently rigorous to suit the proper standard of refutation:

Trivet, *Quodl.* I q. 1, ed. Hauke, p. 12+	**Thomas Sutton, *Quaestiones ordinariae* q. 32, ed. Schneider, p. 884**
Omitto enim rationem illam quae fundatur super dialecticum principium quod si ea quae magis conveniunt non uniuntur, nec illa quae minus; sed Deus minus et creatura conveniunt quam substantia et accidens. Si haec ⟨hae Hauke⟩ ergo non uniuntur, nec illa.	Et multo longius distat esse cuiuslibet creaturae ab esse divino quam esse accidentis cuiuscumque ab esse substantiae; propter quod multo minus potest ens dici de Deo et creatura univoce quam substantia et accidente

We shall return in our conclusion to consider what this public setting aside of Sutton's reasoning tells us, if anything, about the targets for Trivet's arguments against univocity.

In his own proposed, and by implication superior, argument for his claim that being would not be univocal to God and creature even if it were univocal to substance and accident, he argues as follows:

> And I argue more appropriately: whatever things are univocal in some feature, participate the nature of that univocal. (For if the whole nature of the univocal were found in one of them, it would not be found in the other at all.) If therefore God and creature agree in some feature, God will partake of the nature of that univocal. This is the argument that Rabbi Moses hints at in his treatment of the name of God: participation is inconsistent with the fullness of the divine perfection.
>
> This line of reasoning is confirmed through the fact that an effect is united to an agent by being assimilated to it perfectly in the form that is the principle of acting, that is, from its necessarily being rendered equal to the agent in the power of acting according to that form. But it is impossible for a creature to be assimilated perfectly to God in a form

> which is the principle of acting, or in the virtue of acting according to that form. Therefore it is impossible for a creature to be univocal in any way with God and a result impossible for it to be univocal in being with God.[18]

Quite clearly Trivet is thinking of the consequence of participation in regard to being, ontologically speaking, as the ultimate ground for denying univocity. Strangely enough, in this regard, his apprehensions are shared by Duns Scotus, who equally denies that the univocity of being understood in his sense entails that God and creature share in some reality or thing.[19] We may reflect upon this point somewhat sadly that misunderstandings of Scotus's doctrine are as ancient as Nicholas Trivet and continue through Garrigou-Lagrange down to the present day.[20]

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18 Trivet, *Quodl.* I q. 1, ed. Hauke, pp. 12+–13+: "Et arguo magis proprie, quia quaecumque univoca in aliquo, participant rationem illius univoci. (Si enim in uno eorum salvaretur tota ratio illius univoci, nullo modo inveniretur in alio.) Si ergo Deus et creatura conveniunt in aliquo, ergo Deus participabit rationi illius univoci. Hanc rationem innuit Rabbi Mosse in tractatu De nominibus Dei. Participatio plentitudini divinae perfectionis repugnat. Confirmatur autem haec ratio per hoc quod ex hoc effectus unitur agenti quod assimilatur ei perfecte in forma, quae est principium agendi, ex quo necessario adaequatur in virtute agendi secundum illam formam. Sed impossibile est creaturam perfecte assimilari Deo in forma, quae est principium agendi, vel in virtute agendi secundum formam. Impossibile est ergo creaturam aliquo modo univocari cum Deo in aliquo et per consequens in ente." The text of Moses Maimonides is Rabbi Moseei Aegypti, *Dux seu Director dubitantium* I c. 57, ed. Aug. Iustinianus, 1520, f. 22^{v}: "Quod si ita est, aut quae erit ratio scientiae nostrae et intellectus, cum conati fuerint apprehendere immunem a materia, simplicem in fine simplicitatis, qui est necesse esse quod non habet causam, nec accidit ei res addita super essentiam suam perfectam, cuius ratio est impossibilitas imperfectionis ipsius tantummodo, et quod est ens cui nihil est simile eorum, quae dedit esse, et non participat eis aliquo modo et non est in eo multitudo?"

19 Scotus, *Ordinatio* I d. 8 pars 1 q. 3 n. 82, ed. Vat. 4, p. 190: "Ad tertium patebit in tertio articulo 'quia Deus et creatura non sunt primo diversa in conceptibus'; sunt tamen primo diversa in realitate, quia in nulla realitate conveniunt,—et quomodo possit esse conceptus communis sine convenientia in re vel realitate, in sequentibus dicetur."

20 John Milbank, *The World Made Strange: Theology, Language, Culture* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1997), pp. 9–45; Catherine Pickstock, *After Writing: On the Liturgical Consummation of Philosophy* (New York: Basil Blackwell, 1997), pp. 137–139; and Alasdair MacIntyre, *Three Rival Versions of Moral Enquiry: Encyclopaedia, Genealogy, and Tradition* (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1990), pp. 152–156. Prof. MacIntyre adopts quite a different attitude towards Scotus and later medieval philosophy in his more recent book, *God and Universities*. For the most recent distortion along these lines, se Brad S. Gregory, *The Unintended Reformation: How a Religious Revolution Secularized Society* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2012).

The first portion of Trivet's third point of his *respondeo* is that, if we follow out the 'logical approach' to being, we must, in light of the failure of being to have a proper concept and to be predicated univocally, acknowledge that being is an equivocal. On this score, he echoes the views of Scotus himself in his logical questions, where in his *Elenchi* commentary, Scotus cites Porphyry along the same lines that Trivet does and argues that being is an equivocal.[21] The second portion of this final point in Trivet's solution, however, argues, along traditionally Thomistic lines, that the metaphysician would say that the attribution of all nine of the accidents to substance is sufficient to allow theirs to be a unity between univocal and equivocal. This mediant unity, as he calls it, is, of course, analogy and this is the manner in which 'being' is predicated: it is said analogically of being insofar as it falls under the categories and analogically of God and creature. The latter two forms of analogy are themselves distinct, but Trivet postpones indicating how these types of analogy are to be understood for a later question, that we do not seem to possess.[22]

In his reply to the 'doubtful and certain' concepts argument, Trivet claims that the argument, if it worked, would actually eliminate univocity as well as analogy. Here he appeals to a thought-experiment inspired by the *Categories* of Aristotle, on the one hand, and Boethius's oft-repeated example in his *De consolatione philosophiae*, on the other. Say we saw a statue of a human being at a great distance. We might be incapable of discerning whether it was genuinely a human being or just the statue of a human being; we would, Nicholas tells us, know, however, it was an animal, but we would be uncertain as to whether it was painted animal or a genuine animal. If Scotus's argument worked, we would have to say there was common notion of animal that prescinded from 'painted animal' and 'genuine animal', even though this is really a pseudo-notion, being a spoken name that has no common notion behind it, but rather a spoken name that has two different formulas or *rationes* and truly an equivocal. Scotus's argument is then, for Nicholas, a failure. For the person who has the notion of being and affirms without reservation that God is a being is using an analogous concept of being, one presumably that divides into nine disjunctions that separate substance and the nine accidents, but also one that also recognizes the ontological dependency of the nine accidents upon the primary instance of being in substance.

21 Duns Scotus, *Quaestiones super librum Elenchorum Aristotelis*, q. 15 n. 2–19, ed. Robert Andrews, Timothy Noone, et al., OPh 2, pp. 331–337.

22 Trivet, *Quodl.* I q. 1, ed. Hauke, pp. 13+–14+.

2 Section 2: The Effectiveness of Trivet's Criticisms

What to make of Trivet's criticisms of univocity overall? Well first let us pay attention to the historical context. Clearly, Trivet is aiming principally at Duns Scotus's doctrine of univocity, but I think his rather dismissive reference to what has to be considered a significant element in Sutton's criticisms of Scotus has to be taken seriously enough to acknowledge that Trivet is both criticizing Scotus and critiquing the manner in which Sutton replied to Scotus. The gist of this is that Trivet seems to be saying that Sutton did not get to what Trivet thinks is the decisive argument against Scotus, namely, a metaphysical argument that claims Scotus denies the analogy of being in proposing his views on univocity.

In its substance, of course, Trivet's views anticipate a steady stream of criticisms of Scotus from the Thomistic school over the centuries. These views do not perceive that Scotus himself affirms the analogy of being, something quite obvious if one considers the Subtle Doctor's discussion of the concept of being in the eight distinction of book I of either the *Lectura* or the *Ordinatio*. Yet, quite apart from the misunderstanding that renders at least part of Trivet's criticism off the mark, I would suggest there is an advance in Trivet's position: he is quite willing to hold that being is logically equivocal and to articulate how it is so with his affirmation of his version of the 'disjunctive concept' hypothesis. How is this an advance, you might ask? Well, a good number of interlocutors on behalf of the Thomistic tradition have held that there are three kinds of spoken and mental terms: univocal, equivocal, and analogical. The last mentioned have been considered a special case, usually reserved for the scope of metaphysical notions. Trivet does not belong to this class of thinkers, even if he shares some characteristics with them. He seems to have taken to heart the alternatives laid out by the *Anonymi* edited by Ebbesen, with which Scotus was acquainted, discarded mental analogues, kept spoken analogues, and admits that being is, logically speaking, an equivocal.[23] Trivet's position may be 'Thomistic', but it is a considerable distance removed from Aquinas's own views, which are on the other side of the late thirteenth century discussion of analogical terms partially inspired by Aquinas.[24] As historians of late thirteenth

23 Anon. S-F, *De soph. elenchis* q. 57, ed. Sten Ebbesen, Corpus Philosophorum Danicorum Medii Aevi 7 (Hauniae: Librarium G E C Gad, 1977), pp. 133–144; Anon. C, *De soph. elenchis*, q. 823, ed. S. Ebbesen, CPDMA 7, pp. 315–316; E. Jennifer Ashworth, "Analogy and Equivocation in Thirteenth Century Logic: Aquinas in Context," *Mediaeval Studies* 54 (1992), pp. 94–135, at p. 119.

24 E. Jennifer Ashworth, *Les théories de l'analogie du XII^e^ au XVI^e^ siècle* (Paris: J. Vrin, 2008),

century and fourteenth century thought have so often discovered, Thomism is not a fixed item and often goes well beyond Aquinas thanks to the need of Thomists to respond to alternative views as well as criticisms of Thomistic positions on the part of Franciscans and others.

But what can be said about the effectiveness of Trivet's criticisms? He shares in both the strengths and weaknesses of the disjunctive hypothesis approach to being; being is an equivocal and is tantamount to ten notions listed in a conjunction: being + suprascript#1 through being + suprascript#10, wherein each member of the conjunction answers to substance or one of the nine accidents. Why being + suprascript#1 is associated with the other nine notions of being is rooted in the metaphysical structure of finite being and the relationship of dependency that accidents have in reference to substance, not in any tie between the notions themselves. The semantic pattern of names bespeaks that dependency and the **pattern of naming** is what 'analogy', understood semantically, amounts to. There are, however, two points on which, it seems to me, Trivet has seriously missed the mark in his criticisms of Scotus, apart from the failure already noted above to recognize that Scotus also holds the analogy of being as a metaphysical tenet. First, Trivet does not seem to have grasped that Scotus's doctrine of univocity is tied to an explanation of how we can know substances and God through the transcendental concept of being that our encounter with finite beings affords us. In other words, he does not seem to understand the epistemological role that Scotus's doctrine of univocity fulfills. Second, he does not recognize that being is a univocal as an imperfect concept in our understanding along with Scotus's effort to articulate how this works by appealing to modes. Consequently how effective Trivet's criticism must ultimately be judged to be cannot be assessed without hearing how he handles in his own fashion the epistemological problems Scotus is addressing and what criticisms he might make of Scotus's imperfect, in the sense of inadequate, transcendental notion of being.[25]

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pp. 1–124; eadem, "Signifying and Modes of Signification in Thirteenth-Century Logic: A Preface to Aquinas," *Medieval Philosophy and Theology* 1 (1991), pp. 39–67; eadem, "Analogy and Equivocation in Thirteenth Century Logic: Aquinas in Context," *passim*; Silvia Donati, "La discussione sull'unità del concetto di ente nella tradizione di commento della 'Fisica': commenti parigini degli anni 1270–1315 ca.," in *Die Logik des Transzendentalen: Festschrift für Jan A. Aertsen zum 65. Geburtstag*, ed. Martin Pickavé (Berlin/New York: Walter de Gruyter, 2003), pp. 60–139 at pp. 66–71; Giorgio Pini, *Scoto e l'analogia: Logica e metafisica nei commenti aristotelici* (Pisa: Scuola Normale Superiore, 2002), pp. 51–73.

25 Stephen D. Dumont, "Transcendental Being: Scotus and Scotists," *Topoi* 11 (1992), pp. 135–148; Idem, "Scotus's Univocity and the Medieval Tradition of Metaphysics," in *What is Philosophy in the Middle Ages?*, ed. Andreas Speer (Walter de Gruyter: Berlin, 1998), pp. 207–211.

9

Vestigia cuiuslibet in quolibet inquirendo: A Comparative Reading of Gonsalvus Hispanus' *Quodlibet* q. 7

Hernán Guerrero-Troncoso

1 Introduction: Tracing Some Points of Interaction between Gonsalvus and Duns Scotus[1]

While it is a commonplace to quote Gonsalvus Hispanus' letter of recommendation for Duns Scotus, where he affirms that he has a long familiarity with the latter's "praiseworthy life, exceptional knowledge and subtle reasoning,"[2] few scholars have attempted to determine whether their acquaintance had any influence on their respective theological and philosophical positions and the extent of their interaction.[3] One could argue that the fact that Gonsalvus'

1 This article is part of the Fondecyt Research Project for Initial Researchers N° 11170810, "Primacy of being or primacy of entity. A comparative study between Henry of Ghent and John Duns Scotus," which also funded a research stay conducted at the Albertus-Magnus-Institut in Bonn (July 2019 and February 2020) and at the Aracoeli Archival Library in Rome (February 2020.)

2 Cf. L. Wadding, *Annales Ordinis Minorum*, ad ann. 1304, n. 32, vol. 6 (Romae: Ad Claras Acquas, 1733), p. 51; *Chartularium Universitatis Parisiensis*, ed. H. Denifle and E. Châtelain, vol. 2 (Paris: Delalain, 1891), p. 117; L. Amorós, "Introductio historico-critica," in *Gonsalvi Hispani Quaestiones Disputatae et Quodlibet*, Bibliotheca Franciscana Scholastica 9 (Firenze/Quaracchi: Ex Typographia Collegii S. Bonaventurae, 1935), pp. xxvi–xxvii; B. Martel, *La psychologie de Gonsalve d'Espagne* (Montreal/Paris: Institut d'Études Médiévales/Vrin, 1968), pp. 21–22; M. Lázaro Pulido, "Filosofía y teología en Gonzalo Hispano. Contribución hispana en el año de Juan Duns Escoto," *Revista de Hispanismo Filosófico* 13 (2008), p. 35.

3 Francesco Fiorentino, "Gonsalvo di Spagna. Volontà e libertà, fede e scienza," in *Gonzalo Hispano y la crisis de la filosofía del siglo XIV*, ed. M. Lázaro Pulido, F. León Florido, and D. González Ginocchio (Pamplona: Eunsa, 2017), pp. 55–59 presents a brief survey of articles on Gonsalvus during the 20th Century. Worthy of notice are Martel, *La psychologie*; Jorge Gracia, "The Doctrine of the Possible and Agent Intellects in Gonsalvus Hispanus' Question XIII," *Franciscan Studies* 29 (1969), pp. 5–36; V. Muñiz Rodríguez, "Gonzalo Hispano, mediación entre San Buenaventura y J. Duns Escoto en la crítica a la teoría cognoscitiva de la iluminación," *Cuadernos Salmantinos de Filosofía* 13 (1986), pp. 153–171. Also worthy of mention is M. Sullivan, The Debate over Spiritual Matter in the Late Thirteenth Century: Gonsalvus His-

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Quaestiones and *Quodlibet* consist of *reportationes* only adds to the difficulty of interpreting them, since the texts are written in a very succinct style and we are left to the fidelity of the reporter to grasp the Master's arguments and nuances.[4] Nevertheless, the increasing availability of critical editions of the writings of the authors of the 13th and 14th Centuries—as well as digitizations of the manuscripts containing them and of Early Modern printed editions, when no critical edition is at hand—and the ever-growing interest in authors hitherto neglected, are of invaluable help when approaching Gonsalvus' thought. Moreover, the view on Duns Scotus' texts has certainly changed since Fr. L. Amorós' edition of Gonsalvus' *Quaestiones*, after the critical editions of the former's philosophical works, two of his three commentaries on the *Sentences*, his *Collationes oxonienses* and the current work on the *Reportationes* carried out by the Scotus Archiv at the University of Bonn. All this research should result in a new, revised edition of Gonsalvus' works, if only to have a closer look into how his "long experience" with the Subtle Doctor took place.

This article moves in that direction. Of the 32 questions of Gonsalvus edited by Amorós—some of which consist of different versions of the same question,—I have focused on q. 7 of his *Quodlibet* to shed some light into the kind of doctrinal interlocution that could have taken place between him and Scotus.[5] If scholars during the last century have hardly devoted any attention to Gonsalvus' writings, almost all those studies have been devoted to the *Quaestiones disputatae*—particularly *Quaest. disp*. q. 11 on spiritual matter, q. 13 on the possible intellect, and the question held against Meister Eckhart, on the nobility

panus and the Franciscan Tradition from Bonaventure to Scotus, Ph.D. Dissertation, Catholic University of America, 2010; cf. *infra*, n. 5.

4 Cf. Amorós, "Introductio", p. lxii: "Quaestiones omnes videntur esse ab auditoribus in scholis reportatae … In quaestionibus quodlibetalibus nullum explicitum testimonium habetur quod sint reportatae; ast, earum textus ita abbreviatus clare manifestat has quaestiones esse compendium reportatoris in scholis exaratum magis quam redactionem magistri completam prout in determinatione proferebatur"; Martel, *La psychologie*, pp. 28–29. As the critical apparatus of my edition of *Quodl*. q. 7 shows, Gonsalvus' manuscripts present many omissions and repetitions, which render the text even more difficult to follow.

5 Another notable instance, namely the question on spiritual matter found in Gonsalvus' *Quaestiones disputatae*, q. 11 and in Scotus' *Quaestiones in Aristotelis De anima* q. 15, relates to the dating of this controversial work of the Subtle Doctor, and it was the subject of a detailed analysis by M. Sullivan, whose conclusions regarding the dating disputes those of the editors of Scotus' *Quaestiones in Aristotelis De anima*; cf. Sullivan, *The Debate over Spiritual Matter*, pp. 312–380, pp. 397–427. Regarding Gonsalvus' role in dating Scotus' *De an*., cf. the introduction to J. Duns Scotus, *Quaestiones in Aristotelis II et III De anima*, ed. R. Andrews et al., OPh 5, pp. 124*–127*.

of the praises *in patria* and *in via*—leaving his *Quodlibet* almost as an aside.[6] I hope it will become clear from the two passages I examine on in this article, that this neglected work shows how broad and detailed Gonsalvus' analyses were and can help in establishing some traces of interlocution between him and the Subtle Doctor.

2 Structure and Scope of Gonsalvus Hispanus' *Quodl.* q. 7

Gonsalvus' *Quodlibet*, disputed during his regency period in Paris between 1302–1303, is preserved as a *reportatio* in ms. Troyes, Bibliothèque Municipale 661, f. 126^{vb}–130va. It consists of 11 questions, all attributed to *Gonsalvus minor*, with no mention of their character nor their occasion. In fact, they appear in the middle of the other version—*alia reportatio*, as Amorós calls it—of his *Quaest. disp.* q. 2, interrupting its continuity.[7] Compared to them, the *Quodlibet* is quite short, with half of its questions barely comprising a column in the manuscript.[8] Neverthless, however brief, they present complex discussions, with a broad range of authorities and positions, which—although mentioned in passing—show the extent of Gonsalvus' familiarity with contemporary authors and views. In their brevity, they also refer to subjects he already dealt with in his disputed questions, so a comparison with them helps us to better understand the context inspiring his positions.

Question 7 of his *Quodlibet* stands out among most of the remaining questions as a model of scholarship and analysis and, at the same time, shows how important for Gonsalvus was the relation between the object, the act and the species in intellection and the primacy of the former, a subject he examines in two of his *Quaest. disp.*, q. 1 (1*) and 6 (3*,) and which plays a role in his anal-

6 That is the case in Martel, *La psychologie*, pp. 129, pp. 136–140; Muñiz, "Gonzalo Hispano," p. 166 n. 24. The only study concerned with Gonsalvus' *Quodlibet*—although the analysis is restricted to q. 2 and only comprises a few pages—is D. González Ginocchio, "El escotismo en las *Quodlibeta* de Gonzalo Hispano," in *Gonzalo Hispano*, ed. Lázaro Pulido et al., pp. 153–165.

7 In his edition of the *Quaest. disp.*, Amorós found the Troyes manuscript after the book was in print, so he could not include this "other account" (*alia reportatio*) in the *Quaestiones*; cf. Amorós, "Introductio Historico-Critica," pp. lii–lviii. For brevity's sake, the questions belonging to this other account will be quoted with an asterisk (*) after the number; for a description of the Troyes ms. cf. M. Grabmann, *Neuaufgefundene Pariser Quaestionen Meister Eckharts und ihre Stellung in seinem geistigen Entwicklungsgänge. Untersuchungen und Texte* (München: Verlag der Bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1927), pp. 8–16.

8 In Amorós' edition, the whole *Quodlibet* comprises 37 pages, with some questions being less than a page long. *Quaest. disp.* q. 13, on the other hand, is 33 pages long.

ysis of the nature and distinction between the agent and the passive intellect, *Quaest. disp*. q. 13. Its structure also follows a usual pattern of the Scholastic *quaestio*, which consists in contrasting two extreme positions and using their mutual criticism to show neither of them to be valid.[9] Consequently, Gonsalvus presents a first position, which claims that superior angels know through fewer species than inferior ones, and a second, which states that the number of species is the same for all angels.[10] His reply presents an intermediate position, namely that the number of species is the same for both superior and inferior angels, but the species of the superior ones are more universal in their virtue, because they are clearer and more evident.[11] The reply to the initial argument closes the question.[12]

While Gonsalvus' reply is straightforward enough—his being an intermediate position between two extremes—and the preceding examination shows the difficulties to which both positions give rise, he articulates his analysis with two remarks, which allow seeing how broad the range of this discussion is and, at the same time, give enough context to look for traces of interlocution with Scotus. The first observation refers to the relation of this subject to two metaphysically relevant arguments, (1) the distinction between essence and existence and (2) the one between matter and form. The second one presents Gonsalvus' doubts about the common assumption that angels know through species, with special regard towards innate species. Both refer to a wide range of authors and to subjects such as spiritual matter, thus giving a broad speculative context to the main question, the role, number and nature of species in the cognition of angels. Although Scotus does not dedicate any exclusive question to this matter, there is a question present only in his Parisian lectures—*Rep*. II d. 11 q. 2—dealing with some of these issues and presenting an interesting point of contact with Gonsalvus. The last section is devoted to this question, which presents some interesting textual particularities as well.

9 Cf. Ioannes Duns Scotus, *Lectura* I d. 8 n. 132, ed. Vat. 18, p. 48: "Ad quaestionem istam dicunt aliqui concordando in conclusione principali, sed discordant in modo ponendi, in quo se impugnant; et eorum impugnatio est pax nostra."

10 Gonsalvus Hispanus, *Quodl*. q. 7 n. 5–15, ed. Amorós, pp. 404–406 (first position); ibid. n. 16–37, ed. Amorós, pp. 406–410 (second position). The paragraph numbering corresponds to my edition at the end of this article.

11 Ibid., n. 38, ed. Amorós, p. 410: "Ideo dico quod per tot species intelligunt angeli superiores sicut inferiores, tamen illae species in angelo superiore sunt magis universales in virtute, quia sunt limpidiores et clariores."

12 Ibid., n. 39, ed. Amorós, p. 410.

3 The Metaphysical Context of the Cognition of Angels

The first paragraph where Gonsalvus articulates his answer to the main question of *Quodl.* q. 7 is at the beginning of his criticism of the third argument of the first position. It reads as follows:

> But neither this [third] argument is conclusive, because superior angels either are called more simple because they are more actual,—and then it does not follow that they understand through less species, because then the same results against this just as against the first argument;—or they are called more simple because they are less composite, which similarly is not suitable, because all who put composition in them, either put a composition [in them] of matter and form, of essence and being, or they differ neither way, not in essence and being, ⟨nor in matter and form,⟩ or [they differ] in matter and form, but not in essence and being or, conversely, [they differ] in essence and being, but not in matter and form.—⟨But,⟩ since all this kind of composition is put equally in superior and inferior [angels,] this argument is not conclusive.[13]

The argument our Doctor criticizes claims that, since everything that is received is conditioned by the way the recipient is able to receive it, and superior angels are more simple than inferior ones, the species of superior angels should also be simpler than the ones of the inferior ones.[14] As the text quoted above shows, a greater simplicity means a lesser number of species, due to a greater actuality or to a lesser composition. By dismissing this argument, Gonsalvus also gives away the controversial character of the metaphysical context of the question, which concerns the distinction between being and essence, matter and form, and—related to this last distinction—the dispute about spiritual matter as well.[15] On this point, it becomes evident that Gonsalvus has many interlocutors in mind, ranging from Alexander of Hales, Thomas Aquinas and Bonaventure, to his contemporaries. However, focusing only on his interlocution with Duns Scotus, there are some distinct features worth noticing. First, for

13 Gonsalvus Hispanus, *Quodl.* q. 7 n. 12, ed. Amorós, p. 405. I have indicated the interventions on the text I propose in my edition, namely the suppression of the second "in eis" and the addition of "nec materiae et formae" and the last "sed."

14 Gonsalvus Hispanus, *Quodl.* q. 7 n. 11, ed. Amorós, p. 405. This is the position, among others, of Thomas Aquinas, Giles of Rome and Godfrey of Fontaines.

15 On the subject of spiritual matter, cf. the comprehensive account of Sullivan, *The Debate over Spiritual Matter*, pp. 37–287, pp. 358–378.

both Gonsalvus and Scotus the distinction between being (*esse*) and essence is of little interest, especially in this case because of the use Thomas Aquinas makes of it in order to render spiritual matter irrelevant.[16] Second, although Scotus agrees with Gonsalvus' position on spiritual matter in his *Quaestiones in Aristotelis De anima*, in his later writings, most notably in his *Quodlibet* q. 2, not only he will ignore that subject almost completely, but he will also affirm the immateriality of angels and of the soul.[17]

But, more importantly, both possible interpretations of simplicity that Gonsalvus presents fall under one of Scotus' key metaphysical notions, namely that infinity is an intrinsic mode, a notion which the Subtle Doctor considers more perfect and simpler than conceiving God merely as the most perfect being that contains all perfections of all beings. In this sense, infinity means that God exceeds beyond measure in perfection any other being and, consequently, does not belong with other extrinsic determination, such as goodness or truth, but consists in an intrinsic mode that remains even without considering (*circumscribendo*) all other attributes.[18] With this approach—that I have called

16 Cf. Sullivan, The Debate over Spiritual Matter, p. 353; on Thomas Aquinas' use of this distinction to deny spiritual matter, cf. ibid., pp. 104–137, especially pp. 120–132. On Duns Scotus' view on essence and existence, cf. L. Honnefelder, *Ens inquantum ens. Der Begriff des Seienden als solchen als Gegenstand der Metaphysik nach der Lehre des Johannes Duns Scotus* (Münster: Aschendorff, 1989), pp. 257–267.

17 Cf. Sullivan, The Debate over Spiritual Matter, pp. 423–427; Duns Scotus, *Quodlibet* q. 2 n. 5 [2]. 9 [3]–24 [7], ed. Felix Alluntis (Madrid: La Editorial Católica, 1968), pp. 45–53.

18 Cf. Duns Scotus, *Ord.* 1 d. 3 n. 58, ed. Vat. 3, p. 40: "Ad multos conceptus proprios Deo possumus pervenire, qui non conveniunt creaturis,—cuiusmodi sunt conceptus omnium perfectionum simpliciter, in summo. Et perfectissimus conceptus, in quo quasi in quadam descriptione perfectissime cognoscimus Deum, est concipiendo omnes perfectiones simpliciter et in summo. Tamen conceptus perfectior simul et simplicior, nobis possibilis, est conceptus entis infiniti. Iste enim est simplicior quam conceptus entis boni, entis veri, vel aliorum similium, quia 'infinitum' non est quasi attributum vel passio entis, sive eius de quo dicitur, sed dicit modum intrinsecum illius entitatis, ita quod cum dico 'infinitum ens', non habeo conceptum quasi per accidens, ex subiecto et passione, sed conceptum per se subiecti in certo gradu perfectionis, scilicet infinitatis,—sicut albedo intensa non dicit conceptum per accidens sicut albedo visibilis, immo intensio dicit gradum intrinsecum albedinis in se. Et ita patet simplicitas huius conceptus 'ens infinitum'." Duns Scotus, *Quodl.* q. 5 n. 9–10 [4], ed. Alluntis, pp. 169–170: "Ex hoc posset ens infinitum in entitate sic describi, quod ipsum est cui nihil entitatis deest, eo modo quo possibile est illud haberi in aliquo uno, et hoc pro tanto additur, quia non potest in se realiter et formaliter per identitatem omnem entitatem habere … Ex hoc sequitur quod infinitas intensiva non sic se habet ad ens quod dicatur infinitum tanquam quaedam passio extrinseca adveniens illi entitati, nec etiam eo modo quo verum et bonum intelliguntur passiones vel proprietates entis, immo infinitas dicitur modus intrinsecus illius entitatis cuius est sic intrinsecum

elsewhere the foundation for his "transcendental turn" in Metaphysics,—[19] the Subtle Doctor answers both Henry of Ghent, who regards infinity as the highest possible degree of perfection, and Richard of Mediavilla, who presents infinity as founded on simplicity, which in turn he conceives as non-composition.[20] Although Gonsalvus does not arrive at the same radical position of Scotus, his rejection of a greater simplicity as a greater actuality or merely as lesser composition seems to point in that direction.

4 Gonsalvus Hispanus on the Role and Nature of Species in the Cognition of Angels

The second observation takes place in Gonsalvus' text before the first one, at the very beginning of his reply to the main question. There, he indicates three premises of both positions that are dubious to him:

> This question presupposes three dubious [premises]. The first one is that species are required in the intellect for the act of understanding, which for me is dubious, and [as is dubious as well] the mode in which species are something other than the habit and the act of understanding. The second one is that all angels understand through innate species, which is [a] similarly dubious [premise], since the inferior angel is almost infinitely distant from the superior one, even more so than an ant from a lion. And [the third one] is that there is a uniform mode of understanding, for instance, through innate species, in some [angels, or at least intelligent

quod circumscribendo quodcumque quod est proprietas vel quasi proprietas eius, adhuc infinitas non excluditur sed includitur in ipsa entitate quae est unita."

19 Cf. H. Guerrero-Troncoso, "The Question about Infinity and the 'Transcendental Turn' of Metaphysics" (forthcoming.)

20 Cf. Richardus de Mediavilla, *Quaestiones disputatae* q. 1 resp., ed. A. Boureau (Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 2012), p. 6: "Deus est summe simplex. Et hoc declaro sic: quod non est compositum ex aliis, nec componibile alii, nec aliud componibile sibi, illud est summe simplex, quia quod non est summe simplex cadit necessario in aliquam istarum compositionum. Sed Deus est nullo modo est compositus ex aliis, nec componibilis alii, nec aliud componibile sibi, proprie loquendo de compositione. Ergo est summe simplex." For a comparison between Henry of Ghent and Duns Scotus regarding infinity, cf. H. Guerrero-Troncoso, "El Carácter intrínseco del infinito en Duns Escoto como condición de una comprensión trascendental del ser," *Carthaginensia* v. 37 n. 71 (2021), pp. 29–48. On Scotus' view of simplicity, cf. H. Guerrero-Troncoso, "La nozione di universale secondo Avicenna e il fondamento metafisico della concezione scotista della semplicità delle creature," *Fides Quaerens* 5 n. 1–2 (2014), pp. 55–85.

> beings] who are quite distant in their having a perfection, which seems [a] dubious [premise] to me.[21]

With these doubts, Gonsalvus addresses the conflicting views on the role of species in intellection, which outline the two main positions he presents and criticizes concerning the nature and number of species through which angels understand. As it turns out during the course of his reply, these doubts do not entail a plain rejection of those positions, but rather outline the terms of his analysis and lay the foundations of his own intermediate reply. The first doubt is of particular interest. In fact, apart from taking into account the position held by Robert Kilwardby and Peter of John Olivi, among others, regarding the role of species in intellection,[22] it brings to mind Gonsalvus' previous examinations of both the relation between actions, objects, habits and species, and of the existence and role of the agent and passive intellect.[23] A brief outline of these analyses will bring forward the relevance of this doubt for the question in general.

4.1 *The Relation between Object, Acts and Potencies, and the Primacy of the Former regarding Intellection*

In *Quaest. disp*. q. 1, on the distinction between the act of praising God (*actus laudandi Deum*) and the simple internal prayer (*oratio mentalis*,) Gonsalvus postulates as a general principle that acts depend on objects with regard to both their specificity and specific differences, although their mode of acting (*modus agendi*) and their objective and elicitive principles also help to further define them.[24] In doing so, our Doctor emphasizes the primary character of the object, i.e. that it conditions actions, potencies and habits, but that does not mean they depend solely and exclusively on the object. On the contrary, actions are capable of being adequately present to their proper object, since they are essentially related to it and, although their proper mode of acting, their objective and elicitive principles, are also related to the object, they do not depend completely on it.

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21 Ibid., n. 4, ed. Amorós, p. 403.

22 Cf. J.F. Silva and J. Toivanen, "The Active Nature of the Soul in Sense Perception: Robert Kilwardby and Peter Olivi," *Vivarium* 48 (2010), pp. 245–278; Martel, *La psychologie*, pp. 129–130.

23 Cf. Gonsalvus Hispanus, *Quaest. disp*. q. 1, ed. Amorós, pp. 2–20, ibid., q. 1*, ed. Amorós, pp. 321–345; ibid., q. 6, ed. Amorós, pp. 87–99, ibid., q. 3*, ed. Amorós, pp. 359–370; ibid., q. 13, ed. Amorós, pp. 245–277.

24 Gonsalvus Hispanus, *Quaest. disp*. q. 1, ed. Amorós, p. 2: "Utrum actus laudandi Deum et oratio mentalis sint idem actus specie."

This primacy of the object is evident in two ways. First, the object defines the action specifically, because acts have an essential relation to their object, which is the conclusive term of their motion, and which could have a negation, a privation or often even nothing as its object, at it is the case in opinion or mere suspicion.[25] Second, actions differ in their species according to the specific difference of their objects, so any difference in number in the object results in a different action; otherwise, a potency could act on many objects, considered as many, through one action. Motions and actions differ in subject, time and term but, since the specific difference of motions depends on the term, in the case of actions, that difference should depend on the object. Actions and objects depend on one another, since they are relative, although their dependency is not reciprocal, because objects are the measure of actions, so any specific difference in the object implies a difference in the act. A comparison between an action and the object is more essential than a comparison between the potency or the habit and the object, because they relate to it through the action and, consequently, any specific difference in the object will result in a specific difference in the potency and the habit as well. Any difference in that which completes a definition will result in a difference in the definition, so that any difference in the object results in a difference in the action.[26]

25 Gonsalvus Hispanus, *Quaest. disp*. q. 1, ed. Amorós, p. 2: "Actus specificatur ab obiecto et habet species, quia [1] unumquodque specificatur ab illo per quod definitur, sed definitur per obiectum"; ibid., 3: "[2] Illud cuius esse simpliciter consistit in habitudine ad aliud, ita quod illam habitudinem essentialiter includat, specificatur per illud … Sed actus respectu obiecti est huiusmodi … Item [3], sicut se habet motus ad terminum finalem, sic se habet actus ad obiectum"; ibid., 4: "Item [4], actus non specificatur per negationem, privationem aut nihil; sed obiectum alicuius actus, sicut opinionis aut suspicionis, est negatio, privatio aut nihil multotiens. Quare, etc.;" ibid., q. 1*, ed. Amorós, pp. 322–326.

26 Gonsalvus Hispanus, *Quaest. disp*. q. 1, ed. Amorós, p. 5: "Actus diversificantur specie secundum diversitatem specificam obiectorum … [1] ad diversitatem numeralem obiectorum sequitur diversitas numeralis actuum; quia aliter potentia per unum actum posset ferri in plura obiecta ut plura sunt, quod falsum est … ergo ad diversitatem specificam obiectorum sequitur diversitas specifica actuum"; ibid., p. 6: "[2] sicut motus distinguuntur ex subiecto, tempore et termino, sic et actus; sed motus diversificantur specie per diversitatem specificam terminorum … [3] non minus dependet actus ab obiecto quam unum relativorum ab alio, quia inter duo relativa datur mutua dependentia; sed actus sic dependet ab obiecto quod non e converso. Obiectum etiam mensurat actum … propter dependentiam relativorum ad invicem, ad diversitatem specificam unius relativorum sequitur diversitas specifica alterius … [4] Essentialius comparatur actus ad obiectum quam potentia et habitus, quia potentia et habitus non respiciunt obiectum nisi mediante actu. Quanto actus autem aliquis respicit aliquid immediatius, tanto essentialius; sed propter essentialem habitudinem potentiae et habitus ad obiectum, ad diversitatem obiectorum secundum rationem sequitur diversitas habituum, quae etiam requirit diver-

However essential the object is in order to specify the action, Gonsalvus admits that not all specific differences depend on it, but on the mode of acting, the term of the action and its elicitive principle, i.e. its potency.[27] Regarding the mode, since it belongs to the form of the action, any difference in it results in a specific difference in the action it qualifies. Such is the case of the different modes in which the intellect and the appetite act with respect to the same object, or the way in which the agent acts to achieve a certain term, as when someone walks or runs to get somewhere, or in the generation with or without a seed, among other examples.[28] On the other hand, the term and the agent determine the action, which consists in carrying itself out, because both allow the action to be complete, as, for instance, in the acts of the speculative and the practical intellect, which differ specifically because of their term.[29] Finally, since the potency is a proper cause of the action, any difference in the former will result in a specific difference of the latter. This is the case of the same object, which falls under the intellect and the will, or the same colour, which is apprehended by the vision—i.e. the particular sense,—the common sense and the imagination, all of them actions that differ specifically because of the potencies that elicit them.[30]

4.2 *The Metaphysical Foundations of the Specific Difference between Angels and the Human Soul*

In *Quaest. disp*. q. 6, Gonsalvus applies the general principles laid down in q. 1, while at the same time further defines the relation between potencies and habits and their connection to the action and the object. Whereas in q. 1 the

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sitatem potentiarum"; ibid., p. 7: "[5] si ultimum complens definitionem alicuius et immediate se habens ad ipsum diversificetur specie, et illud ad quod sic se habet … obiectum autem est huiusmodi respectu actus;" ibid., q. 1*, ed. Amorós, pp. 326–332.

27 Gonsalvus Hispanus, *Quaest. disp*. q. 1, ed. Amorós, p. 12: "Non omnis diversitas specifica actuum est ex obiectis, sed ex modo agendi, ex fine actus, et ex principio elicitivo sive ex parte potentiae."

28 Gonsalvus Hispanus, *Quaest. disp*. q. 1, ed. Amorós, p. 12: "Unumquodque diversificatur specie per id quod ad suam formam pertinet, quia sicut unitas speciei sumitur ex forma, sic et distinctio; sed modus agendi pertinet ad formam actus"; ibid., pp. 13–14.

29 Gonsalvus Hispanus, *Quaest. disp*. q. 1, ed. Amorós, p. 12: "Idem patet de fine et agente, quia esse ipsius actus consistit in fieri; sed finis et agens per se faciunt ad fieri rei … Actus intellectus speculativi differt in specie ab actu practici. Sed potest esse quod non differt nec ex parte obiecti, nec modi considerandi … et ideo solum differunt ex fine, quia ille considerat propter speculationem, iste propter actionem."

30 Gonsalvus Hispanus, *Quaest. disp*. q. 1, ed. Amorós, p. 12: "Nec differunt, sive potentia sit principium actus sive non, quia constat quod potentia est per se causa actus; effectus autem variatur ex variatione suae causae per se"; ibid., p. 14.

main problem was to determine the foundations of the specific differences in actions, here Gonsalvus tries to establish the grounds for affirming the identity of actions carried out by agents who belong to different genera, such as angels and blessed souls.[31] With regard to the main question, Gonsalvus considers the act of praise of angels and blessed souls not to be identical (*unius rationis*,) based on four arguments. First, following the authorities of Damascene, Boethius and Aristotle, different actions correspond to different natures, which differ in their operations.[32] Thus, angels and blessed souls have different specific potencies, whose difference not only comprises their nature, but also their concept (*ratio*) and their mode of acting.[33] Second, the beatific vision of angels and blessed souls is not identical, since it is an action of natures belonging to different genera, not subordinated with each other; in other words, the way angels understand is different from the way human beings do.[34] Third, that which is required to achieve a proper perfection is not common, but different for different specific natures, and this is the case of angels and blessed souls.[35] Finally, each nature finds delight in something different (*eorum sunt diversae delectationes*,) according to their own species, and their delight is fit together by their operations, and this is the case of angels and blessed souls.[36]

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31 Cf. Gonsalvus Hispanus, *Quaest. disp*. q. 6, ed. Amorós, pp. 91–92: "Diversitas obiecti sufficit ad diversitatem actuum, et non ad unitatem unitas … Ad unitatem enim compositi non sufficit unitas formae, licet eius diversitas sufficiat ad diversitatem compositi. Ad unitatem enim rei requiritur identitas omnium principiorum essentialium suorum."

32 Gonsalvus Hispanus, *Quaest. disp*. q. 6, ed. Amorós, p. 89: "Diversarum naturarum sunt diversae potentiae, ut Damascenus dicit frequenter … et Boethius … et Aristoteles ex diversitate operationum concludit diversitatem naturarum."

33 Gonsalvus Hispanus, *Quaest. disp*. q. 6, ed. Amorós, pp. 89–90: "Ergo sequitur quod habent diversas potentias secundum speciem; etiam non solum ut est natura quaedam ipsa potentia, sed etiam secundum rationem potentiae, et ut sunt rationes agendi et secundum ordinem ad actum, quia etiam habent alium et alium modum agendi."

34 Gonsalvus Hispanus, *Quaest. disp*. q. 6, ed. Amorós, p. 96: "Illa quae continentur sub diversis generibus non sunt unius speciei, quia diversorum generum et non subalternatim positorum, diversae sunt species et differentiae, ut patet in praedicamentis; sed visio beata angeli et animae beatae sunt huiusmodi, quia constat quod intelligere angeli ut angeli, et hominis, ut hominis est, differunt specie … Cum igitur visio beatifica angeli contineatur essentialiter sub intelligere angelico, et visio beatifica animae beatae sub intelligere humano, sequitur quod differunt specie, immo, genere."

35 Gonsalvus Hispanus, *Quaest. disp*. q. 6, ed. Amorós, p. 97: "Diversorum perfectibilium secundum speciem, diversae sunt perfectiones propriae secundum speciem. 'Proprias' dico, quia hoc non oportet de communibus perfectionibus, quia ad identitatem perfectibilium secundum speciem requiritur identitas perfectionum propriarum secundum speciem. Ergo multo fortius diversitas ad diversitatem, sive perfectiones sint naturales sive supernaturales. Sed angelus et anima beata sunt diversa perfectibilia specie. Ergo etc."

36 Gonsalvus Hispanus, *Quaest. disp*. q. 6, ed. Amorós, p. 98: "Diversorum secundum speciem

4.3 *The Terms of the Distinction between Agent and Possible Intellect*

Gonsalvus further defines the inherent relation between the object and the intellect in his *Quaest. disp*. q. 13, where he affirms the intrinsic nature of the active and passive intellect and that their difference is not real, but of reason.[37] Gonsalvus arrives at this conclusion after an intricate discussion that revolves around the proper grounds for the distinction between the active and passive intellect, which concerns their intrinsic or extrinsic character, their number and their identity or difference.[38] However important this discussion is, the reasons he points out for a general agreement about the need of an active and a passive intellect are more relevant for the purpose of this article. One of them concerns the act of cognition, the other one the intelligible object. With respect to the act of the intellect, Gonsalvus notes the general experience that sometimes we cognize and sometimes we do not, i.e. that intellection is not a continuous, but an intermittent action. Consequently, this kind of act possesses something that produces the effect, an agent, and something else that receives it, a passive potency, both of which concur so that intellection can take place. On the other hand, our intellect does not apprehend material and sensible objects such as they are, namely as material, individual and sensible, but rather as immaterial, universal and spiritual. Thus, the receptive and efficient, i.e. passive and active potencies cannot be of the same nature as the material or sensible objects, namely organic, but intellectual.[39]

The way in which Gonsalvus explains this general agreement on the need of an agent and passive intellect is consistent with his previous understanding of the relation between the object and the intellect. However dependent on the object the intellect is, especially in the case of intuitive cognition, one must not consider it as the only unconditional source of knowledge, because

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sunt diversae delectationes secundum speciem, ut dicitur X *Ethicorum* et experimur in nobis. Sed angelus et anima beata differunt specie; ergo et habent diversas delectationes specie. Sed delectationes coaptantur operibus, ut patet in VII et X *Ethicorum*."

37 Gonsalvus Hispanus, *Quaest. disp*. q. 13, ed. Amorós, p. 271: "His ergo remotis [cf. ibid., 265–271,] dico quod intellectus agens, prout est aliquid animae, realiter non differt ab intellectu possibili, sed sunt una potentia, realiter differentes solum secundum rationem."

38 Gonsalvus Hispanus, *Quaest. disp*. q. 13, ed. Amorós, pp. 245–277. Given that this question "is set up in a rather elaborate fashion of arguments and counter-arguments so that it becomes difficult sometimes to follow the line of thought," as J.T. Gracia states, I will only focus on the aspects that are relevant for the present discussion. For a thorough examination, not without its defects, of this question, cf. Martel, *La psychologie*, pp. 107–144; Gracia, "The Doctrine of the Possible and Agent Intellects," pp. 18–36.

39 Gonsalvus Hispanus, *Quaest. disp*. q. 13, ed. Amorós, pp. 254–255; Martel, *La psychologie*, pp. 108–109; Gracia, "The Doctrine of the Possible and Agent Intellects," pp. 19–20.

the intellect, like any other potency, will act only as it is capable of acting, and establishes its own conditions under which knowledge is to take place. Among these conditions, species play an important role in translating what is incompatible in the object with the nature of the intellect.

5 Duns Scotus and Gonsalvus Hispanus: A Most Notable Interlocution

Along the lines of the two selected paragraphs of Gonsalvus' *Quodl.* q. 7, some points of interlocution with Duns Scotus have become clear, which do not necessarily appear at a first glance or in a brief comparison of questions. First, Gonsalvus' doubts about the need, origin and role of species in intellective acts justify a critical analysis of the main positions of his contemporaries and predecessors on this subject, as well as on the relation between acts, objects, potencies and habits. As it is well known, Duns Scotus carries out this analysis at length in the *Lectura* and the *Ordinatio* I d. 3 p. 3, where he examines a number of extreme and intermediate positions on the role and origin of species, as well as the role of the object in the intellection.[40] Nevertheless, just as in the case of spiritual matter, the Subtle Doctor does not seem very concerned about the main argument of Gonsalvus' *Quodl.* q. 7, whether superior angels cognize through lesser species than inferior ones. In fact, in both the *Lectura* and the *Ordinatio* there is little more than a mention about it in the question about angelic locution, and only in his Parisian lectures he devotes a question that deals with this issue, although from a different perspective, namely whether angels benefit from receiving some knowledge from things.[41] This question provides us another instance of interaction with Gonsalvus.

40 Cf. Duns Scotus, *Ord.* I d. 3 p. 3 q. 2, ed. Vat. 3, pp. 245–330; ibid., q. 3, ed. Vat. 3, pp. 330–338; *Lect.* I d. 3 p. 3 q. 2–3, ed. Vat. 16, pp. 349–395.

41 Cf. Duns Scotus, *Rep.* II-B d. 11 q. 2 n. 1, "Utrum [angeli] possunt proficere recipiendo cognitionem a rebus." In Wadding's edition, this question appears as q. 11 in *Ord.* II d. 3 (ed. Wad. 12, pp. 270[a]–280[a]) but, as the Vatican editors note, this text is a mixture of Scotus' *Rep.* II-B d. 11 q. 2 and William of Alnwick *Additiones Magnae* II d. 10 (11) q. 1; cf. Duns Scotus, *Ord.* II d. 3 n. 412, note 2, ed. Vat. 7, p. 603: "Post 'alteri' in Qυ sequitur quaestio interpolata 'Utrum angeli possint proficere accipiendo cognitionem a rebus', quam etiam codex Y tradit infra d. 12 q. 1. Quaestio nunc ad verbum nunc satis libere conflata est ex *Rep.* II B d. 11 q. 2 (cod. Patav. Anton. 175) et ex *Additiones magnae* II d. 11 q. 1 (ex. gr. iuxta cod. Oxon. Merton. 87) vel d. 10 q. 1 (ex. gr. iuxta cod. Vat. lat. 876)."

5.1 *Duns Scotus* (*and Gonsalvus*) *against Thomas Aquinas*

Scotus devotes most of this brief question to discuss the positions of Thomas Aquinas and Henry of Ghent, who deny that angels receive any knowledge from sensible creatures. The discussion with the Angelic Doctor is particularly relevant here, since Scotus defends some theses already seen in Gonsalvus, most notably that angels possess both agent and patient intellect and the role of images (*phantasmata*) in intellection. Scotus presents several arguments by Thomas denying that angels receive any knowledge from sensible creatures. First, the angelic intellect would create such sensible species and would be able to receive them, which would then result in angels having both a passive and an active intellect, a conclusion that Thomas rejects, especially in the case of the passive intellect, since the angelic intellect is always active, according to him.[42] Second, just as heavenly bodies have qualities not received from inferior ones, which, in turn, do receive their qualities from others, the human intellect receives species from other creatures, while superior spirits possess qualities they do not receive from other creatures.[43] Third, an intellect receives species from sensible creatures because of its attachment to the body, while angels, which are not attached to a body, cognize without receiving species from sensible things.[44] Fourth, the agent and passive intellect distinguish each other by their comparison to images (*phantasmata*) but, since angels do not cognize through images, that distinction does not apply. Similarly, when going from one extreme to the other, such as the passive and agent intellect, a middle term, such as the image, is necessary, and this intermediate passage does not take place in angels, because their cognition makes no use of images.[45] Finally, angels are able to know individuals, because a superior intellect can know all that is scattered in individuals as one. Hence, since all things proceed from God, with regard to both their existence and cognoscibility, the divine essence is the manifesting reason (*ratio repraesentativa*) which produces knowledge in the angelic intellect, so that they do not receive that knowledge from other creatures.[46]

Scotus' lengthy reply to Thomas Aquinas features some coincidences with Gonsalvus that are worth noticing. First, not only does he affirm that angels possess an active and passive intellect, but also that they are both a constitu-

42 Duns Scotus, *Rep*. II-B d. 11 q. 1 n. 7–8.
43 Duns Scotus, *Rep*. II-B d. 11 q. 1 n. 9.
44 Duns Scotus, *Rep*. II-B d. 11 q. 1 n. 10.
45 Duns Scotus, *Rep*. II-B d. 11 q. 1 n. 11–12.
46 Duns Scotus, *Rep*. II-B d. 11 q. 1 n. 13–14.

tive part of the intellect, even if they receive some knowledge directly from God. According to Scotus, the agent intellect is not a sign of imperfection, but of perfection in an inferior intellect and, consequently, it must not be denied to a superior intellect, such as the angelic one.[47] On the other hand, regarding the passive intellect, since angels receive a form, i.e. an intelligible species, there must be something in their intellect capable of receiving it, wherever it comes from, and, even if that intelligible species is co-eternal with angels, there must be a potency capable of receiving them all the same. Moreover, even if God created another similar soul and granted it intelligible species, that soul would have an agent and a passive intellect as well, just as it is evident in the soul of Christ. Consequently, it is a sign of perfection that the created intellect is capable of rendering actually intelligible something that is only potentially intelligible and it is nevertheless a perfection inherent to the created intellect, even if God produces that intellection.[48] On the other hand, Scotus affirms that what distinguishes the agent from the passive intellect is a comparison to the objects or to that which makes the objects known (*illa in quibus obiecta relucent*,) rather than a comparison to images.[49]

Then, regarding the immateriality of the angelic intellect, Scotus claims that it is not true of a primacy of adequacy, because it is not possible for something to be the first adequate object of an intellect attached to something else, and at the same time for it not to virtually contain everything that the intellect is capable of knowing. Should immateriality be a valid argument for denying that angels receive any knowledge from other creatures, the divine essence should be the adequate object of their intellect, since it contains all that angels are capable of knowing and, according to Thomas, angels cognize material and individual objects, which are contained virtually only in the divine essence, but that is not true.[50] Therefore, the adequate object of the angelic intellect should be something common in both predication and analogy to all that is cognizable by it, and common to both intelligible and sensible. However, in this case, one should admit that angels possess an agent intellect, which reduces in act all that is possible to be known.[51]

Finally, Scotus agrees with Gonsalvus in admitting a primacy of the object, or at least a certain degree of dependency on it, in the angelic intellection,

47 Duns Scotus, *Rep*. II-B d. 11 q. 1 n. 15.
48 Duns Scotus, *Rep*. II-B d. 11 q. 1 n. 18–19.
49 Duns Scotus, *Rep*. II-B d. 11 q. 1 n. 20.
50 Cf. Thomas Aquinas, *S. theol*. I q. 57 a. 1 resp., ed. Leon. 5, p. 69[b]; ibid., a. 2 resp., ed. Leon. 5, p. 71[a].
51 Duns Scotus, *Rep*. II-B d. 11 q. 1 n. 16–17.

because angels do not possess in themselves all perfections of the bodies they know nor, in general, of all objects they are capable of knowing. Consequently, they depend on the bodies and other objects to cognize them, although it is not necessary for angels to be united to the bodies to know them, because this union is not a precise cause of their intellection. This contradicts explicitly Thomas' argument about heavenly bodies—namely, that superior sensible beings are endowed with their perfections directly from God—because for the same "ordained necessity" (*necessitas ordinata*) God does not grant creatures immediately the perfections that they can acquire by the direct action of another creature.[52]

5.2 *Scotus and Gonsalvus on What Angels Know from Other Creatures*

Another point in common is to be found in Scotus' reply, where he enumerates three types of cognition angels acquire from creatures—the individual, the contingent combinations, and the intuitive knowledge of the contingent—and a fourth one, the universal intelligible species, which they would acquire from them as well, had it not had been granted to them by God.[53] First, angels acquire the knowledge of individuals from their proper reason (*propria ratio*) as individuals; if that knowledge were co-created, angels should have infinite co-created proper reasons of each individual, which is impossible.[54] Second, angels acquire from other creatures the knowledge of their contingent combinations (*complexiones contingentes*,) i.e. their actual features, such as the colour of their hair, or the actions they carry out or suffer, such as being awake or being cold. This knowledge cannot derive from the species of the terms of those combinations, otherwise they would be necessary. Moreover, if those species are co-created, that would be the only truth angels would recognize as such from those combinations and, should they change, there would be no more truth left for angels to know.[55] Third, even if the other two cognitions—of the individual and of its contingent existence—were co-created, still angels would necessarily acquire any intuitive knowledge from them, because intuition requires the actual presence of the object.[56] Finally, in the fourth instance, regarding the cognition of universal intelligible species, Scotus distinguishes the fact that God grants them immediately to angels, from the general princi-

52 Duns Scotus, *Rep*. II-B d. 11 q. 1 n. 21–24.
53 Duns Scotus, *Rep*. II-B d. 11 q. 1 n. 36–43.
54 Duns Scotus, *Rep*. II-B d. 11 q. 1 n. 37.
55 Duns Scotus, *Rep*. II-B d. 11 q. 1 n. 38–40.
56 Duns Scotus, *Rep*. II-B d. 11 q. 1 n. 41.

ple that the angelic intellect is capable of abstracting those species, just as the human intellect does, because of its greater perfection. Indeed, a sign of perfection of the human active intellect is precisely its ability to produce universal species from the individual, so it should not be denied in the angelic intellect.[57]

6 Closing Remarks

In many respects, to study of the positions of philosophical or theological authors implies a great deal of reconstruction, not only of their assumptions and reasonings, but of their interlocutors and influences as well. At the same time, the further an author is removed from our times and own common assumptions, the more important their textual context becomes, so the study of an author turns out to be the study of his intellectual environment. Regarding Gonsalvus Hispanus and John Duns Scotus, because of both the scarcity of texts preserved or the difficulties the manuscript tradition presents to the modern critical editor, a study of the sources and interlocutors illuminates a great deal of their more cryptic affirmations and positions, and helps to better understand their reasonings and discussions. As I have attempted in this article—and as M. Sullivan has notably accomplished,—several instances enable us to reconstruct the kind of dialoue these two Franciscan masters held during their "long experience" together. This reconstruction should not be limited only to look for mutual allusions or points of agreement or disagreement, but it also should consider matters of method and of intermediation, most notably in the case of Gonsalvus' master, Peter of John Olivi, and his influence in Duns Scotus.

This interaction should not be restricted to Gonsalvus and Scotus, since a better knowledge of the rich intellectual atmosphere they both shared at the University of Paris during the first years of the 14th century, should give us a better image of the aim of their discussions and the controversy their positions must have surely caused. More than simple external evidence or testimonies of the impact of these authors, the references, allusions and criticism help to restore their letter and thought, a task that, in the case of Scotus, is also a matter of reconstruction. With regard to Gonsalvus, many of his interlocutors during his stay in Paris still wait for editors to make their texts accessible and allow scholars to study them. Until that moment, we should acknowledge

57 Duns Scotus, *Rep.* II-B d. 11 q. 1 n. 42–43.

how fragmentary and incomplete our reconstruction of the period inevitably is. Nevertheless, the deeper our scholars are able to penetrate the spirit and way of thinking of the period; the better their conclusions are to conduct our research.

7 A Note on the Edited Texts

Gonsalvus' *Quodlibet* is preserved in only one manuscript, Troyes, Bibliothèque Municipale 661, f. 126^{vb}–130va, with the sole mention of "*Gonsalvus minor*" as its author.[58] It contains a fair amount of marginal corrections and additions, either by the same hand or by another copyist. Amorós transcription, which also amends some errors, is quite accurate, although it rarely indicates the corrections present in the manuscript.

Scotus' *Reportatio* II-B is contained in three manuscripts: Vatican City, Bibliotheca Apostolica Vaticana Lat. 13687 (V), f. 99^{r}–190^{r}; Padua, Bibliotheca Antoniana 175, f. 1ra–58^{rb} (P); Orleans, Bibliothèque Municipale 146 (123), f. 1ra–66^{rb} (O).[59] For d. 11 q. 2, the text is also contained in one of the manuscripts of the *Lectura* II, Rome, S. Francesco a Ripa, Lat. AFR 422 (olim Q II 21), f. 72^{v}–75^{r} (R), now part of the archive of the Aracoeli library.[60] As Fr. B. Hechich noted, O is a copy of P, while R is very close to V, up to the point that there are some passages only present in R, whose omission could be due to homoioteleuton in V, although I found some instances of interpolation in R which derive from the *Additiones magnae*. There is also a noticeable distinction between these two groups, RV having an overall better text, with PO sometimes providing better readings. Consequently, I have followed RV as basis for the edition, while at the same time preferring some of PO's readings that I consider to be better.

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58 Cf. *supra*, note 7.

59 Discussion in S. Dumont, "John Duns Scotus's Reportatio Parisiensis Examinata. A Mystery Solved," *Recherches de Théologie et Philosophie Médiévales* 85.2 (2018), pp. 417–421. According to Fr. B. Hechich, the Orleans ms. is a copy of Padua, cf. B. Hechich, "Il problema delle 'Reportationes' nell'eredità dottrinale del b. Giovanni Duns Scoto, OFM", in *Giovanni Duns Scoto. Studi e ricerche nel VII Centenario della sua morte*, vol. 1, ed. M. Carbajo Núñez (Roma: Antonianum, 2008), p. 73.

60 Cf. Scotistic Commission, "Introductio generalis," in ed. Vat. 19, pp. 6*–15*; Dumont, "Reportatio Parisiensis," p. 437; Hechich, "Il problema," pp. 83–86. I want to thank Fr. Alvaro Caciotti, OFM, director of the Centro Culturale Aracoeli, and Ms. Maria Melli, librarian of the archive, for allowing me to inspect the ms. and to collate the distiction for this edition. I also thank Fr. Witold Salamon, OFM, of the Scotistic Commission, for providing me with a copy of the relevant questions.

In editing the texts, I have followed the tradition of the Scotistic Commission of normalizing the orthography and numbering the paragraphs. Besides the critical apparatus, the sources and some notes on textual matters and cross-references are indicated in the footnotes. Regarding the sources, I have noted references, leaving a more comprehensive list of interlocutors for future research and as a requisite for an eventual new edition of his extant works.

Gonsalvus Hispanus

Quodlibet

[Quaestio 7
Utrum angeli superiores intelligant per species magis universales]

Tr 128^{rb} [1] Utrum angeli superiores intelligant per species magis universales.

α 403 [2] Quod non, videtur, quia tunc confusius intelligerent quam inferiores.[1]

[3] Contra. Quanto aliquid est superius tanto per pauciora ad plura se extendit.[2] Ergo etc.

[i.—Ad quaestionem]

[4] Respondeo. Ista quaestio tria dubia supponit. Primum est quod species in intellectu requiritur propter actum intelligendi,[3] quod est mihi dubium,[4] et quomodo species est aliud ab habitu et actu intelligendi.[5] Secundum est quod omnes angeli intelligant per species innatas,[6] quod similiter est mihi dubium,

12 et] *add.* Tr$^{\pm}$ 13 Secundum] *add.* Tr$^{\pm}$ 14 similiter] sequitur *corr.* Tr$^{\pm}$

1 Aeg. Romanus, *Quodl.* v q. 28 resp., ed. Nempaei (Lovanii 1646), f. 345^{b}: "Restat ostendere, qualiter [animas separatas] huiusmodi cognitionem [de particularibus] habeant. Propter quod dicendum, quosdam dixisse animas separatas de particularibus non habere cognitionem distinctam, sed confusam simpliciter et absolute loquendo."

2 Thom. de Aq., ii *Sent.* d. 3 q. 3 a. 2, ed. Mandonnet (Paris 1929), p. 115–118; *S. theol.* i q. 55 a. 3, ed. Leonina 5, p. 58a–59b; Aeg. Romanus, *Quaest. de cogn. angel.* q. 8, ed. S. de Luere (Venetiis 1503); Godefridus de Font., *Quodl.* ii q. 5, ed. De Wulf–Pelzer, PhM 2 (Louvain/Paris 1904), p. 86: "Respondeo dicendum quod angeli superiores aliquo modo habent universaliores et pauciores species quam inferiores."

3 Aeg. Romanus, *Quodl.* v q. 28 resp. ed. Nempaei, ff. 70ra–71ra; Bonav., ii *Sent.* d. 3 p. 2 a. 2 q. 1 resp, ed. pp. Coll. S. Bonaventurae, Opera omnia 2 (Quaracchi 1885), p. 120^{a}: "Ideo angelus huiusmodi individua et singularia non cognoscit, nisi dirigat aspectum supra ipsum cognoscibile, et secundum illud quod est in re, ipse componat species in se; et tunc habet ita claram et certam cognitionem de re, sicut si speciem statim reciperet."

4 Petrus Ioannes Olivi, *Lect. sup. De ang. hier.* vii q. 7 n. 21–25, ed. S. Piron, *Oliviana* 1 (2003), pp. 4–5.

5 Gonsalvus Hispanus, *Quaest. disp.* q. 1, resp., ed. Amorós, bfsma 9 (Quaracchi 1935), pp. 2–20; ibid. q. 6 resp., ed. Amorós, pp. 87–99; Petrus Ioann. Olivi, *Lect. sup. De ang. hier.* vii q. 7 n. 22, ed. Piron, p. 4; Idem, *Quaest. in ii Sent.* q. 36, ed. B. Jansen, bfsma 4 (Quaracchi 1922), pp. 647–653.

6 Thom. de Aq., *De veritate*, q. 8 a. 9, ed. Leonina 22/2, p. 150$^{a–b}$: "Et ideo dicendum videtur … quod angeli res materiales per formas innatas cognoscunt"; *S. Theol.* i q. 55 a. 2, ed. Leonina 5, p. 56^{a}: "Species per quas angeli intelligunt, non sunt a rebus acceptae, sed eis connaturales."; Richardus de Mediav., *Quaest. disp.* q. 12 a. 3, ed. Boureau (Paris 2012), p. 172: "Videtur

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cum angelus inferior quasi in infinitum distet a superiore, et plus quam formica a leone.[7] Et[8] quod aliquorum,[9] tantam distantiam in perfectione habentium, sit uniformis modus intelligendi, ut per species innatas, mihi videtur dubium. | α 404

[1.—Opiniones aliorum

a.—Quod angeli superiores per pauciores atque universaliores species intelligant]

[5] His tamen suppositis tamquam veris, dicunt QUIDAM quod sic,[10] quod probatur primo sic. Materialitas est causa recipiendi aliquid particulariter; ergo immaterialitas erit ratio recipiendi aliquid universalius.[11]—Sed angeli, quanto sunt superiores, tanto sunt immaterialiores; ergo etc.

[6] Sed ista ratio non concludit, quia caelum est minus materiale quam elementum, et tamen ita particulariter recipit caelum suum motum sicut elemen-

6 species] Hiis Tr± 9 universalius] ulterius *corr.* Tr±

similiter quod, si angelus intelligeret creaturas corporeas quae sunt inferiores eo, quod vilesceret intellectus si intelligeret eas per species earum, sive concreatas, vel a rebus acceptas."; Henr. Gand., *Quodl.* v q. 15, ed. Badius (Paris 1518), ff. 179G–185D; Guil. de Ware, *Sent.* ii d. 11 q. 6, in corp. art., cod. Bibl. Med. Laur, Firenze, Plut. 33 dex. 1, f. 125r: "Unde omnes angeli intelligunt per species innatas de facto ut credo et species innatae repraesentant species rerum et per relationem singularium ad speciem intelligunt individua per unam speciem."

7 Guil. de Mara, *In ii Sent.* d. 3 q. 9 resp., ed. H. Kraml (München 1995), p. 69: "Opinio quorundam fuit quod angelus non cognoscit ista sensibilia nisi in corpore assumpto … Alii dicunt quod naturalia et necessaria cognoscit per species innatas, voluntaria et contingentia per species acquisitas … Alii dicunt quod angelus tantum cognoscit per species innatas. Sed qualiter hoc fiat diversimode assignatur a diversis."; Idem, *Correctorium Thomae Aquinatis* a. 18, ed. P. Glorieux (Le Saulchoir 1927), pp. 79–80; Alex. Halensis, *Summa* i–ii n. 130 (ed. Quaracchi 1928), vol. 2, p. 178a: "Dicimus quod unus angelus cognoscit alium et per speciem, non innatam, sed potius acquisitam, quia ipse eam sibi facit in se."; Bonav., *ii Sent.* d. 3 p. 2 a. 2 q. 1 resp., ed. Quaracchi, vol. 2, pp. 119a–120a; Aeg. Romanus, *Quodl.* v q. 28 s. c. (ed. Nempaei), 345a: "Ad cognitionem particularium per species requiritur connaturalitas specierum; sed species non sunt connaturales animae, ergo etc."; Petrus Ioannes Olivi, *Quaest. in ii Sent.* q. 36 resp., ed. Jansen, pp. 646–647.

8 Scilicet tertio.

9 Scilicet angelorum.

10 Scilicet quod angeli superiores per universaliores species intelligunt.

11 Thom. de Aq., *S. Theol.* i q. 85 a. 1 resp., ed. Leon. 5, pp. 330b–331a: "Quaedam autem virtus cognoscitiva est quae neque est actus organi corporalis, neque est aliquo modo corporali materiae coniuncta, sicut intellectus angelicus. Et ideo huius virtutis cognoscitivae obiectum est forma sine materia subsistens: etsi enim materialia cognoscant, non tamen nisi in immaterialibus ea intuentur, scilicet vel in seipsis vel in Deo"; Godefridus de Font., *Quodl.* iii q. 3, ed. De Wulf–Pelzer, PhM 2, pp. 182–186.

tum suum, sicut ignis est immaterialior quam terra et tamen aeque particulariter recipiunt.[12]

[7] Item, cum dicitur quod angelus superior est magis immaterialis quam inferior,[13] aut accipitur immaterialitas pro privatione materiae proprie dictae, aut largo modo pro privatione potentialitatis.[14] Si primo modo, sic omnes angeli, secundum eos, sunt aeque immateriales; si secundo modo, sic non sequitur quod quanto aliquid est immaterialius tanto universalius recipit, quia intellectus noster, licet sic sit materialior quam intellectus angeli, tamen ita universaliter recipit sicut angelus, ut conceptum entis.

[8] Secundo, pro dicta opinione arguunt sic. Quanto aliqua sunt superiora in entibus, tanto sunt propinquiora Deo. Sed Deus intelligit omnia per unum, ut per essentiam suam; ergo propinquiora sibi[15] per pauciora intelligunt, quia non possunt per unum propter distantiam ab ipso.[16]

4 materiae] materia *corr.* Tr$^{\pm}$ | proprie] actuale *corr.* Tr$^{\pm}$ 7 est] *add.* Tr$^{\pm}$ 8 quam … angeli] *add.* Tr$^{\pm}$ 9 conceptum] contra *corr.* Tr$^{\pm}$

12 Henr. de Gand., *Quodl.* iv q. 16 sol., ed. G.A. Wilson—G.J. Etzkorn, AMPh s. 2, 8 (Leuven University Press: Louvain 2011), p. 295: "Cum a nulla harum formarum [scil. elementorum et elementaribus] sit transmutatio ad alteram [scil. formam caeli aut angeli], non ergo est materia sub forma elementi eiusdem rationis cuius est illa quae est sub."

13 Cf. supra, n. 5, p. 315 lin. 9-10.

14 Guil. de Mara, *In ii Sent.* d. 3 q. 1 resp., ed. Kraml, p. 48: "Distinguendum tamen est de materia quia quaedam est generationis et corruptionis subiectum, et sic sumendo materiam frequenter dicitur a Philosopho quod caelum non habet materiam. Alio modo dicitur materia principium primordiale vel principium potentiale per quod res est in potentia, et ista non est subiecta corruptioni et generationi, et sic sumendo materiam dicit Philosophus quod caelum habet materiam."

15 Scilicet Deo.

16 Thom. de Aq., *S. Theol.* i q. 55 a. 3 resp., ed. Leon. 5, p. 59^{a}: "Sunt in rebus aliqua superiora, quod sunt uni primo, quod est Deus, propinquiora et similiora … Unde oportet quod ea quae Deus cognoscit per unum, inferiores intellectus cognoscant per multa: et tanto amplius per plura, quanto amplius intellectus inferior fuerit."; Aeg. Romanus, *Quaest. de cogn. angel.* q. 8 sol., ed. De Luere, f. 100ra: "Superiores sunt Deo proprinquiores. Deus enim per unam et eadem rem simplicissima ut est per essentiam suam cognoscit secundum omnia; omnes enim ideae in Deo sunt una et eadem res simplicissima, ipsa scilicet divina essentia … Sed cum superiores sint deiformes licet non habeant species ita unitive sicut unitive sunt ideae in Deo, attamen quia sunt deiformiores et plus participant de modo perfectionis divinae, ideo recipiunt species magis unitive et per consequens habent pauciores species quam inferiores, et si pauciores ergo universaliores."; Godefridus de Font., *Quodl.* ii q. 5 sol., ed. De Wulf–Pelzer, PhM 2, p. 87: "Et quanto angelus est perfectior in essentia et natura, tanto etiam perfectius habent esse in ipso huiusmodi similitudines aliorum; et quia quanto aliquid est perfectius et actualius et summo actui perfectissimo propinquius, tanto quodammodo est virtuosius et universalius … Et ideo

[9] Sed nec ista ratio concludit, quia non sequitur 'angeli superiores sunt propinquiores Deo, ergo in hoc sunt propinquiores', quia inferiora—ut corporalia—in aliqua conditione magis appropinquant Deo—ut in ratione producendi—quam angeli.[17] Unde non sequitur 'angeli superiores sunt propinquiores Deo, ergo in omni conditione sunt propinquiores'.

[10] Item, sicut tu arguis ex appropinquatione ad Deum paucitatem specierum in angelis superioribus,[18] ita posses arguere paucitatem actuum intelligendi ex eodem, et ita angeli superiores per pauciores actus intelligendi | Tr 128va
intelligerent plura obiecta quam inferiores, quod non est verum. | α 405

[11] Tertio arguunt sic. "Omne quod recipitur in aliquo recipitur per modum recipientis", ut ait BOETHIUS, V *De consolatione*;[19] sed angeli superiores sunt simpliciores quam inferiores; ergo et species receptae in eis erunt simpliciores, et ita universaliores et pauciores.[20]

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1 ista] ita *corr*. Tr± 4 sunt] s. ergo (e. *canc*. Tr+) Tr 6 Item] Iterum Tr | appropinquatione] ad 1 *canc*. Tr± 6–7 specierum] *canc*. Tr+ 7 in] et i. (et *canc*. Tr+) Tr | superioribus] pauciobus (p. *canc*. Tr+) s. Tr 8 per] et *corr*. Tr± 11 sed] licet *canc*. Tr+ 13 universaliores] *rescr*. Tr±

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ponendae sunt huiusmodi species aliquo modo universaliores et simpliciores in superioribus quam inferioribus."

17 Id est: inferiora magis appropinquant Deo quam angeli in aliqua condicione, ut corporalia in ratione producendi.

18 THOM. DE AQ., *S. Theol.* I q. 55 a. 3 resp., ed Leon. 5, p. 59a: "Sic igitur quanto angelus fuerit superior, tanto per pauciores species universitatem intelligibilium apprehendere poterit."; AEG. ROMANUS, *Quaest. de cogn. angel.* q. 8 resp., ed. De Luere, f. 99ra–vb: "Si esset nobis nota natura angelica statim appareret nobis quod in uno angelo essent plures species quam in alio ... quanto angelus est superior tanto habet pauciores species et quanto inferior plures."; RICHARDUS CLAPWELL, *Correct. corrupt. "Quare"* a. 20 resp., ed. GLORIEUX, p. 89: "Illa participatio [scilicet formae omnino primae, quae Deus est] plenior invenitur atque perfectior in angelis superioribus, hinc est quod species in eis magis accedunt ad unitatem, et sunt per consequens pauciores, et in repraesentando magis universales, utpote illi formae uni quae universaliter omnia repraesentat similiores."; ibid., ad 2, ed. GLORIEUX, p. 90.

19 BOETHIUS, *De consol. phil.* V c. 4 n. 25, ed. C. MORESCHINI (Monachii/Lipsiae 2005), p. 149: "Omne enim quod cognoscitur non secundum sui vim, sed secundum cognoscentium potius comprehenditur facultatem."; *Liber de causis* c. 9 n. 99, ed. A. PATTIN, *Tijdschrift voor Filosofie* 28 (1966), p. 160: "Et similiter aliqua ex rebus non recipit quod est supra eam nisi per modum secundum quem potest recipere ipsum, non per modum secundum quem est res recepta."

20 RICHARDUS CLAPWELL, *Correct. corrup. "Quare"* a. 41 resp., ed. GLORIEUX, p. 182: "Decet quod superiores angeli perfectiones suas inferioribus communicent secundum gradum capacitatis eorum; unde superiores hoc volunt et faciunt"; THOM. DE AQ., *S. theol.* I q. 55 a. 3 resp., ed. Leon. 5, p. 59a: "Quanto angelus fuerit superior, tanto per pauciores spe-

[12] Sed nec ista ratio concludit, quia angeli superiores aut DICUNTUR simpliciores quia actualiores,[21] et tunc non sequitur quod per pauciores species intelligant,[22] quia tunc idem reddit contra hoc sicut contra primam rationem.[23]—Aut dicuntur simpliciores quia minus compositi, quod similiter non convenit, quia omnes PONENTES compositionem in eis, aut ponunt compositionem [in eis] materiae et formae,[24] essentiae et esse,[25] aut neutro modo

1 ista] ita *corr*. Tr$^{\pm}$ 4 similiter] *add*. Tr$^{\pm}$ 6 in eis] *secludendum puto* | materiae] aut ponunt compositionem (*canc*. Tr^{+}, cf. hic *lin*.5–6) m. Tr

cies universitatem intelligibilium apprehendere poterit. Et ideo oportet quod eius formae sint universaliores, quasi ad plura se extendentes unaquaeque earum."; AEG. ROMANUS, *Quaest. de cogn. angel*. q. 8, ed. De Luere, f. 97^{rb}: "Si [angeli] cognoscunt per universaliores, consequens est quod per pauciores, nam universaliores species plura continent, propter quod consequens est quod pauciores sufficere possint."; GODEFRIDUS DE FONT., *Quodlibet* II q. 5, ed. DE WULF–PELZER, PhB 2, p. 88; GUIL. DE WARE, *Sent*. II d. 11 q. 6 in corp. art., cod. Bibl. Med. Laur, Firenze, Plut. 33 dex. 1, ff. 124^{v}–125^{r}.

21 GODEFRIDUS DE FONT., *Quodlibet* II q. 5, ed. DE WULF–PELZER, PhB 2, p. 88: "Sunt ergo universaliores, id est virtuosiores, quia per ipsas [species] perfectius et limpidius [angeli] superiores cognoscunt; sunt etiam [species] pauciores, quia simpliciores in quantum actualiores."

22 GUIL. DE WARE, *Sent*. II d. 11 q. 6 resp., cod. Bibl. Med. Laur, Firenze, Plut. 33 dex. 1, f. 125^{v}: "Et ideo angelus superior limpidius videt per species suas universaliores per privationem potentialitatis et imperfectionis quam angelus inferior, nec tamen videt per species pauciores numero."

23 Cf. supra n. 61.

24 BONAVENT., II *Sent*., d. 3 p. 1 a. 1 q. 1 concl., Opera omnia 2, p. 91^{a}; RICHARDUS DE MEDIAV., II *Sent*. d. 3 a. 2 q. 2 (ed. Brixiae 1591), vol. 2, p. 52^{a}: "Videtur igitur mihi dicendum, quod essentia angeli composita est ex materia et forma, extendendo nomen materiae ad omnem naturam possibilem, ex qua et alia natura magis actuali constituitur unum per essentiam."; PETRUS IOANNES OLIVI, *Quaest. in II Sent*. q. 16 resp., ed. B. JANSEN, p. 304: "Credo tamen iuxta communiorem opinionem in eis [scil. in substantiis intellectualibus] esse compositionem materiae cum forma et credo quod haec secundum fidem sit sanior et securior et quod altera multum appropinquet errori philosophicae et paganicae infidelitatis."

25 BONAVENT., II *Sent*. d. 3 p. 1 a. 1 q. 1 concl., Opera omnia 2, p. 91^{a}; RICHARDUS DE MEDIAV., II *Sent*. d. 3 a. 1 q. 1 concl. (ed. Brixiae 1591), pp. 49^{a}–50^{a}: "Eo modo quo essentia angeli et suum esse differunt, est ibi compositio ex essentia et esse … Alii dicunt, quibus magis consentio, quod esse actuale nihil absolutum dicit super essentiam ipsius angeli, sed tantummodo realem relationem ad datorem ipsius esse … Concedendum est quod in angelo et in omni creata substantia est aliqua realis compositio ex essentia et esse."; IDEM, *Quaest. disp*. q. 6, sol., ed. A. BOUREAU (Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 2012), p. 222: "Essentia angeli composita est ex materia et forma, hoc est ex duabus naturis, quarum una est potentialis respectu alterius et alia actualis respectu illius."; AEG. ROMANUS, *Quodl*. I q. 7, ed. Nempaei, 5va: "Erit ergo in rebus creatis vel in essentiis creaturarum actualitas quaedam differens ab essentia quae actualitas dicitur esse, quare in rebus creatis differt essentia et esse."

ponentes essentiam et esse non differre ⟨nec materiae et formae⟩,[26] aut materiae et formae sed non essentiae et esse[27] aut, e converso, essentiae et esse sed non materiae et formae;[28]—⟨sed⟩ quia omnis talis compositio aequaliter ponitur in superiore et in inferiore,[29] ratio illa non concludit.[30]

[13] Item, in alio deficit ratio, quia non sequitur 'angelus superior simplicius recipit, ergo pauciora', quia quod simplicius recipit potest esse aut quia modo simpliciori et spiritualiori recipit;—et sic non sequitur 'ergo pauciora recipit', quia intellectus simplicius recipit species quam visus, non tamen sequitur quod pauciores[31] recipit.—Alio modo dicitur 'aliquid simplicius recipere' quia sub minori quantitate recipit, ut pupilla oculi sub minori quantitate recipit speciem visibilem quam res extra. Primo modo angelus superior simplicius recipit.

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1 nec … formae] *addi* 2 converso] contrario Tr 3 sed quia] s. *addi* (*sed corr.* Tr±) 4 et] *conieci* sed Trα | ratio] r^r *add.* Tr± * *canc.* Tr+ 5 alio] aliquo *corr.* Tr± 7 non] n. recipit (r. *canc.* Tr+) Tr

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26 Henr. de Gand., *Quodl.* IV q. 16 sol., ed. G.A. Wilson—G.J. Etzkorn, AMPh s. 2, 8 pp. 299–300: "Cum ergo angeli sint substantiae summe intellectuales, omnino debent esse separatae a materia, maxime ne sit materia pars essentiae suae … Unde etiamsi compositio in ea inveniatur, illa non est ex materia et forma, sed ex aliquo se habente ad modum materiae et aliquo se habente ad modum formae, in quantum omnis creatura deficit a divina simplicitate … habet compositionem ex quiditate et essentia sive ex 'quod' et 'quo' est, appelando quiditatem 'quo est' et essentiam 'quod est'."; Godefridus de Font., *Quodl.* III q. 1, ed. De Wulf–Pelzer PhB 2, pp. 164–166.

27 Duns Scotus, *Lect.* II d. 12 n. 58, ed. Vat. 19, p. 91: "Concedo igitur quod materia est alia res a forma et alterius rationis".

28 Thom. de Aq., *S. Theol.* I q. 75 a. 5 ad 4, ed. Leon. 5, p. 202^b: "In substantiis vero intellectualibus est compositio ex actu et potentia; non quidem ex materia et forma, sed ex forma et esse participato. Unde a quibusdam dicuntur componi ex 'quo est' et 'quod est': ipsum enim esse est 'quo' aliquid est."; Aeg. Romanus, *Quodl.* I q. 8, ed. Nempaei, f. 6^ra: "Et in tota corporalis substantia sit convenientia propter ipsas spirituales substantias regentes eam inconveniens est ipsas spirituales substantias ponere sic distantes et diversas disiunctas ut non reperiantur duae eiusdem generis, non est ergo materia in angelis; bene est tamen ibi aliquid loco materiae, quia non sunt actus purus, sed habent aliquam potentialitatem admixtam."; idem, *In II Sent.* d. 3 p. 1 q. 1, ed. A. Rocchensis (Venetiis 1581): "non compositi sunt ex materia et forma."; ibid., q. 2: "compositi sunt ex essentia et esse."

29 Scilicet angelo.

30 Guil. de Ware, *Sent.* II d. 11 q. 6, cod. Bibl. Med. Laur, Firenze, Plut. 33 dex. 1, f. 125^v: "Alio modo potest intelligi aliquid universalius alio per privationem partium exprimentium apud intellectum intelligibilia,—et isto modo non habet unus angelus alio species universaliores, quia quot sunt species secundum unum in infimo angelo, tot sunt in supremo de eisdem cognitis. Sunt tamen universaliores in angelo supremo quia unus contractae ad potentialitatem et imperfectionem."

31 Scilicet pauciores species.

[14] Quarto, arguunt sic. Quanto lumen est clarius in intellectu tanto universalius et perfectius cognoscitur res. Sed lumen intelligibile in angelo superiore est clarius; ergo etc.[32]

[15] Sed nec ista ratio concludit, quoniam angeli superiores dicuntur clarius intelligere, quia acutius penetrant et velocius obiectum attingunt, et hoc est clarius intelligere, non quia certius intelligant quam alii; habens enim intellectum rudem ita universaliter intelligit sicut studiosus.[33] |

α 406

[B.—Quod angeli superiores per tot species quot inferiores intelligant]

[16] Ideo est alia opinio, verior, quod angeli superiores non intelligunt per species magis universales, immo per tot superiores sicut inferiores.[34]—Et pro hac

1 in] *add.* Tr± 1–2 universalius] ulterius *corr.* Tr± 2 in] *add.* Tr± 4 ista] ista *corr.* Tr± 6 certius … alii] nihil certius *corr.* Tr± 7 rudem] videam *corr.* Tr± | universaliter] ulterius *corr.* Tr± 11 sicut] sed *corr.* Tr±

32 Aeg. Romanus, *Quaest. de cogn. angel.* q. 8 sol., ed. De Luere, f. 100ra: "Angeli superiores habent lumen clarius et efficacius quam inferiores … Angelus superior plus abundans in lumine et in perspicuitate intellectus intelliget in uno acceptu et in una specie, quod non potuit intelligere angelus inferior in multis conceptibus et per multas species."; Henr. de Gand., *Quodl.* v q. 15 sol., ed. Badius, f. 180v R: "Quia omnia illa quilibet angelus videt, licet differenter secundum maiorem et minorem limpiditatem; secundum quod limpidius vident verbum et habitu simpliciori, et magis universali superiores cognoscunt res creatas quam inferiores."; Godefridus de Font., *Quodl.* ii q. 5 in corp., ed. De Wulf–Pelzer, PhM 2, p. 88: "Sunt ergo [scil. species] universaliores, id est virtusiores, quia per ipsas perfectius et limpidius superiores [scil. angeli] cognoscunt; sunt etiam pauciores, quia simpliciores in quantum actualiores."

33 Petrus Ioannis Olivi, *Lect. sup. De ang. hier.* vii q. 8 n. 37, ed. S. Piron, p. 7: "Quando vero per locutionem non elevatur nec informatur mens audientis ad aliquid scientiale seu sapientiale, sicut fit quando aliquis idiota ostendit verbo et signo aliquam rem particularem, utpote lapidem vel pomum suo magistro, tunc talis locutio non dicitur proprie illuminativa, quamvis secundum quid, in quantum scilicet per eam aliquid quasi sensibiliter ostenditur, possit hoc aliqualiter dici."; Idem., *Quaest. in ii Sent.* q. 34, ed. Jansen, pp. 613–614.

34 Petrus Ioannis Olivi, *Quaest. in ii Sent.* q. 34 ad 1, ed. Jansen, p. 613: "Ex modo autem talis simplicitatis [scil. angeli] non sequitur quod quamvis species angeli superioris sint hoc modo simpliciores, quod propter hoc possit plura cognoscere per unam speciem quam angeli inferiores; sed bene ex hoc sequitur quod per illam speciem simpliciori et unitiori modo cognoscat suum obiectum quam angelis inferior per suam."; Guil. de Ware, *Quaest. in ii Sent.*, d. 11 q. 6 in corp. art., cod. Bibl. Med. Laur, Firenze, Plut. 33 dex. 1, ff. 125v–126r: "Et isto modo non habet unus angelus alio species universaliores, quia quot sunt species secundum unum in infimo angelo, tot sunt in supremo de eisdem cognitis; sunt tamen universaliores in angelo supremo, quia minus contractae ad potentialitatem

opinione arguitur primo sic. Cognoscere aliquid in universali est cognoscere ipsum magis confuse et indeterminate, quod non convenit angelo superiori.

[17] Sed ad hoc dicunt quod cognoscere aliquid universalius ex parte obiecti est cognoscere ipsum imperfectius, sed non cognoscere universalius ex parte medii.[35]—Sed contra. Si concludatur ista, 'omnis asinus est animal' per hoc medium 'omnis substantia animata sensibilis est animal', imperfectius cognoscitur quam si sciatur per hoc medium 'omnis substantia animata sensibilis talis est animal'; ergo non solum cognitio universalis ex parte obiecti est imperfectior, verum etiam ex parte medii cognitio universalior est imperfectior.

[18] Praeterea, secundo sic. Idem non potest esse ratio repraesentandi plura ut plura; ergo per unam speciem non potest angelus superior plura ut plura cognoscere.

[19] Dicitur quod assumpta[36] est vera de medio adaequato, non de medio excedenti. Exemplum, de essentia divina quae est ratio repraesentandi plura ut plura.—Similiter, aliud exemplum, de prudentia universali quae est tantum una, quae tamen est principium cognoscendi multas prudentias particulares, ut prudentiam lupi et leonis, nam per actum magnitudinis cognoscit prudentiam leonis, et sic de aliis.[37]

[20] Sed ista exempla non sunt ad propositum. | Non primum,[38] quia quando Tr 128^{vb}
aliquid est totalis causa multorum et sufficiens, tunc potest esse ratio repraesentandi multa, quia est illimitatum, ut essentia divina. Sed quando aliquid est ratio repraesentandi solum et non causa, impossibile est quod sit propria ratio repraesentandi plura ut plura.

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1 Cognoscere] cognoscibile Tr *corr.* α | est] *add.* α 2 ipsum magis] = α m. i. videtur non intelligunt per species magis universales immo per tot superiores sicut inferiores et pro hac opinione argumentat (*canc.* α, cf. supra, p. 320 lin. 10–11) Tr 5 ista omnis] ita cum *corr.* Tr$^{\pm}$ 9 universalior] ulterior *corr.* Tr$^{\pm}$ 10 ratio] *bis* (*alterum canc.* Tr^{+}) Tr 11 ergo] *rescr.* Tr$^{\pm}$ | ut plura] *add.* Tr$^{\pm}$ 14 ratio] *add.* Tr$^{\pm}$ 15 Similiter] sequitur *corr.* Tr$^{\pm}$ 22 solum] *add.* Tr$^{\pm}$

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et imperfectionem, vel sub aliis verbis, angelus superior habet species magis universales quia intensiores in repraesentando illud obiectum, et de omnibus cognitis, non tamen habet species extensiores, hoc est magis universales extensione."

35 Id est: cognoscere aliquid universalius non est imperfectius ex parte medii.

36 Cf. supra, n. 18, lin. 10–11.

37 Thom. de Aq., *S. Theol.* q. 55 a. 3 ad 3, ed. Leon. 5, p. 59^{b}: "Idem non potest esse plurium propria ratio adaequata. Sed si sit excellens, potest idem accipi ut propria ratio et similitudo diversorum. Sicut in homine est universalis prudentia quantum ad omnes actus virtutum; et potest accipi ut propria ratio et similitudo particularis prudentiae quae est in leone ad actus magnanimitatis, et eius quae est in vulpe ad actus cautelae, et sic de aliis."

38 Cf. supra, n. 19, lin. 14–15.

[21] Nec aliud exemplum[39] est ad propositum, quia non secundum idem realiter | est principium cognoscendi illa plura, sed secundum diversos actus, ut α 407
secundum actum magnitudinis, cuius similitudinem habet leo, est principium cognoscendi prudentiam leonis, et sic de aliis.

[22] Tertio, sic. Nec unus habitus nec unus actus potest esse multorum ut multa sunt, sed ut conveniunt, nec species potest esse ratio repraesentativa multorum ut multa.

[23] Dicunt quod sicut habitus et actus non sunt multorum ut multa, ita nec species acquisita, tamen species innata potest. Unde non est simile de specie innata et acquisita, quia aliquid a quo habet entitatem et unitatem.—Et quia species acquisita habet entitatem suam ab obiecto imprimente eam, et ideo unitatem propter quod species acquisita diversificatur secundum diversitatem obiectorum. Sed non sic est de specie innata, quae habet unitatem suam et entitatem a Deo. Ideo talis species non numeratur secundum numerationem obiectorum.

[24] Contra. Videtur quod species innata et acquisita eodem modo participant rationem repraesentantem unitatem et diversitatem. Quod patet, quia quae sunt eiusdem speciei eodem modo habent unitatem specificam et diversitatem.[40]—Sed species innata et acquisita sunt eiusdem speciei, quamvis sint effective a diversis principiis; ergo eodem modo participant unitatem et diversitatem. Et ita, si species acquisita non possit repraesentare diversa ut diversa, sequitur quod nec species innata poterit.

[25] Minor probatur, quia diversus modus producendi non variat unitatem specificam rei producibilis, sicut patet per Augustinum in *Libro sex quaestionum contra paganos*, ubi vult quod aliquod productum ex semine et sine semine sint eiusdem speciei,[41]—aliter enim Adam, Christus et Petrus

1 Nec aliud] ut autem *corr.* Tr± 4 et] *addi* 10 aliquid] *corr.* habet Tr± 11 ab] *add.* Tr± 15 obiectorum] = α subiectorum Tr 19 eiusdem] eius (*add.* dem Tr±) Tr | sint] sunt *corr.* Tr± 20 participant] participent *corr.* Tr± 24 sicut] sed *corr.* Tr± | Augustinum] Avicennam *corr.* Tr± | sex] = Trα 83 Tr±

39 Cf. supra, n. 19, p. 321, lin. 15–18.

40 Petrus Ioannes Olivi, *Quaest. in II Sent.* q. 34, ed. Jansen, p. 617: "Ponere mentes nostras esse particulares et simul cum hoc habere aliquod accidens universale est aperte ponere simul duo contradictoria in eodem … Ponere igitur habitum universalem in mente particulari est ponere quod habitus ille sit simul particularis et universalis, finitus et infinitus, proportionalis illi menti et improportionalis, et consimiliter quod mens illa sit particularis et universalis, finita et infinita, proportionalis et improportionalis infinitati sui accidentis."

41 August., *Epist.* 102 c. 3–4, ed. Kl. D. Daur, ccsl 31B (Brepols: Turnhout 2009), pp. 9–10.

non essent eiusdem speciei, quia diversus erat modus quo hi producebantur,[42] quamvis AVERROES in hoc erraverit, VIII *Physicorum*.[43]—Hoc etiam vult AUGUSTINUS, XV *De civitate Dei* versus finem.[44] Hoc etiam dicit in epistola ad Deogratias.[45]

[26] Hoc | etiam patet per exemplum de geometria infusa et acquisita, quae α 408
sunt eiusdem speciei, quamvis diversimode producantur. Si geometria infusa et arithmetica infusa differunt specie, non ratione principii aut subiecti, quae eadem sunt utrobique, ergo differunt a parte obiecti; ergo non propter diversum modum producendi differunt aliqua secundum speciem; sed innatum et acquisitum non dicunt nisi diversum modum producendi; ergo species acquisita et innata non differunt specie.

[27] Quarto, arguitur sic. Numerus angelorum maior est quam formarum substantialium, descendendo a genere generalissimo ad speciem secundum lineam praedicabilem; ergo ascendendo secundum gradum angelorum, ultimo devenietur ad aliquem angelum qui intelligat omnia per unam speciem.[46]

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1 hi] hii Tr 3 XV] XVI Tr^{+} 4 Deogratias] = Trα (sed Deodatum corr. Tr$^{\pm}$ 6 sunt] = α habent Tr 9 sed] *add.* Tr$^{\pm}$ 11 differunt] *rescr.* Tr$^{\pm}$ 12 Quarto] *add.* Tr$^{\pm}$

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42 PETRUS IOANNES OLIVI, *Quaest. in II Sent.* q. 34, ed. JANSEN, pp. 617–618: "Quis autem fidelis ferat audiens quod visio qua Petrus videt Deum aut caritas qua fruitur Deo non sit eiusdem speciei, immo nec eiusdem generis cum visione et caritate Pauli aut angeli in cuius hierarchia et ordine est collocatus?"

43 AVER., *Phys.* VII t. 46, ed. Iuntina (Venetiis 1562), vol. 4, f. 387rE-vH.

44 AUGUST., *De civ. Dei* XV c. 27 n. 4, ed. B. DOMBART—A. KALB, CCSL 48 (Brepols: Turnholti 1955), pp. 496–497: "Alia sunt quippe quae de quibuscumque rebus sine concubitu ita nascuntur, ut postea concumbant et generent, sicut muscae; alia vero in quibus nihil sit maris et feminae, sicut apes. Ea porro quae sic habent sexum, ut non habeant fetum, sicut muli et mulae, mirum si fuerunt ibi [scil. in arca Noe], ac non potius parentes eorum ibi fuisse suffecerit, equinum videlicet atque asinum genus; et si qua alia sunt, quae commixtione diversi generis genus aliquod gignunt."

45 Id est, in eodem libro sex quaestionum contra paganos, cf. nota 41.

46 GUIL. DE MARA, *Correctorium*, ms. Vat. Lat. 4413, f. 23^{r}: "Praeterea, si quanto angeli fuerit superior tanto per pauciores species intelligit sive universales intelligibilium apprehendere potest ut ipse dicit cum novem sit ordines angelorum et tamen infimus habet species universales. In quolibet enim ordine sunt primum, medium et ultimum, sicut dicit Dionysius, *De angelica hierarchia* c. 4, 'plures multo sunt gradus angelorum quam formarum in predicamento substantiae', descendendo a genere generalissimo usque ad species specialissimas et individuorum earum; ergo sequitur quod supremus angelus cognoscit unica forma, scilicet generis generalissimi, omnia contenta in praedicamento substantiae. Et si angelus superior illo produceretur a Deo quod fieri potest cognosceret omnia secundum aliqua specie, quod est absurdum et impossibile, vel si per unam intelligeret, tunc non est universaliter verum quod angelus superior semper cognoscat per formas universaliores et pauciores."

[28] Ad hoc respondetur a quodam, qui deridet argumentum, quod maior est falsa, quia praeter illos gradus qui sunt in angelis adhuc sunt aliae formae substantiales, et ita non videtur verum quod numerus angelorum sit maior quam formarum substantialium.

[29] Sed iste vel non videt argumentum vel dissimulat se videre, quia non intelligo maiorem et minorem numerum nisi secundum ordinem descensus quasi per lineam superioris et inferioris. Et sic, nullus dubitat quin sint plures gradus in angelis quam in formis substantialibus.

[30] Alii respondent aliter, supponendo quod numerus et gradus angelorum secundum speciem sit maior quam formarum substantialium, non tamen numerus et gradus angelorum differentium secundum genus secundum ordines suos.

[31] Nunc autem, ut dicunt, ex hoc quod angeli sunt superiores, differen-
Tr 129ra tes secundum speciem, non minuitur numerus specierum quibus | intelligunt. Non enim ex hoc quod sunt superiores habent pauciores species, sed clariores,
α 409 unde gradus | angelorum differentium secundum[47] speciem non variat quantitatem specierum sed qualitatem, tamen gradus generum angelorum variat et quantitatem specierum et qualitatem, quia angeli superiores alterius ordinis, differentes secundum genus, intelligunt per species pauciores. Ideo non sequitur quod angelus supremus intelligat per unam speciem omnia vel per nullam.[48]

[32] Et ponunt exemplum quod numerus specierum non variatur propter differentiam secundum speciem sed secundum genus. Sicut in diversis plantis differentibus secundum speciem sunt aequales potentiae, sed in animali differenti secundum genus sunt plures, ita quod numerus potentiarum non variatur propter diversitatem secundum speciem sed secundum genus, sic in proposito de numero specierum.

[33] Sed nec haec responsio sufficit, quia sunt in angelis ad minus tot gradus angelorum. Et ita, si sunt differentes secundum genus, erunt tot genera et tot gradus generum.—Sed non sunt tot gradus generum in linea praedica-

2 adhuc] ad hoc *corr.* Tr± 9 gradus] *bis* (*sed alterum canc.* Tr+) Tr 11 angelorum] an (*spat. vac. 4 litt.*) gelorum Tr 17 angelorum] non (*om.* α) a. Tr 22 Et] *add.* Tr± 24–25 differenti] *rescr.* Tr± 27 numero] *rescr.* Tr± 28 tot] cum *corr.* Tr± 29–30 tot … tot] cum … cum *corr.* Tr±

47 Boethius, *De consolatione philosophiae* III 10.5, ed. C. Moreschini, p. 81: "Neque enim ab deminutis inconsummatisque natura rerum cepit exordium, sed ab integris absolutisque procedens in haec extrema atque effeta dilabitur."

48 Id est, quod angelus supremus omnia per unam vel per nullam speciem intelligat.

mentali, descendendo a genere generalissimo ad speciem specialissimam; ergo ultra secundum gradum angelorum, alii[49] non intelligerent per species.

[34] Item, infimus angelus per unicam speciem generis intelligit speciem, ut hominem per speciem animalis, quia intellectus noster per speciem hominis intelligit hominem; ergo cum angelus intelligit per speciem magis universaliter quam intellectus noster, sequitur quod infimus angelus intelligat hominem per speciem animalis, et qua ratione hominem, et alias species animalis;—ergo infimus angelus intelligit omnia animalia per speciem animalis.[50] Ergo secundum istam viam angelus superior alterius generis intelligeret omnia animalia et inanimata corporea per speciem corporis, et sic ultimo angeli superiores intelligerent omnia per unam speciem vel per nullam.

[35] Praeterea, non est verum quod dicunt, quod diversitas secundum genus variat numerum potentiarum, nam animalia immobilia differunt secundum genus et ab animalibus gres|sibilibus, et tamen non habent pauciores potentias nec plures; ergo sequitur quod nec in angelis diversitas secundum genus variat numerum specierum. α 410

[36] Praeterea, plus creatura Deo appropinquat per illud quo differt secundum speciem ab alio quam per illud quo differt secundum genus, ut patet de homine. Ergo species repraesentans ipsam ut differt secundum genus.

[37] Praeterea, isti concedunt quod Deus potest semper producere angelum nobiliorem in infinitum, quamvis velint dicere quod non differentem secundum genus.[51] Sed si hoc sit verum, tandem potest a Deo produci angelus unus

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5–6 universaliter] ulterior *corr*. Tr$^{\pm}$ 7–8 et … animalis] *bis* (*sed altera vice* et … animalis, *lin*. 7, *post* ergo … animalis, *lin*. 7–8) Tr *canc*. Tr$^{\pm}$ 10–11 intelligerent] intelligit *corr*. Tr$^{\pm}$ 12 diversitas] diversita Tr 13 immobilia] mobilia *corr*. Tr$^{\pm}$ | differunt] *rescr*. Tr$^{\pm}$ 14 gressibilibus] maius gressibus *corr*. Tr$^{\pm}$ | pauciores] minores *corr*. Tr$^{\pm}$ 15 quod] *add*. Tr$^{\pm}$ 17 quo differt] quod differunt *corr*. Tr$^{\pm}$ 18 differt] differunt *corr*. Tr$^{\pm}$ 19 differt] differunt *corr*. Tr$^{\pm}$ 21 infinitum] finitum *corr*. Tr$^{\pm}$

49 Intellige: angeli.

50 Durandus, II *Sent*. d. 2 q. 6 [a7], ed. F. Retucci, Recherches de Théologie et Philosophie médiévales Bibliotheca 10.2.1 (Leuven: Peeters, 2012), pp. 173–174: "Angelus inferior intelligit hominem et quaecumque sub homine continentur per unam speciem. Si autem angelus superior intelligit plura per unam speciem, oportet quod intelligat per eam animal et quaecumque sub animali continentur, et adhuc superior illo intelliget per unam speciem corpus animatum et quaecumque sub ipso continentur, et sic usque ad ens. Cum enim species sint coaequaevae sub genere, non potest assignari ratio quare species in mente angeli repraesentans plus quam hominem sub animali repraesentet quasdam animalis species et quasdam non. Et idem dico de speciebus corporis animati et sic semper usque ad ens."

51 Thom. de Aq., *S. Theol*. I q. 25 a. 6, ed. Leon. 4, p. 298^{b}.

qui plus distabit a supremo nunc producto quam supremus ab infimo.[52] Ergo si supremus nunc intelligit per species pauciores valde quam infimus, sequitur quod ille intelligeret per species quasi in infinitum pauciores quam nunc supremus, et ita tandem deveniretur ad angelum productibilem qui omnia poterit intelligere per unam speciem vel nullam.

[2.—Opino propria]

[38] Ideo dico quod per tot species intelligunt angeli superiores sicut inferiores, tamen illae species in angelo superiore sunt magis universales in virtute, quia sunt limpidiores et clariores.[53] Et sic intelligenda est auctoritas Dionysii, *De angelica hierarchia* c. 11, ubi dicit quod "angeli inferiores idem lumen participant quod superiores, sed particularius illud participant".[54] Sic etiam potest exponi dictum auctoris *De causis*, propositione 9, ubi dicit quod "intelligentiae sunt plenae formis, sed in inferioribus sunt particulariores".[55]

[II.—Ad argumentum]

Tr 129^{rb} [39] Ad rationem in | oppositum[56] patet responsio, quod non est perfectior quia ad plura se extendit—nam virtus generativa in homine est perfectior quam in aliis, et tamen non ad plura in specie se extendit—, sed est perfectior quia limpidius et clarius intelligit, ut dictum est.

1 distabit] distet *corr*. Tr$^{\pm}$ 4 deveniretur] devenitur *corr*. Tr$^{\pm}$ 10 angelica … c] ange. ca. *corr*. Tr$^{\pm}$ 12 ubi] ut *corr*. Tr$^{\pm}$ 13 particulariores] particulares *corr*. Tr$^{\pm}$ 17–18 limpidius … est] *add*. Tr$^{\pm}$

52 Petrus Ioan. Olivi, *Sent*. II q. 34, ed. Jansen, pp. 611–612.

53 Durandus, II *Sent*. d. 3 q. 6 [a10], ed. F. Retucci, pp. 175–176: "Nullo igitur modo dicendum est quod angelus superior intelligat per speciem universaliorem quam angelus inferior, quamquam perfectius intelligat et clarius".

54 Cf. Albertus Magnus, *Super Dionysium De coelesti hierarchia* c. 11, ed. P. Simon—W. Kübel, Opera omnia 36^{1} (Aschendorff, Monasterii Westfalorum, 1993), p. 177^{b}; Thom. de Aq., *S. Theol*. I q. 55 a 3, ed. Leon. 5, p. 59^{a}. Ps. Dionysius, *De coelesti hierarchia* c. 11 n. 2, translat. I. Scotus Erigena, *Dionysiaca* 2 (Bruges: Desclée de Brouwer 1950), pp. 932–933: "Iuxta enim saepe a nobis recte redditam rationem, ipsae quidem superfirmatae dispositiones abundanter habent et minorum sacras proprietates, ultimae vero maiorum superpositas universitates non habent, particulariter in eas primo apparentibus illuminationibus per primas proportionaliter eis distributis."

55 *Liber de causis*, prop. 9 (10) n. 92, ed. A. Pattin, p. 158: "Omnis intelligentia plena est formis."

56 Cf. supra n. 21.

[Ioannes Duns Scotus
Reportatio II-B
Distinctio 11
Quaestio 2
Utrum possunt angeli proficere in cognitione a rebus]

[1] Utrum possunt proficere recipiendo cognitionem a rebus. R 72v V 135ra P 24va O 29ra

[2] Quod non. Probatio. Receptivum debet denudari a toto genere recepti, II *De anima*.[1] Sed angelus non denudatur a speciebus intelligibilibus, quia 9 propositione *De causis* dicitur quod "intelligentia plena est formis".[2]

[3] Item, Augustinus XII *Super Genesim ad litteram*: "Agens praestantius est patiente";[3] sed corpus non est praestantius spiritu, per ipsum[4] ibidem; ergo corpus non potest agere in angelum qui spiritus est; ergo non potest angelus accipere cognitionem a rebus.

[4] Item, Dionysius 7 capitulo *De divinis nominibus* dicit: "Angeli non congregant notitiam divinam ex sensibus."[5]

[5] Item, angelus est medium in essendo inter Deum et homines; ergo in cognoscendo. Sed Deus non intelligit per species acceptas a se nec ab aliis, homo autem intelligit per species et per species acceptas a rebus intelligibilibus; ergo angelus medio modo se habet in intelligendo per species non acceptas

6 possunt] possint R 7 Probatio] Primo probo R | debet] oportet V | genere] generi O 8 denudatur] est denudatus R | a] *om.* VR | 9] 2 (!) R 9 intelligentia] materia O | plena est] e. p. RPO 10 Augustinus] angelus *corr.* V± | XII] *om.* PO II R | ad litteram] *om.* V 10–11 praestantius est] e. p. R 11 patiente] passo aliter pat. R | ipsum] Augustinum R 12 corpus … ergo] *om.* V | angelum] angelis R 14 dicit] *om.* R 14–15 Angeli … congregant] angelus n. congregat R 15 divinam] dignam (!) R 16 est medium] m. e. V dignus e. R | homines] hominem R 17 non] nec V | a … aliis] a rebus PO 18 homo … rebus] *om.* O | per … et] *om.* VR 19 ergo angelus] *iterum post* modo P | se … intelligendo] intelligit PO

1 Aver., *De an.* III c. 4, ed. F.S. Crawford (Cambridge, MA: The Medieval Academy of America, 1953), p. 385: "Omne recipiens aliquid necesse est ut sit denudatum a natura recepti, et ut sua substantia non sit substantia recepti in specie."; Avic., *De an.* II c. 2, ed. S. van Riet, AviL 1 (Louvain: Peeters, 1972), p. 120: "Virtus in qua formae existentes non sunt materiales ullo modo nec accidit eis esse materiatas, nec sunt formae rerum materialium, sed denudatae ab omni colligatione cum materia, constat quia apprehendit formas apprehensione nuda a materia omni modo."

2 *Liber De causis* prop. 9 (10) n. 92, ed. A. Pattin, p. 158: "Omnis intelligentia plena est formis."

3 August., *De Gen. ad litt.* XII n. 16, ed. I. Zycha, CSEL 28[1] (Pragae: Tempsky, 1894), p. 402: "Omni enim modo praestantior est qui facit ea re, de qua aliquid facit."

4 August., *De Gen. ad litt.* XII n. 16, ed. Zycha, CSEL 28[1], p. 402: "Neque ullo modo spiritu praestantius est corpus, immo perspicuo modo spiritus corpore."

5 Ps.-Dionysius, *De divinis nominibus* c. 7, ed. Ph. Chevalier, Dionysiaca I (Bruges: Desclée de Brouwer, 1937), p. 388; Thom. de Aq., *S. Theol.* I q. 55 a. 2 s. c., ed. Leon. 5, p. 56a.

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ab aliis rebus.[6] Et iste modus arguendi apparet per ARISTOTELEM I *De generatione*[7] et per RICHARDUM IV *De trinitate*.[8]

[6] Oppositum. Omne cognoscibile cognoscitur per similitudinem ipsius; sed angelus cognoscit singulare; ergo per similitudinem singularis. Sed similitudo illius singularis non est concreata sibi,[9] quia eadem ratione qua similitudo unius singularis esset concreata sibi et alterius et infinitorum, quia ideae infinitorum sunt vel esse possunt in mente divina, sed infinitas species rerum non potuit ipsum habere concreatas sibi.

1 iste] ille R | per Aristotelem] parum (*pro* p. A.) O 2 per] *om.* R | IV] I VRO 3 Omne] esse V | cognoscitur] cognitus V | similitudinem] sim. singularis, sed similitudo illius singularis non est concreata (cf. infra *lin.* 4–5 *et var. lect.*) *canc.* V^{+} 3–5 ipsius … illius] *om.* R 5 illius] ipsius *corr.* O^{+} | singularis] *om.* V | est] autem R | concreata] communicata O | ratione qua] ratio quae est PO 6 unius] illius PO | esset … sibi] non est communicata (e. c. *canc.* O^{+}) O *om.* VP | et infinitorum] *om.* R 7 vel] nec O | divina] Dei V | sed … rerum] et istas ideas R | non] nulla V 7–8 non potuit] *bis* (potuit[1] *rescr.*) O 8 potuit ipsum] possunt omnes R | concreatas sibi] s. communicatas PO

6 HENR. DE GAND., *Quodl.* V q. 14, ed. BADIUS (Parisiis 1518), f. 177[r] O-P: "Intellectus noster in genere intellectualium respectu formarum universalium intelligibilium est sicut materia prima respectu formarum particularium, quia quandoque habet informationem habituum scientialium, quandoque non habet, et prius est sicut tabula nuda ad eos recipiendum in se. Deus autem sicut in genere entium sic in genere intelligibilium est forma pura, cuius esse est suum secundum actum intelligere. Angelus autem medio modo se habet. Habitus enim scientiales non recipit postquam in actum fuerit productus potentia actum praecedente duratione, sed pertinent ad suam naturalem perfectionem, sed in potentia est ad actus intelligendi ut non sit necesse eum singula intelligere simul."

7 ARISTOT., *De gen. et corr.* I c. 3, 318[a] 1–11, transl. vetus, ed. J. JUDYCKA, AL 9[1] (Leiden 1986), p. 18: "Exsistente autem causa una quidem unde principium motus esse dicimus, una autem materia, talem causam dicendum … Nunc autem ut in materiae specie positam causam dicamus, propter quam semper corruptio et generatio non deficit naturam."; ibid. 318[b] 19–25: "Videtur autem magis multis sensato et non sensato differre … Ens enim et non ens in sentire et non sentire determinant, quemadmodum discibile quidem ens, ignotum autem non ens; sensus enim disciplinae habet virtutem."; AVER., *Commentarium Medium in Aristotelis De Generatione et Corruptione* I t. 19, ed. F.H. FOBES—S. KURLAND (Cambridge, MA: The Medieval Academy of America, 1956), p. 30: "Necesse est igitur ut sensibile sit ens et non sensibile sit non ens, sicut cognitum apud nos est ens et ignotum est non ens."

8 RICHARDUS DE SANCTO VICTORE, *De trin.* IV c. 25, ed. J. RIBAILLIER (Paris: Vrin, 1958), p. 190: "Hinc est facile perpendere de proprietate divina atque humana quomodo una alteri videatur opposita. His itaque duabus quasi ex opposito altrinsecus respicientibus et velut per contrarium sibi invicem respondentibus, angelica proprietas velut media interponitur et altrinseca similitudine hinc inde ambabus coniungitur, commune habens cum divina numquam habere substantiarum pluralitatem in unitate personae, commune habens cum humana numquam habere personarum pluralitatem in unitate substantiae."

9 Scil. angelo.

[I.—Ad quaestionem
A.—Opinio aliorum
1.—Opinio Thomae

a.—Opinionis expositio]

[7] Una opinio dicit quod angelus non accipit cognitionem nec proficit in accipiendo cognitionem a rebus sensibilibus. Ratio talis probo, quia si acciperet species a rebus, ergo angelus habet intellectum creativum illarum specierum et receptivum similiter illarum, quia species intelligibiles creantur ab intellectu; ergo angelus haberet intellectum possibilem et agentem.[10] Hoc autem falsum est. Quod non agentem, quia intellectus agens solum requiritur in illis ubi obiectum intellectus est intelligibile in potentia tantum ut per intellectum agen|tem | reducatur in actum. Sed obiectum intellectus angelici non est aliquid in potentia intelligibile, sed actu intelligibile, quia immateriale.[11] V 135^{rb} O 29^{rb}

[8] Item, nec angelus habet intellectum possibilem, quia suus intellectus semper est in actu,[12] dicente Augustino II *Super Genesim ad litteram*: "Res prius sunt in cognitione angeli quam sint in genere proprio";[13] ergo etc.

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5 dicit] prima parte quaestione 55 articulo 2 *add.* R | non] *om.* PO | nec] non O | proficit] perficit O 6 probo] probatio O primo V 7 species] cognitionem R | ergo] igitur R | creativum] creatum VPO | illarum] istarum RPO 8 similiter] *om.* R | illarum] illorum O istarum R | creantur] causantur RO 9 possibilem … agentem] a. et p. PO 10 falsum est] e. f. PO e. *om.* V | Quod] quia VPO | non] n. habet PO | solum] solus PO | illis] illud O 11 ubi] ut V nisi PO | intellectus] *om.* R | ut] non V 12 reducatur] reducantur V | Sed] licet O | angelici] agenti V agentis PO 14 nec] minus V | nec angelus] unus a. V nullus actus R | possibilem] potentialem PO | suus] superius V 15 Augustino] at *corr.* O$^{\pm}$ | II] *om.* RO | ad … Res] ad re lites (!) V 16 cognitione] g (*canc.* V^{+}) c. V | sint] sunt O

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10 Thom. de Aq., *S. Theol.* I q. 55 a. 2 sol., ed. Leon. 5, p. 56$^{a–b}$: "Substantiae vero superiores, id est angeli, sunt a corporibus totaliter absolutae, immaterialiter et in esse intelligibile subsistentes: et ideo suam perfectionem intelligibilem consequuntur per intelligibilem effluxum, quo a Deo species rerum cognitarum acceperunt simul cum intellectuali natura."

11 Thom. de Aq., *S. Theol.* I q. 54 a. 4 sol., ed. Leon. 5, p. 50^{b}–51^{a}: "Necessitas autem ponendi intellectum agentem fuit, quia naturae rerum materialium, quas nos intelligimus, non subsistunt extra animam immateriales et intelligibiles in actu, sed sunt solum intelligibiles in potentia, extra animam exsistentes: et ideo oportuit esse aliquam virtutem, quae faceret illas naturas intelligibiles actu … neque intelligibilia eorum [scilicet angelorum] sunt intelligibilia in potentia, sed in actu; intelligunt enim primo et principaliter res immateriales."; ibid. q. 84 a. 7 sol., ed. Leon. 5, p. 325$^{a–b}$; ibid. q. 85 a. 1 sol., ed. Leon. 5, pp. 330^{b}–331^{a}.

12 Thom. de Aq., *S. Theol.* I q. 54 a. 4 sol., ed. Leon. 5, p. 51^{a}: "Neque [angeli] sunt quandoque intelligentes in potentia tantum, respectu eorum quae naturaliter intelligunt."

13 August., *De Gen. ad litt.* II n. 8, CSEL 28^{1}, p. 44: "Nec mirum est, quod sanctis angelis suis in prima lucis conditione formatis prius deus ostendebat, quod erat deinceps creaturus."

[9] Item, arguitur sic. Quod corpora caelestia habent qualitates non receptas ab aliis, et corpora inferiora habent qualitates suas, sed receptas ab aliis; sic similiter est in spiritibus superioribus et inferioribus. Sed intellectus hominis habet species receptas a rebus; ergo angeli, qui sunt spiritus superiores, habent ipsas non acceptas a rebus.[14]

[10] Item, modus essendi animae arguit ipsam accipere perfectionem cognitionis | a rebus qui est quod unitur corpori; ergo ex opposito, cum angelus habet modum oppositum essendi, quia non unitur materiae,[15] sequitur ipsum habere opposito modo perfectionem cognitionis, scilicet non acceptam a rebus.

P 24^{vb}

[11] Item, intellectus agens et possibilis non distinguuntur nisi per comparationem ad phantasmata. Sed in angelis non sunt phantasmata, ergo etc.

[12] Item, non potest deveniri ab extremo in extremum nisi | per medium; sed medium inter intellectum agentem et possibilem est imaginabile, et tale non est in angelis; ergo etc.

R 73^{r}

1 arguitur] arguo V | Quod] quia R 2 et … aliis] *om.* PO | sic] ergo VPO 3 similiter] consimiliter PO | est] erit O | spiritibus] simplicibus s. R speciebus V | superioribus … inferioribus] i. (*bis* V) et s. V s. et *om.* PO | Sed] quod V 3–4 Sed … rebus] *om.* PO 4 a rebus] *bis* V | ergo] et VPO 5 ipsas] materias R 6 animae] c (*canc.* V^{+}) a. V | arguit ipsam] *om.* V 6–7 cognitionis] cognoscitur O 7 a rebus] *om.* O | qui] quia R 7–9 cum … opposito] *om.* R 7 habet] habeat V 9 perfectionem] arguimus p. R 10 distinguuntur] distinguitur V 11 Sed … phantasmata] *om.* R 13 sed medium] *om.* V | possibilem] possibile O 14 in] *bis* V

14 Thom. de Aq., *S. Theol.* I q. 55 a. 2 sol., ed. Leon. 5, p. 56^{a}: "Suprema autem corpora habent potentiam in sui natura totaliter perfectam per formam; in corporibus autem inferioribus potentia materiae non totaliter perficitur per formam, sed accipit nunc unam nunc aliam formam, ab aliquo agente.—Similiter et inferiores substantiae intellectivae scilicet animae humanae, habent potentiam intellectivam non completam naturaliter; sed completur in eis successive, per hoc quod accipiunt species intelligibiles a rebus. Potentia vero intellectiva in substantiis spiritualibus superioribus idest in angelis, naturaliter completa est per species intelligibiles, inquantum habent species intelligibiles connaturales ad omnia intelligenda quae naturaliter cognoscere possunt."

15 Thom. de Aq., *S. Theol.* I q. 50 a. 2 sol., ed. Leon. 5, p. 6^{a}: "Impossibile est quod substantia intellectualis habeat qualemcumque materiam. Operatio enim cuiuslibet rei est secundum modum substantiae eius. Intelligere autem est operatio penitus immaterialis. Quod ex eius obiecto apparet, a quo actus quilibet recipit speciem et rationem: sic enim unumquodque intelligitur, inquantum a materia abstrahitur; quia formae in materia sunt individuales formae, quas intellectus non apprehendit secundum quod huiusmodi. Unde relinquitur quod omnis substantia intellectualis est omnino immaterialis."

[13] Item, dicit quod angelus cognoscit singularia.[16]—Contra autem AVICENNAM[17] arguit sic: "Illa quae sunt dispersa in inferioribus sunt unita in superioribus", et in intellectu superiori; ergo singularia quantumcumque divisa et dispersa in inferiori intellectu, possunt esse unita in intellectu angeli qui est superior; ergo potest angelus cognoscere singularia et omnia cognoscibilia a nobis.

[14] Confirmatur, quia III *Metaphysicae* ARISTOTELES contra EMPEDOCLEM habet pro inconvenienti quod Deus non cognoscit litem.[18] Modus autem suus ponendi apparet esse talis. Res effluunt a Deo in esse exsistentiae et in esse cognito in intellectu angeli, et hoc quantum ad materiam et quantum ad formam.[19] Et ex hoc sequitur quantum ad intellectionem universalem et particularem. Sed si quaeritur quomodo effluunt res a Deo, dicitur quod essentia divina est ratio repraesentativa ipsius rei quantum ad utrumque esse in intellectu angeli, et ideo facit cognitionem in intellectu angeli et non accipit ipsam angelus a rebus.[20]

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1 Item] iste (*om.* R) tamen RV | singularia] singulare O | autem] *om.* V 2 sunt] *om.* V 2–4 unita … intellectu] i. int. sup. unita, sed in inferioribus est cognitio singularium et universalium per intellectum; ergo talia R 3 superiori] superiorum V 4 inferiori] inferioribus in V 5 et] *om.* R 7 Aristoteles] *om.* V 8 cognoscit] cognoscendi V | litem] li (*spat. vac. et signum + in rasura*) R vocem O 9 suus ponendi] p. s. V | effluunt] effluit PO | a Deo] *om.* V 10 in] *om.* O et R | et hoc] *om.* V | materiam] *bis* V 12 quaeritur] quaeratur PO 13 ratio] tunc R | quantum] *bis* O | utrumque] utramque P instrumentum V | in] *om.* O et i. V 14 angeli] angelorum V | et … non] tunc R 14–15 accipit … angelus] acc. ang. i. R 15 angelus … rebus] a r. ang. PO

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16 THOM. DE AQ., *S. Theol.* I q. 57 a. 2, ed. Leon. 5, p. 70^{b}: "Sicut homo cognoscit diversis viribus cognitivis omnia rerum genera, intellectu quidem universalia et immaterialia, sensu autem singularia et corporalia; ita angelus per unam intellectivam virtutem utraque cognoscit."

17 AVIC., *De an.* III c. 5, ed. VAN RIET, AviL 1, p. 223: "Aut dicemus quod lux est corpus dispersum in aere et in caelo, unita cum nostris visibus, et fit instrumentum ipsorum."; DUNS SCOTUS, *Ord.* II d. 3 n. 323, ed. Vat. 7, p. 554: "Cognitio phantastica est abstractiva respectu sensus particularis, quia quae sunt dispersa in inferioribus, quandoque sunt unita in superioribus."

18 ARISTOT., *Metaph.* III c. 4, 1000^{b} 3–5, transl. G. de Moerbeke, ed. G. Vuillemin-Diem,, AL 25$^{3.2}$ (Leiden/New York/Köln 1995), p. 60: "Propter quod et accidit ipsi felicissimum deum minus prudentem esse aliis; non enim cognoscit elementa omnia; nam odium non habet"; THOM. DE AQ., *S. Theol.* I q. 57 a. 2 resp., ed. Leon. 5, p. 70^{b}–71^{a}.

19 THOM. DE AQ., *S. Theol.* I q. 57 a. 2, ed. Leon. 5, p. 70^{b}–71^{a}.

20 THOM. DE AQ., *S. Theol.* I q. 57 a. 2 resp., ed. Leon. 5, p. 71^{a}: "Modus autem quo intellectus angeli singularia cognoscit, ex hoc considerari potest quod, sicut a Deo effluunt res ut subsistant in propriis naturis, ita etiam ut sint in cognitione angelica. Manifestum est autem quod a Deo effluit in rebus non solum illud quod ad naturam universalem pertinet,

[b.—Contra positionem Thomae]

[15] Sed contra, ex istis arguo oppositum.

Primo sic. Angelus habet intellectum agentem et possibilem; ergo potest accipere notitiam a rebus. Consequentiam concedit ipse. Probatio antecedentis. Potentia activa quae non est imperfectionis in inferiori creatura non est neganda in creatura superiori, quae est superior quantum ad hoc. Sed angelus est superior quam homo in intelligibilitate, sed intellectus agens qui est
V 135va potentia activa in homine | non est imperfectionis in ipso; ergo non est neganda intellectui angelico.

[16] Cum autem dicit quod primum obiectum intelligibile ab intellectu angeli est actu intelligibile quia immateriale,[21] aequivocatio est, quia si intelligit de primitate adaequationis non est verum, quia impossibile est aliquid unum esse obiectum alicuius intellectus uniti primum et adaequatum nisi contineat omnia cognoscibilia ab ipso intellectu virtualiter; et ideo essentia divina est obiectum adaequatum sui intellectus, quia ipsa continet virtualiter omnia cognoscibilia ab ipso.

[17] Et iterum, obiectum adaequatum alicuius potentiae extendit se ad omnia cognoscibilia ab isto intellectu. Sed angelus intelligit singularia et materia-

2 contra] *om.* R | arguo] arguitur V | oppositum] principalem P propriam (!) O 3 Angelus] *rescr.* O^{+} | ergo] igitur *corr.* P 4 Consequentiam] quod non R 5 inferiori] *om.* VPO 6 in … superiori] a s. c. PO | Sed] quod *corr.* R$^{\pm}$ 7 intelligibilitate] intellectualitate (!) R intelligente O 8 est] *om.* V | ipso] illo V | neganda] negando PO 9 intellectui angelico] in int. agente (agenti R) RV 10 obiectum] *om.* VPO | ab] quantum (¶ *an pro* obiectum hic?) a. V 11 angeli] *om.* R | intelligibile] in int. V | quia] et R | est] e. de ly primum *add.* R | quia] quod PO | quia si] quod s. PO s. enim R 11–12 intelligit] intelligitur R 12 de] *om.* R | primitate] principalitate PO | est] e. esse (cf. *lin.* 97) P | aliquid] aliquod RPO 13 esse] *om.* P | obiectum] o. e. O | alicuius] alicui O *om.* R | intellectus uniti] u. i. PO | uniti] *om.* R | nisi] non O 13–15 nisi … adaequatum] *om.* V 14 ipso] isto P 15 sui intellectus] i. s. O | quia] et R | continet virtualiter] v. c. PO 17 alicuius] alicui O | potentiae] p. intellectivae R 18 cognoscibilia] illa (*canc.* R$^{\pm}$) c. R intelligibilia V ab ea; ergo obiectum adaequatum intellectus angeli extendit se ad omnia intelligibilia PO | isto] illo VPO | intellectu] *om.* PO 18–333.1 angelus … nisi] *om.* PO 18 et] *addi* 18–333.1 materialia] materialiter V virtualiter PO

sed etiam ea quae sunt individuationis principia: est enim causa totius substantiae rei et quantum ad materiam et quantum ad formam. Et secundum quod causat, sic et cognoscit: quia scientia eius est causa rei … Sicut iguur Deus per essentiam suam per quam omnia causat, est similitudo omnium et per eam omnia cognoscit non solum quantum ad naturas universales, sed etiam quantum ad singularitatem; ita angeli per species a Deo inditas, res cognoscunt non solum quantum ad naturam universalem, sed etiam secundum earum singularitatem, inquantum sunt quaedam repraesentationes multiplicatae illius unicae et simplicis essentiae."

21 Cf. n. 7.

lia, per te, quae non continentur in aliquo virtualiter nisi in essentia divina, quae non est proprium obiectum intellectus angelici; ergo oportet intelligere quod obiectum adaequatum intellectui angelico sit aliquod commune communitate praedicationis et analogiae respectu omnibus cognoscibilibus ab ipso, et non primum primitate virtutis; ergo oportet quod sit unum tale quod sit commune | secundum praedicationem ad intelligibilia et ad sensibilia, quia et ista O 29va considerantur et intelliguntur ab angelo.—Sed in talibus oportet esse intellectum agentem reducentem ea quae sunt intelligibilia in potentia ut sint actu intelligibilia; ergo in illis est intellectus agens.

[18] Item, in illis[22] est intellectus possibilis, quia in omni eo quod recipit aliquam formam necesse est dare proprium receptivum. Sed angelus recipit aliquam formam, ideo necesse est dare aliquod re|ceptivum proprium, sed R 73v angelus recipit species intelligibiles, non obstante quod non praecedat illas duratione, immo si species illae essent sibi coaeternae, adhuc esset receptivus illarum; ergo in illis est intellectus possibilis.—Hoc confirmatur quia, si Deus creasset animam similem cum speciebus intelligibilibus, in ea nihilominus anima haberet intellectum agentem et potentiam intellectivam receptivam illarum.

[19] Item, manifestum est quod in anima Christi fuit intellectus agens et possibilis, qui tamen habuit species intelligibiles omnium rerum sibi concreatas;—unde perfectio naturalis est in intellectu creato quod possit facere actu intelligibile quod est in potentia intelligibile tantum. Et si illud non faciat,[23] sed

1 per te] *om.* VPO | in] c. omnia intelligibilia ab illo (i. *om.* O) intellectu (cf. p. 332 *lin.* 18) *add.* PO | aliquo] aliis R 2 obiectum] d o. V | angelici] angeli PO agentis V a. igitur non substantia immaterialis primum obiectum adaequatum intellectui *add.* R 3 intellectui angelico] in intellectum angeli R 3–5 aliquod … sit] *om.* R 4 respectu] respectum O | cognoscibilibus] omnium cognoscibilium PO 5 primum] ipsum PO 6 ad] *om.* V | sensibilia] ad i. sec. p. et ad sens. PO 7 considerantur] considerat O 7–9 Sed … agens] Igitur ut sensibilia quae sunt intelligibilia in potentia actu intelligantur oportet esse intellectum agentem in angelis R 7 oportet] *om.* PO 8–9 reducentem … agens] *om.* V 10 Item] Similiter etiam R | in] et i. V 11 necesse] necessario PO | proprium] aliquod R 12–13 aliquam … recipit] = R*om.* VPO 13 obstante quod] absolute quia PO | illas] istas R 14 duratione] in (i. *canc.* O+) d. O | illae] istae R | sibi] ibi V | coaeternae] adaequatae *corr.* O+ 15 illarum] istarum R | in] si O | illis] eis RV | intellectus] *om.* PO | confirmatur] confirmat O 16 creasset] causasset V crearet R | similem] similis RPO | ea] eo R 17 anima haberet] h. a. R | intellectivam] *om.* R 18 illarum] istarum R 20 qui] *om.* R | tamen] cum V 20–21 concreatas] communicatas PO 21 naturalis est] e. n. R | actu] in a. VPO 22 quod … intelligibile] *bis* V | potentia] ipso O | Et] *om.* PO 22–334.1 Et … fiat] sed si illud non faciat V

22 Scil. in angelis.

23 Scil. perfectio naturalis.

illud fiat a Deo, verbi gratia, naturalis perfectio est in igne quod comburat vel calefaciat aliquod passum sibi approprinquatum, et si non calefiat ab eo, sed praeveniatur a Deo calefaciente illud passum, sic in proposito.

[20] Item, illud quod dicitur quod intellectus agens et possibilis non distin-
P 25ra guuntur | nisi per comparationem ad phantasmata,[24] falsum est immo princi- 5
paliter per comparationem ad obiecta vel ad illa in quibus obiecta relucent.

[21] Ad argumentum de corporibus caelestibus,[25] est ad oppositum, quia
V 135vb istam perfectionem Deus immediate dat creaturis | necessario necessitate ordinata in quantum administrat rebus perfectiones sibi necessarias, quae perfectio non potest illi rei conferri a natura tota creata, et ideo immediate causat ipse 10
tales qualitates in corporibus caelestibus quia a tota natura creata non posset causari.

[22] E contrario, eadem ratione Deus non creat immediate perfectiones in rebus quae possunt creari in illis ab aliquo agente creato, sed aliqua virtus creata potest causare cognitionem alicuius incogniti in intellectu angelico, ut 15
patet supra de locutione angelorum, distinctio 9.[26] Si ergo concurrat obiectum cum hic, habebitur effectus perfectus.

[23] Item,[27] omnem intellectum qui non potest habere in se perfectionem sui obiecti, necesse est aliqualiter dependere ab obiecto. Illud patet IX *De trinitate* ultimo.[28] Sed intellectus angeli non habet perfectionem omnis corporis in 20

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1 comburat] comburit R 2 calefaciat aliquod] calefacit a. (aliquid O) RO | calefiat] calefaciat V 3 in] et i. V 4 Item] et O | illud] ad i. PO | quod] q. angelus V 5 immo] vero P 6 illa] ista R | quibus] quo PO 7 Ad argumentum] *bis* V Illud aliud arg. R | oppositum] oppositionem P comparationem (!) O 8 istam] illam V | immediate] i. ordinata V *om.* R | necessario] necessariori (!) O 9 quantum] qua P 10 illi] isti PO | conferri] conferre O | a … creata] a. n. data c. PO | causat] creat PO 11 quia] qui V | creata] *om.* R | non] *add.* R± | posset] possunt R 12 causari] creari RPO 13 eadem] autem R | non] n. necessario PO | creat] causat V | perfectiones] imperfectiones (im *canc.* O+) O 14 creari] causari (creari *corr.* O+) O | aliquo agente] ag. al. V | creato] c. ut patet in qualitatibus elementorum *add.* R 15 causare] creare VPO | incogniti] cogniti R 16 Si] cum R 17 hic] *om.* PO | habebitur] habebo V | perfectus] perfectione P perfectionis V 18 se] sua essentia habere virtualiter R 19 sui obiecti] o. s. R | necesse] et n. PO | obiecto] o. incognito R | IX … trinitate] XII Metaphysicae R 20 ultimo] universaliter R | perfectionem] perfectiones R 20–335.1 in se] i. s. virtualiter R *om.* PO

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24 Cf. n. 11.

25 Cf. n. 9.

26 Cf. DUNS SCOTUS, *Rep.* II-B d. 9 q. 2.

27 Cf. n. 10.

28 AUGUST., *De trin.* IX c. 12 n. 18, ed. MOUNTAIN—GLORIE, CCSL 50, p. 309: "Unde liquido tenendum est quod omnis res quamcumque cognoscimus, congenerat in nobis notitiam sui, ab utroque enim notitia paritur, a cognoscente et cognito."

se, quod est suum obiectum; ergo in intelligendo corpus necessario dependet eius intellectio a corpore, et tunc sua ratio non valet, quia licet intellectus angeli non dependet a corpore ut sit actus corporis, sicut anima quae unitur corpori propter perfectionem ipsius, cum intellectus separatus dependet a corpore et ab alio obiecto in intellectione illius obiecti, non in unione reali ad illud obiectum.

[24] Cum dicit "unio cum corpore attestatur intellectum nostrum dependere a corpore in intelligendo", non sequitur. Intellectus enim angeli, cum non est infinitus, non continet in se virtualiter omnia intelligibilia ab ipso.—Et ideo magis potest concedi dependere ab obiecto de intellectu nostro per unionem eius ad corpus quam possit concludi de angelo non dependere ab obiecto propter hoc quod separatur, quia unio cum corpore non est causa praecisa | dependentiae intellectus ad obiectum. R 74r

[25] Item, ad aliud de medio,[29] dico quod non tenet, quia illud quod est medium virtuti inferiori et imperfectiori non oportet esse medium in agendo virtuti perfectiori. Exemplum patet supra, quod medium in motu locali, quod est medium in magnitudine, est mere medium virtutis | agentis quod operatur ad movendum corpus.—Sed illud non est medium virtutis divinae moventis necessario. Et ideo, si 'esse in phantasmate' sit medium inter intellectum agentem et possibilem in intellectu nostro imperfectiori,[30] non oportet quod sit medium in intellectu angeli perfectiori. O 29vb

1 in] *om.* PO 2 intellectio] intelligentia R | licet] *om.* V | intellectus] intellectio V 3 ut … corporis] *om.* V | sicut] sic V 3–5 sicut … alio] *bis* V 4 ipsius cum] totius sed V 5 in … obiecti] intelligibili R | in] et V | unione] unionem V | illud] idem PO 5–6 obiectum] sed quoad actum intelligendi *add.* R 7 dicit] ergo dicitur R | unio] imo PO | corpore] c. in ratione V | attestatur] contestatur R 8 a … intelligendo] a c. in ratione obiecti V int. a c. ergo separatio a corpore acceptam non dependere a corpore in ratione obiecti PO | Intellectus] quia i. VPO | enim] ille V iste PO | cum] *om.* VPO 9 infinitus] finitus PO | non] ideo n. VPO | se] s. in V | ipso] i. igitur dependet etiam in intelligendo R 10 magis] licet m. R | concedi] concludi R | obiecto de] *om.* R 11 eius] *add.* R± | corpus] cor O | possit] potest VPO | concludi] concedi V | non … obiecto] *om.* R | obiecto] aliquo PO 12 separatur] seperatur PO | quia unio] tum uniri R | corpore] c. attestatur V | causa praecisa] p. c. R 13 obiectum] aliquod R 14 ad … quia] = R *om.* VPO | illud] id PO 15 inferiori et] *om.* R | et] perfectiori PO | oportet] o. non (non *canc.* O+) O | esse] non (*canc.* O+) e. O 16 virtuti] virtutum O | perfectiori] imperfectiori PO | motu] virtute R 17 est] et e. R | mere] necessario PO | medium] *bis* V 17–18 virtutis … corpus] virtuti angelicae ut (non V) comparatur ad motum (modum V) corporis VPO 18 Sed] *om.* R | virtutis] virtuti PO | divinae] agentis (*canc.* R±) d. R 19 necessario] *om.* R | si] etsi V | intellectum] *om.* VPO 20 in intellectu] intellectui R

29 Cf. n. 12.

30 Cf. n. 11.

[26] Item, illud medium non est necessarium ex natura rei, quia tunc nec Deus posset cognoscere sine phantasmate, ideo solum est medium in cognito, comparando cognitionem ad naturam talis cognoscentis, scilicet hominis.

[27] Dico ergo quod argumentum tenet si medium illud sit similiter medium
V 136ra tali agenti, quod non est | verum respectu angeli.—Item, dico quod esse imaginabile non est necessario medium inter intellectum agentem et patientem in nobis.—Item, aliter potest dici quod esse imaginabile se tenet ex parte unius extremi et non est medium proprie, quia non omne intelligibile in actu continet sub se esse imaginabile et esse sensible, et tamen non oportet illud esse extremum apud intellectum angeli, et sic sit extremum apud intellectum agentem hominis,—verbi gratia, aliqua infirmitas potest esse extremum alicuius virtutis sanativae, et ista non esset extremum respectu alterius virtutis sanativae.

[2.—Opinio Henrici

a.—Opinionis expositio]

[28] Alius modus ponendi est quod angelus habeat unum habitum scientialem sibi concreatum, quem si non haberet nihil posset intelligere, et in isto habitu intelligit ea quae intelligit hoc modo, quia primo cognoscit habitum et secundo obiectum suum naturale ut relucet in suo habitu et tertio obiectum singulare ut relucet in eodem habitu, quia singulare, secundum ipsum, non addit super universale in essendo nisi duplicem negationem;[31] ergo nec in cognoscendo;—ideo non cognoscit singulare nisi per obiectum universale ut relucet in suo habitu, in quo relucet quod est cognoscibile ab ipso.[32]

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1 necessarium] medium VPO | tunc] circa? V 2 posset cognoscere] intelligeret R | in cognito] concogitando (!) V cognoscendi PO 4 quod] *om.* R | medium] necessarium PO | similiter] super P 5–6 imaginabile] i. se tenet ex (*rescr.* V+) parte (cf. supra *lin.* 7) V 6–7 non … imaginabile] *om.* R 6 est necessario] n. e. V 8 omne] esse V est PO 9 sub] in R | esse] est PO | tamen] ideo R 9–10 esse extremum] ex. (*inter virgulas* R±) es. intelligibile (*canc.* R±) R 10 angeli … intellectum] *om.* PO | extremum] extremi VPO 12 ista] illa V | esset] esse V 15 modus ponendi] p. m. V | est] *om.* PO | angelus habeat] a. habet PO angeli habent V | habitum] hominem *canc.* R 16 concreatum] communicatum PO | quem] quid V | haberet] haberent V | posset] possent V | posset intelligere] intelligeret R | isto] illo V 17 primo] p. modo PO 18–19 suum … obiectum] *om.* PO 18 naturale] immutabile R | ut] u. quia R 18–19 obiectum] lobiectum (l *canc.* V+) V 19 ut] quod R | in] *om.* V | ipsum] proprium R 20 super] supra O | ergo] ideo PO | in] *om.* PO 21 cognoscendo] cogitando V | cognoscit] cognitis V 22 relucet] nihil latet VPO

31 Henr. de Gand., *Quodl.* v q. 15 in corp., ed. Badius, f. 181V.

32 Henr. de Gand., *Quodl.* v q. 14 sol., ed. Badius, f. 177 R-S: "Intellectus vero angeli-

[29] Item, si intellectus angeli cognosceret singulare sub propria ratione singularitatis, tunc sequitur quod intellectus angeli esset determinatior quam intellectus noster.

[30] Item, illa cognitio singularis sub ratione propria singularitatis impediet cognitionem universalis.

[31] Item, si cognosceret singulare sub ratione propria, potest acquirere habitum scientialem ex illo. Consequens est falsum, ergo etc.

[b.—Opinionis improbatio]

[32] Contra illud arguitur sic. Tota entitas singularis non continetur in universali obiecto; ergo nec tota cognoscibilitas. Probatio antecedentis per IPSUM, quod singulare addit super universalem duplicem negationem.

[33] Item,[33] intelligere singulare ut singulare est non est | imperfectionis, P 25rb
quia competit intellectui divino.

[34] Item,[34] perfectio conveniens potentiae inferiori non negatur a superiori, sed sensus creatus sentit omne sensibile; ergo et aliquis intellectus creatus potest intelligere omne intelligibile; ergo intellectus angeli non est magis determinatus vel imperfectus per hoc quod intelligit singulare.

1–2 intellectus … quod] *bis* O 1 cognosceret] *om.* V 2 singularitatis] singularis V 2–4 tunc … singularitatis] *om.* V 4 illa] ista R | singularis] singulariter PO | singularitatis] singulariter PO 6 cognosceret] cognoscetur O | propria] *rescr.* V 7 illo] illis R | est] *om.* V 9 arguitur] arguo PO | singularis] singulariter PO | in] sub VO 9–10 universali obiecto] o. u. PO 11 quod] qui V quia PO | super] supra V | universalem] universale V 13 competit … divino] i. d. c. PO 15 sentit] sensit V | omne] esse O | creatus] causatus V 16 omne] esse O 17 vel] nec V | imperfectus] in potentia V | intelligit] intelligat V | singulare] Item perfectio contingens inferiori non negatur a superiori, sed sensus creatus sentit omne sensibile, ergo et aliquis intellectus creatus potest intelligere omne intelligibile, ergo intellectus angeli non est magis determinatus nec impeditus per hoc quod intelligit singulare R

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cus … habet in se habitum scientialem perfectum ad omnia naturaliter se cognoscibilia … Angelo ergo creato et tali habitu ei naturaliter concreato, habitu illo naturaliter inclinabatur ad concipiendum rerum quiditates". Cf. IDEM, *Summa* (*Quaest. ord.*) a. 43 q. 2 sol., ed. L. HÖDL, AMPh s. 2, 29 (Leuven: Leuven University Press, 1998), p. 54; IDEM, *Summa* a. 53 q. 6 sol., ed. G.A. WILSON et G.J. ETZKORN, AMPh s. 2, 31 (Leuven: Leuven University Press, 2014), pp. 71–74.

33 Cf. nn. 29–30.

34 Cf. n. 31.

[B.—Responsio propria ad quaestionem]

[35] Ad quaestionem dico quod angelus potest proficere accipiendo cogni-
R 74v tionem a rebus, | nam tres cognitiones accipit necessario a rebus et quartam posset accipere a rebus si non esset sibi concreata a Deo.

[36] Prima cognitio est singularis ut est singularis, et hanc habet angelus acceptam a rebus, quia cognoscit hoc ut hoc est per se cognoscibile, et hoc est per propriam rationem eius. Sed impossibile est propriam rationem singularis esse concreatam angelo, quia tunc infinitae rationes essent sibi concreatae, ut supra argutum est.[35] Hoc est impossibile; ergo accipit[36] illas rationes a rebus.

[37] Secundo. Cognitionem contingentis complexionis accipit a rebus et non a speciebus terminorum contingentis complexi sibi concreatis, quia con-
V 136rb tra | rationem contingentis est quod cognoscatur per terminos, quia iam esset necessarium.

[38] Confirmatur. Si habet rationes terminorum complexionis contingentis sibi concreatas, aut istae rationes determinate repraesentant hanc complexionem et hanc veritatem; ergo per illas | rationes non potest cognoscere aliam veritatem; ergo, cum illud contingens non est, non manet aliqua cognitio illius in intellectu angeli, nec potest dici quod istae rationes indeterminate repraesentant et indistincte hanc veritatem huius complexi et aliam.

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2 quaestionem] quam R | potest proficere] pro. pot. R 3 nam … rebus] *om.* PO | accipit] cognoscit VPO | quartam] iam PO 4 sibi] *om.* PO | concreata] communicata O | Deo] D. et hanc habet angelus R 5 Prima] praeterea O 5–6 ut … hoc] nec singulare quia hoc singulare ut (u. *canc.* R±) R 6 quia cognoscit] qui tam sibi (!) V | et] *om.* R 7 eius] e. unde tantum per rationem entis, quia eius cognitio non est improportionata intellectui creato R | rationem singularis] eius r. vel speciem R | singularis] singularem PO 8 esse] sibi e. PO | concreatam] communicatam VO | angelo] *om.* VPO | concreatae] concausatae V communicatae O 9 supra] scilicet PO | impossibile] *rescr.* O± | illas] istas R 10 complexionis] complexionem tamen PO 11 contingentis] contingenter O *om.* R | concreatis] concreati P concausati V communicati O 12–14 terminos … terminorum] *om.* R 12 quia … esset] i. enim e. V 14 rationes] rationem V | complexionis] complexi PO 15 concreatas] concreatos R communicatas O | aut] quia a. R | rationes] r. terminorum R 16 veritatem] v. aut complexionis oppositae vel indeterminatae necessariam si determinate repraesentant hanc R | illas] istas R 16–17 aliam … est] quod talis complexio sit contingens si oppositam complexionem repraesentat, igitur R 17 illud] est (!) V | non] nec V | illius] i. complexionis contingentis R 18 nec potest] non p. etiam R | istae] illae V 18–19 repraesentant] reputant V 19 hanc … aliam] igitur per notitiam illorum terminorum non cognoscitur veritas determinata huius complexionis, igitur oportet ut aliunde accipiat notitiam exsistentiarum rerum R

35 Cf. n. 32.

36 Scil. angelus.

[39] Contra. Istae rationes modo naturali repraesentant sicut et ideae in mente divina; ergo non sunt in potentia contradictionis ut nunc repraesentent istam veritatem et iam non repraesentent istam sed contradictionem istius.

[40] Tertio dico quod quantumcumque haberet concreatam sibi notitiam singularis et similiter exsistentiae contingentis, tamen cognitionem intuitivam singularium accipit necessario a rebus, nam non omne cognoscens existentiam alicuius cognoscit ipsum intuitive, immo potest ipsum cognoscere abstractive, nam cognitionem intuitivam singularium non potest habere in verbo nisi tantum habet cognitionem exsistentiae, ideo ad cognitionem intuitivam habendam de re necessario requirit obiectum.

[41] Quarto dico quod species intelligibiles universales posset accipere a rebus si non essent sibi concreatae, quia intellectus agens in angelis est perfectius quam in hominibus, ergo potest species intelligibiles abstrahere, sicut potest intellectus agens noster.

[42] Item, perfectio quae competit potentiae inferiori non est neganda a superiori si sit illi possibilis. Sed perfectionis est in intellectu agente nostro quod potest ex causis intrinsecis acquirere sibi suam naturalem perfectionem abstrahendo species intelligibiles; ergo magis intellectus angeli hoc potest, quia intellectum agentem habet,[37] ut ostensum est supra.[38]

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1 Contra … rationes] Confirmatur R 2–4 ergo … istius] sed ideae non repraesentant aliquam contingentiam rerum, sed notitia talis dependet ex determinatione voluntatis, igitur nec praedictae rationes terminorum R 2 nunc] non V 3 istam] illam PO | iam] illam V | istam] illam V 4 istius] illa V 5 quod quantumcumque] quamvis R | haberet] haberent R | concreatam … notitiam] n. s. communicatam O 6 singularis] singulariter PO | similiter] sicut V super P | tamen] cum V 7 accipit necessario] n. recipit PO | non] *om.* R | omne] esse O 8 cognoscit] cognitis V 9 cognitionem] cognoscet PO | nisi] ubi R in (i. *canc.* V$^{\pm}$) natura V 9–10 tantum] tamen VO 11 requirit obiectum] o. continet VPO 12 Quarto] secundo O 13 concreatae] concausatae V communicatae PO | intellectus] si i. PO 13–14 perfectius] perfectissimus R perfectionis PO 14 hominibus] hominis hominibus V nobis PO | abstrahere] repraesentare *canc.* R 15 agens noster] n. ag. O a. in angelis naturale V 16–17 a superiori] superiore V 17 in] *om.* O | agente nostro] n. a. PO 18 potest] non p. v 19 abstrahendo] abstrahenda V | magis] multo m. PO 20 ut] *om.* PO

37 Scil, quia angelus habet intellectus agentem.

38 Cf. n. 15.

[II.—Ad argumenta

1.—Ad argumenta principalia]

[43] Ad primum argumentum,[39] dico quod auctor *De causis* intelligit quod omnis intelligentia est plena formis, id est speciebus universalibus sibi concreatis, et tamen potest acquirere alias.

[44] Ad aliud,[40] dico quod Augustinus dicit quod nullum corpus potest
R 75r agere in spiritum ut totale agens, sed ut particulare agens minus principale, | sed corpus cum intellectu agente spirituali potest agere in intellectum possibilem, licet sit spiritualis.

[45] Ad auctoritatem Dionysii,[41] ipsa solvit seipsam, quia concedo quod angelus non congregat cognitionem divinam a sensibus, concedo, quia ista vocatur divina cognitio in ipso quae est sibi concreata a Deo et illam non congregat a sensibus.

[46] Ad aliud de medio,[42] dico quod angelus potest habere illam cognitionem mediam, scilicet per species non acceptas ab aliis quam ab intellectiva nostra non habet ut Deus;—et tamen non sequitur "ergo angelus aliam cogni-
V 136va tionem non habet quam illam quae non accipitur a rebus". |

2.—Ad argumenta Henrici]

[47] Ad primum alterius positionis[43] iam patet.

[48] Ad secundum,[44] dico quod non sequitur "intellectum angeli esse magis limitatum quam intellectum nostrum", immo oppositum sequitur, nam intel-

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3 auctor] auctore V | De causis] *om.* PO 4 omnis intelligentia] omnes intellectus R | est plena] p. e. V | formis] *om.* V | id est] et R | universalibus] intelligibilibus V 4–5 concreatis] concausatis V communicatis O 5 alias] aliam R illas V 6 Augustinus] angelus A. V | nullum] nonnullum (non *canc.* O+) O | potest] *om.* V 7 totale] corporale (*corr.* V+) V | particulare] partiale PO | minus] et m. PO 8 sed] quia PO 9 spiritualis] simplex R 10–11 quod … concedo] *om.* V 11 cognitionem … concedo] speciem universalem a sensibus R | ista] illa V 12 divina] digna R | est] *post* concreata (*lin.* 284) PO | concreata] concausata V communicata O | illam] istam R illa PO 13 a] ex PO 14 illam] istam R 15 per] quod V | ab] *om.* RV 16 nostra] ratione R | ut] nec VPO | et tamen] a causa PO | ergo] ut (*canc.* R±) e. R | aliam] primam R 17 illam] istam R | quae … accipitur] quam n. accipit R 19 alterius … patet] argumentum solutum est supra distinctione 3, ubi talis habitus fuit improbatus multipliciter R

39 Cf. n. 2.
40 Cf. n. 3.
41 Cf. n. 4.
42 Cf. n. 5.
43 Cf. n. 28.
44 Cf. n. 29.

lectus diversus. Ideo illimitatus est, quia cognoscit unumquodque sub ratione propria singulare et universale. Unde dico quod non posse intelligere singulare imperfectionis est et limitationis, sed posse tantum intelligere singulare arguit limitationem in intellectu.

[49] Ad aliud,[45] dico quod habitus non generatur ex termino quorumcumque actuum, sed numquam si principium sit determinatum ad unum, sicut ex motu ignis sursum non generatur | habitus movendi sursum, quia determinatur ad oppositum. Angelus autem determinatus est, ideo actum primum non potest acquirere. P 25va

1 diversus] *om.* PO | illimitatus est] illi unitus e. V illuminatur PO | unumquodque] unde patet (!) V 2 singulare] et s. PO singulariter R | singulare] *om.* R 3 limitationis] et posse intelligere singulare est perfectionis et illimitationis (illuminationis O) *add.* PO | sed] similiter R | singulare] signo PO 5 non] *om.* PO 5–6 quorumcumque] quocumque R 7 ignis] gravis PO | sursum] s. loco O s. iacco P | non] nam R 8 Angelus] in a. R | actum] actis V 9 potest] habet PO | acquirere] sed facilitatem quamdam *add.* PO

45 Cf. n. 30.

10

The Concept of Practice and the Franciscan Understanding of the Nature of Theology

The Cases of Gonsalvus Hispanus and Alexander of Alessandria

Mikołaj Olszewski

The texts by Gonsalvus and Alexander that are the main object of my analysis grow out from the earlier, lasting more than a half of a century, Franciscan reflection on the nature of theology, hence it is worth to present first their intellectual predecessors. Then, since the Franciscan standpoint was discussed and criticised by thinkers from outside of the order, it will be relevant to take a look at their solutions and arguments proving them. These two elements constitute the historical context for Gonsalvus' and Alexander's interventions into the discussion, the presentation of which will be the third part. At the end, fourthly, I will compare of Gonsalvus' and Alexander's standpoints with that of Scotus.

1 Franciscan Root Paradigm

The founding text of Franciscan intellectual tradition is *Summa fratris Alexandri*, and the same is true of Franciscan reflection on the nature of theology. Although Alexander of Hales does not ask directly about the practical or theoretical character of theology, one can easily find some ideas that paved the way to the later Franciscan vision of theology as practical science in his *Summa*. Question 1 of the *Summa*: *De doctrina theologiae* is organized around the question of ascription of theology either to the realm of sciences or acknowledging the title of wisdom to it. Alexander says that theology is a science but its characteristics (it deals with the noblest object, i.e. the cause of causes, it is autotelic) permit us to call it wisdom. Moreover, theology deserves the honorific title of wisdom more than metaphysics (called by Alexander *theologia philosophorum*). This is so because theology makes the soul perfect not only in respect to knowledge but also regarding the good and striving to it and loving it.[1] So, the-

1 Alexander Halensis, *Summa theologica*, I pars, q. 1. *De doctrina theologiae*, mem. 1. *Utrum doctrina theologiae sit scientia*, corp., cura et studio pp. Collegii S. Bonaventurae (Ad Claras Aquas,

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ology is distinguished from any other science because it combines knowledge (theoretical aspect) with affection, i.e. the movement of the soul directed to the good (practical aspect). The practical aspect prevails over the theoretical.

The set of ideas proposed by Alexander was adopted by many contemporary and later Franciscan theologians, as Odo Rigaldi and the group of related authors presented by Leonardo Sileo,[2] William of Melitona[3] and last but not least, St Bonaventure. Two of those authors were especially important for the next generations of the Franciscans, namely Odo and Bonaventure. The first of them was the first to formulate the Franciscan thesis that theology is practical. Odo's proof of the practical character of theology is incorporated into the discussion on the unity of theology, endangered above all by the variety of objects treated by it, e.g. some of them are practical, and some theoretical. Odo states univocally that theology is one, therefore its nature must be classified either as practical or as theoretical. The criterion of the distinction between a practical and theoretical science is its goal because the theoretical aims merely at knowledge, while the practical assuming the acquired knowledge aims further at the good or actions leading to the good. Finally, Odo contends that theology is practical since it is not limited to mere knowledge.[4]

1924), p. 2[b]: "Theologia igitur, quae perficit animam secundum affectionem, movendo ad bonum per principia timoris et amoris, proprie et principaliter est sapientia. Prima philosophia, quae est theologia philosophorum, quae est de causa causarum, sed ut perficiens cognitionem secundum viam artis et ratiocinationis, minus proprie dicitur sapientia. Ceterae vero scientiae, quae sunt de causis consequentibus et causatis, non debent dici sapientiae, sed scientiae."

2 L. Sileo, *Teoria della scienza teologica. Quaestio de scientia theologiae di Odo Rigaldi e altri testi inediti* (*1230–1250*), 2 vols., Studia Antoniana 27 (Roma: Pontificia Universitas Antonianum, 1984).

3 B. Pergamo, "De quaestionibus ineditis Fr. Odonis Rigaldi, fr. Guilelmi de Melitona et Codicis Vat. Lat. 782 circa naturam theologiae deque earum relatione ad Summam theologicam fr. Alexandri Halensis, Pars II," *Archivum Franciscanum Historicum* 29 (1936), pp. 308–364.

4 Odo Rigaldi, *Quaestio de natura theologiae*, in L. Sileo, *Teoria della scienza* ..., vol. 2, Ibid., p. 51, §§117–118: "Haec scientia est una, sicut supra ostensum est; ergo cum haec sit prima divisio philosophiae per speculativam et practicam, et est divisio per opposita, necesse est theologiam sub altera harum differentiarum contineri, et nunquam sub utraque; alioquin non esset una vel illa divisio non esset bona. Haec divisio scientiae per speculativam et practicam datur per comparationem ad finem, speculativa enim sistit in cognitione veri, practica autem, quamvis sit cognitio veri, tamen ibi non sistit, sed ulterius ordinat ad bonum sive ad opus, per quod pervenitur ad bonum intentum. Quoniam igitur theologia secundum suum finem non sistit in pura cognitione, sed ulterius ordinat ad opus, ideo dicendum est, quod haec scientia sit practica." Cf. also G.H. Tavard, *Transience and Permanence. The Nature of Theology According to St. Bonaventure* (St. Bonaventure, New York/Louvain/Paderborn: The Franciscan Institute, 1954), pp. 177–193, esp. pp. 192–193.

A more nuanced theory on the nature of theology was presented by Bonaventure in his Prologue to the *Commentary on the Sentences*. This text later became crucial for the entire Franciscan reflection on the nature of theology. The Prologue is organized around the fourfold Aristotelian distinction of causes, and the analysis of practical or theoretical character of theology is conducted under the heading of the final cause. Bonaventure begins with the claim that every science perfects the intellect. This perfecting can be realized as it refers to the intellect in itself (then the acquired perfection or habit is theoretical), or to the intellect in its relationship to actions in the external world (then the habit is practical), or to internal affects (then the habit is placed between the theoretical and the practical, it can be called affective and it can be identified with wisdom). Bonaventure ends his considerations with a characteristic remark saying that wisdom, being a habit mediating between the practical and the theoretical, combines both those elements aiming at contemplation and moral perfection but it is more principally focused on making man good. Hence wisdom is more practical than theoretical.[5] And because theology is wisdom, theology is also mostly practical and/or affective.

Both of the Franciscan Masters base their answer to the question whether theology is practical or theoretical on the definition of the principal goal of theology, and both contend that it is practical. The difference between them lies in their understanding of the notion of the practical: Odo does not hesitate to call theology practical, whereas Bonaventure is prone to describe it as affective intending to emphasise that it combines some kind of knowledge (theoretical and/or contemplative) with acting, but with acting that is performed inside the human being and that consists in perfecting its affection, not with acting in the extramental world that can be characterized as practical in the purely

5 Bonaventura, *Liber primus Sententiarum*, prooem., 3, corp., studio et cura pp. Collegii a S. Bonaventura, *Opera omnia* I (Ad Claras Aquas, 1882), p. 13[b]: "Ad intelligentiam praedictorum notandum est, quod perfectibile a scientia est intellectus noster. Hunc autem contingit considerare tripliciter, scilicet in se, vel prout extenditur ad affectum, vel prout extenditur ad opus. Extenditur autem intellectus per modum dictantis et regulantis. Secundum hunc triplicem statum, quia errare potest, habet triplicem habitum directivum. Nam si consideremus intellectum in se, sic est proprie speculativus et perficitur ab habitu, qui est contemplationis gratia, qui dicitur scientia speculativa. Si autem consideremus ipsum ut natum extendi ad opus, sic perficitur ab habitu, qui est, ut boni fiamus; et hic est scientia practica sive moralis. Si autem medio modo consideretur ut natus extendi ad affectum, sic perficitur ab habitu medio inter pure speculativum et practicum, qui complectitur utrumque; et hic habitus dicitur sapientia, quae simul dicit cognitionem et affectum. 'Sapientia enim doctrinae est secundum nomen eius', *Ecclesiastici* sexto (23). Unde hic est contemplationis gratia, et ut boni fiamus, principaliter tamen, ut boni fiamus."

philosophico-Aristotelian understanding. Nonetheless, the affectivity in turn can be also classified as practical in a more general sense.

The two main theses—(1) goal is the criterion of practical vs. theoretical character of a science, and (2) theology is in a large, including affectivity, sense practical—were commonly accepted by subsequent generations of Franciscan theologians. Some of them accepted not only these two theses but also many minor elements, especially deriving from Bonaventure's Prologue, as e.g. John Peckham and Matthew of Aquasparta.[6] The others took Bonaventure's and Odo's concept of theology as a starting point for their own considerations. The three most interesting examples are William de la Mare's conception of theology as law, Nicholas of Ockham's definition of theology as a supernatural medicine, and to some degree also William of Ware's idea of theology as supernatural prudence. In all three cases the practical character of theology is crucial and it is based on its goal.[7]

2 The Opponents

The conception of theology as practical/affective science, which was predominant not only among the Franciscans and became a component of the 13th century *opinio communis*, was not, however, accepted by all the scholastic theologians. Four prominent 13th century thinkers argued against this conception and formulated their own solutions opposed to it, namely Thomas Aquinas, Henry of Ghent, Giles of Rome, and Godfrey of Fontaines.

The first who doubted the mainly practical character of theology was Thomas Aquinas. He says in his *Summa theologiae* that theology fulfils two functions, the practical and the theoretical, but the theoretical function dominates over

6 Cf. John's and Matthew's questions from their prologues to their commentaries on the *Sentences*, in L. Amorós, "La teología como ciencia práctica en la escuela franciscana en los tiempos que preceden a Escoto. Edición de textos," *Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du Moyen Âge* 9 (1934), pp. 281–283 and 284–285.

7 Guillelmus de la Mare, *Scriptum in primum librum Sententiarum* prol. 1, corp., ed. H. Kraml (München: Bayerische Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1989), pp. 12, 23–13, 38—definition of theology as law; prol. 2 corp., pp. 15, 25–16, 38—the practical character of theology. Nicolaus de Ockham, *Commentarius in primum librum Sententiarum. Prologus*, in M. Olszewski, "*Theologia ut medicina supernaturalis*. The Nature of Theology according to Nicholas of Ockham," *Archa Verbi* 5 (2008), pp. 143–162; prol. 1.1 corp., pp. 154, 49–52—theology as the supernatural medicine prol. 3.4 corp., pp. 162, 302–315. William of Ware: cf. M. Olszewski, "William of Ware on the Nature of Theology," in *What is Theology in the Middle Ages? Religious Cultures of Europe (11th–15th Centuries) as reflected in their Self-Understanding*, Archa Verbi. Subsidia 1 (Münster: Aschendorff, 2007), pp. 225–243.

the practical because the object of theology is God. And since God cannot be an object of any human action, theology cannot be practical. Therefore, it must be mainly theoretical, although it comprises practical issues because things that belong to the realm of practice refer to God and thus become its secondary object.[8]

The solution of the problem put forward in the *Summa*, which was later perceived by medieval thinkers as genuinely Thomistic, differs little from the earlier conception proposed in the *Commentary on the Sentences*, where Aquinas defends the theoretical character of theology basing it on its ultimate goal, that is the contemplation of the first truth in heaven.[9]

A very similar reasoning lead Henry of Ghent to espouse the thesis claiming that theology is purely theoretical. Henry argues that the ultimate goal of man is to see the truth—this is the reason why it is theoretical. And since a science must be either theoretical or practical and cannot be both at the same time, theology is theoretical. Practical elements are incorporated into theology and subordinated to its theoretical principal aim, and thus do not influence its principal character.[10]

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8 Thomas de Aquino, *Summa theologiae* I, 1, 4, corp., cura et studio Instituti Studiorum Mediaevalium Ottaviensis (Ottawa 1953), pp. 4[b], 3–19: "Sacra doctrina (…) una existens se extendit ad ea, quae pertinent ad diversas scientias philosophicas, propter rationem formalem, quam in diversis attendit, scilicet prout sunt divino lumine cognoscibilia. Unde licet in scientiis philosophicis alia sit speculativa et alia practica, sacra tamen doctrina comprehendit sub se utramque, sicut et Deus eadem scientia se cognoscit, et ea, quae facit. Magis tamen est speculativa quam practica, quia principalius agit de rebus divinis quam de actibus humanis; de quibus agit, secundum quod per eos ordinatur homo ad perfectam Dei cognitionem, in qua aeterna beatitudo consistit."

9 Thomas de Aquino, *Scriptum super primum librum Sententiarum. Prologus* 3.1 corp., in A. Oliva, *Les débuts de l'enseignement de Thomas d'Aquin et sa conception de la sacra doctrina avec l'édition du prologue de son Commentaire des Sentences*, Bibliothèque Thomiste 58 (Paris: J. Vrin, 2006), pp. 320, 30–36: "Ista scientia, quamuis sit una, tamen perfecta est et sufficiens ad omnem humanam perfectionem propter efficaciam divini luminis (…). Unde perficit hominem et in operatione recta et quantum ad contemplationem veritatis. Unde quantum ad quid practica est et etiam speculativa. Set quia scientia omnis principaliter pensanda est ex fine, finis autem ultimus istius doctrine est contemplatio prime veritatis in patria, ideo principaliter speculativa est."

10 Henricus de Gandavo, *Summa quaestionum ordinariarum* a. 8 q. 3, ed. Badius (Parisiis 1521), f. 65S: "Quod non potest stare, cum enim haec scientia sit utilissima inter scientias huius vitae, ad quam et ad cuius finem omnes aliae et fines earum reducuntur (…). Finis autem ultimus diversorum ordinatorum ad idem semper debet esse unus et idem, vel si plures sint, oportet quod semper unus ordinetur ad alterum, ut sic sit unicus principalis. Unicus ergo finis principalis necessario debet poni huius scientiae, non duo aeque principales. Non igitur debet simul haec scientia dici theorica et practica, sed alterum solum, vel principaliter. (…) Est enim finis et bonum idem, ut dicitur III *Metaphysicae* et ut dic-

The solution of the problem proposed by Giles of Rome went into a different direction. The Augustinian Master begins with a general analysis of goal. He argues that one thing can possess many goals but those goals must be subordinated to one another and one of them must be ultimate, to which any others refer.[11] Then Giles applies this scheme to theology, and contends that theology has three goals: (1) good actions, (2) contemplation of theoretical truths and (3) charity. The hierarchy of the goals is crowned by charity since it is the most universal and intended everywhere in Scriptures. Good actions are only a means leading to attainment of charity, and charity is the content of contemplation. Giles adds that contemplation is higher in the hierarchy than good actions. Further, Giles points out that charity strictly speaking does not belong to the realm of the intellect, therefore the distinction of practical vs. theoretical cannot be applied to it. Instead charity, and consequently theology, should be characterized as affective, which should be understood as opposed to the practical, not as compatible with it.[12]

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itur II *Physicae*: 'non omne ultimum finis est, sed optimum'. Licet ergo plura sint bona, ad quae aliquid ordinatur, non quodlibet eorum debet dici finis eius, sed solum id, quod est optimum illorum, et maxime ad quod omnia illa, quae sunt illius, ordinantur. Nunc autem indubitanter constat, quod melior est ex se veri cognitio quam boni operatio, quia non attenditur in moribus operatio boni, nisi ut serenetur oculus mentis sedatis passionibus, et fiat clarior in speculatione veri. 'Beati enim mundo corde, quoniam ipsi Deum videbunt', ut dicitur *Matth.* (5, 8) (…). Operatio igitur boni ad hoc est, ut oculus mentis sanus fiat et in speculando opus sanitatis agat, ut primo speculando per fidem intantum proficiat, ut credita intelligat, quantum possibile est in praesenti; et tunc deinde in futuro credita et intellecta facie ad faciem videat."

11 Aegidius Romanus, *Super primo Sententiarum opus*, prol. 4 a. u. corp. (ed. Venetiis 1521), f. 7P: "Non est inconveniens eiusdem rei diversos esse fines. Si unus ad alium ordinatur, sicut si bellum ordinatur ad victoriam, potest homo intendere ad bellum et victoriam. Quando autem ita est quod in una re diversos fines aspicimus, oportet unum illorum ad alium ordinari; et ille, ad quem alii ordinantur, dicitur finis ultimus. Qui ab aliis sic distinguitur, quia omnia alia moventur in virtute eius, et in omnibus aliis ipse intenditur."

12 Ibid., prol., 4, a. u., corp., f. 7Q–8B: "Et quia videmus Sacram Paginam plura intendere, oportet diversos esse fines Scripturae Sacrae. Intenditur enim per eam bona operatio, nam finis moralis, ut dicebatur, est actio. Ipsa autem potissime de moribus determinat. Rursum in ea intenditur speculatio, quia de summe speculabilibus tractat. Intenditur in ea dilectio, quia 'finis praecepti caritas' (*I Tim.* 1, 5). Igitur cum diversi fines in ea intendantur, oportet unum istorum ad alium ordinari et unum illorum principalem esse. Finis principalis, ut dicebatur, ab aliis distinguitur, quia ipse ubique intenditur, alii autem non; et quia dilectio et caritas in tota Sacra Pagina intenditur, quia in ea 'pendet lex et prophetae' (*Matth.* 22, 40), principalis enim finis in Sacra Pagina intentus est inducere homines ad Dei et proximi dilectionem. (…) Et quia a fine dignum est omnia denominari, ut dicitur in II *De anima*, ergo ab eo, quod potissime est finis, ab eo potissime res appellari debet. Et quia caritas est simpliciter finis Sacrae Paginae, ut probatum est, quia ubique in ea inten-

The last author who influenced the discussion on the nature of theology was Godfrey of Fontaines. He asserts that theology has two functions, practical and theoretical, that are irreducible to each other and that are grounded on the distinction of subjects considered in theology into practical and theoretical.[13] The distinction of goals is, therefore, secondary and it follows from the distinction of objects.[14] Thus, Godfrey undermines the unity of theology that was very important to almost all scholastic theologians. To provide theology with some kind of unity, Godfrey acknowledges that the two distinct branches of theology, practical and theoretical, are connected in one final goal common to them, which is the contemplation of God in heaven. This unifying element enables to argue that theology is more principally theoretical than practical.[15]

All four quoted positions contain also direct criticisms of the Franciscan concept of theology as a practical science but, instead of going into details of particular technical arguments, I would like to draw attention to two funda-

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ditur ut principalis finis, ab ea denominari debet, et quia caritas est in affectu, non in intellectu—intellectus autem dividitur secundum speculativum et practicum—theologia nec speculativa, nec practica proprie dici debet, sed affectiva, quia ad affectionem principaliter inducit."

13 *Quodlibet XIII*, 1, corp., in *Quodlibets XIII et XIV de Godefroid de Fontaines*, ed. J. Hoffmans, PB 5, fasc. 3–4 (Louvain: Éditions de l'Institut supérieur de philosophie, 1935), pp. 174–175: "Et secundum praemissa patet quod ad hoc, quod homo fidelis secundum quod huiusmodi sit sufficienter perfectus scientiis, quae natus est convenienter habere pro statu vitae praesentis, oportet ponere aliquam scientiam fidelium, secundum quod fideles sunt, quae tractet principaliter et de moralibus, per quae homo acquirit notitiam speculativam beatam per modum meriti; et quae etiam principaliter tractet de speculabilibus, in quibus consistit ipsa speculatio beata, licet multum imperfecta sit illorum speculatio in hac vita respectu futurae, quia neutrum per se sufficeret ad perfectionem possibilem et convenientem homini fideli, etiam viatori. (…) Et moralia et etiam speculabilia praedicta sub propriis et distinctis rationibus per se et principaliter considerantur; nec unum illorum habet attributionem ad aliud, sicut entia communiter ad ens primum, quod est substantia. Secundum hoc videtur quod theologia, inquantum comprehendit considerationem talium, non possit esse vere et proprie sic una scientia, sicut est una scientia quaecumque alia scientia humana, sed erit scientia aliquo modo vere plures habens sic plura subiecta et etiam plures fines."

14 Ibid., p. 169: "Distinctio et diversitas scientiarum per se et primo accipitur ex obiecto; et ex consequenti ex diversitate obiectorum consequitur diversitas ex fine."

15 Ibid., p. 176: "Sic ergo patet, quod scientia, quae est propria fidelium secundum quod huiusmodi, debet tractare principaliter de agibilibus et speculabilibus, non tamen sic per se vel propter se de quibuslibet illorum, quin utraque consideret in ordine ad aliquem unum finem magis principalem non quidem intrinsecum, sed extrinsecum. Et sic propter habitudinem et connexionem, quam habent ea, de quibus est theologia, ad illum unum finem principalem et ex hoc aliquo modo etiam inter se non faciunt scientias omnino plures et disparatas, sed scientiam aliquo modo unam tali unitate connexionis et ordinis ad unum."

mental problems following from Aquinas', Henry's, Giles' and Godfrey's considerations that seem to be the most troublesome for Franciscan thinkers: namely, first, the question of the criterion determining the practical vs. theoretical nature of theology, as the object criterion seems to favour the theoretical character of theology, and second, an adequate definition of practice, namely whether it should be understood in the way proposed by Aristotle, and if so, whether practicality in such a sense can be applied to theology. To analyse these two issues was a task that Gonsalvus and Alexander had to handle if they wanted to restate the Franciscan concept of theology and at the same time to adjust it to the contemporary stage of the discussion on the nature of theology.

3 Gonsalvus of Spain and Alexander of Alessandria

Gonsalvus considers the problem of the practical or theoretical character of theology in one of his disputed questions devoted generally to the act of praising God in the mind. One element of his analysis is the question *Utrum laudare Deum mentaliter sit actus intellectus practici*.[16] Since, however, this act is performed mostly in theology, the solution of this problem depends on the definition of the practical or theoretical character of theology. Gonsalvus' analysis consists of four elements: (1) establishing the criterion of the difference between a practical and a theoretical science, (2) the definition of practice, (3) the proof of the practicality of theology, (4) answer to the main question.

Gonsalvus begins with the assertion that according to Aristotle the theoretical science differs from the practical due to object or due to goal. The problem lies in which criterion is primary and which secondary.[17] According to one opinion, whose author is presumably Godfrey, the subject is more important (1) because beings are divided into things produced by man and not produced, (2) because Aristotle says so, and (3) since a practical science refers to human actions secondarily, the goal distinction of the practical against the theoretical must be grounded in something that precedes relation to action,

16 Gonsalvi Hispani *Quaestiones disputatae et de Quodlibet* q. 5, ed. L. Amorós, Bibliotheca Franciscana Scholastica Medii Aevi 9 (Quaracchi: Collegium S. Bonaventurae, 1935), pp. 69–86. The motif of relation between reason and faith in this question has been presented by M.L. Pulido, "Filosofía y teología en Gonzalo Hispano. Contribución hispana en el año de Juan Duns Escoto," *Revista de Hispanismo Filosofico* 13 (2008), pp. 31–52, see pp. 45–51.

17 Gonsalvi Hispani *Quaestiones disputatae et de Quodlibet*, pp. 69–70.

i.e. to its object.[18] Gonsalvus does not agree with this opinion and contends that the goal is the primary criterion first because Aristotle says so; second according to an Aristotelian *adagium* that the goal necessitates its means, so consequently since actions are the goal of a practical science, actions determine the intellect to deal with such and such objects; third the distinction that is disjunctive is more principal and such is the criterion based on goal not on object that can be treated by both kinds of sciences.[19] Then Gonsalvus rejects Godfrey's arguments: the first is invalid because from the mere fact that there exists a distinction between doable and undoable things it does not follow that this distinction dominates over the one based on goals. Against the authority of Aristotle Gonsalvus argues that the distinction based on objects is material, whereas that based on goal is formal and hence primary. The third argument misses its aim because a science as practical pertains to actions primarily.[20]

In the second part, devoted to the definition of practice, Gonsalvus lists four conditions necessary to acknowledge an action to be practice: (1) practice cannot be cognition, (2) practice must be performed by a knower, and it cannot be a side effect of the fact of knowing something, (3) action must be doable by a knowing subject, (4) the goal of practice must be an action of the subject of practice (an action of another man whom I persuade to do something is not my practice). Gonsalvus ends his considerations stating that even an act of knowing can be a practice, e.g. if I decide to know something because it is good to know it, nonetheless the acquired knowledge is purely theoretical.[21]

18 Ibid., p. 70.

19 Ibid., pp. 70–72.

20 Ibid., p. 72.

21 Ibid., p. 73: "Dicimus scientiam practicam esse non propter scire, sed propter opus. Ad hoc opus quattuor requiruntur: 1. Primo enim requiritur, quod non sit de genere actuum cognitivorum, nam scientia principiorum ordinatur ad scientiam conclusionum, et cognitio scientiarum inferiorum ad cognitionem superioris, ut omnes scientiae naturales ad metaphysicam, et ex hoc non dicuntur practicae. 2. Secundo requiritur, quod actus ille sit actus aut opus cognoscentis. Scientia enim speculativa bene quaeritur propter actum alterius a cognoscente, ut propter honorem, nec propter hoc est practica, si ex ea aliquis quaerit honorari. 3. Tertio requiritur, quod actus ille, vel saltem actus, qui ad illum per se ordinatur, sit in potestate cognoscentis. (…) 4. Quarto requiritur, quod actus ille, ad quem scientia practica ordinatur, non ordinetur ad consimilem actum aut habitum generandum in alio; ad hoc enim bene potest ordinari scientia speculativa. Ordo enim cognitionis, vel ad cognitionem, non ponit extra genus scientiae, ut fiat de speculativa practica; et ista quattuor sufficiunt, quia illa scientia non quaeritur propter se, sed quaeritur usus alicuius gratia, ubi ista quattuor reperiuntur."

Next, in the third part of the question, Gonsalvus considers the problem of the nature of theology. First, he quotes and rejects three opinions. The first one contends that theology is both practical and theoretical but it is more theoretical than practical. This opinion appears in two versions: the first one, roughly Thomistic and/or Henry's, assumes the unity of theology, the second one, that of Godfrey's, rejects it. The first version of the first opinion is based on (1) the prevalence of theoretical contents of theology over the practical and on (2) the subordination of theology to the contemplation of the blessed; the unity of theology is grounded on the unity of the divine light in which they are known. Those arguments are not valid because (1) the theoretical contents are considered practically, (2) the subordination to contemplation does not necessitate the theoretical character of theology since contemplation is an external goal, not internal, (3) the unity of theology cannot be assured by the unity of light because there are many natural sciences based on one and the same light.[22]

The second version of this opinion proves first the practical character of theology. Theology is practical because it deals with human actions. Moreover, its practical part is not subordinated to the theoretical as a kind of preparation to it. Second, theology is theoretical because there are many theoretical issues in theology that cannot be known adequately in a practical way, e.g. articles of faith. Furthermore, the community of the faithful must possess practical as well as theoretical knowledge because it cannot be worse equipped than pagans that have both. The twofold structure of theology is at odds with its unity. Consequently, theology is not one science in the same sense in which natural sciences are but in a weaker one following from the affinity of the act of theoretical cognition with contemplation in heaven.[23]

Gonsalvus criticises Godfrey's arguments for the theoretical character of theology, pointing out that theology does not in fact consider theoretical issues only theoretically but also practically. Against the second one he says that the knowledge of the faithful always, notwithstanding that it pertains to theoretical or practical issues, aims at practical ends, the same way as their whole life is subordinated to gathering merits.[24]

Secondly, Gonsalvus rejects Giles' claim that theology is affective. The Franciscan Master argues that the Aristotelian dichotomy of practical and theoretical is complete, therefore there cannot exist the third element, affectivity, different and distinguishable from the practical and theoretical. This is so because

22 Ibid., pp. 76–77.
23 Ibid., pp. 77–78.
24 Ibid., pp. 78–79.

every science is a perfection of the intellect which divides into practical and theoretical, not into affective.[25]

Thirdly, Gonsalvus analyses the conception of theology as a purely theoretical science. Since the arguments for this are very general, it is difficult to identify precisely its author. The arguments justify the theoretical character of theology pointing out to the highest nobility of theology, to the maximal nobility of its subject, and to the fact that theology is wisdom. And, as Aristotle contends, since the most noble science is theoretical, it considers a theoretical object and it can be called wisdom, theology is theoretical. Gonsalvus rejects the pure theoretical character of theology, proving first that theology must indispensably serve practical ends because it is a tool of salvation. Second, to achieve salvation man must perform actions and not necessarily speculate theoretically. Third, the act of theoretical speculation cannot be the only goal of theology. If it were so, the speculation would be more valuable than orations, fasts, and vigils, but the opposite is proved by the lives of saints. It is also not true if the eternal vision in heaven is taken into account because this kind of speculation does not continue our earthly theological speculation. Finally, Gonsalvus rejects the arguments for the theoretical character of theology. He acknowledges the nobility of theology that is due to the nobility of its object, i.e. God, but at the same time he shows that it is precisely this object that requires by its nature practical approach to it, hence God must be considered in theology practically.[26]

This reasoning introduces Gonsalvus' own solution consisting of three theses. The first one asserts that theology is practical because it fulfils all the criteria of the practicality of a science listed in the second part of the *corpus quaestionis*. Theology aims at a non-cognitive act of the subject who is a knower able to perform an act recommended by his/her knowledge. This act, in the case of theology, is love for God.[27] Gonsalvus is aware that his position can be opposed by pointing out that love for God is not totally in human power because it depends also on God's grace and theology is not the sufficient cause of good actions since there are many men who know theology and at the same time act badly. Gonsalvus denies the validity of those two arguments and assures us

25 Ibid., pp. 80–81.

26 Ibid., pp. 81–82.

27 Ibid., pp. 82–83: "Theologia simpliciter est practica, quia illa scientia, quae ordinatur ad actum non cognitivum, qui est actus cognoscentis et in potestate ipsius, vel actus ipse vel actus ad ipsum per se ordinatus, non ordinatus ad consimilem actum aut habitum generandum, est scientia practica (…). Theologia est huiusmodi, quia quaeritur et ordinatur per se ad dilectionem Dei, quae habet omnes praedictas conditiones."

that the fact that a science is subordinated to a practical act is enough to classify it as practical, and a science need not be the sufficient cause of action to be practical.[28]

Second Gonsalvus' thesis contends that theology is totally and merely practical. This is so because Scriptures, and consequently theology, cannot mislead its readers. And such a misleading would occurr if Scriptures recommended pure knowledge where love should be evoked above all. Therefore, the entire Bible orders one to love God and it recommends knowledge only if it is the indispensable condition of love.[29]

The third thesis claims that theology is the most practical science. This is so because (1) its goal, i.e. salvation, is the highest, (2) its extension is the largest because it teaches about all the virtues, acquired naturally as well as those given by God's grace, (3) its goal is the most necessary (the more necessary is the goal of a science, the more practical a science is, hence the more a theologian is immersed into theological considerations, the more clearly he perceives the necessity of theology's prescriptions), (4) as Aristotle says, the truth harmonized with a right appetite is an object of the practical intellect, and there is no other truth better harmonized with rightness than the truth of Scriptures.[30]

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28 Ibid., p. 83: "Ad primum dicendum, quod non est scientiae practicae facere actus vel actum, ad quem ordinatur; unde medicus non semper sanabit, nec rhetor semper suadebit, ut dicit Aristoteles (*Ethica nicomachea*, III, 3); sed scientiae practicae est facere actum per se ordinatum ad actum, ad quem ipsa ordinatur. Sic ista scientia, aut habens ipsam, non facit per se actum caritatis vel caritatem, sed actum per se ordinatum ad hoc. Unde si facimus, quod in nobis est, quod docet ista scientia, Deus nobis dat caritatem. Ad secundum dicendum, quod scientia practica non debet esse causa actus principalis, immo nec causa, quia medicus non sanat, sed natura. Medicus autem est minister naturae, ita etiam ista scientia non est causa actuum meritoriorum, sed inducit dispositionem."

29 Ibid., pp. 83–84: "Theologia est tota practica secundum omnem suam partem, quia impossibile est in Sacra Scriptura aut in aliqua eius parte intentionem esse vitiosam. Quaerere scire propter scire, principaliter in rebus amabilibus, quibus amor debetur, est vitiosum, quia scire in rebus, quibus amor debetur, ordinatur ad aliud, scilicet ad amorem."

30 Ibid., pp. 85–86: "Ipsa est maxime practica omnium practicarum moralium, primo, quia fines in moralibus sunt sicut principia in speculabilibus, sed in speculativis tanto scientia est magis speculativa, quanto considerat universaliora prinicipia, ut patet de metaphysica. Ergo et scientia quanto considerat finem magis communem et altiorem, tanto est magis practica. Theologia est huiusmodi, quia considerat finem altissimum, ad quem ordinatur, scilicet beatitudinem aeternam. Quare etc. Item, illa scientia maxime est practica, quae maxime est operativa et maxime docet operari. Theologia est huiusmodi, quia docet omnes habitus operativos et acquisitos et infusos et operari secundum ipsos. Quare etc. Item, tertio scientia practica est propter necessitatem finis, qui non est scire, sed magis operari; et ideo tanto scientia est magis practica, quanto sciens ipsam habet maiorem necessitatem consequendi finem, ad quem scientia ordinatur. Sed hoc maxime est nec-

Gonsalvus ends the *corpus quaestionis* with the short positive answer to its principal *quaesitum*, namely the act of praising God mentally is an act of the practical intellect because it is accomplished by theology that is practical.[31]

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Alexander of Alessandria deals with the practicality of theology in the last two questions of the Prologue to his *Commentary on the Sentences*.[32] Those are Question 9: *Utrum scientia speculativa et practica different penes finem vel penes obiectum* and Question 10: *Utrum haec scientia sit practica vel speculativa*. The distribution of the analysis in two questions reflects the importance of the question of the criterion of practicality for the solution of the problem.

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essarium theologo; quod si theologus non consequatur finem theologiae, theologia non solum est sibi otiosa, sed etiam pernitiosa, quia servus sciens voluntatem domini sui et non faciens vapulabit multis *Lucae* (12, 47). Item, veritas confesse se habens appetitui recto est obiectum intellectus practici, ut dicitur VI *Ethicorum* (2); sed nulla veritas magis confesse se habet appetitui recto quam veritas Sacrae Scripturae, ergo nulla veritas magis practica."

31 Ibid., p. 86.

32 General information about Alexander's activities and works have been presented by Leon Veuthey in his *Alessandro d'Alessandria. Maestro dell'Università di Parigi e ministro generale dei Frati Minori*, trad. G.C. Corrà, Leon Veuthey *Opera omnia* 8 (Roma 2005), which is an annotated translation of his *Alexandre d'Alexandrie. Maître de l'Université de Paris et ministre général de Frères Mineurs* (Paris: Soc. et Libr. Saint-François d'Assise, 1932). My presentation of Alexander's views is based on the most diffused version of his *Sentences Commentary*, usually called the second redaction. For a more detailed account of the manuscripts and editorial versions of Alexander's work, see my editorial notes to the edition below. The doctrinal contents of Alexander's questions studied here have been recently presented by Davide Riserbato, *La qualità speculative o practica della teologia in Alessandro di Alessandria. Studio e edizione critica delle qq. 9–10 del* Prologo *del* suo Commento alle Sentenze, in *Itinerari di filosofia e teologia francescana. Studi offerti in memoria di Marco Arosio*, a cura di Andrea Nannini/Irene Zavatero, Studi e Ricerche 26 (Trento: Università degli Studi di Trento, 2021), pp. 231–290. This article belongs to a series of articles-editions covering almost the whole of Alexander's Prologue by the same author: *La nozione di scienza e la scientificità della teologia in Alessandro di Alessandria* (In Primum Sententiarum, Prologus, qq. 5–6), in Idem, *La rosa mistica e altri saggi* (Roma: If Press, 2020), pp. 219–279; *Possibiltà e limiti dell'inteletto umano in Alessandro di Alessandria. Studio e edizione critica delle qq. 1–2 del* Prologo *del suo* Commento alle Sentenze, *Rivista di filosofia neo-scolastica*, 112 (2020), pp. 839–878; "Il soggetto della teologia e le sue passiones explicabiles in Alessandro Bonnini di Alessandria (*† 1314*): Commento alle Sentenze: Prologo, qq. 3–4," *Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du Moyen Âge* 87 (2020), pp. 201–235. In his studies, Riserbato is focused above all on the reconstruction of the positions espoused by Alexander, and not so much on its historical and/or polemical context.

Question 9 begins with three standard arguments for the goal as the criterion (1) Aristotle's authority—*Physics*, III, 10, 433^a (2) the objects are distinguished according to their goals, (3) goal necessitates means leading to it, which are counterbalanced by Aristotle's authority—*The Nicomachean Ethics*, VI, 5, 1140^a 20. The most important motif here is the juxtaposition of two Aristotle's quotations demonstrating that the issue of the criterion was not solved univocally by the Philosopher.

The *corpus quaestionis* is divided in two articles: the first one shows ways in which the practical science differs from the theoretical, the second answers the main question.

Article 1 enumerates four ways in which practical and theoretical sciences differ. First, both kinds of sciences differ in the concepts they produce, i.e. in the definition of their respective objects: the theoretical produces the definition of a concept that cannot be put into existence by a knower, whereas the practical defines concepts that are to be produced in reality by a knower. Alexander adds that this difference is meant by Aristotle at the beginning of Book 6 of the *Metaphysics* and exposited by Averroes in the commentary to this passage stating that the principle of the producible things is located in the will, whereas the principle of the natural things lies outside of the will. Thus, the difference of concepts is equivalent to that of the ultimate principles of theoretical and practical things, resp. the things in themselves and the will.

The difference of concepts is followed by that of infallible axioms: e.g. the typical theoretical axiom is 'the whole is bigger than its part', while the practical is 'parents should be venerated'.

The third difference considers syllogisms produced by the sciences. Theoretical sciences compose their syllogisms *simpliciter*, i.e. without any additional condition, whereas the practical *propter aliquid*, in regard to something, namely in regard to action or outcome (*opus*), as Averroes argues in the same place. Moreover, theoretical syllogisms can be resolved to purely speculative concepts, while the practical to concepts that are doable by men.

The fourth difference is inferred from the third one by Averroes who contends that from the fact that theoretical syllogisms are composed *simpliciter*, whereas the practical *secundum quid*, it follows that these kinds of sciences differ in their goals. The theoretical aim at pure knowledge, while the practical at action and/or outcome. Alexander quotes here another fragment, namely Comment 3 to Book 2, and ends his considerations demonstrating that also in this passage the Commentator assumes all the four listed differences between the practical and theoretical sciences.

This part of Alexander's work is original in comparison with the texts written by his predecessors and contemporaries who did not quote Averroes in

this context. And it plays a particular role in the Franciscan Master's position. Alexander realized that, though the problem of the criterion was signalized by Aristotle himself, it was not solved by him, and that it could be elucidated by a systematic interpretation of the Stagirites' texts provided by Averroes.[33] This interpretation is then applied in Article 2 to answer the principal question.

In Article 2 Alexander accounts for two competing opinions. The first one argues that it is the goal that is the proper criterion of the nature of a science. This opinion is proved by four arguments. The first one states that practical sciences differ from the theoretical by means of the same thing by which practical and theoretical syllogisms differ, and the syllogisms differ because of their goals, as can be seen in Article 1.

The second argument assumes that if objects differentiate sciences, these objects are material or formal. But neither material object nor formal can do this. The material object cannot cause the difference because matter is the cause of distinction through form. The formal object differentiates powers but the distinction of sciences is the distinction of habits.

The third presupposes that theoretical sciences do not produce anything, while the practical do, as it is clear from Aristotle's and Averroes' texts quoted in Article 1. But nothing does anything unless moved by the goal.

The fourth says that if the difference between theoretical and practical sciences must be based on their objects, the object known in a theoretical science cannot be produced or affected by men. And that is not true because there are many theoretical objects that are also treated in practical sciences, e.g. the triangle is the same in geometry and in architecture.

The second opinion assumes that the object is the proper criterion of the distinction of sciences into practical and theoretical. This thesis is proved by three arguments. The first one says that each science aims at its proper object, but those objects are attainable only as a mental concept, or as a concept that is realized outside the mind. The truth of this reasoning is grounded in Aristotle's considerations on the object of physics analysed in the previous article.

33 Alexander analyses the quoted fragments also in his *Commentary on Metaphysics*. The comment on the quotation from Book 2 is a mere paraphrase of the original text, while the comment on the beginning of Book 6 stresses the same general idea that theoretical sciences differ from the practical due to their objects. The object of the practical is *agibile*/*factibile* and its ultimate principle can be found in the acting subject, whereas the object of the theoretical is *speculabile* and its ultimate principle is located in external things. The interpretation of Aristotle's text is confirmed or inspired by Averroes' comment quoted in the Prologue. Cf. Alexander [de Ales], *In duodecim Aristotelis Metaphysicae libros expositio* II (Venetiis 1572), ff. 35vbF–36raA, and VI, f. 107vaF-vbG.

The second argument assumes that if the goal is to be the criterion, the goal must be either actual or virtual. The actual goal cannot be the criterion unless the knower actually produces the object of knowledge. Hence, it must be the virtual goal. But the virtual goal is in fact the *operabile*. The goal established by a knower which can differ from the goal of the very object cannot be the criterion because it is accidental. Besides, if the goal established by a knower is to be the criterion, the same science could be theoretical for one and practical for another. Such a situation is impossible when the natural goal of the object is taken into consideration. And the natural goal depends directly on whether the object dealt with in a science can be produced; if not, a science is theoretical, if it can, it is practical. This thesis is further confirmed by the example of natural things and God. Because natural things cannot be produced by men, they are theoretical objects for men, whereas for God, who is able to produce them, they are practical. Precisely this reasoning is meant by Aristotle in the fragment quoted in Article 1.

Alexander ends the presentation of the second opinion pointing out that it is because sciences differ due to their objects they differ also in their goals, since the nature of the object determines if it is doable or undoable by men. Finally, he argues that notwithstanding how the goal is understood, as internal action or an external outcome, science can be classified as practical without it. It is enough for a science to be practical if a knower is able to operate, not necessarily actually operating. This remark allows Alexander to assert that difference regarding objects or regarding goals is indeed the same.

The last element of the *corpus* is refutation of the arguments for the goal as the proper criterion. The first is invalid because *propter quid* in the case of the practical syllogisms can be in fact reduced to doable objects. Against the second Alexander argues that it is the formal object that differentiates sciences. Besides, it is possible that the object which is material as related to powers is nonetheless formal as related to habits, e.g. the eternal and the temporal that are the material objects of intellectual power are formal when referred to science and wisdom, as Augustine testifies. The third is not cogent because the difference between practical and theoretical sciences does not primarily follow from their relation to their goals but from their relation to their objects. Besides, the thesis claiming that the cause operates because of the goal is true but the causation presupposes the causable object. The fourth argument can be reversed and directed against those who claim that the goal is the proper criterion because something that is purely theoretical, as triangle, can be also investigated practically. A speculative knower as well as a practical one cognizes triangle according to one and the same concept but in two different ways.

The entire question ends with answers to the three introductory arguments. The first is invalid because Alexander's position does not deny that a science is practical or theoretical because of the goal but only that this goal is not accidental, i.e. not established by a knower; on the contrary, it follows from the very nature of the known object. The second answer acknowledges that habit, object and goal are ordered but it is the nature of habit and goal that they depend on the nature of object. The third answer also acknowledges the main premise of the objection (the goal necessitates its means) but Alexander explains that the goal which is meant in his reasoning is goal preconceived as doable and as such it can be reduced to object.

Alexander's Question 10 begins with a series of common arguments for theoretical nature of theology and another for its practical nature (the theoretical character of theology is proved by Boethius, its nobility and its object that is purely theoretical, whereas its practicality by Augustine, the Bible and the identification of Scriptures with law).

The *corpus* of the question consists of three articles headed as (1) definition of practice, (2) what is commonly acknowledged, and (3) what is dubious.

Alexander's definition of practice is the following: practice is an operation of the power different from the intellect, thanks to which what is conceived by the intellect can be realized in the external world. The proof of the definition assumes first that each practical habit extends. This extension follows from the fact that a practical science directs and regulates not an operation of the intellect but an operation of the will or of the power exercising the action in the extramental world. This definition is rooted in Aristotle's statements saying that (1) acting according to the practical habit belongs to another power, and that (2) a choice cannot be right unless it is preceded by the right estimation of reason.

Second, practice must be in the power of the acting person. This statement also can be inferred from Aristotle, as commented upon by Averroes (Alexander refers to the passage from Book 6 of *Metaphysics* analysed in Article 1) who contends that the principle of *agibilia* is the will, which in turn is free and empowered to accomplish its action either in itself or by means of other powers. The practical habit's ability to act or to cause is also confirmed by Averroes and Aristotle asserting that the concepts of the soul are the source of some really existing things, and it is also confirmed by everyday knowledge.

In Article 2 Alexander confirms the commonly shared intuition according to which among the contents dealt with in theology there are theoretical as well as practical contents. E.g. the triune nature of God is purely speculative. Further, the existence of practical elements is testified by (1) the fact that the Bible contains commandments, (2) that the act of praising God which is prac-

tical is doubtlessly prescribed by theology. This argument probably alludes to Gonsalvus, who associated his conception of theology as a practical science with the notion of praising God in the mind. And finally, every science that formulates patterns to be imitated is practical and theology does so.

Article 3, the longest in the *corpus*, solves the principal problem, i.e. the nature of theology. Alexander first presents several current competing propositions.

The first opinion states that theology is purely theoretical. Alexander quotes two arguments borrowed from Henry of Ghent's *Summa*. The first one argues that although theology concerns moral actions, theology is not limited to it because its ultimate goal is to know the truth. This argument is confirmed by Augustine. The second argument assumes that the practical science teaches about moral actions or it encourages one to love God. The first possibility has been already disproved in the first argument. Then, the second possibility is rejected. A practical habit pertains to action of the power that is different from the intellect, i.e. to an action of the will. The will's action is twofold and consequently the cognition is also twofold: (1) action ordered by the will or (2) the unity of the will with the ultimate goal. The former is surely practice, and the cognition corresponding it is practical too but in spite of it, it does not make theology practical because the action ordered by the will is not theology's ultimate goal. The latter is not practical neither its corresponding cognition because it does not direct or order any action, it merely reveals the goal. Hence it can be called properly wisdom that illuminates the intellect and inflames the affect without any previous intellectual reflection.

Alexander's criticism of Henry's position focuses on the practical character of love for God. First to love God rightly is a practice prescribed and directed by a practical science. Second, the love for God is the virtue that crowns all the other virtues, it is maximally practical and as such it orders the remaining virtues to act. Third, the love is evoked by the will. Hence, Henry's arguments are invalid: although theology teaches about the right actions to enable knowledge about God, it does not make it theoretical since the knowledge is not its ultimate goal. Besides, surely the unity with the ultimate goal in love is practice.

Then Alexander rejects Giles of Rome's thesis that theology is an affective science, based on enumeration of its goals and subordination of moral actions and theoretical knowledge to love for God as it is testified by Augustine. Alexander first of all rejects the possibility of the third habit mediating between the practical and theoretical. Then, the Franciscan Master assumes that love for God is surely an action and it is in the same relation to the will like any other virtue.

The third opinion, accounting for Godfrey of Fontaines' standpoint, says that theology is simultaneously practical and theoretical and that none of its parts

can be reduced to another. This is so because the knowledge of the faithful resembles the knowledge of the pagans who have two kinds of sciences: the practical relative to active life, and the theoretical relative to contemplative life. Theology understood in this way nonetheless can be called one science thanks to the unity of the light of faith through which it is known.

Alexander agrees with Godfrey that theology fulfils those two functions but he does not accept that the contemplative life of the Christians resembles the contemplation of pagans so closely. On the contrary, Christian contemplation does not aim at pure speculation and it includes also a practical component, as it is assured by Gregory the Great. Besides, the unity of science cannot be grounded merely in its light because, e.g. geometry and arithmetic are two distinct sciences, though they are based on the same natural light.

After having criticised the competing theories Alexander puts forward his own. He sides with Godfrey in saying that theology combines theory and practice but against Godfrey he contends that it is more practical than theoretical. The proof of the predominance of the practical component over the theoretical is based on two assumptions. First, Alexander presupposes that acquiring knowledge resembles generation: in generation something effectively existing is produced, and in analogy in science something merely conceptual. Second, the Franciscan distinguishes between the subject and object of science. The subject is a substrate of the process that ends when a substrate achieves its final perfection, whereas the object is a subject that already received perfection that had been supposed to be acquired. Then, the object is subject plus explication of the assumed or aimed at perfection. Next, Alexander applies that scheme to theology. Theology assumes its subject, i.e. God, and looks for its explication, which is the object of theology. In this explication, however, occur various elements: the theoretical (God's intellect, will and omnipotence) as well as practical (God is praiseworthy, recommended, and should be loved). The theoretical contents of theology are subordinated to the practical because the full explication of theoretical truths about God demonstrates His eminence which is the reason why men should love and praise Him.

Those two assumptions allow also to prove the unity of theology, which lies namely not only in the unity of the light through which God is known but it follows from the unity of its subject: sometimes theology produces theoretical concepts of God, while another time practical concepts. Those practical concepts do not involve that we affect or even produce God in any sense but that they evoke our actions related to God. E.g. the notion of being worthy of love evokes love which is a practical act following from the charity that is a practical virtue.

The question ends with answers to the series of arguments for the theoretical character of theology. Arguments 1 and 3 prove only that it is theoretical not that it is exclusively theoretical. Argument 2 can be objected to by pointing out that the nobility of science can be based either on its mode of proceeding or on the nobility of its object. If the mode of proceeding is taken into consideration, the theoretical science is the noblest but if the object is accepted as the criterion, it does not matter in which way, practical or theoretical, it is investigated.

4 John Duns Scotus

To present a comparison between Gonsalvus, Alexander and Scotus one has to take a look at Scotus' conception of theology as a practical science.[34] I am going to present it in a very schematic way taking into consideration only elements that have counterparts in Gonsalvus' and Alexander's considerations. That is why I omit Scotus' distinction into *theologia in se* and *theologia nostra* as well as *theologia contingentium* and *theologia necessariorum*. These distinctions are crucial for right understanding of the *Ordinatio* but they are absent in the corresponding parts in Gonsalvus' and Alexander's Prologues.[35] Accordingly, I do not take into consideration differences between the *Lectura* and the *Ordinatio* as far as some details are concerned since there are no explicit quotation from Duns' works in Gonsalvus and Alexander. Instead, I am going to present a kind of *vulgata scotistica* stressing the issues referable to Gonsalvus' and Alexander's positions taken from both of Scotus' works.

Duns' position consists of three parts: (1) definition of practice, (2) the criterion of the practical, (3) the nature of theology. Practice, according to Scotus,

34 My reconstruction is based mostly on Ioanni Duns Scoti, *Lectura in librum primum Sententiarum*, prol., pars 4: *De theologia quatenus scientia practica*, ed. Vat. 16, pp. 45–62, but it includes also some elements from Ioannis Duns Scoti, *Ordinatio*. prol. pars 5: *De theologia quatenus scientia practica*, ed. Vat. 1, pp. 151–237. For a commentary on the text, cf. Duns Scot, *La théologie comme science pratique* (*Prologue de la Lectura*), introduction, traduction et notes par G. Sondag, Bibliothèque des Textes Philosophiques (Paris: J. Vrin, 1996), pp. 72–103.

35 It must be noted, however, that Alexander in Article 2 of Question 4: Utrum hoc subiectum explicabile, de quo explicantur passiones vel quasi passiones, sit subiectum sub aliqua ratione determinata, says: "posset dicere aliquis et probabiliter, quod Deus est subiectum scientiae in se et scientiae ut participatur a nobis" (F, f. 5ra, L, f. 7ra, V, f. 5^{vb}), where probably Scotus' distinction is meant, though the solution of the entire problem is Alexander's own.

must refer to something external to the intellect, therefore, (1) the intellect cannot be its subject, but (2) practice must be dictated by the knowledge worked out by the intellect, besides (3) practice is principally the act of the will, and the operations executed in the extramental world by sensitive powers are practices secondarily.

The starting point of the analysis of the criterion of practicality are two opinions. The first one, advanced by Godfrey of Fontaines, asserts that the criterion of the practicality of the intellect differs from that determining the nature of habit and act. This is so because the intellect is neither theoretical nor practical in itself, hence its practicality depends on the goal aimed at by the intellect and as such is accidental. By contrast, the practicality of power and its habits is due to their objects. Against Godfrey Scotus contends that all the three must be practical because of the object.

The second opinion, that of Henry of Ghent, argues that habits are practical because of their goals. Practicality cannot follow from the object since one and the same object can be considered practically and theoretically. Duns rejects Henry's position pointing out that the extension of the habit to goal and action can be either real or aptitudinal. If the real extension were needed, a physician who does not actually cure would not be a practitioner. If the extension were aptitudinal, it could not be realized because aptitude is inherent to the thing, which is doable or not doable in itself. Henry's opinion can be modified by adding that the proximate goal, not the ultimate, must be considered, and this proximate goal is consideration (Godfrey's proposition). Scotus denies this thesis and argues that consideration must be either practical or theoretical because of something, this role cannot be played by the intellect that is indifferent in itself, hence it must be such or such due to the object.

The third part of Scotus' considerations also begins with discussion of the competing opinions. The first, authored by Henry of Ghent, claims that theology is theoretical (1) because acts of the will can refer either to the goal in itself or to the means leading to it. The principal act of the will does not refer to the means but to the very goal, and this act is theoretical since the relation of the will to the final goal is not directed by any rule, it suffices only to show the final goal to the will. (2) The theoretical character theology is also confirmed by the authority of Augustine who says that the goal of theology is to purify an eye aiming at the vision of God. Against Henry's position Scotus asserts that merely demonstrating the final goal to the will does not necessitate the will to love it, the act of the will must be preceded by practical deliberation and consequently it is practical.

The second opinion, developed by Godfrey of Fontaines, says that theology is at the same time practical and theoretical, and due to this it is not one habit,

but two. This is so because theology combines practical and theoretical contents. Scotus rejects this opinion pointing out that every theoretical knowledge about God causes the augmentation of the love of Him, hence the development of the practical knowledge grows along the growth of the theoretical.

Additionally, Scotus briefly mentions Giles' affectivity of theology, which according to him can be reduced to its practical character. Giles is wrong because the distinction of the science into theoretical and practical is complete.

Duns' own opinion argues that theology is practical because it precedes the love for God, which is a pure practice, i.e. the act of the will directed toward God and dictated as right by the intellect. Duns' thesis agrees with Aristotle's statement saying that the goal of practical knowledge is *veritas confesse se habens appetitui recto* (VI, 2, 1139[a] 29–31). Theology is fully and exclusively practical because every theological proposition is practical, even such thesis as "The Father gave birth to the Son" is practical since it assumes and dictates the proper action of the will, a particular kind of love for God evoked by this sentence. Thus, Scotus expressly denies that there exists any theoretical theological proposition.

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As everyone can notice at the first glance, the similarities between the three Francicans are striking and far reaching and they make it possible to pose the question regarding the possible influence of one on another. The chronology of the texts is clear: Duns Scotus was the first, the first draft of his vision of theology as a practical science arose in Oxford, before Gonsalvus' *Disputed Questions* dated to 1301–1303[36] and Alexander's *Commentary on the Sentences* (1301–1303 or 1308–1309).[37] Yet, one has to ask whether traces of acquaintance with Scotus' standpoint can be found in Gonsalvus' and Alexander's Prologues.

The answer with respect to Gonsalvus is negative. Though Gonsalvus had the possibility to learn of Scotus' position, there is no trace of a direct impact

36 L. Amorós, "Introductio historico-critica," in Gonsalvi Hispani, *Quaestiones disputatae*, pp. LX–LXI.

37 L. Veuthey, *Alessandro d'Alessandria*, pp. 14–15, and F. Stegmüller, *Repertorium commentariorum in Sententias Petri Lombardi* (Herbipoli: Schöningh, 1947), pp. 29–30, assume that Alexander commented on the *Sentences* twice: for the first time in 1301–1303 before he left Paris for Rome, and for the second time in 1308–1309 as *magister regens* of the Franciscans, neither the acceptance of the first date nor the second excludes the posteriority of Alexander's *Commentary* to those of Scotus and Gonsalvus.

of Scotus on Gonsalvus. Indeed, the similarity between the two conceptions are striking, especially if the most general scheme is taken into account. First, the tripartite structure of the reasoning, consisting of the definition of practice, stating a criterion of practicality and the proof of the practicality of theology. But there are important differences occurring between both standpoints. First, the sequence of components—Gonsalvus analyses first the criterion, and then practice, while Duns reverses the sequence. Second, the definition of practice proposed by Gonsalvus stresses different issues than that of Scotus'—Gonsalvus points to the necessary unity of a knower and an agent, the agent's actual power to perform practice, while Scotus emphasizes that practice must be prescribed by intellectual cognition and he neglects the actual possibility of its accomplishment in the external world, reducing practice to the act of the will. Third, Gonsalvus defends the goal as the criterion of practicality. By contrast, Scotus opts for the object. Fourth, Gonsalvus and Scotus reconstruct the discussion on the nature of theology in different way. Gonsalvus enumerates more positions than Scotus in his *Lectura*, but he presents the conception of theology as purely theoretical in a very general way, far from the explicit quotations from Henry's *Summa* in the *Lectura*. What is interesting here, is the fact that Scotus' *Ordinatio* makes a reference to Giles' position and summarizes and criticises it almost in the same way as Gonsalvus did. In spite of all those divergences, the main thesis, namely that theology is practical and exclusively and totally practical is shared by both authors, and so it is with the idea to base the practicality of theology on a definition of practice. This fundamental similarity, according to me, can be explained by the spirit of understanding of the nature of theology common to all the Franciscans. As I have tried to demonstrate, the inner logic of the development of the Franciscan vision of theology is a growing emphasis on its practicality understood in this or that way. At the turn of the 13th and 14th century the Franciscans reached the idea of theology as purely and exclusively practical. And to be able to sustain this thesis they had to define practice in such a way that the love for God could be called practice—and this was done by Gonsalvus and Duns Scotus, most probably in two independent ways: Gonsalvus based on the goal as criterion of the practicality vs. theoreticality of a science in agreement with all his Franciscan predecessors, whereas Scotus accepted the object as the criterion against the earlier Franciscan tradition but siding with Thomas Aquinas and Godfrey of Fontaines.

What about Alexander then? According to me it is quite probable that Alexander knew Scotus' solution of the problem of the practicality of theology, though his own position seems highly independent. First of all, the structure of the whole consideration is different: Alexander begins with the question

pertaining to the criterion of practicality, and subsequently considers the definition of practice and finally answers the principal question. The entire part devoted to the criterion differs from Scotus' proposition (the nature of syllogisms formulated in theoretical and practical sciences as the basis of their distinction, *auctoritates*, reconstruction of the whole discussion) save for the final thesis favouring the object as the proper criterion. Such a scheme resembles that adopted by Gonsalvus. Besides, there are significant differences in the solution of the main problem. First, Alexander's definition of practice, and consequently of a practical science, is much more similar to the common sense idea of it: practice is what was thought out in the intellect and then brought into existence in the extramental world; Alexander is far away from Scotus' reduction of practice to the act of the will. Furthermore, Alexander structures his presentation of various solutions to the main problem differently: first he distinguishes the thesis shared by all scholastic theologians, i.e. that theology is partially practical and partially theoretical, and second discusses what element prevails. What is striking here is the fact that neither Gonsalvus nor Scotus would have agreed with the thesis described by Alexander as shared by all theologians because both of them held that theology was not theoretical. Moreover, as the justification of this common opinion Alexander quotes very general arguments, apart from the one based on the practical character of praising God that seems to be an allusion to Gonsalvus' standpoint. It looks so as if Alexander deliberately did not want to argue against Gonsalvus' and consequently Scotus' main thesis and as if he interpreted their thesis as sticking to this *opinio communis*, which is simply not true. By contrast, the presentation of the issue which theologians solve in different ways is quite close to the reconstruction of the discussion offered by Scotus: the main opponent seems to be Henry of Ghent and especially his claim that love of God is not a practical but a theoretical act. Giles is presented and criticised in the same way by all three Franciscans. Obviously, Alexander evaluates Godfrey's standpoint in a more sympathetic way than Gonsalvus and Scotus because Godfrey's position differs from his own not as much as it differs from that of Scotus' and Gonsalvus'.

The general overview on Alexander's standpoint is the following: he is with Gonsalvus and Scotus in regard to the general idea of how the discussion on the nature of theology should be construed, namely its starting point should be a definition of practice. He is with Scotus and against Gonsalvus in the discussion on the criterion of the practicality of science. He sides with Scotus in his criticism of Henry of Ghent's defense of the theoretical character of theology. And, finally, he departs from the purely practical nature of theology espoused by both of his close Franciscan predecessors. Alexander's option for the two-

functional character of theology resembles Richard of Middleton's standpoint formulated before Scotus and Gonsalvus interventions.[38] Thus, Alexander's thesis claiming that theology is practical and theoretical but more practical than theoretical is a step back in comparison with Gonsalvus' and Scotus' full practicality of theology. This thesis is true only if one accepts that the inner logic of the development of the Franciscan reflection on the nature of theology tends toward sharpening and emphasising of its practical character. Alexander combines this thesis with a slight reserve to goal as the proper criterion of the character of a science; he shares this doubt (directed against the Fransican mainstream) with Scotus.

5 Some Remarks on the Ways in Which Scholastic Thinkers Debate with One Another

At the end, I would like to come back to the central issue of our meeting, namely the question of what the dialogue between scholastic thinkers looks like. By this, I will try to show in what sense Gonsalvus and Alexander can be called Scotus' interlocutors.

It is a truism among medievalists that scholastic theologians and philosophers usually refrained from naming their direct opponents, and that they seldom quoted precisely the other's writings, instead, they preferred to argue against the paraphrases often difficult to identify with the originals. Yet, it is also trivial to say that scholastic thought evolved and developed in discussions and the discussions nourished and enlivened it. Both of these elements accurately characterize the relationship between Gonsalvus, Alexander and Scotus. On the one hand, they belonged to one "intellectual party", they shared many fundamental assumptions, used the same categories to express their views, and they had similar intellectual purposes or tasks, but on the other, they did not perform one and the same piece, they—to apply the same musical metaphor—

38 Generally, it seems that Richard's question is a very relevant element in grasping the development of Franciscan discussion on the character of theology. Cf. Richardus de Mediavilla, *Scriptum super primum Sententiarum* prol. q. 4 (ed. Brixiae 1591), pp. 7^{a}–8^{b}. Richard's position seems to be the reverse of Aquinas' thesis that theology is more theoretical than practical combined with discussion on the proper criterion of practicality. Richard asserts that to save the principally practical character of theology it must be acknowledged to include not only action that takes place outside the mind but also acts of the will, such as to love God. Besides, Richard accepts that the object of theology, i.e. God, favours its theoretical character since none can affect God, but he adds that the objective criterion is of secondary importance because it is relative, whereas the goal is more relevant.

produce different variations on the same theme. Consequently, their conceptions of the nature of theology should not be perceived as deliberately rival, antagonistic but as alternative solutions worked out in the particular situation, taking into consideration competitive propositions, and based on many commonly shared ideas. Thus, Alexander did not want to argue directly against the total and exclusive practicality of theology, instead he proposed to the same audience another solution, accepting some points of Scotus' and Gonsalvus' position but abandoning and modifying the others. Hence, although Alexander did not make any direct allusion do Scotus' standpoint and even misrepresented the essence of Gonsalvus' opinion,[39] he nonetheless entered into dialogue with them showing the alternative way of solving the same set of problems, more moderate and less exposed to criticism—and thus he became what I would propose to term a silent interlocutor.

6 Editorial Note

The edition below of the two last questions of Alexander's Prologue reproduces the text usually identified as the second redaction, dated to 1308–1309 and supposed to transmit his genuine, mature teaching. The existence of two different redactions is testified by Alexander himself in a short introductory letter put at the very beginning in its few copies:

> Nobili et reverendo domino, domino Francisco Caraculo, canonico Parisiensi, frater Alexander de Alexandria de ordine minorum cum humili recommendatione se ipsum *Scriptum* super primum *Sententiarum* dudum a me inceptum et particulatim habitum, nunc autem usque ad finem completum, vestrae dominationi transmitto; in quo sic rationi innitor quod a limitibus fidei non recedo, quia etsi in aliis facultatibus ratio praeveniat fidem, in facultatem tamen theologiae fides praevenit rationem.[40]

39 L. Veuthey noticed Alexander's special reluctance to direct critiques and acknowledged it as an important feature of his intellectual *ésprit*, cf. *Alessandro d'Alessandria*, pp. 170 sqq.

40 The letter is extant in B (f. 3ra), P (f. 1ra), V (f. f. 1ra) as well as in L that was probably the source of information about the multitude of versions of the *Commentary* through Bandini's *Catalogue* where it was published: Angelus Maria Bandinus, *Bibliotheca Leopoldina Laurentiana seu Catalogus manuscriptorum qui nuper in Laurentiana translati sunt sub auspiciis Ferdinandi III* (Florentiae MDCCXCIII), col. 79.

Veuthey (p. 15), basing on some remarks of the editors of Bonaventure's *Opera Omnia* from Quaracchi, supposed that the first redaction is conserved in BAV, Ross. 252 (books 1–3) and Firenze, Nazionale, D 4 26 (book 4) that seems to be a continuation of the former. The attribution of the Vatican codex was restated of repeated after Veuthey by Glorieux.[41] The same Glorieux, however, ascribed the *Commentary* conserved in Ross. 252 to William of Falgar as the *Abbreviatio Commentarii Bonaventurae in Sententias*, which was noticed by Stegmüller.[42] Besides, Stegmüller as the principal source for this text gives the manuscript from Assisi, Comunale, 124 and list some more copies of it.[43] What strikes one at the first glance in this account is a certain contradiction between the way Alexander characterises the first version and its identification as the abbreviation of Bonaventure's work by medievalists. Alexander says that the first redaction was only commenced and remained unfinished or incomplete—this, however, assumes the continuity of both redactions, the second being a completion of the first, and not another work. But obviously the abbreviation of Bonaventure's *Commentary* is a different work and Alexander's second redaction cannot be classified as its continuation in any sense.

The whole Prologue of the putative Alexander's first redaction, based on Bonaventure's scheme of the analysis of four causes of theology, presents the nature of theology under the heading of the analysis of its final cause. The author begins with the statement that theology should be denominated according to its goal, but this goal must be the proximate, not final goal. This goal must be inherent to the science, not established by a person acquiring knowledge since a person can establish a goal of any nature. Then it is said that sciences are able to perfect the intellect in three ways: (1) in itself, a science is theoretical, (2) as it extends to the goal is an external effect, then a science is practical, and (3) as it extends to the internal motion of the will, i.e. to love, then a science is practical as well as theoretical, and it can be properly called affective and identified with wisdom. The third possibility is true of theology.[44]

As it can be easily perceived, this text is immersed in Bonaventure's parallel question; it merely adds to it a specification of the goal that can serve as the criterion of theology's nature. According to me, it is hardly imaginable not only that it was completed by Alexander's Commentary but also that such a

41 P. Glorieux, *Répertoire des maitres en théologie de Paris au XIII^e siècle*, vol. 2 (Paris: J. Vrin, 1933), p. 200.

42 Ibid., p. 113; F. Stegmüller, *Repertorium*, p. 29.

43 Ibid.

44 Cf. the text transcribed from Assisi, Comunale, 124 at the end of this study.

standpoint could be presented in Paris at the beginning of the 14th century. By contrast, it fits well in the early stage of the development of Franciscan school, e.g. in the 70's of the 13th century when, e.g. William of Falgar flourished, as Glorieux probably rightly stated.

All these observations make me suppose that the first incomplete version of Alexander's *Commentary* arose in 1301–1303 but this version circulated among the small group of Alexander's Franciscan collaborators in a loose form, consequently it could happen that it had not been officially published and copied. Then, in 1308–1309, Alexander resumed his work and prepared the *Ordinatio* at least of the Book 1 that was soon published and diffused in several manuscripts, some of which are extant now. It is also possible that the original material of the first redaction has not survived to our times and that is why it is hardly possible to determine the birth of the particular ideas presented in the *Ordinatio* to 1301–1303 or to 1308–1309.

Another issue that must be touched in the introduction to an edition is an evaluation and affinities of the manuscripts. By now, the most thorough study of the manuscript tradition of Alexander's *Commentary*, based on *Sent. I*, Distinction 35, Questions 3 and 4 has been presented by M. Rossini and Ch. Schabel.[45] First of all, Rossini and Schabel present the most exhaustive list of the manuscripts:

B London, British Museum, 14007,
F Firenze, Biblioteca Centrale Nazionale, conv. soppr., E IV 24,
L Firenze, Biblioteca Laurenziana, Fesul. 133,
M Venezia, Biblioteca Nazionale Marciana, Bessar., 105,
P Paris, Bibliothèque Nationale, 15859,
R Rennes, Bibliothèque de la ville, 40,
V Citta del Vaticano, Bibliotheca Apostolica Vaticana, Borg. 311.

Rossini and Schabel assert that FLM constitute a distinct group due to some common variants, in significant part erroneous, moreover, it can be supposed that M has been copied from F, which is the best in this group. R is independent but also contains a poor text, whereas BPV are much better, though L that

45 M. Rossini and C. Schabel, "Time and Eternity among the Early Scotists. Texts on Future Contingents by Alexander of Alessandria, Radulphus Brito, and Hugh of Novocastro," *Documenti e studi sulla tradizione filosofica medievale* 16 (2005), pp. 237–338 (introduction to the edition—pp. 275–278, the edition—pp. 284–298). Veuthey's remarks on the manuscripts are rather vague impressions than a thorough analysis; he distinguishes L and M as better (*Alessandro*, pp. 17–18).

seems to be the best, transmits many individual but correct readings. Finally, the editors give preference to the text transmitted by BPV.

My remarks about the manuscript tradition of Alexander's *Super primum Sententiarum* and edition are based on the comparison of five of seven copies listed by Rossini and Schabel, namely BFMPV. Generally my conclusions about the affinity and quality of single manuscripts agree with those put forward by Rossini and Schabel: indeed the similarity between F and M is striking, but most of variants they share against BPV are erroneous (e.g. three homoteleuta: p. 377, 13–14, p. 386, 21, p. 390, 32, and one longer omission: p. 373, 27–29.), but none of the BPV is totally free from similar bigger faults (p. 380, 29–30, p. 381, 18–19, pp. 385, 32–386, 1, p. 387, 10–11, p. 388, 18). Of the three better manuscripts (BPV), V seems to convey slightly worse text than BP. In the questions I have worked on B does not present remarkably more individual variants than PV and the average of acceptable individual variants against incorrect ones does not differ much form that in PV.[46]

Finally, in my edition I usually give preference to the common text of BPV, while variants from FM are put into the philological apparatus. I do not present all the individual variants, I limit only to significant readings offering alternative but correct readings of the text. Besides, I show all the bigger faults, as homoteleuta and longer omissions to illustrate my remarks on the quality of the manuscripts.

⁂

The text of the putative first redaction of Alexander's *Commentary on the Sentences* has been transcribed from the manuscript Assisi, Biblioteca del Sacro Convento in Assisi (olim Biblioteca Comunale), 124, f. 3^{ra-b}.[47] The text is not impeccable but its quality is good enough to provide a reliable material to the comparison with genuine Alexander's work.

46 The results of the comparison of the manuscript tradition presentened by Riserbato does not differ significantly from those of Rossini/Schabel and mine. He notices a slightly stronger affinity between P and V, in regard to all the questions edited by him, than Rossini/Schabel and I, see above all his *Il soggetto della teologia*, pp. 216–219.

47 This manuscript is available at: http://www.internetculturale.it/jmms/iccuviewer/iccu.jsp?id=oai%3Awww.internetculturale.sbn.it%2FTeca%3A20%3ANT0000%3APG0213_ms.124& mode=all&teca=MagTeca+-+ICCU

Alexander de Alessandria
Commentarius in Sententias
Prologus

Nono quaeritur
Utrum scientia speculativa et practica differant penes finem vel penes obiectum

[1] Videtur quod penes finem III *Physicorum*: intellectus practicus est, qui propter aliquid operatur.[1] Ergo intellectus practicus specificatur a fine. Sed ab eodem, a quo specificatur intellectus practicus, videtur quod specificetur scientia practica, ergo etc. B 10^{vb} F 9^{vb} M 10ra P 12va V 10va

[2] Secundo sic. Quando tres se habent per ordinem, ita quod primum distinguitur a secundo, et secundum a tertio, videtur quod tota distinctio sit a tertio radicaliter et originaliter. Sed haec tria se habent per ordinem: habitus, obiectum et finis, quia habitus distinguuntur per obiecta, et obiecta penes diversos fines. Ergo tota distinctio principaliter est a fine.

[3] Tertio sic. Finis imponit necessitatem his, quae sunt ad finem. Ergo finis scientiae imponit necessitatem obiecto, quia obiectum est quid ordinatum ad finem et non est ipse finis. Magis ergo dicendum est quod distinctio obiectorum est propter finem quam econverso. Et magis scientia est talis, puta speculativa vel practica, propter finem, qui imponit necessitatem, quam propter obiectum, cui imponitur.

[4] Ad oppositum. PHILOSOPHUS VI *Ethicorum*: obiectum practicae scientiae est agibile,[2] sed ratio agiblis est ratio obiectalis. Ergo videtur quod ab obiecto sumatur scientia practica.

[5] Circa hanc quaestionem duo sunt videnda: primo videbitur quot modis differt speculativa et practica, secundo venabimur utrum earum differentia magis sit penes finem quam penes obiectum.

17 obiecto] scientiae *add.* FM

1 Rectius ARISTOT., *De an.* III c. 10 (433^{a} 14–15): "intellectus autem qui propter aliquid ratiocinatur et qui practicus; differt autem a speculativo fine."

2 Cf. ARISTOT., *Eth. nic.* VI c. 5, AL 26 1–3, 4, p. 482; 24–25; 1140^{b} 21–22.

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⟨Articulus 1⟩

[6] Quantum ad primum possunt dari quattuor differentiae inter hanc scien-
B 11ra tiam et illam. | Prima differentia est, quia differunt penes actum definitivum. Definit enim speculativus et definit practicus. Et hoc, quia uterque versatur circa conceptum expressibilem per definitionem, sed tamen differenter, quia practicus versatur circa conceptum ponibilem in effectu ab ipso considerante, sicut medicus versatur circa conceptum sanitatis ponibilem in effectu ab ipso et domificator versatur circa conceptum domus ponibilem in effectu ab eodem.
F 10ra Et ideo dictum est VII *Metaphysicae* | a PHILOSOPHO quod domus in effectu est a domo in anima.[3] Speculativus autem versatur circa conceptum non ponibilem in effectu a considerante. Sicut scientia naturalis versatur circa quidditatem rerum naturalium, quae res naturales non fiunt a nobis considerantibus, sed supponuntur factae. Et ideo scientia naturalis est scientia speculativa, non practica. Unde PHILOSOPHUS VI *Metaphysicae* secundum translatio-
V 10vb nem COMMENTATORIS loquens de scientia naturali sic dicit: | "manifestum est quod non est activa, neque artificialis. Principium enim rerum activarum est in agente aut intellectus, aut ars, aut alia virtus. Et principium artis," id est, rerum artificialium "est in artibus,"[4] id est, in artifice habente artem. Commentator: "principium rerum artificialium, quod est in nobis, est voluntas,"[5] naturalium autem principium est natura, et sic artificialia et naturalia differunt penes naturam et voluntatem.

[7] Haec est prima differentia inter speculativum et practicum. Quam differentiam considerantes quidam antiqui dicebant quod forma speculationis est forma abstractionis. Forma autem practica est forma compositionis. Quorum
M 10ra dictum sic intelligo quod forma speculationis est ab|stractionis, quia abstrahit
P 12vb a ponibilitate in effectu, quia considera|tum non est a considerante in effectu ponibile. Forma autem practica est forma compositionis propter concernentiam ipsius esse in effectu. Et hoc, quia in practicis illud idem, quod est in conceptu, est ponibile in effectu, sicut domus vel sanitas in conceptu potest fieri domus vel sanitas in effectu.

6 conceptum] subiectum FM 10 conceptum] *om.* FM 19 artificialium] artificiatarum *fons* 27–28 concernentiam] convenientiam B co *et lacuna* P concurrentiam V

3 ARISTOT., *Metaph.* VII c. 7, AL 25, 3.2, pp. 134, 11 sqq.; 1032^{b} 1–12; cf. AVERROES, *In Met.*, VII, comm. 23, Iunctina 8, f. 174A.

4 ARISTOT., *Metaph.* I c. 1, Iunctina 8, f. 144B–C.

5 AVERROES, *In Met.* VI comm. 1, Iunctina 8, f. 144M–145A.

[8] Advertendum tamen hic quod aliquid esse in conceptu duobus modis: vel quia in concipiente subiective eo modo, quo dicitur a multis quod species est subiective in intellectu; vel quia est in concipiente obiective. Quando ergo dicitur quod ens in conceptu fit ens in effectu, non est intelligendum de ente in conceptu subiective, quia quod est in anima subiective, numquam fuit in re extra, sed est intelligendum de eo, quod est in conceptu obiective, quia illud idem, quod fuit obiectum concipientis, potest fieri obiectum agentis. Et hoc attendens PHILOSOPHUS VI *Metaphysicae* secundum translationem COMMENTATORIS sic dicit quod "artificiatum et voluntatum sunt idem".[6] Quod dictum sic intelligo, quantum spectat ad praesens, quod artificiatum, id est, obiectum artis, ut est in conceptu, est voluntatum, id est, obiectum voluntatis, ut est in effectu, quia voluntas est illa, quae imperando potentiis inferioribus imperat rem poni in effectu.

[9] Ad hanc differentiam, quae est penes conceptus, sequitur illa, de qua dicit COMMENTATOR VI *Metaphysicae*, ubi dicit quod "illa, quorum principium est voluntas, sunt alia ab illis, quorum principium est natura, et scientiae eorum diversae sunt."[7] In quibus verbis videtur dicere COMMENTATOR quod distinctio scientiae speculativae et practicae accipitur penes diversitatem principiorum ponentium in effectu conceptum speculativum et practicum.

[10] Secunda differentia inter hanc scientiam et illam est penes actum compositivum et divisivum, nam sicut scientia speculativa habet proprias propositiones et propria principia, circa quae non errat, puta quod omne totum est maius sua parte, ita et scientia practica habet propria principia, circa quae non errat. Hoc patet in practica activa, nam unum principium est quod parentes sunt honorandi. Hoc etiam patet in practica factiva, sicut in domificativa, nam unum principium est quod gravia ponantur deorsum et levia sursum vel aliquid simile. Conveniunt ergo et differunt. Conveniunt quidem, quia utraque scientia fabricat propositiones, differunt autem penes proprietatem propositionum, quia proprietas propositionum practicarum est in ordine ad ponibile in effectu.

[11] Tertia differentia potest accipi penes actum syllogisticum, nam tam scientia speculativa quam practica syllogizat, ut per discursum syllogisticum deveniat ad conclusionem intentam, differenter tamen, quia syllogismi speculativi | syllogizant simpliciter, | practici autem syllogizant propter aliquid. V 11ra B 11rb
Unde hanc differentiam attendens COMMENTATOR VI *Metaphysicae* dicit:

1 esse] *om.* FM | conceptu] est *add.* FM 16 et] quod *add. fons* 17 verbis] *om.* FM 27–29 Conveniunt … effectu] *om.* FM 34 dicit] quod *add.* B

6 ARISTOT., *Metaph.* I c. 1, Iunctina 8, f. 144C.

7 AVERROES, *In Met.* VI comm. 1, Iunctina 8, f. 145A.

"omnes cogitationes agentes et operantes et quae utuntur argumentatione,
F 10rb sunt ar|guentes secundum aliquid, non arguentes simpliciter, cum scientia in eis non sit nisi propter opus. Et per istum sermonem videtur PHILOSOPHUS dare differentiam inter scientias speculativas et practicas, etsi tantum det exemplum de scientia naturali."[8] Haec COMMENTATOR, quasi dicat in omni-
P 13ra bus verbis dictis: quaedam sunt cognitiones, quae non sunt | operantes, et heae sunt speculativae et istae sunt arguentes simpliciter, quia non arguunt propter opus; quaedam sunt cognitiones, quae sunt operativae, et heae sunt practicae arguentes secundum aliquid, id est, propter opus. Hi ergo duo syllogismi differunt in duobus: primo quidem differunt in arguendo, quia syllogismi speculativi arguunt simpliciter, practici autem secundum quid. Differunt etiam in resolvendo, quia syllogismi speculativi resolvunt usque ad conceptus purae speculationis non ponibiles a nobis in effectu. Syllogismi autem practici resolvunt ad conceptus operabiles a nobis.

[12] Quarta differentia sequitur tertiam, nam ex quo syllogismi speculativi syllogizant simpliciter, syllogismi autem practici secundum aliquid, id est,
M 10rb secundum opus, sequitur, quia | heae duae scientiae differunt penes finem, quia finis syllogismi speculativi non est opus sicut practici, Hanc differentiam attendens COMMENTATOR II *Metaphysicae* dicit: "scientiae attributae philosophiae sunt duae, quarum una est, cuius finis est scire tantum, et altera operari."[9] Et paucis interpositis: "Scientia enim operativa, quamvis utatur ratiocinatione et speculatur de causis, tamen non est digna vocari speculativa, quia non perscrutatur de causis rerum, nisi ut scientes eas", id est, causas et definitiones "agant, et non ut sciant."[10] Haec COMMENTATOR. In quibus verbis aperte dicit COMMENTATOR quod scientia practica considerat de conceptibus, quando dicit quod considerat de definitionibus, et sic ex verbis eius possumus habere primam differentiam. Secundo dicit quod ratiocinatur et resolvit ad causas, et sic habemus ex verbis eius tertiam differentiam et etiam secundam, quia qui syllogizat, format propositiones. Tertio dicit quod non considerat causas vel definitiones nisi propter opus, et sic habemus ab eo quartam differentiam.

[13] His visis patet primum declarandum.

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2 secundum] per V | aliquid] quid FM 3–4 Philosophus] quasi *fons* 11 etiam] autem FM 17 quia] quod B 19 philosophiae] V *fons om.* FPM 22 vocari] scientia *add.* V F *marg.* 23 id … definitiones] *om.* FM

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8 AVERROES, *In Met.* VI comm. 1, Iunctina 8, f. 145A.

9 AVERROES, *In Met.* II comm. 3, Iunctina 8, f. 29H–I. Commentum super Aristotelis *Met.* II c. 1, 993^b 21.

10 AVERROES, *In Met.* II comm. 3, Iunctina 8, f. 29I.

⟨Articulus 2⟩

[14] Quantum ad secundum sunt duo modi dicendi probabiles. Unus est quod distinctio scientiae speculativae et practicae accipitur penes finem et non penes obiectum. Ad istum modum fortificandum est prima ratio talis. Sicut distinguuntur syllogismi practici vel speculativi, ita videtur distingui scientia practica et speculativa. Sed syllogismi practici et speculativi distinguuntur penes fines. Ergo et heae scientiae penes fines distinguuntur. Maior patet, quia eadem est habitudo in distinctione et unitate in scientiis, quae est in syllogismis, qui oriuntur a scientiis, ergo eadem est habitudo scientiae speculativae et practicae in unitate et distinctione, quae est in syllogismis, qui oriuntur ab eis. Minor, scilicet quod syllogismus speculativus et practicus distinguantur penes fines, patet per ea, quae dicta sunt in praecedenti articulo.

[15] Secunda ratio ad probandum eandem conclusionem potest esse talis. Si obiectum distinguit has scientias, vel obiectum materiale, vel formale. Sed nec primum, | nec secundum distinguit, ergo etc. Maior patet, quia obiectum materiale et formale evacuant totum ambitum obiecti. Minor probatur, quia obiectum ut materiale non distinguit. Sicut enim materia non est causa distinctionis in effectu nisi per formam, ita obiectum materiale non est causa distinctionis in potentiis vel habitibus, ergo non est distinctio | penes obiecta materialia nec penes formalia, quia obiecta formalia distin|guunt potentias. Distinctio autem scientiae speculativae et practicae, quae quaeritur, est distinctio habituum. V 11^{rb} F 10va P 13^{rb}

[16] Tertia ratio ad idem probandum potest esse talis. Scientia speculativa non est factiva, scientia practica est factiva et causativa. Sed nihil causat nisi motum a fine, ergo tota ratio practici sumitur a fine. Quod autem scientia speculativa non sit causativa patet per PHILOSOPHUM et COMMENTATOREM VI *Metaphysicae*, ubi dicit quod principium effectivum speculabilium non est voluntas nec aliquid, quod sit in speculante.[11] Quod autem scientia practica sit causativa patet in eodem VI, ubi dicit Commentator: vocat eam scientiam operativam.[12] Quod autem agens moveatur a fine patet, quia finis est causa causarum.

[17] Quarta ratio potest esse talis. Si differentia scientiae speculativae | et practicae acciperetur penes obiectum speculabile et operabile, sequeretur quod scitum speculativae non posset esse operabile a nobis sive quod scientia speculativa non posset esse de aliquo operabili a nobis, quod patet esse B 11va

22 ratio] est *add.* FM 28 ubi dicit] *om.* FM

11 Sententia ex AVERROIS *In Met.*, VI, comm. 1, Iunctina 8, f. 144M sqq.

12 E.g. AVERROES, *In Met.* VI comm. 1, Iunctina 8, f. 144M, comm. 2, f. 146D.

falsum, quia figurae, de quibus geometria est, extendunt se usque ad artificialia, et per consequens sunt operabilia, quia cadunt sub arte. Imaginamur
M 10va enim quod illud distinguit, | quod constituit, quia idem est principium constituendi et distinguendi. Sed illud constituit, quod universaliter inest, nec potest separari a re. Ergo illud, quod distinguit, universaliter inest nec potest a re separari. Sed differentia finium semper videtur inesse istis scientiis, quia scientia speculativa semper est propter se, practica semper propter opus. Differentia autem penes operabile et speculabile non videtur semper inesse, quia id, quod cadit sub aspectu scientiae speculativae, sicut figura geometrica, est operabile a nobis, quia figura salvatur in naturalibus et salvatur in artificialibus. Aequilaterus enim in corpore naturali et artificiali est eiusdem speciei. Hic est ergo unus modus probabilis.

[18] Alius modus est, qui videtur mihi probabilior, scilicet quod distinctio scientiae speculativae et practicae potest accipi penes obiecta, licet includat distinctionem finium. Ad hoc potest esse prima ratio talis. Pure speculabile, agibile et factibile se tenent ex parte obiecti. Haec autem faciunt differentiam inter scientiam, artem et prudentiam. Nam scientia est certitudo speculabilium, "prudentia autem est recta ratio agibilium",[13] sicut dicitur VI *Ethicorum*: "ars autem est recta ratio factibilium",[14] sicut dicit idem PHILOSOPHUS. Ex quo sequitur quod distinctio inter istas duas scientias, scilicet speculativam et practicam, est, vel quia obiectum est pure speculabile in speculativa, vel quia est agibile et factibile, sicut in practica. Imaginamur enim sic quod omnis scientia est assecutio obiecti. Ad hoc enim inventae sunt scientiae ut sciens mediantibus eis assequatur obiectum. Assecutio | autem obiecti potest esse duobus
V 11va modis. Nam quaedam sunt scientiae, quae ordinantur ad assecutionem obiecti
P 13va in conceptu tantum, et istae sunt | scientiae speculativae, nam obiecta speculabilium ita sunt in conceptu quod non ponuntur in effectu a speculante. Et haec est intentio PHILOSOPHI VI *Metaphysicae*, ubi dicit quod scientia naturalis est speculativa.[15] Et hoc, quia ita speculatur conceptum rei naturalis quod non ponit illum in effectu, sed supponit positum. Quaedam enim scientiae sunt, quae ordinantur ad assecutionem obiecti non solum in conceptu, sed in effectu. Et istae sunt scientiae practicae, quae quidem non solum quaerunt cognoscere rem, sed etiam operari, ita tamen quod ipsa ordinabilitas in obiecto
F 10vb ad opus sufficit ad distinctionem scientiae practicae | et speculativae.

22 in] *om.* F M *marg.*

13 Cf. ARISTOT., *Eth. nic.* VI c. 5, AL 26 1–3, 4, pp. 482, 24–25; 1140b 24–25.

14 Cf. ARISTOT., *Eth. nic.* VI c. 4, AL 26 1–3, 4, pp. 481, 19; 1140a 20.

15 Cf. ARISTOT., *Metaph.* VI c. 1, AL 25 3.2, pp. 127, 54–55; 1026a 18–19.

[19] Secunda ratio ad eandem conclusionem potest esse talis. Si finis, qui dicitur opus, specificat scientiam practicam, vel specificat finis aptitudinalis, vel actualis. Non actualis, quia secundum hoc nullus haberet scientiam practicam, qui non actu operaretur, ergo specificat finis aptitudinalis. Finis autem, qui in aptitudine est opus, idem est quod operabile. Ergo operabile specificat, quod est propositum. Quaeremus enim ab adversario utrum finis, qui specificat scientiam practicam, sit finis solum positus a considerante, vel a natura rei, hoc est, quia natura rei de se habet quod ordinetur ad hunc finem, qui est opus. Non primo modo, quia iste est finis accidentalis. Nullum autem accidens ut sic specificat naturam rei.

[20] Praeterea. Secundum hoc eadem scientia posset esse practica huic et speculativa illi secundum diversitatem considerantium. Restat ergo quod iste finis specificans sit ex natura rei consideratae. Numquam autem opus, quod ponit finis, est ex natura rei, nisi illa res non sit de se operabilis, ergo operabile specificat. Imaginabimur enim quod opus non specificat, sed extensibilitas as opus et ordinabilitas vel privatio eiusdem. Quando enim consideratum a scientia de se est extensibile ad opus, tunc est scientia practica, quia ibi non sistit intellectus nec syllogizat simpliciter, ut dictum est superius, | sed propter M 10^{vb}
opus. Quando autem consideratum ab intellectu de se non est operabile, tunc in considerato sistit intellectus non quaerens nisi scire eius. Et tunc scientia est speculativa. Et signum horum est, quia de eodem scito, de | quo est scien- B 11^{vb}
tia nobis speculativa, est scientia practica Deo. Sicut de rebus naturalibus Deus habet praxim, quia eas operatur, de quibus nos habemus scientiam speculativam, ut dictum est in VI *Metaphysicae*.[16] Et hoc non videtur propter aliud, nisi quia illud idem, quod non est ponibile in effectu a nobis, est ponibile in effectu a Deo.

[21] Sic ergo his dictis patet ad quaestionem, quod scilicet scientia speculativa et practica differunt penes obiectum ponibile in effectu et non ponibile, quia tamen ponibile et non ponibile arguunt opus possibile extra vel privationem eiusdem, ideo etiam differunt penes fines, qui finis oritur ex natura subiecti.

[22] Attendendum tamen quod si finis vocetur ipsa operatio intrinseca sive extrinseca—extrinseca sicut aedificare, intrinseca sicut velle aedificare—sic sine tali fine potest esse scientia practica. Alias omnis practicus | actus opera- V 11^{vb}
retur. Licet enim requiratur quod practicus possit operari, tamen non requiritur

13–14 consideratae ... rei] FM *hom.* 22 Deo] *om.* MVF *marg.* 23 nos] non BPV 30 natura] F M *marg.*

16 Cf. ARISTOT., *Metaph.* VI c. 1, AL 25 3.2, pp. 125, 20 sqq.; 1025^{b} 19 sqq.

P 13^{vb} quod actu operetur. Alio modo potest | vocari finis ipsa ordinabilitas ad opus, quae idem est quod ipse finis in aptitudine. Et tunc differre penes finem et penes obiectum videntur mihi idem, quia idem est ipsum obiectum esse operabile et ipsum posse poni in opere et econverso.

[23] Tenendo hunc modum secundum potest responderi ad primum argumentum alterius positionis, quando dicitur quod syllogismi speculativi et practici differunt penes syllogizare simpliciter et secundum quid, dicendum est quod pro tanto syllogismi practici sunt propter aliquid, id est, propter opus, quia sunt de conceptibus operabilibus et agibilibus. Et ideo ratio syllogismi semper oritur ab obiecto. Nisi enim syllogismus esset de operabilibus de se, non esset propter opus, immo si esset, hoc esset per accidens et ex extrinseco. Distinctio autem per accidens non habet locum, sed per se, quia omne per accidens fugit artem et scientiam.

[24] Ad secundum, quando dicitur quod si obiectum distinguit, vel materiale, vel formale, dico quod formale. Et quando subditur quod obiecta formalia distinguunt potentias, dicendum est quod non est impossibile aliqua obiecta esse materialia respectu potentiarum et formalia respectu habituum. Exempli gratia, aeternum et temporale sunt obiecta materialia respectu intellectus, cuius ratio est, quia intellectus non intendit in aeternum et temporale inquantum talia, sed inquantum induunt rationem entis et veri, et per consequens
F 11ra inquantum induunt rationem formalioris, et tamen aeternum | et temporale sunt obiecta formalia respectu scientiae et sapientiae, quia secundum Augustinum, XII *De Trinitate*, sapientia intendit aeternis regulis consulendis, scientia autem temporalibus.[17]

[25] Ad propositum ergo. Licet operabile et non operabile sunt obiecta materialia respectu intellectus simpliciter accepti, tamen possunt esse obiecta formalia respectu intellectus induentis rationem habitus speculativi vel practici. Et sic possunt facere distinctionem habituum, et non potentiarum.

[26] Ad tertium, quando dicitur quod scientia practica causat effectum, omne autem causans causat propter finem, dicendum est quod ex eo non distinguitur practicum et speculativum, quia hoc causat, et hoc non. Alias si hoc requireretur, numquam esset habitus practicus sine actuali causatione. Sed magis distinguuntur penes speculationem causabilis et non causabilis a nobis, ita quod obiectum causabile prius sit praecognitum a causante, quam praecognitionem ego voco scientiam practicam.

12 locum] hic *add.* FM 20–21 talia, sed … inquantum] P *hom.* 22–23 secundum Augustinum] sicut Augustinus BP 32 requireretur] requiretur MPV

17 August., *De Trin.* XIII cc. 19, 24, CCSL 50, pp. 416, 50 sqq.

[27] Et quando dicitur quod causans causat propter finem, dicendum est hoc esse verum. Sed tamen hoc causare non esset nisi praesupposito causabili. Quaero enim ab illo, qui ponit hanc distinctionem penes finem, utrum distinguat finis elicitus vel finis praecognitus. Voco autem finem elicitum ipsam causationem vel ipsum opus in effectu. Certum est enim quod non distinguit finis elicitus. Alias numquam esset practicus, nisi eliceret. Ergo distinguit finis ut praecognitus. Finis autem ut praecognitus | incidit in rationem obiecti, finis M 11ra
etiam ut praecognitus, sive causatio ut praecognita, induit rationem causabilis. Ergo causabile distinguit.

Ad quartum, quando dicitur quod id, quod est speculabile, potest esse operabile. Idem argumentum potest fieri contra eos, quia si speculabile, sicut figura geometrica, potest fieri operabile, id quod quaeritur propter se, scilicet speculabile, potest quaeri propter aliquid, id est, propter opus, dum sit operabile. Et si dicas quod hoc est secundum diversas rationes, ita dicam ego quod figura V 12ra
sub alia ratione cadit sub geometria | speculativa et alia | ratione sub geo- P 14ra
metria practica, nam in figuris sunt quaedam necessariae habitudines, quae non concernunt esse vel | ponibile in effectu, sicut necessaria habitudo est B 12ra
inter triangulum et habere tres—sive triangulus sit in effectu sive non—et has habitudines necessarias venatur geometra speculativus, qui est tantum propter scire. Accidit enim volenti scire quod triangulus habeat hanc passionem, hoc scire propter opus. Alio modo figura potest considerari, inquantum ex coniunctione partis ad partem sicut in figura, quae fit per compositionem vel ex remotione partis a parte, sicut in figura incisionis est ponibile in effectu a nobis, et hoc modo cadit sub aspectu practici. Domificator enim vel statuarius possunt considerare rationem figurae ponibilis in effectu, sed non eo modo, quo geometra speculativus, quia non est eorum probare necessarias habitudines figurarum, quae abstrahunt ab esse in effectu, sed solum eorum est considerare, quo modo ex positione partis ad partem vel ex remotione partis a parte sequitur aptior vel minus apta figura.

[28] His dictis ad quaestionem ad primum argumentum, quando dicitur quod intellectus practicus operatur propter aliquid, iam est solutum, quia non negatur, quin haec scientia sit propter finem, sed hoc negatur quod finis non est accidentalis, ita quod sit ex consideratione tantum, sed oritur ex natura considerabilis, et sic considerabile ex parte obiecti facit illam essentialitatem.

[29] Ad secundum, quo dicitur, quando tria se habent per ordinem etc., potest dici quod numquam tertium, scilicet finis, esset tale essentialiter, nisi

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10 quod] per FM 12 operabile] ita *add.* B 22–23 ex remotione] remotionem FM 28 quo modo] quando FM 35 quo] quando V

propter essentialitatem obiecti. Numquam enim scientia de se esset propter opus, nisi obiectum eius esset operabile. Exempli gratia, finis prudentiae, qui est habitus practicus, est operatio recta. Operatio tamen recta non esset finis eius, nisi consideratum illius esset agibile et operabile. Et ideo PHILOSOPHUS eam definiens definit penes obiectum dicens quod prudentia est recta ratio agibilium. Et sic licet finis sit tertium, tamen non debet esse principale in distin-
F 11rb guendo, quia istud tertium reducitur ad | practicum mediante essentialitate obiecti.

[30] Ad tertium, quando dicitur quod finis imponit necessitatem his, quae sunt ad finem, dicendum hoc esse verum, sed hic finis, de quo loquimur hic, est finis praecognitus sive potentialis, quia enim causatio possibilis est, ideo scientia talis est. Causatio autem ut praecognita reducitur ad rationem obiecti. Ubi est enim scientia practica proprie, ibi est praecognitio causabilis et causationis, ita quod in potestate illius sit ponere talem causationem in effectu. Si quis enim habet scientiam sanitatis, sicut cuiusdam causabilis, tamen non bene scit introducere eam in effectu, non habet rationem medicinae sub omnimoda praxi. Et ideo consuevit dici quod quidam medici sunt boni speculativi et non boni practici.

Decimo quaeritur
Utrum haec scientia sit practica vel speculativa

[1] Et videtur quod speculativa. BOETHIUS *De Trinitate*: "tres sunt partes speculativae scientiae: naturalis, mathematica et theologia".[18] Ergo theologia speculativa est, cum sit pars eius.

P 14rb [2] Secundo sic. Nobilissima | scientiarum est illa, quae est sui gratia. Talis autem est speculativa, speculativa ergo est nobilissima scientiarum. Haec scientia est nobilissima, ergo est speculativa.

[3] Tertio sic. PHILOSOPHUS VI *Metaphysicae*: si aliquod ens est sempiternum et immobile et absolutum a materia, manifestum est quod cognitio illius est in aliqua scientia speculativa,[19] ubi videtur dicere quod cognitio sempiterni
M 11rb et immobilis semper est cognitio speculativa | et non practica. Sed obiectum,
V 12rb circa quod versatur haec scientia, est sempiternum et im|mobile, ergo est speculativa et non practica.

13–14 et causationis] *om.* FM 29–30 ubi … speculativa] B *hom.* 30 est] *super.* FM

18 BOETHIUS, *De Trin.* c. 2, ed. MORESCHINI, pp. 168, 68–169, 78.

19 Cf. ARISTOT., *Metaph.* VI c. 1, AL 25 3.2, pp. 126, 45; 1026a 15.

[4] Ad oppositum. Illa scientia est practica, cuius finis est bonum intellectus practici. Sed haec scientia est huiusmodi. Unde AUGUSTINUS I *De doctrina christiana*: "legis et omnium divinarum scripturarum finis et plenitudo dilectio est, qua fruendum est"[20] etc.

[5] Secundo sic. Sacra Scriptura lex divina est. Unde et dividitur penes legem veteris testamenti et novi. Sed lex pertinet ad scientiam practicam, ergo etc.

[6] Tertio sic. Practica ad agendam vitam et mores pertinet. Sed haec scientia ordinatur ad actionem. Iacobi I: "estote factores verbi",[21] ergo est practica.

[7] Circa hanc quaestionem tria sunt videnda: primo videbitur quid est praxis sive operatio, a qua dicitur scientia practica, secundo videbitur quid certum est in quaestione, tertio videbitur in quo est dubium quaestionis.

⟨Articulus 1⟩

[8] Quantum ad primum communiter dicitur quod praxis, a qua dicitur scientia practica, est operatio | alterius potentiae quam sit intellectus, per quam operationem potest poni in effectu illud, quod concipitur ab intellectu. B 12^{rb}

[9] Hoc commune dictum patet sic. Habitus practicus est habitus protensus. Protensio autem est ex hoc quod scientia practica est directiva alterius operationis quam sit operatio intellectus. Haec autem operatio, cuius est directiva, potest esse operatio appetitus vel motivae potentiae. Et ideo ponitur duplex habitus practicus: unus est activus dirigens ipsum appetitum, ut appetat debita media ad debitum, et talis habitus est prudentia; alius est habitus factivus, sicut ars regulans potentiam motivam ut introducat debitum effectum, sicut domum vel aliquid simile. Sic ergo haec operatio est alterius potentiae quam intellectus. Hoc videtur confirmari per PHILOSOPHUM III *De anima*, ubi dicit quod agere secundum intellectum practicum est alterius potentiae. Certum est autem quod agere secundum habitum practicum dicit praxim, ergo praxis est alterius potentiae. Confirmatur etiam hoc per ARISTOTELEM VI *Ethicorum*, ubi dicit quod electio non est recta, nisi praecedat ratio recta,[22] ubi innuit quod operatio sive praxis, quam vocat hic electionem, est operatio alte-

2 huiusmodi] *marg.* FM 18–19 intellectus ... operatio] P *hom.*

20 AUGUST., *De doc. chr.* I cc. 35, 39, CCSL 32, pp. 29, 2–4.

21 Iac. 1, 22.

22 Cf. ARISTOT., *Eth. nic.* VI c. 3, AL 26 1–3, 4, pp. 479, 14–16; 1139^{a} 22–25.

rius potentiae quam intellectus consentanee tamen se habens ad rationem rectam. Sic ergo hoc dictum commune ponit quod praxis est operatio alterius potentiae quam intellectus.

[10] Secundo debet esse in potestate operantis. Cuius ratio est, quia, sicut dictum est VI *Metaphysicae*: "voluntatum et artificiatum idem sunt"[23] in forma, quasi dicat commune PHILOSOPHUS, sicut exponit eum COMMENTATOR:
F 11va "principium operabilium practicorum est voluntas."[24] Si autem voluntas | est principium, oportet quod operatio sit in potestate operantis, quia voluntas libera est. Sic ergo proprie operatio ista, a qua dicitur scientia practica, est operatio voluntatis, qua voluntas vel vult in se, vel imperat aliis potentiis. Sic ergo hoc est unum dictum ad primum articulum. Videtur tamen mihi posse dici quod etiam operatio illa, a qua dicitur scientia practica, est operatio habi-
P 14va tus practici, | extendendo largo modo operationem ad directionem, quam facit habitus practicus respectu operationum practicarum. Hoc patet triplici via. Prima via est, quia COMMENTATOR ut communiter vocat habitum practicum habitum factivum sive activum, quod non esset, nisi habitus haberet aliquam rationem causationis.

[11] Secunda via est, quia Philosophus VII *Metaphysicae* dicit quod in artificialibus a specie, quae est in anima, fit species in natura,[25] ita quod entia in conceptu sunt causa entium in effectu. Videtur enim Philosophus intelligere quod ens in conceptu causat ens in effectu, non solum reducendo ad causam formalem, sed etiam ad causam efficientem, ita quod ratio digirens et voluntas imperans et motiva, exequens integrant unam perfectam rationem causationis.

[12] Tertia via potest accipi ex communi dicto. Commune enim dictum est
V 12va quod quaedam sunt ab intellectu, | quaedam a natura, quod non esset verum, nisi intellectus et habitus practicus haberent aliquam rationem causationis.

[13] Visis his satis patet primum declarandum.

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1 consentanee] confesse F *marg.* 6 commune] *om.* FM 11 unum] verum P 11–12 ad ... etiam] *om.* FM 15 Prima ... est] *om.* BPV 21 reducendo] reducitur FP deducendo M 27 haberent] habentur P haberentur V

23 ARISTOT., *Metaph.* I c. 1, Iunctina 8, f. 144C.

24 AVERROES, *In Met.* VI comm. 1, Iunctina 8, f. 145A.

25 Cf. ARISTOT., *Metaph.* VII c. 7, AL 25 3.2, pp. 143, 314–315; 1031b 1–2.

⟨Articulus 2⟩

[14] Secundo videndum | est quid certum est in hac quaestione. Certum est M 11va
in hac quaestione quod in ea est aliquid speculabile et aliquid agibile. Quod autem in ea sit aliquid speculabile non agibile a nobis patet, quia haec scientia est de his, quae sunt fidei. Multa autem sunt sub fide, quae sunt pure speculabilia non agibilia a nobis, puta Deum esse trinum et unum et similia.

[15] Quod etiam sint ibi multa agibilia a nobis patet primo sic, quia haec scientia in aliqua sui parte est praeceptiva et prohibitiva. Sed praeceptum et prohibitio non respiciunt nisi agibile, et non agibile. Ergo haec scientia est circa agibilia.

[16] Secundo sic.[26] Laudare est actus habitus practici. Sed haec scientia in aliqua sui parte praecipit laudem Dei. Ergo in aliqua sui parte respicit habitum practicum et per consequens agibile. Minor, scilicet quod haec scientia praecipit laudem, patuit cuilibet scienti hanc scientiam. Maior, scilicet quod laudare pertineat ad actum practicum, patet, quia omnis actus imperatus a virtute morali respicit praxim. Sed laudare est actus imperatus a iustitia. Ergo respicit habitum practicum. Quod laudare sit habitus imperatus a iustitia patet, quia est actus, qui Deo debetur. Iustitia autem respicit rationem debiti.

[17] Tertio patet quod sit de agibilibus sic: omnis scientia, quae in aliqua sui parte inducit exempla | imitabilia, respicit rationem agibilis. Ad hoc enim indu- B 12va
cit ut agamus. Maior probata est, sed haec scientia inducit exempla imitabilia, ergo etc.

[18] Certum est ergo quod haec scientia et concernit non agibilia et concernit agibilia. Tantum de secundo declarando. Tertium oritur ex secundo.

⟨Articulus 3⟩

[19] Ex quo enim haec scientia concernit rationem pure speculabilis et rationem agibilis, videtur quod concernat rationem practici et speculativi. Et ideo dubium est quid horum sit, scilicet speculativa vel practica. Ad hoc autem dubium ad modum sunt multi modi dicendi.

[20] Unus modus est quod est simpliciter speculativa, quia licet haec scientia ordinetur ad speculationem veri et ad actionem boni, tamen debet dici

2 quid … quastione] quod FM 3 quaestione] certum est in hac quaestione *iter.* V

26 Cf. Gonsalvi Hispani *Quaestiones disputatae et de Quodlibet* q. 5, ed. L. Amorós, Bibliotheca Franciscana Scholastica Medii Aevi 9 (Quaraccchi 1935), pp. 69–86.

P 14vb speculativa. | Ad hoc potest esse duplex persuasio. Prima est talis. Haec scientia non debet dici practica nisi quatinus determinat de moribus. Sed hoc non dat
F 11vb sibi praxim, ergo etc. Maior patet per praecedentia. Minor probatur, | quia licet haec scientia determinet de moribus, tamen ibi non sistit nec ibi est finis suus principalis, sed magis finis principalis est speculatio veri. Magis enim in hac scientia est actio boni propter speculationem veri quam econverso. Haec enim scientia ideo praecipit mores et actiones bonas, ut oculus mentis serenetur et purificetur, ut purificatus intueatur Deum. De hoc Augustinus in sermone *De Iacob et Esau* sic dicit: "Tota operatio nostra in hac vita est sanare oculum cordis, unde videatur Deus. Ad hoc sacrosancta mysteria celebrantur, ad hoc sermo Dei praedicatur, ad hoc exhortationes Ecclesiae morales ad corrigendos mores ad emendandas carnales concupiscentias. Ad hoc agunt quidquid agunt divinae sanctaeque Scripturae, ut purgetur illud interius ab ea re, quae nos impedit ab aspectu".[27] Haec Augustinus. Sic ergo secundum istos, cum
V 12vb speculatio veri sit ultimus finis istius scientiae, ab eo fine principaliter dicetur | speculativa, non obstante quod sit de moribus.

[21] Secunda persuasio potest esse talis. Haec scientia non dicitur practica, nisi quia instruit mores vel quia hortatur ad dilectionem Dei. Nec primum, nec secundum facit eam practicam, ergo etc. Non primum, ut iam patuit in ratione praecedenti. Nec secundum, quia dilectio Dei non faceret hanc scientiam esse practicam, nisi quatinus est operatio voluntatis, ad quam protenditur habitus intellectivus dictans talem dilectionem. Nam ut probatum est, habitus practicus est habitus protensus non solum ad scire, sed etiam ad operationem alterius potentiae. Sed ista operatio voluntatis non facit eam practicam, quia operatio voluntatis est duplex et per consequens duplex est speculatio correspondens huic duplici operationi. Quaedam est enim operatio, quae a voluntate imperatur, qua actione voluntas extendit se ad aliquid extra. Et hoc est actio directa in finem. Speculatio autem correspondens actioni huic est speculatio regulans et dirigens hanc actionem. Secunda operatio voluntatis est, qua voluntas unitur ipsi fini. Et haec est operatio perfecta. Speculatio autem respondens huic actioni est speculatio, qua intellectus ostendit finem ipsi voluntati, ut tendat in ipsum in praesenti amore imperfecto, in futuro autem uniatur ipsi bono amato amore perfectissimo. Speculatio respondens huic primae operationi practica est. Et hoc, quia omnis speculatio directiva actionum videtur esse practica. Haec autem est huiusmodi, ut iam dictum est, ergo etc. Licet autem haec specu-

5 principalis] principaliter FM | finis] simpliciter *add.* P | principalis] principaliter FM 27 aliquid] aliquod BM

27 August., *Sermo 88*, 5, PL 38, 542.

latio sit practica, tamen non facit hanc scientiam | esse practicam, quia non est M 11^{vb}
finis ultimus, sed finis sub fine. Ad hoc enim sunt actiones morales et speculationes dirigentes has actiones, ut voluntas possit consequi ultimum finem.

[22] Secundi speculatio non est practica. Et hoc, quia non est ad aliquam directionem sive regulationem, sed solum ad hoc ut ostendat voluntati ultimum finem, cui coniungatur per dilectionem | et amorem. Et quia haec speculatio non est practica, quamvis ordinetur ad dilectionem, ideo non largitur huic scientiae quod sit practica. Prima ergo non largitur nec secunda, quamvis ordinetur ad dilectionem Dei, ergo haec scientia practica non est. Speculatio P 15ra
enim secunda | bene largitur huic scientiae quod sit sapientia, quasi a sapore, B 12^{vb}
quia illuminat intellectum et inflammat affectum, non tamen sibi largitur quod sit practica. Hic est ergo unus modus dicendi.

[23] Contra quem sic potest argui. Recte concupiscere et recte audere et iuste distribuere subintrant praxim. Et speculatio ad has actiones ordinata practica est, ergo multo magis recte amare subintrat praxim. Et speculatio ad hoc ordianta practica | est. Sed amare Deum super omnia est quoddam rectissimum amare, ergo actio practica est et per consequens cognitio, quae respicit F 12ra
hunc amorem, practica est. Et talis est cognitio huius scientiae, sive ergo haec cognitio sit circa actiones, quae sunt ad finem, sive circa amorem ipsius finis, semper practica est.

[24] Secundo sic. Illa virtus, quae est maxime operativa, est maxime practica. Caritas est cognitio maxime operativa, ergo maxime practica. Cognitio ergo, quae ordinatur ad caritatem, videtur quod practica sit. Haec autem est huiusmodi, Maior patet, quia ex quo praxis dicit operationem, virtus maxime operativa est maxime practica. Minor probatur, quia caritas imperat actum aliarum virtutum. | Unde 1 *Ad Corinthios*: "Caritas omnia credit, omnia imperat, V 13ra
patiens est, benigna est"[28] etc. Intelligemus enim quod caritas est amor finis et quia amor finis, ideo imperat omnem actum ordinatum ad hunc finem, et per consequens est maxime operativa, eo ipso ergo quod est circa finem sequitur quod cognitio eam respiciens est practica. Falsum est ergo dicere quod cognitio ostendens finem amandum non sit practica.

[25] Tertio sic. Operatio caritatis non est operatio elicita ab intellectu, sed est operatio voluntatis. Ex hoc, sicut dictum est in primo articulo, operatio,

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2 enim] autem FM 4 Secundi] Secunda FM 5 hoc] est *add.* FM P *lacuna* 8 quod sit practica] *om.* V 21–22 est maxime … practica] *om.* V Caritas … practica] F *hom.* M *marg.* 26 imperat] sperat B 30 eam respiciens … cognitio] V *hom.* 32–386.1 sed est … facit] *om.* P 33 sicut] enim ut FM

28 1 Cor 13, 3–4. Vulg. sperat *loco* imperat.

M 12ra quae facit praxim, est alterius potentiae quam intellectus et est in potestate | operantis. Operatio caritatis est huiusmodi. Videtur ergo quod ipsa sufficiat ad faciendum cognitionem, quae dictat actum eius esse practicum. Hic ergo modus non stat.

[26] Ad primum argumentum, quando dicitur quod mores instruuntur in hac scientia ut sanetur oculus cordis, quo Deus videatur, diceret adversarius hoc esse verum, tamen ex hoc non arguitur quod sit speculativa, quia in tali sanitate oculi vel visione non est finis huius scientiae vel status. Sed finis eius est ut desideretur et ametur id, quod visum est. Ad hoc enim sanatur oculus mentis ut clareat nobis obiectum et clarefactum magis ametur.

[27] Ad secundum patet per praedicta, quia, ut ostensum est, caritas respectu finis practica est, quia est maxime operativa et etiam quia respicit operationem alterius potentiae quam intellectus, scilicet voluntas, ideo facit quod cognitio eam respiciens sit practica.

[28] Secundus modus dicendi est aliquorum,[29] qui dicunt eam esse affectivam. Ad hoc potest esse una persuasio talis. Illa scientia, cuius finis est considerare, est speculativa. Illa autem, cuius finis est agere, est practica. Ergo illa, cuius finis est diligere, est affectiva. Haec est huiusmodi, quia secundum Augusti-
P 15rb num | i *De doctrina christiana*: "finis legis et omnium divinarum scripturarum dilectio Dei est" etc., quasi dicat haec positio: tres actus faciunt tres fines et per consequens tres fines, et per consequens tres scientias; considerare, agere et diligere sunt tres actus, ergo faciunt tres scientias, scilicet speculativam, practicam et affectivam.

[29] Hic modus dicendi in hoc peccat, quia ponit medium inter scientiam practicam et speculativam. Arguo enim sic. Inter illam scientiam, cuius finis non est usus, sed scire, et illam, cuius finis est usus, non est medium. Sed speculativa et practica sunt huiusmodi, ergo etc. Intelligemus ergo quod inter obiectum scientiae speculativae, quod non est operabile a nobis, et obiectum scientiae practicae, quod est operabile, non est dare medium, et per consequens non est dare medium inter scientiam speculativam et practicam.

[30] Secundo sic. Diligere est quoddam agere alterius potentiae quam intellectus, scilicet ipsius voluntatis, et est in potestate operantis. Sufficit ergo ad faciendum scientiam practicam per praedicta. Nulla ergo imaginatio est imaginari quod diligere dividatur contra agere. Sicut enim species non dividitur

3 esse practicum] omnem practicam V 13 voluntas] voluntatis FM 21 fines ... tres] FM *hom.* 21–22 considerare ... scientias] FMV *hom.* 27–28 sunt huiusmodi ... quod] *om.* V

29 Cf. Aegidius Romanus, *Super primo Sententiarum opus* prol. 4 a. u. corp. (ed. Venetiis 1521), f. 7Psqq.

contra genus, sic nec diligere contra agere; sicut ergo temperate agere et iuste et fortiter, quae non exeunt actiones practicas, et | cognitio eas respiciens est practica, ita similiter recte diligere et recte amare non exit actionem practicam, et cognitio sibi respondens est | practica. B 13ra F 12rb

[31] Tertio sic. Sicut caritas respicit appetitum, ita et virtutes morales. Suo enim modo ita afficiunt heae virtutes affectum sicut et caritas. Immo AUGUSTINUS *De moribus ecclesiae* vocat quattuor virtutes quosdam amores, quia iustitia nihil est, ut videtur, nisi quaedam modificata affectio vel modificatus amor ad aequaliter distribuendum, et temperantia quaedam modificata affectio circa obiectum gustus et tactus. Si ergo cognitio correspondens caritati est affectiva, quia caritas est quaedam affectio, ita videtur quod cognitio correspondens aliis virtutibus moralibus sit affectiva, quia istae virtutes sunt quaedam affectiones.[30] Et sicut non obstante quod heae virtutes sunt affectiones cognitio eis correspondens est practica, ita non obstante quod caritas sit affectio cognitio ei respondens erit practica.

[32] Hic ergo | modus dicendi non potest stare. Argumentum parum cogit, quia imaginatur quod diligere faciat aliud genus scientiae ab ipso agere, quod est falsum. Diligere enim est quoddam agere, diligere etiam Deum propter se et super omnia est quaedam rectitudo appetitus. Cognitio autem, quae est protensa ad rectitudinem | appetitus, est practica. V 13rb M 12rb

[33] Tertius modus dicendi[31] est quod haec scientia est simpliciter practica et simpliciter speculativa. Et hoc, quia est de pure speculabilibus et agibilibus a nobis, ut dictum est in secundo articulo.

[34] Imaginatur enim haec opinio vel potest imaginari duo. Primum est quod sicut scientia philosophorum et infidelium dividitur per contemplativum et practicum, ita et vita fidelium et scientia dividitur per vitam contemplativam et activam, ita quod vita contemplativa vacet circa pure speculabilia, vita autem activa circa agibilia. Secundum, quod posset imaginari, est quod haec scientia sit simpliciter practica et speculativa, tamen est una propter unitatem luminis. Infra enim unum lumen fidei continetur scientia, quae est de speculabilibus et agibilibus, nam fidelium est considerare ea, quae sunt pure speculabilia, et etiam agere illa, quae | ordinantur meritorie ad assecutionem vitae futurae. P 15va

1 sicut ergo … agere] BPV *hom.* 5 sic] *om.* FM 10–11 caritati … correspondens] BV *hom.* 13 sicut] sic VM

30 AUGUST., *De moribus Ecclesiae* I, PL 32, 1322.

31 Cf. GODEFRIDUS DE FONTIBUS, *Quodl. XIII* q. 1 corp., ed. J. HOFFMANS, PB 5 fasc. 3–4 (Louvain 1935), pp. 174 sqq.

[35] Hic modus dicendi quantum ad hoc quod dicit quod haec scientia continet agibilia et speculabilia verum dicit, ut patet in secundo articulo, peccat tamen primo in prima imaginatione, quia vita contemplativa fidelium non spectat ad puram speculationem. Sic enim arguo: id, quod concernit praxim, magis spectat ad scientiam practicam quam speculativam, vita contemplativa concernit praxim, ergo etc. Maior patet per dicta. Minor probatur per GREGORIUM *Super Ezechielem* parte II, homilia 3, sic dicentem: "Activa vita est panem esurienti tribuere, verbum sapientiae nescientem docere, ad humilitatis viam superbientem proximum revocare, infirmitatis curam gerere, quae singulis, quibusque expediunt, dispensare et nobis commissis qualiter subsistere valeant providere. Contemplativa vero vita est caritatem Dei et proximi tota mente retinere, ab exteriori actione quiescere etc.".[32] Haec GREGORIUS. In quibus verbis innuit GREGORIUS quod contemplativa vita concernit praxim voluntatis, quando dicit quod contemplativa vita debet retinere caritatem Dei et proximi et per consequens pertinet ad scientiam practicam.

[36] Secundo peccat hic modus ponendi, quando probat quod scientia practica et scientia speculativa theologiae sunt una scientia propter unitatem luminis. Unitas enim luminis non sufficit ad faciendum unitatem | scientiae. Alias F 12va si hoc sufficeret, geometria et arithmetica essent una scientia, quia innituntur uni lumini naturali. Illud enim idem lumen, quod dicit continuum esse divisibile in infinitum quantum ad continuum geometricum, dicit numerum parem esse divisibilem per duo aequalia quantum ad arithmeticam. Intelligemus enim quod lumen est sicut causa universalis scientiarum, quaelibet autem scientia sicut fulgor particularis huius luminis. Non autem sequitur quod si effectus uniantur in causa universali, quod uniantur inter se. | Existente ergo L 13rb unitate in lumine potest esse magna diversitas in scientiis.

[37] Ultimus modus dicendi, qui videtur mihi probabilis, est quod haec scientia habet aliquid de speculabili et aliquid de agibili, sicut dicit praecedens positio. Et ideo aliquid habet de speculativo et aliquid de practico. Magis tamen est practica quam speculativa.

[38] Ad cuius evidentiam duo praemitto. Primum est quod acquisitio scientialis est sicut quaedam generatio. Sicut enim in natura per generationem acquiritur | ens in effectu, ita in acquisitione scientiali acquiritur ens in con- V 13va ceptu. Et signum huius est, quia sicut naturalis distinguit materiam, agens perficiens materiam, et ipsum compositum sive formam factam de materia, ita

18 Unitas ... luminis] V *hom.* 19 quia] quae P 33 scientiali] scientiarum FM

32 GREGORIUS MAGNUS, *Homiliae in Hiezechihelem prophetam* II 2.8, CCSL 142, pp. 230, 187–193.

PHILOSOPHUS III *De anima*[33] ponit intellectum possibilem, qui assimilatur materiae, et intellectum agentem, qui in acquisitione scientiali assimilatur illi, quod agit in generatione naturali, et intellectum in actu | scientifico, qui assimilatur generato in naturalibus. M 12va

[39] Secundum, quod est praemittendum, est quod licet secundum communiter dicentes idem sit subiectum in scientiis et obiectum, tamen ita possumus distinguere inter subiectum in scientia et obiectum, sicut distinguimus inter subiectum et obiectum generationis. Subiectum enim in generatione est illud, quod generationi supponitur, cuius perfectio et complementum quaeritur. Obiectum autem evidens est ipsum subiectum iam perfectum, quod vocatur compositum in VII *Metaphysicae*,[34] ita in scientia id, quod supponitur ut explicabile et quasi in potentia ad explicationem scientialem, est subiectum. Ipsum autem ut explicatum et quasi deductum ad actum est obiectum. Et ideo obiectum huiusmodi quasi est compositum | ex subiecto et explicatione facta. P 15vb

[40] Et si dicatur quod ista explicatio est in intellectu subiective, et non in ipso obiecto, dicendum est quod sic arguens est in aequivoco, nam explicatio accipitur duobus modis, quia uno modo idem est quod ipse actus intellectus. Et de ista non est dubium quod est subiective in intellectu. Et de ista intellexi superius, quando dixi quod intellectus in actu est quasi quid compositum ex ipso intellectu possibili et actu intelligendi. Alio modo explicatio idem est quod ens intentionis tenens se ex parte obiecti. Hoc enim modo dicimus quod unus duorum intelligentium unum et idem obiectum intelligit explicatiori modo quam alius, quia sub pluribus intentionibus vel rationibus. Unum autem istorum sequitur ad aliud, quia quando intellectus habet obiectum explicatiori modo, et obiectum est sibi repraesentatum sub pluribus rationibus.

Tertio ex his duobus patet, quod intendimus, nam haec scientia supponit suum subiectum, scilicet Deum esse, quaerit autem explicationem eiusdem tamquam obiectum ex dictis. In explicando autem aliqua explicat, quae videntur habere rationem speculabilis, sicut quando explicando probat Deum esse summe intelligentem et summe volentem et Deum esse omnipotentem. Aliqua autem explicat, quae includunt rationem agibilis a nobis, sicut quando innuit implicite vel explicite ipsum esse laudabilem vel exhortabilem vel amabilem. Et sic de similibus. Quia ergo prima ratio, scilicet speculabilis, magis quaeritur propter secundam quam econverso, ideo haec scientia magis est practica quam

5 est] *om.* FM 6 et obiectum] *om.* FM 10 evidens] *om.* FM 14 huiusmodi] hic B 15 explicatio] facta *add.* B 26 Tertio] Tertium V | quod] quia P 32 vel exhortabilem] *om.* P

33 ARISTOT., *De an.* III c. 5, 430a 10 sqq.

34 ARISTOT, *Metaph.* VII c. 17, AL 25 3.2, pp. 167, 932–935; 1041b 12–15.

F 12vb speculativa. Ideo enim haec scientia quaerit speculabilia de isto | subiecto ut ipsis explicatis clareat eminentia eius, propter quam eminentiam summe desideretur et summe ametur et summe laudetur. Et ideo communiter sancti ponunt rationem agibilis esse finem speculabilium in ista scientia, ita quod hoc est propter illud, non econverso. Unde AUGUSTINUS II *De Trinitate*: "Creatura et Scriptura ad hoc sunt ut ipse quaeratur, ipse diligatur, qui et illam creavit et istam inspiravit",[35] quasi dicat AUGUSTINUS: Scriptura semper est vel ad quaerendum Deum per desiderium vel ad fruendum ipso per amorem.

[41] Ex his patet quod quamvis haec scientia includat practicum et speculativum, tamen potest dici una non solum ratione luminis, sicut dicebat praecedens opinio, sed aliquo modo ratione subiecti, cuius aliquando quaerimus rationem speculabilis, aliquando propter rationem agibilis, non quia subiectum agamus, quia necessarium est, sed quia circa subiectum quaerimus aliV 13vb quam rationem, quae requirit actum practicum ex parte nostra, sicut | ratio B 13va amabilis requirit a|morem et ratio laudabilis laudem. Amare autem et laudare sunt actus practici. Dicitur autem actus laudandi practicus, quia imperatus a virtute practica et etiam a ratione, quae est consona appetitui recto. Amare autem Deum super omnia est actus practicus, quia est a virtute summe operativa, scilicet caritate. Est etiam una propter ordinem, qui est in ea, quia, ut dictum est, ratio speculabilis ordinatur ad rationem agendi.

[42] His dictis ad quaestionem, ad primum argumentum, quando dicit BOETHIUS quod tres sunt partes scientiae speculativae, scilicet naturalis, mathe-
M 12vb matica et theologia, dicendum est quod loquitur | de theologia quantum ad id, quod est speculabile in ea. Et hoc patet, quia probat eam esse speculativam, inquantum est de subiecto immateriali, quod caret motu et materia. Hoc etiam patet, quia dicit quod ista scientia speculatur ipsam formam in se, quae
P 16ra est ipsum esse. Probare autem de Deo quod ipse est suum esse non deductum | ab alio est pure speculabile.

[43] Ad secundum, quando dicitur quod nobilissima scientiarum est speculativa, dicendum est quod esse nobilissimum est duobus modis. Vel ex parte modi, et sic speculativa videtur esse nobilior, quia procedit per modum magis necessarium et per rationes magis firmas, quae sunt circa necessarium. Ex parte autem obiecti non est impossibile quod aliqua practica, quam numquam vidit PHILOSOPHUS, sit nobilissima, quia quaerit explicationem nobilissimi subiecti, ut pateat eminentia eius ut ex hoc magis desideretur et ametur.

14 requirit] quaerit FM 27 autem] *om.* FM 32 et per … necessarium] FM *hom.*

35 AUGUST., *De Trin.* II c. 1 proem., CCSL 50, pp. 80, 16–19.

[44] Ad tertium, quando dicitur quod illa scientia, quae est circa abstracta et immaterialia, est speculativa, dicendum est quod argumentum non plus probat, nisi quod haec scientia habet aliquam rationem speculativi, sed quod principaliter non.

⟨Anonymi
Commentarius in Sententias
Prologus, Quaestio 3⟩

[1] Tertio quaeritur de causa finali. Et quia omnis scientia aut est gratia speculationis, aut ut boni fiamus, ut dicitur II libro *Metaphysicae*, quaeritur cuius finis gratia sit ista scientia.

[2] Et videtur quod sit ut boni fiamus, quia omnis doctrina, quae convenit cum virtute in obiecto est ut boni fiamus. Sed haec doctrina est talis, quia est de credibili, de quo est fides, ergo etc.

[3] Contra. MAGISTER dicit in littera quod finis sive intentio sua est theologicarum inquisitionum abdita pandere. Sed hoc pertinet ad eam, cuius finis speculatio. Ergo est gratia speculationis.

[4] Respondeo. Dicendum quod denominatio scientiae debet fieri a fine, non a fine ultimo, quia tunc omnes scientiae essent speculativae. Vult enim PHILOSOPHUS quod practicae ordinentur ad beatitudinem, quae {verbum illegibile} consistit in speculatione, ergo debet fieri a fine propinquo, aut igitur a fine intento ab addiscente, aut a fine acquisito per scientiam. Non a fine intento ab addiscente, quia tunc omnes possent dici speculativae. Posset enim etiam practicas addiscere propter istum finem, ut scilicet sciret. Ergo a fine acquisito per scientiam debet fieri denominatio.

[5] Et quia aliquae scientiae perficiunt intellectum in se, non inclinando ipsum ad voluntatem, nec ad opus, ideo tales dicuntur speculativae; aliquae perficiunt intellectum, prout extenditur ad opus extrinsecum, ideo tales dicuntur practicae, sive morales. Et tales sunt proprie ut boni fiamus.

[6] Nota quod intellectum extendi nihil aliud est nisi illud, quod intelligimus, dirigere vel regulare in opus suum ad affectum vel effectum. Aliae perficiunt intellectum ut extenditur ad affectum, sive ad opus intrinsecum, scilicet ad amorem. Et tales per prius dicuntur practicae et per prius speculativae. Et talis habitus dicitur sapientia et complectitur affectionem et cognitionem. Et talis cognitio traditur in hoc libro. Et quod talis cognitio habeat movere affectum videtur, nam haec cognitio quod Christus pro nobis mortuus est et consimiles, nisi homo sit multum durus, movet ad amorem; non sic ista quod diameter est asymetra costae.

[7] Ad illud quod obicitur dicendum quod ibi non est status, quia illa revelatio | ordinatur ad affectum.
3rb

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PART 2

The Quodlibet *of John Duns Scotus*

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11

The Adequacy of Production according to Duns Scotus

Wouter Goris

1. In the trinitarian theology of Duns Scotus, the conception of the adequacy of production accounts for the singularity of the divine processions and their completeness. But this conception, viz. that an adequate production results in one unique effect, is not only important for Scotus's theory of trinitarian processions. This same idea also underlies Duns Scotus's influential doctrine of the first adequate object of the human intellect. To the precise extent in which 'production' differs from 'operation', i.e. in so far as the effect does or does not differ from the act in which it is produced, the human intellect has a first adequate object defining the scope of its non-transient operation. This connection is reflected by the fact that Scotus, when introducing the first adequate object of the human intellect in the first book of the *Ordinatio*,[1] characterises the relevant notion of adequation as that of precise causation.[2] It is this meaning

1 See *Ord.* I d. 3 p. 1 q. 1–2 n. 69–70, ed. Vat. 3, pp. 48–49: "Ad secundam quaestionem dico quod triplex est ordo intelligibilium in proposito: unus est ordo originis sive secundum generationem, alius est ordo perfectionis, tertius est ordo adaequationis sive causalitatis praecisae. De duabus primis primitatibus habetur IX *Metaphysicae* cap. 7 b: 'Quae sunt priora secundum generationem, sunt posteriora secundum substantiam'. De tertia prioritate habetur I *Posteriorum*, in definitione 'universalis', quia 'primo' ibi dicit praecisionem sive adaequationem."

2 In the *Lectura Oxoniensis*, Duns Scotus traces the idea of precise causality to *APost* A 13, $78^{b}15$–22, to capture the idea that, if the negation is the cause of the absence of something, then the affirmation is the cause of its presence. See *Lect. Ox.* I d. 13 q. un. n. 13, ed. Vat. 17, pp. 532–533. Precise causality results in one single effect that is adequate to the capacity of the cause. In tandem with the idea of 'primary belonging' (*APost* A 4–5), precise and adequate causality indicates such an inherence of the predicate in the subject that there is nothing in the subject that is not the cause of the predicate, and *vice versa*. See *Lect. Ox.* II d. 2 p. 2 q. 5–6 n. 336–337, ed. Vat. 18, p. 202. On the level of adequate representation, precise causality introduces a further unicity, for where there is *una formalis ratio agendi*, the *effectus productus* is *unius rationis*. If some predicate, therefore, belongs to something according to a *ratio praecisa*, in everything to which this *ratio praecisa* belongs in some way, the predicate inheres in the same way; see *Lect. Ox.* II d. 2 p. 2 q. 5–6, ed. Vat. 18, pp. 216–217. Here we retrieve the exact meaning of a first object adequate to the intellect as what indicates the *ratio praecisa* according to which objects are apprehended by the intellect and which must therefore be univocally predicated of these objects.

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of adequacy, viz. as precise causality, that is operative in Scotus's account of adequate production within the broader context of his doctrine of trinitarian processions.

As the present contribution will argue, the argumentative function of the idea of adequate production in Duns Scotus's trinitarian theology changes between its first version in the *Lectura Oxoniensis* and its ultimate formulation in the second question of the *Quodlibet*.[3] We will first present Scotus's original argument from the adequacy of production, such as it was formulated in the *Lectura Oxoniensis* and the *Ordinatio* (§ 1). We then turn to his revision of this argument (§ 2). On the basis of the Parisian lectures on the first book of the *Sentences*, Scotus revises his argument in later additions to the *Ordinatio*. In fact, he rejects the argument from the adequacy of production as ineffective and argues instead for the unicity of the products of trinitarian procession by means of his theory of individuation. The correlation between both problems, viz. the account for the impossibility of a plurality of divine productions of the same type and his search for a homogeneous explanation of the principle of individuation for finite and infinite reality, defines the final treatment of the adequacy of production in the second question of the *Quodlibet* (§ 3), parts of which had previously been debated at the occasion of Scotus's inception ceremony, viz. the magisterial dispute with William Peter Godinus on the principle of individuation (§ 4).

1 The Oxonian Doctrine of the Adequacy of Production

2. The conception of the adequacy of an effect to its productive principle engages aspects of univocal causation in the finite realm to render trinitarian procession in the divine realm intelligible to us. In reality, however, all causal processes in the finite realm are derived from and explained by trinitarian procession. As innertrinitarian production is the exemplary model from which Duns Scotus—just like other medieval authors—draws his explanation of finite causation, the adequacy of finite causation can be conceived as a deficient mode of the adequacy involved in divine production. By abstracting from

3 The discussion of the proof for the impossibility of more than one production of the same type in God in Wetter's otherwise very informative study on the trinitarian theology of Duns Scotus is hampered by the—at the time accepted, but—incorrect chronology of Scotus's works, as well as by its disregard of the relevant passages in the *Lectura Oxoniensis* and the *Ordinatio*. See Friedrich Wetter, *Die Trinitätslehre des Johannes Duns Scotus* (Münster i. W: Aschendorff, 1967), pp. 167–176.

the imperfections of finite causality, therefore, one acquires knowledge of its exemplar, viz. innertrinitarian procession.

Scotus bases his argument, namely that innertrinitarian production is the exemplary model for finite causation, on the adequacy of production. Upon the assumption that the divine intellect considers its primary object, viz. the divine essence, prior to its secundary objects, viz. creatures, it can be shown that the innertrinitarian processions precede any relation to creatures. For just like the divine intellect, as an infinite memory which has an infinite object present to itself, is sufficient to produce the divine word, viz. an "adequate infinite knowledge," before any comparison to the secundary object, in the same way the intellect represents the divine essence to the will, upon which representation the will engenders an "infinite love that is adequate to the divine essence." Hence, the "causality of the external producible presupposes this causality in the trinity."[4]

3. The difference between the adequacy of univocal causation and the adequacy involved in innertrinitarian procession can be determined in a more precise way. Both agree in the production of a first adequate term, while they differ in respect of the distinction between the producer and the formal aspect

4 See *Lect. Ox.* II d. 1 q. 1 n. 24, ed. Vat. 18, p. 9: "Praeterea, quando sunt plura obiecta alicuius intellectus, unum per se et essentiale et aliud secundarium et per accidens, prius respicit obiectum essentiale et primum quam secundarium; sed primum obiectum intellectus divini est essentia; ergo prius intellectus divinus operatur circa essentiam quam circa creaturam (quae est obiectum secundarium). Sed intellectus Patris in primo instanti est sufficiens ad producendum Verbum, quia est memoria infinita, habens obiectum infinitum sibi praesens; igitur sufficit ad producendum notitiam infinitam adaequatam, antequam comparetur ad obiectum secundarium.—Sic etiam arguitur de voluntate, quod sicut intellectus divinus prius potest intelligere essentiam quam creaturam, ita prius potest eam repraesentare voluntati, qua repraesentata, voluntas spirat Amorem infinitum adaequatum essentiae divinae.—Et ista sunt antequam intellectus divinus respiciat ad extra; igitur ante omne obiectum aliud productum, illa producentur. Cum igitur non est causalitas ad producendum creaturam, nisi quando potest, et non potest producere creaturam (ut probatum est) nisi productis personis ad intra,—sequitur quod causalitas producibilis ad extra praesupponit causalitatem illam esse in tribus." *Ord.* II d. 1 q. 1 n. 18, ed. Vat. 7, pp. 10–11. The claim that the trinitarian processions precede the divine knowledge of creatures is restricted to the Oxonian phase of Scotus's thought and has induced an extensive debate among his contemporaries. According to William of Alnwick, Scotus revised his position in the *Quodlibet*: "Sed quamvis haec dixerit quando Sententias legebat, oppositum tamen dicebat postquam fuit Magister, nam in tertio articulo solutionis primae quaestionis sui Quodlibet dicit …" Guillelmus de Alnwick, *Quodl.* q. 4, ed. A. Ledoux (Quaracchi: Collegium S. Bonaventurae, 1937), p. 315. I will deal with this issue in a separate publication.

which terminates the production.[5] A passage in the commentary on the fifth distinction of the first book of the *Lectura Oxoniensis* is illustrative in this regard. Scotus differentiates between 'generation' (of a different trinitarian per-

5 Russell Friedman, *Intellectual Traditions at the Medieval University. The Use of Philosophical Psychology in Trinitarian Theology among the Franciscans and Dominicans, 1250–1350*, 2 vols. (Leiden: Brill, 2013), vol. 1, pp. 377–378, esp. nt. 103, emphasizes the distinction between the first adequate and the formal term of production as a terminology introduced by Scotus and later on regarded to be associated with his ideas. This distinction is compatible with what Friedman claims is the most characteristic aspect of Scotus's trinitarian theology, viz. his rejection of the traditional relation account of personal distinction, and its substitution by an account of the persons as absolute realities. For this, see also Wetter, *Die Trinitätslehre des Johannes Duns Scotus*, pp. 283–342; Richard Cross, *Duns Scotus on God* (New York, NY: Routledge, 2005), p. 195 sqq. The question is how Scotus's development regarding the argument from the adequacy of production relates to his alleged retraction of the constitution of the divine persons by absolute realities, as reported by the *Liber Propugnatorius* (ed. Venetiis 1523), f. 100^{vb}: "In ista quaestione ponit doctor quandam opinionem tamquam probabilem quam cum ipse doceret Oxoniae compulsus est publice revocare." In agreement with Franz Pelster, "Thomas von Sutton O. Pr., ein Oxforder Verteidiger der thomistischen Lehre: II. Lehrmethode und Lehrrichtung des Thomas von Sutton," *Zeitschrift für katholische Theologie* 46 (1922), pp. 361–401, at p. 393, Friedman, *Intellectual Traditions at the Medieval University*, vol. 1, pp. 478–479, discards the alternative reading 'Coloniae' in the ms. Vat. Urbin. 120. And indeed, the Oxonian condemnation might be the reason why Scotus would omit, as Friedman, ibid., vol. 1, p. 375 indicates, the absolute realities in the Parisian lectures and qualify the constitution of the divine persons a matter of faith, not reason. At the same time, however, the role of the doctrine of individuation in the Parisian account of the impossibility of a plurality of production of the same type might also point to a certain continuation of the doctrine of absolute realities; see e.g. *Quodl.* q. 2 a. 1 n. 22, ed. Wad.-Viv. 25, p. 63: "… *quaecumque entitas, praecipue absoluta*, seipsa primo est in suo esse, quia seipsa primo recedit a non esse ad esse; quia licet multa concurrant ad suum esse, sicut materia ad esse formae et forma ad esse materiae, tamen nullum concurrens est sibi prima ratio essendi in suo esse; ergo seipsa primo est haec *et, per consequens, filiationem divinam esse hanc accipietur primo ex ratione filiationis talis*." (My italics, WG) I am undecided on the issue; further research could help clarifying the problem and decide upon its solution. The connection established in the present essay between the argument from the adequacy of production and the doctrine of individuation suggests that another development might be relevant, namely the substitution of the vocabulary of *realitas* or *entitas individualis* by that of *gradus individualis* to indicate the *haecceitas* as *differentia individualis*, which starts in the Parisian lectures and is fully unfolded in the later additions to the commentary on the seventh book of the *Metaphysics*; this vocabulary is present in the additions to *Ord.* I, d. 26, q. un., which defend Scotus's position (see e.g. ed. Vat. 6, p. 38, with reference to *Ord.* III d. 1; and the express argument that the intensive and extensive illimitation of the divine essence agrees with divine simplicity, ibid., p. 60). The point here is the correlation with the doctrine of unitive containment in the later works, which solves the conflict of accepting formal contents in the divine that are singular by themselves with divine simplicity. See Stephen D. Dumont, "The Question on Individuation in Scotus's 'Questiones super metaphysicam'," *in Via Scoti: Methodologica ad mentem Joannis Duns Scoti; Congressus Scotisticus Internationalis, Romae, 9–11 martii 1993*, ed. L. Sileo, vol. 1 (Roma: Edi-

son) and 'communication' of the divine essence, by distinguishing between the first adequate term of production and its formal term, viz. the formal aspect under which the production is terminated. In finite reality, these are the composite and the form respectively. The example of a standard case of univocal causality, viz. the communication of specifically the same form of fire, shows which aspects of the real distinction involved in causation must be varied, to express the proper modalities of innertrinitarian procession.

> In one way the form is truly the term of production, but the first adequate term is the composite. The producer hence has a relation to the first (term), which is adequate to the production, and to the form of the produced, which is the formal aspect by which the produced terminates the production. And although these are not really distinct actions, for by one action the producer relates (both) to the first term and to the formal term of the produced, which assumes being in something else, nevertheless the relation of the generating fire to the generated fire is real, and similarly the relation to the terminating form is real. Hence the relation of causality in respect of the composite and of the form is real, since here obtains a real distinction between the producer and the produced. But suppose that the fire would communicate the same form that it has: still the relation to the produced would be real, but since the form of the producer and of the produced would be (numerically) the same, the form would neither be caused by the fire, nor would the distinction between the communicated form and the communicating form be real—and hence fire would not have a real relation in respect of the communicated form; whence the relation would then be real, viz. of the composite to what generates, but not of the produced form.[6]

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zioni Antonianum, 1996), pp. 193–227, who concludes: "The question still remains why Scotus has there recast his doctrine in significantly different terms and to what philosophical advantage or disadvantage?" (ibid., p. 221). Friedman emphasizes that the model used by Scotus to explain trinitarian relations is that of individuation in created things; see Friedman, *Intellectual Traditions at the Medieval University*, vol. 1, p. 379.

6 *Lect. Ox.* I, d. 5, p. 1, q. un., n. 29, ed. Vat. 16, pp. 420–421: "Uno ergo modo forma vere est terminus productionis, sed tamen terminus primus adaequatus est ipsum compositum. Producens ergo habet habitudinem ad primum, productioni adaequatum, et ad formam producti, quae est formalis ratio qua productum terminat productionem. Et licet non sit haec alia et alia actio realiter, quia una actione comparatur ad primum terminum et ad terminum formalem producti, qui capit esse in alio, relatio tamen ignis generantis ad ignem generatum est realis,—et similiter relatio ad formam terminantem est realis. Unde relatio causalitatis respectu compositi et respectu fornae est realis, quia ibi est realis distinctio inter producens et productum.

The most perfect type of causation in the finite realm is the communication of specifically the same form (e.g. fire) to something else—the torch transmits the fire to the wood. But not only is the supposit to which the form is transmitted (the wood) really distinct from the agent (the torch), the form itself is not numerically the same either. In finite reality, therefore, perfect production associates with two real distinctions, viz. the agent's real distinction from both the first adequate term (the burning wood) and the formal term (fire) of production. Upon the assumption, however, that fire would communicate numerically the same form which it possesses, it would only have a real relation to the first adequate term of the production, and not to the formal aspect under which the production is terminated. This is the model, according to Scotus, to understand production in the divine realm. For there is truly action, in the sense of the communication of the divine essence, such that there is a real relation and real distinction between the producer and the first produced (viz., the trinitarian person), but not between the producer and the formal term of the produced (viz., the divine essence), which does not assume new being.

Hence, two aspects of adequacy stand out in Scotus's discussion of trinitarian relations: communication (of the essence) and singularization (of the persons).[7] The communication of the identical divine nature accords with the unicity of the adequate term of production, which accounts for the distinction between the divine persons. Both aspects converge in the seventh distinction of the first book of the *Lectura Oxoniensis*, where Scotus characterizes the perfection of innertrinitarian production as an adequate communication producing an adequate term that exhausts the productive power. Such adequate communication in a strict sense, which argues the unicity of an effect adequate to its cause, is absent in finite causation.

> It is a sign of imperfection in the communicative principle to communicate something different from itself and not itself, and likewise it is a sign of imperfection in the communicative principle that it does not communicate by adequate communication. Therefore, the opposites of these will be a sign of perfection in the communicative principle, viz. to

Sed ponamus quod ignis communicaret eandem formam quam habet: adhuc esset relatio realis ad productum, sed quia forma est eadem producentis et producti, forma non erit causata ab igne, nec distinctio realis formae communicatae a forma communicantis—et ideo respectu formae communicatae non haberet ignis relationem realem; unde esset habitudo tunc realis, compositi ad generans, sed non formae productae." *Ord.* I d. 5 p. 1 q. un. n. 27–29, ed. Vat. 4, pp. 25–27. See also ibid. n. 97 & 140, ed. Vat. 4, pp. 62, 79.

7 See Cross, *Duns Scotus on God*, pp. 158–170.

> communicate itself as perfect as it is, and this is to communicate by adequate communication. (…) Hence the divine father has a perfect principle of communication, so perfect a principle of production that it communicates itself, not something divided (from it), and it communicates by adequate communication, and thus the son has the same form as the father; the son, however, cannot generate, for the form in the father which is the productive principle has an adequate term, and therefore it cannot produce, just like, if fire would produce fire by communicating its form to itself by adequate communication, the produced fire, although it possesses fireness, nevertheless could not produce fire, for then it would not be an effect adequate to the producing fire, exhausting its power. Which applies to the case at hand.[8]

In adequate communication, the production comes to a stop in a unique effect. What distinguishes absolute production from finite causation, viz. the producer's communicating numerically the same form that it possesses to an adequate term, is captured by this notion of adequate communication. In adequate communication, the principle communicates itself as perfect as it is, and produces one single adequate effect, which exhausts its productive power. A later passage in the same question confirms that such a singularization is occasioned by adequate communication, as the principle of only this communication by which it is communicated to the other.[9] In line with this association of singu-

8 *Lect. Ox.* 1 d. 7 q. un. n. 63–64, ed. Vat. 16, pp. 495–496: "[…] imperfectionis est in principio communicativo communicare aliud a se et non se, et similiter imperfectionis est in principio communicativo quod non communicat communicatione adaequata; igitur opposita istorum erunt perfectionis in principio communicativo, scilicet communicare se ita perfecte sicut est, et hoc est communicare perfectione adaequata. Unde si ponitur per impossibile, vel incompossibile, quod Deus generaret alium Deum, et ille tertium, tunc deitas esset ratio communicandi, et non communicaret se nec communicatione adaequata, quia tunc Deus generatus non generaret alium, et haec sunt imperfectionis; igitur cum principium productivum in divinis sit perfectissimum, et producit productione adaequata, ita quod non potest communicari eadem via iterum, et haec sunt perfectionis, non debet dici quin natura sit ratio communicandi et non relatio. Unde Deus Pater habet perfectum principium communicandi et ita perfectum productivum quod communicat se, non divisum, et communicat communicatione adaequata, et ideo Filius habet eandem formam cum Patre; nec tamen Filius potest generare, quia forma in Patre quae est principium productivum, habet terminum adaequatum, et ideo non potest producere, sicut si ignis produceret ignem communicando sibi formam suam communicatione adaequata, ignis productus, licet habeat igneitatem, non tamen posset producere ignem, quia tunc non esset effectus adaequatus igni producenti, exhauriens potentiam eius. Sic in proposito." *Ord.* 1 d. 7 q. 1 n. 39–41, ed. Vat. 4, pp. 123–124.

9 See *Lect. Ox.* 1 d. 7 q. un. n. 75–76, ed. Vat. 16, p. 500; *Ord.* 1 d. 7 q. 1 n. 67, ed. Vat. 4, p. 136. See

larization with adequate communication, Scotus argues for the sufficiency and exhaustiveness of trinitarian processions in the second distinction of the first book of the *Lectura Oxoniensis*. We deal with the productions of the second and third persons successively.

4. In the discussion of how divine intellection can be thought to arise such as to explain innertrinitarian processions, Scotus advances the objection that the adequacy of production would commit the divine intellect to one effect alone, viz. intellection, since the cause having an effect that is adequate and proportional to it cannot have another, different effect.[10] The problem is here that paternal intellection is supposed to generate the son as the intellectual word (hereafter, we will discuss the related problem of accounting for the production of the third person). Scotus distinguishes between intellection and the production ('diction') of the word; only the latter is the adequate (and singularizing) effect of generation in a strict sense.

> It is to be said that, although the intellection of the father is quasi adequate and quasi caused, since it is from the object and the intellect in the father, by which the father thinks, nevertheless it is not truly caused, for it is not thinkable that something would cause itself. And then it is argued: when something has truly a principle of production, although it has something quasi produced, as long as it does not have a product in which its complete power is exhausted, (this power) is never taken away from it, such that it cannot produce; hence, since the paternel intellection is not such an adequate product, it can produce knowledge generated according to the proportion of the principle, which is equal to it, and this is the son; and therefore, when it has generated knowledge adequate to itself, it cannot generate another, and therefore it cannot produce another son.[11]

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also ibid. n. 82, ed. Vat. 16, p. 502: "[N]on oportet quod forma communicata alicui sit principium propriae operationis, quando communicatur communicatione adaequata. Nunc autem intellectus cum essentia, quae sunt principium generationis, communicantur Filio communicatione adaequata, et ideo in Filio illud non potest esse principium generationis." A cross reference validates the significance of the claim; see *Lect. Ox.* I d. 11 q. 1 n. 10, ed. Vat. 17, p. 129.

10 *Lect. Ox.* I d. 2 p. 2 q. 1–4 n. 168, ed. Vat. 16, pp. 168–169; *Ord.* I d. 2 p. 2 q. 1–4 n. 230, ed. Vat. 2, pp. 264–265.

11 *Lect. Ox.* I d. 2 p. 2 q. 1–4 n. 173, ed. Vat. 16, pp. 170–171: "[D]icendum quod licet intellectio Patris sit quasi adaequatum et quasi causatum, quia est ab obiecto et intellectu in Patre, quo Pater intelligit, tamen non est vere causatum, quia non est intelligibile quod aliquid

The argument distinguishes between intellection, as merely quasi produced and hence only quasi adequate, and the production of generated knowledge, viz. the son as the divine word, which is truly adequate and results in one adequate effect alone. At the background of this differentiation between the productions of intellection and the word, there is a distinction between 'operation' and 'production' strictly (viz., as action from the category of action).[12] Intellection as an operation is not strictly produced; the word, on the contrary, is truly produced, for it is an adequate effect, both in the sense of a term of production that equals the producer from which it differs, and in the sense of the only possible term that exhausts the generative power of the producer. The relevant distinctions involved in this solution, viz. 'intellection' vs. 'diction' and 'operation' vs. 'production', are articulated in some later passages in the *Lectura Oxoniensis*; they apply to both finite and infinite knowledge. As a matter of fact, they give insight in some fundamental decisions underlying Scotus's theory of cognition.

Intellection and diction: The word as a proper product, Scotus states in the 27th distinction of the first book of the *Lectura Oxoniensis*, is produced by an act of 'diction', which, as an action from the category of action, produces a separate term; by contrast, 'intellection' is not productive in this sense. At the center of this differentiation stands the concept of 'memory', as the immediate principle of both acts of intellection and diction. For memory denotes the intellect,

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se causet. Et tunc arguitur: quando aliquid habet vere principium producendi, licet habeat aliquid quasi productum, dummodo non habet productum in quo exhauritur tota virtus eius, numquam tollitur sibi quin possit producere; igitur cum intellectio Patris non sit huiusmodi productum adaequatum, igitur potest producere notitiam genitam secundum proportionem principii, quae sit sibi aequalis, et hoc est Filius; et ideo quando habet notitiam genitam sibi adaequatam, non potest gignere aliam, et ideo non potest producere alium filium." *Ord.* I d. 2 p. 2 q. 1–4 n. 237, ed. Vat. 2, pp. 269–270. The passage in the *Ordinatio* is subject to extensive reworking, e.g. in this *extra de manu Scoti*: *Ord.* I d. 2 p. 2 q. 1–4 n. 222–224, ed. Vat. 2, pp. 261–263: "Ulterius arguo: nulla productio per memoriam perfectam est perfecta nisi sit notitiae adaequatae illi memoriae sive illi intellectui respectu talis obiecti; memoriae autem sive intellectui personae divinae infinitae nulla notitia adaequatur respectu essentiae divinae ut intelligibilis nisi infinita; quia intellectus ille est comprehensivus illius obiecti infiniti, igitur aliqua persona divina per memoriam potest producere infinitam notitiam. (…) Maior secundi syllogismi declaratur sic: sicut enim non est perfecta memoria respectu alicuius intelligibilis nisi illud obiectum sit praesens in ratione actu intelligibilis, quantum potest esse praesens ut intelligibile illi, ita non est perfecta proles talis memoriae nisi sit actualis notitia tanta illius obiecti quanta potest competere tali intellectui respectu talis obiecti; et illam voco adaequatam tali intellectui respectu talis obiecti." See Cross, *Duns Scotus on God*, pp. 133–134.

12 On the fundamental distinction between production and operation in Scotus's philosophical theology, see Cross, *Duns Scotus on God*, pp. 17–21 & p. 227 sqq.

insofar as it has an actually intelligible object present to it and produces actual knowledge, viz. the word as the term of diction.

> I say therefore, in agreement with the aforesaid above, that the word is actual cognition, which is the term of an action from the category of action, for it is the term of an act of diction, and diction is an act from the category of action, and not intellection, as was said above. Hence memory, viz. the intellect having an actually intelligible object present to itself, is the productive principle of equal knowledge, adequate to habitual knowledge; and this actual knowledge is the word in us, however not as such, but it is necessary that its account includes 'begetting' (*gignitio*). Hence the word is actual knowledge, as 'offspring' (*proles*).[13]

The underlying idea is that of 'perfect memory' (*memoria perfecta*), i.e. the whole complex 'the intellect having an actually intelligible object present to it'.[14] Since the word denotes actual cognition and memory denotes habitual knowledge, the word is not something pertaining to memory itself, but is its product. Confused knowledge results from an imperfect memory, whereas a perfect act begotten in the intelligence produces a perfect word from perfect memory.[15] The point for Scotus is that the (concept as the mental) word is not something different from the intellective act, viz. a further product over and above the produced act of knowledge; nevertheless, this act must be something really produced and immediately by the memory.

Operation and production: The differentiation between operation and strict production, viz. action from the category of action, leads us back to the sixth

13 *Lect. Ox.* I d. 27 q. 1–3 n. 42, ed. Vat. 17, p. 354: "Dico igitur, secundum praedicta supra, quod verbum est intellectio actualis, qui est terminus actionis de genere actionis quia est terminus actus dicendi, et 'dicere' est actus de genere actionis et non intellectio, sicut supra dictum est. Unde memoria, quod est intellectus habens obiectum actu intelligibile sibi praesens, est principium productivum notitiae similis, adaequatae notitiae habituali; et haec notitia actualis est verbum in nobis, sed non in quantum huiusmodi sed oportet quod de ratione sui includat gignitionem. Unde verbum est actualis notitia sicut proles." The reference 'secundum praedicta supra' is to the sixth distinction: "Ad illud dico quod Patrem dicere Filium non est formaliter intelligere, nec dicere est formaliter idem quod intelligere, nec in nobis nec in Deo." (*Lect. Ox.* I d. 6 q. un. n. 10, ed. Vat. 16, p. 461)

14 See Cross, *Duns Scotus on God*, pp. 132–137; Friedman, *Intellectual Traditions at the Medieval University*, vol. 1, p. 396 sqq.

15 *Lect. Ox.* I d. 27 q. 1–3 n. 47, ed. Vat. 17, p. 356. Friedman, *Intellectual Traditions at the Medieval University*, vol. 1, pp. 410–411, n. 191, draws attention to the subtle equivocation in Scotus's use of the term 'perfect(ed) memory' (*memoria perfecta*).

distinction, where Scotus argues that such acts of diction and of intellection are formally diverse. For the word is perfect knowledge, the expression of which (viz., its eliciting) is formally an act of diction (and not intellection) by the paternal intellect, viz. memory having the divine essence present to it as its object.[16] Production and operation hence oppose as diction (producing the word as a distinct term) and intellection (an operation which is its own term).[17] In answer to the objection that the immediate connection of diction with memory would imply that the divine intellect is not actually thinking before the word is generated, Scotus differentiates, in line with what we have seen above, the act of intellection as a quasi product of memory as an operative principle, from its production of the word, which necessarily presupposes intellection.[18] Hence, intellection as a quasi product is not an adequate effect, but only the word is. Adequate acts, since they are exhaustive, alone diversify potencies,[19] although a potency may be said to have acts both in the sense of action from the category of action (viz. diction) and acts as the term of such an action (viz. intellection).[20]

5. In this way, Scotus warrants the production of an adequate term by distinguishing between intellection and production proper in the generation of the second person in the trinity. Now, if the adequate communication of the divine essence is limited to one adequate effect alone, the question poses itself, of course, of how to account for a third person in the trinity. Scotus answers the question by means of the distinction between nature (expressed here by the intellect) and will as primarily diverse principles of production,[21] according to

16 *Lect. Ox.* I d. 6 q. un. n. 15, ed. Vat. 16, p. 463.

17 Ibid. n. 19, Vat. 16, p. 464; *Ord.* I d. 6 q. un. n. 12, ed. Vat. 4, p. 92.

18 Ibid. n. 22, ed. Vat. 16, p. 465.

19 Ibid. n. 27, ed. Vat. 16, p. 467. Curiously enough, *Ord.* I d. 6 q. un. n. 15, ed. Vat. 4, p. 95, presents the second part of the quotation as *textus interpolatus*. Furthermore, see the cross-reference in *Lect. Ox.* I d. 1 p. 1 q. 2 n. 47, ed. Vat. 16, p. 76.

20 *Lect. Ox.* I d. 6 q. un. n. 27–28, ed. Vat. 16, pp. 467–468; *Ord.* I d. 6 q. un. n. 14, ed. Vat. 4, pp. 93–94.

21 For the distinction between nature and will, see Tobias Hoffmann, "The Distinction between Nature and Will in Duns Scotus," *Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du moyen âge* 66 (1999), 189–224; Cross, *Duns Scotus on God*, p. 145 sqq. & p. 223 sqq. See furthermore Friedman, *Intellectual Traditions at the Medieval University*, vol. 1, pp. 376–395, who stresses the problem of deriving the distinction of the emanations from a distinction between divine attributes, and points at the formal distinction between intellect and will, as well as between the persons in themselves, as the basis for a harmonization of both perspectives, viz. the emanations being formally distinct in themselves, while deriving their distinction *principiative* from the formal distinction between the intellect and the will.

which each—although not in the same way—produce in adequate communication one adequate effect alone.

> I therefore say briefly to this question that there are only two persons produced, for of one productive principle there is only one production that is adequate to and coeternal with the productive principle. Whence if any of these two (conditions) would be wanting, it is not required that there is only one production: for if the production is not adequate to the productive principle, the productive principle can produce plural effects, just like when the same heat produces many heated (items); or if the product is not coeternal, for then, when one product is corrupted, another can be produced. Now since in the divine there are only two productive principles of diverse aspects, namely the will and the intellect (which has the aspect of the principle of nature), as was shown before, and both principles are adequate to their respective productions, like the infinite to the infinite, as was shown before, it follows that there are only two productions, and consequently only two produced persons.[22]

Although adequate communication is determined to the production of one adequate term alone, the original diversity of nature and will as principles indicates a twofold adequate communication, and confines adequate communication to exactly these two types. Over and above the condition of adequate communication, Scotus adds here the coeternity of the product as a further condition for the singularizing effects of trinitarian productions—which is relevant, of course, because of his overall strategy of specifying the adequacy of causation, taken to apply also to the finite realm, to innertrinitarian processions. For on the presupposition of the permanence of the finite

22 *Lect. Ox.* 1 d. 2 p. 2 q. 1–4 n. 205, ed. Vat. 16, p. 186: "Dico igitur breviter ad quaestionem istam quod tantum sunt duae personae productae, quia unius principii productivi est tantum una productio adaequata et coaeterna principio productivo. Unde si alterum istorum deficiat, non oportet tantum unam esse productionem: si enim productio non sit adaequata principio productivo, principium productivum potest plura producere, sicut cum idem calidum producit plura calida; aut si productum non sit coaeternum, tunc enim corrupto uno producto potest aliud producere. Cum igitur in divinis tantum sint duo principia productiva diversarum rationum, scilicet voluntas et intellectus habens rationem principii naturae, ut praeostensum est, et utrumque principium adaequatur suae productioni sicut infinitum infinito, ut praeostensum est, sequitur quod tantum sint duae productiones, et per consequens tantum duae personae productae." *Ord.* 1 d. 2 p. 2 q. 1–4 n. 300–303, ed. Vat. 2, pp. 305–308. See also *Lect. Ox.* 1 d. 7 q. un. n. 118, ed. Vat. 16, p. 513.

cause's effect, finite univocal and infinite agency would agree in having only one adequate term.[23]

On the basis of these two fundamentally distinct productive principles, viz. nature and will, Scotus argues for the sufficiency of innertrinitarian processions; each productive principle produces, in adequate communication of the divine essence, one adequate effect. In the case of the will, however, a special problem arises. For if the will is a proper and separate principle of production, the freedom of which opposes nature's determination to one effect alone, how can it share in the defining characteristic of nature as the principle from which it is distinguished, viz. producing one effect alone?[24] Scotus answers that the will, despite its freedom, and because it is infinite, produces an infinite love adequate to it, which is why it cannot produce anything else within the divine realm, as this production exhausts its productive virtue.[25] Later in the *Lectura Oxoniensis*, Scotus argues from nature and will as distinct principles, which are instantiated in the finite realm only in an imperfect way, to reduce them to two perfect productive principles in God, and infers from the perfection of the will as a productive principle to the adequate production of an infinite love.[26] Necessarily, this infinite love is adequate to the infinite essence as its object, for otherwise an act of divine love towards creatures would be susceptible of producing ever more divine persons.[27]

We may conclude, therefore, that Scotus's proof for the sufficiency of trinitarian processions is based on the adequacy of production. Apart from the first ungenerated person, there are only two persons produced in the trinity: for adequacy implies the unicity of the end term of production, as the term, viz. the product, is adequate to the production in the sense that the production is exhausted by the product, and there are only two productions, based on the intellect and the will as distinct principles, the terms of which are adequate to them.

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23 *Lect. Ox.* I d. 2 p. 2 q. 1–4 n. 244, ed. Vat. 16, p. 205; *Ord.* I d. 2 p. 2 q. 1–4 n. 375, ed. Vat. 2, pp. 343–344.

24 See *Lect. Ox.* I d. 2 p. 2 q. 1–4 n. 162, ed. Vat. 16, p. 166; *Ord.* I d. 2 p. 2 q. 1–4 n. 218, ed. Vat. 2, p. 258. The same problem also with regard to the intellect: ibid. n. 304, 310, ed. Vat. 2, p. 310, pp. 313–314. For a discussion of this problem, see Cross, *Duns Scotus on God*, pp. 137–142.

25 *Lect. Ox.* I d. 2 p. 2 q. 1–4 n. 227, ed. Vat. 16, p. 198. See the different line of answering in *Ord.* I d. 2 p. 2 q. 1–4 n. 352, ed. Vat. 2, p. 335.

26 *Lect. Ox.* I d. 10 q. un. n. 7, ed. Vat. 17, pp. 116–117; *Ord.* I d. 10 q. un. n. 9, ed. Vat. 4, pp. 341–142, together with the *adnotatio Scoti* there. See furthermore *Lect. Ox.* I d. 10 q. un. n. 19, ed. Vat. 17, p. 122; *Ord.* I d. 10 q. un. n. 31, ed. Vat. 4, p. 352. See also *Ord.* I d. 12 q. 1 n. 19, 36, 49, ed. Vat. 5, p. 35, p. 44, p. 53.

27 *Lect. Ox.* I d. 10 q. un. n. 27, ed. Vat. 17, p. 124. For the criticism of the opposed standpoint as that of the philosophers, see *Lect. Ox.* II d. 1 q. 1 n. 20, ed. Vat., vol. 18, p. 7.

> Secondly, it is shown that there are not more than two (persons) produced, and thus only two produced. This is shown thus: no person is produced, if not by some production, and there are only these two productions, as was shown before, since there are only two productive principles; therefore, if another person produced from these is posited, it is necessary that it would be produced by either the one or the other of these productions; but this is impossible, for the term is adequate to the production here, such that this total production is exhausted by its term; but the same production does not have plural adequate terms, for then it would not be adequate; hence there will be only two persons produced.[28]

The adequacy of production explains that there is a twofold fecundity in the first trinitarian person, viz. generation and spiration, each associated with an adequate term proper; after the first fecundity is exhausted, the second fecundity is communicated to and shared by the adequate term of the first fecundity.[29] Finally, because the whole argument is based on the distinction of nature and will as productive principles which each have an adequate term proper, there is no moment at which the will is involved in the generation of the second person.[30]

2 The Parisian Revision of the Argument from the Adequacy of Production

6. The argument for the sufficiency of trinitarian processions that we have discussed so far, viz. the adequacy of production, sollicits in the *Ordinatio* a

28 *Lect. Ox.* I d. 2 p. 2 q. 1–4 n. 231, ed. Vat. 16, p. 200: "Secundo ostenditur quod non sunt plures quam duae productae, et ita tantum duae productae. Hoc ostenditur sic: nulla persona producitur nisi aliqua productione, et non sunt nisi istae duae productiones, ut praeostensum est, cum tantum sint duo principia productiva; igitur si ponitur alia persona producta ab istis, oportet quod producatur altera istarum productionum; sed hoc est impossibile, quia terminus hic est adaequatus productioni, ita quod tota illa productio exhauritur suo termino; sed eadem productio non habet plures terminos adaequatos, tunc enim non esset adaequata; erunt igitur tantum duae personae productae." *Ord.* I d. 2 p. 2 q. 1–4 n. 303, ed. Vat. 2, pp. 308–309; ibid. n. 358, ed. Vat. 2, p. 337. See Cross, *Duns Scotus on God*, pp. 145–149.

29 See ibid. d. 3 p. 3 q. 4 n. 443, ed. Vat. 16, p. 401; *Ord.* I d. 3 p. 3 q. 4 n. 588, ed. Vat. 3, pp. 347–348. See the articulation of the *filioque* at *Lect. Ox.* I d. 11 q. 1 n. 10–11, ed. Vat. 17, pp. 129–130; *Ord.* I d. 11 q. 1 n. 11, ed. Vat. 5, p. 4. See also the presentation in *Ord.* II d. 1 q. 1 n. 30, ed. Vat. 7, pp. 16–17. See Cross, *Duns Scotus on God*, p. 212 sqq.

30 See the *sed contra* in *Lect. Ox.* I d. 6 q. un. n. 6, ed. Vat. 16, p. 460, and its confirmation: ibid. n. 32, ed. Vat. 16, p. 469.

(self-)critical reflexion on the distinction between extensive and intensive adequacy.[31] If it is argued that there are only two productions, since each productive principle has a production adequate to it, one might ask what proof

31 At five places in the *Ordinatio*, we find a differentiation between extensive and intensive adequacy: *Ord.* I d. 2 p. 2 q. 1–4 n. 307, ed. Vat. 2, p. 311; *Ord.* I d. 7 q. 2 n. 95, ed. Vat. 4, p. 149; twice in the *Adnotatio Scoti* added to *Ord.* I d. 10 q. un. n. 62, ed. Vat. 4, p. 368, p. 375; and *Ord.* III d. 14 q. 1–2 n. 74, ed. Vat. 9, p. 454: "[V]irtus activa quaecumque finita potest habere aliquem effectum adaequatum sibi intensive, vel extensive aliquos effectus adaequatos, et plures non potest simul causare; ergo nullus intellectus creatus potest simul elicere infinitas visiones." See also *Lect. Par.* II d. 3 q. 2 n. 51; d. 9 q. 2 n. 36; *Lect. Par.* III d. 18 q. 1 n. 45.

To the transference of the distinction intensive/extensive from its original use as a qualification of infinity and perfection to qualify the adequacy of production and representation, which seems a *prima facie* evident explanation, is to be added another explanation, viz. its origin in the discussion on the equality of the divine persons. For Scotus states already in the *Lectura Oxoniensis*: "Et dupliciter potest intelligi quod Filius sit aequalis Patri secundum hanc potentiam: aut secundum intensionem, aut secundum extensionem ad obiecta. Nam aliquando potest intelligi aliqua esse aequalia secundum intensionem potentiae, licet non secundum extensionem ad obiecta,—sicut si ignis produceret ignem adaequantem hanc productionem, tunc ignis productus, licet habeat principium agendi ita intensive sicut ignis generans, non tamen produceret nec haberet tantam potentiam extensive, quia adaequat productionem suam. Aliquando potest intelligi aliqua esse aequalia secundum potentiam extensive, licet non intensive,—sicut si ponitur quod per minorem caritatem possint tot diligi sicut per maiorem, licet non ita intensive. Aliquando tamen concurrunt aliqua esse aequalia secundum potentiam extensivam, quae sunt aequalia secundum potentiam intensivam." (*Lect. Ox.* I d. 20 q. un. n. 12, ed. Vat. 17, p. 286; see also *Ord.* I d. 20 q. un. n. 14, ed. Vat. 5, p. 309). This alternative explanation accounts for the possible coincidence of extensive and intensive adequacy, as witnessed by an extensive *adnotatio Scoti* in the tenth distinction. Here, the thesis that the will as a productive principle requires the presence of its first object as coproductive principle is tentatively argued from the claim that, prior to the presence of the secundary object, the will's production is adequate (namely, together with its first object), and beyond adequate production no further production is possible. The distinction between extensive and intensive adequacy, however, challenges the inference from adequacy to unicity: "[V]oluntas non est principium producendi nisi ut habens obiectum sibi praesens (quod est comprincipium producendi), et non potest esse principium habens quodcumque obiectum sed praecise ut habens obiectum primum sibi praesens et cum illo (…) quia ante praesentiam obiecti secundarii habet productionem adaequatam, quia cum primo obiecto: ultra autem adaequatam, non potest in aliam. Sed quod additur de differentia obiecti primi (quod ipsum est comproductivum) et secundi (quod ipsum non est comproductivum), hoc dubium est tam in intellectu quam in voluntate, nec aliqua causa quae assignatur, videtur sufficere: prima non, quia aut intelligitur de adaequata extensive et petitur principium, aut intensive et falsa est illa 'ultra autem' etc. (sicut patet in operatione, quia ultra sic adaequatam operationem quae est circa primum obiectum, potest in operationem circa secundum obiectum)." (*Adnotatio Scoti* to *Ord.* I d. 10 q. un. n. 62, ed. Vat. 4, pp. 367–368). Nevertheless, in the same text the argument that the trinitarian father alone speaks the word of creatures, just like the word of the divine essence, is confirmed by a more

there is for the inference 'if the one act adequate to the potency stands, it cannot have another at the same time'. For the relevant sense of adequacy can be interpreted according to either intensive or extensive adequacy. An act of production is intensively adequate if it produces a term as perfect as the agent itself. It is extensively adequate if it equals the total range of the agent's productive capacity. According to neither of these interpretations, Scotus now argues, the inference is valid.

> Whence is proved the proposition 'when one act adequate to the power stands, the power cannot have another act'? If adequation is understood according to extension, the question is begged; if according to intension, it seems to be false. For although the vision of the word is adequate to the intellective power of the soul of Christ, yet it can also know by an elicited act some other intelligible; it is plain too that God knows himself by a knowledge adequate to his intellect according to intension, and yet he knows things other than himself. If this is how it is about an act adequate to the operative power, which allows of another, much more does it seem to be so of the productive power, because its product is not in the productive power as operation is in the operative power.[32]

The inference 'if the one act adequate to the potency stands, it cannot have another at the same time,' Scotus claims, is to be evaluated according to the pre-

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positive evaluation of the inference from adequacy to unicity, which results from the *combination* of extensive and intensive adequacy: "Confirmatur, quia sicut hoc principium operativum habet unam operationem adaequatam sibi non tantum intensive sed etiam extensive, hoc est, circa omnia quae virtualiter sunt in ipsa, ita in quantum est productivum habet unam productionem adaequatam utroque modo, quia neutrum repugnat uni producto." (ibid. ed. Vat. 4, p. 375).

32 *Ord.* I d. 2 p. 2 q. 1–4 n. 307, ed. Vat. 2, p. 311: "Quarto, unde probatur illa propositio, 'stante uno actu adaequato potentiae, ipsa non potest simul habere alium'? Si intelligat adaequationem secundum extensionem, petitur principium; si secundum intensionem, videtur falsum. Licet enim visio Verbi adaequetur potentiae intellectivae animae Christi, tamen potest nosse etiam actu elicito aliud intelligibile; patet etiam quod Deus novit se notitia adaequata intellectui suo secundum intensionem, et tamen novit alia a se. Si ita est de actu adaequato potentiae operativae, quod compatitur alium, multo magis videtur de potentia productiva, quia eius productum non est in potentia productiva sicut operatio est in potentia operativa." (transl. Simpson mod.) See also ibid. p. 1 q. 1–3 n. 103, ed. Vat. 2, p. 187: "Item, intellectus primi habet actum unum adaequatum sibi et coaeternum, quia intelligere se est idem sibi; ergo non potest aliquem habere alium.—Consequentia non valet. Exemplum de beato, qui simul videt Deum et aliud etiam si videat Deum secundum ultimum capacitatis suae, ut de anima Christi ponitur, et adhuc potest videre aliud."

cise meaning of the adequacy involved. If the inference is taken in the sense of an adequacy according to extension, it obviously begs the question. For the reason why the second person, produced in an act adequate to the potency, is not a productive principle, is argued by the same fact, i.e. that it cannot produce anything else, which is exactly what was to be explained. Taken in the sense of an adequacy according to intension, however, the inference is incorrect. As God's self-knowledge shows—which is adequate to the divine intellect according to intension, yet God knows other objects besides himself—, there are most perfect acts in which a most perfect object is cognized, without excluding others. Scotus concludes that if such is the case in regard of an act adequate to the operative potency, viz. that it can receive another object at the same time, it holds *a fortiori* for the productive potency, the product of which does not remain—like the operation does—within the operative potency.

We find the same objection in the *Ordinatio*'s account of why there is not more than one son in the divine. The proposal here is to explain the unicity of the son's generation by the argument that such a generation is an act adequate to the generative power that always stays in place; since the single son is a term adequate to the power and is always being produced, there cannot be another one. This application of the adequacy of production to argue the unicity of the son's generation, which was initially accepted in both the *Lectura Oxoniensis* and the *Ordinatio*, now sollicits the objection that the relevant sense of adequacy is to be made precise.

> On the contrary: Is the adequacy understood as intensive or extensive? If in the second way, there is a begging of the question. If in the first way, the proposed conclusion does not follow from the adequacy of the act, because fire generating a fire as equally perfect as itself—and so adequate—can still generate another fire elsewhere; therefore the consequent is inferred 'that the adequate act always stays in place', and consequently the power is not of itself determined to this act but absolutely it would have power for another act,—just as if the sun were always staying in place and so were with a single adequate illumination to illuminate the medium present to it, it would not have power for another illumination, because that single illumination always stays in place; but from this it follows that of itself it would have power for another—and suppose that the first one does not stay in place, it will proceed to another.[33]

33 *Ord.* I d. 7 q. 2 n. 95, ed. Vat. 4, p. 149: "Ideo aliter—magis proprie—dicitur quod 'unica generatio' est actus adaequans potentiam generativam et semper stans, et unicus Filius

Again, Scotus argues that the adequacy of production, understood according to extensive adequacy, begs the question. Understood according to intensive adequacy, however, the inference is not cogent, as the example of univocal causality in the finite realm proves. As we have seen before, on the presupposition of the permanence of the finite cause's effect, finite univocal and infinite agency agree in having only one adequate term. The necessity for this additional condition, viz. the permanence of the effect, shows that, by itself alone, the adequacy of production does not exclude that there can be more than one effect.

In the continuation of this passage, therefore, Scotus concludes to the impossibility of proving the unicity of divine productions by means of the adequacy of production. The fact that the generation in the divine has an adequate term is not sufficient on itself to argue the unicity of its effect.

> I concede, however, that adequacy, whether absolute or with 'a staying in place', does not sufficiently entail the unity of divine generation, because it does not entail that to be the principle of another generation is repugnant to the generative power absolutely of itself, nor consequently does it entail the absolute impossibility of another generation,—nay it entails the absolute possibility, if this [sc. the adequacy of the one generation] were the precise reason for the impossibility—because where there is an impossibility for this reason, there is there an absolute possibility (the result is plain from induction). One must then look for another reason so as to show that the generative power is determined of itself to this generation, such that if per impossibile it would not proceed to this generation, or if this generation were not adequate or were not always staying in place, it would altogether have power for no other, just as sight cannot hear. (…) Not only does this argument refute the reason 'about adequacy', but also, if this father or this generation were not by itself, but the essence were as it were indifferent to several fathers and the generative power were indif-

terminus adaequans eam et semper in produci; ergo non potest esse alius. Contra: Aut intelligitur adaequatio intensiva, aut extensiva? Si secundo modo, est petitio principii. Si primo modo, ex adaequatione actus non sequitur propositum, quia ignis generans ignem aeque perfectum sibi—et ita adaequatum—adhuc potest alium ignem alias generare; ergo infertur consequens 'quia actus adaequatus semper stat', et per consequens potentia non est ex se determinata ad hunc actum, sed absolute posset esse ad alium,—sicut sol si semper staret, et ita unica illuminatione adaequata illuminaret medium sibi praesens, non posset in aliam, quia illa unica semper stat; sed ex hoc sequitur quod ex se posset in alium,—et pone istum non stare, exibit in alium." (transl. Simpson, available at: https://www.aristotelophile.com/current.htm)

> ferent to several generations, one would not be able to give more a reason for this generation existing in divine reality than for that one, because that one too would be adequate, and so for the case where this one prevents that one, which is altogether impossible—nay for what reason the one is posited, any at all might be posited, and for what reason the other is not posited, any other might not be posited.[34]

The argument from the adequacy of production, by means of which Scotus originally proposed to prove that there cannot be many productions of the same kind in the divine, is now rejected as a satisfactory explanatory account. At the beginning of the second book of the *Ordinatio*, he refers back to this unsuccessful explanation of the unicity of the second person as the position of 'many' who are said to argue that the divine son cannot generate because paternel memory would have an adequate term.[35] Again, Scotus declares that additional conditions must be satisfied, in order for such a proof to be cogent.[36]

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34 Ibid. n. 98–100, ed. Vat. 4, pp. 150–151: "Concedo tamen quod adaequatio, nec absoluta nec cum statione, concludit sufficienter unitatem generationis divinae, quia non concludit quod repugnet potentiae generativae absolute ex se esse principium alterius generationis, nec per consequens absolutam impossibilitatem alterius generationis, immo absolutam possibilitatem, si haec esset praecisa ratio impossibilitatis, quia ubi est ex ista ratione impossibilitas, ibi est absoluta possibilitas (patet inductive). Oportet ergo aliam rationem quaerere, quae ostendat generativam determinari ex se ad hanc generationem, ita quod si per impossibile in hanc non exiret, vel haec non esset adaequata vel non semper staret, omnino in nullam aliam posset, sicut nec visus potest audire,—quemadmodum si hic Pater non esset in natura divina, omnino nulla persona posset ibi esse quae esset Pater: quia si ideo praecise non posset esse alius Pater, quia scilicet in essentia—quamvis indifferenti ad plures personas ingenitas—haec persona quasi subsisteret a se et adaequate essentiae, absolute tunc posset alius Pater esse, et si posset, esset. Nec tantum istud improbat rationem 'de adaequatione', sed etiam si non esset de se hic Pater vel generatio sed essentia esset quasi indifferens ad plures Patres et potentia generativa ad plures generationes, non esset plus dare quare haec generatio esset in divinis quam quare illa, quia et illa esset adaequata, et ita casus quod ista praevenit illam, quod omnino est impossibile; immo qua ratione una poneretur, et quaelibet, et qua ratione non illa, nec aliqua." (transl. Simpson)

35 The argument is formulated by William of Ware to adjust the proof of Henry of Ghent; see below, nt. 39.

36 See *Ord.* II d. 1 q. 1 n. 39–40, ed. Vat. 7, pp. 23–24, esp. n. 24: "Sed ista responsio destruit quamdam positionem quae ponitur a multis distinctione 7 primi libri, quae ponit quod Filius non potest generare: non enim tota illa ratio est 'quia memoria ut in Patre, habet terminum adaequatum', sed oportet addere quod 'habet terminum adaequatum illi principio, non producibilem ab eo cui communicatur tale principium'; quia si esset producibile ab eo cui communicatur tale principium, communicaretur etiam ei principium in ratione principii ad producendum, et ita posset illo principio producere. Quaerendo autem ultra

7. These objections are taken from passages that are subject to heavy revision and redistribution within the *Ordinatio*. Scotus reallocates the discussion in the second distinction to the seventh distinction of the first book of the *Ordinatio* and introduces in this seventh distinction a separate and new question on there being many sons in the divine—this revision, I will suggest, is the consequence of the discovery in the second distinction of the first book of the Parisian lectures, viz. that the adequacy of production is not a satisfactory argument to prove the unicity of the generation of the second trinitarian person.

In the Parisian treatment of whether there could be more than one internal production of the same type in God,[37] Scotus remarks that this issue, which is at home in the seventh distinction, is only added to the second distinction to complete its argument. Since there is actually no question whether there could be more than one production of the same type, for all theologians deny so, the real issue is the evaluation of their arguments for this impossibility. Scotus presents two arguments, which he refutes one after the other. The first is the argument taken from Henry of Ghent, viz. that only in the case of inner-trinitarian processions the fecundity of the productive principle is completely exhausted because of the perfection of its effect.[38] The second argument introduces the adequacy of production: it is not compatible with a production having an adequate term and always remaining to have another of the same type; now since such is every internal production in the divine, there cannot be more than one production of the same type in the divine.[39] Scotus refutes this argument by the differentiation between extensive and intensive adequacy that we have met before. Extensive adequacy simply begs the question and intensive adequacy would only be cogent on the additional condition of the permanence of the product. As intensive adequacy leaves on itself the possibility of there being many productions of the same type and since every possibility is necessary in the divine, the argument of adequate production actually infers the opposite of what is known to be true and necessary—and is to be dismissed

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quare 'Verbo habenti eandem memoriam cum Patre' non communicatur ipsa memoria in ratione principii productivi, videtur quod oporteat probare per aliud quam per terminum adaequatum rationi huius principii ut in Patre."

37 See *Lect. Par.* I d. 2 p. 3 q. 3, ed. and trans. Allan Wolter and Oleg Bychkov (St. Bonaventure, NY: Franciscan Institute, 2004), pp. 174–178: "Utrum in Deo possint esse plures productiones intrinsecae eiusdem rationis." On this text, see Wetter, *Die Trinitätslehre des Johannes Duns Scotus*, pp. 168–170.

38 See Henry of Ghent, *Quodl.* VI q. 1, ed. Gordon Wilson (Leuven: Leuven University Press, 1987), p. 22. Note that already Henry stresses the permanence of the divine production as a necessary condition for the proof of its exhaustive character.

39 See William of Ware, *In I Sent.* d. 7 q. 4; cit. app. font. *Ord.* II d. 1 q. 1, ed. Vat. 7, p. 23 ad l. 20.

accordingly. Again, the example of the fire and the sun confirms the insufficiency of the argument. Scotus hence concludes to the ineffectiveness of the argument from the adequacy of production.[40]

In agreement with the conditions set out for an argument on the subject to be effective, Scotus advances his proper solution, which dispenses with the adequacy of production and advances the singular character of the innertrinitarian processions as a self-sufficient argument.

> Therefore, I say to this question that there is numerically only one production of the same sort in the divine, so that were one to assume the impossible or incompatible, i.e., that this production ceased to exist, there could not be another production by this productive principle. The reason for this is that because whatever is in the divine is of itself just a 'this'; therefore, nothing in the divine can be multiplied that is of one sort. Then it is argued in this way. Whatever is of itself just a 'this' cannot be possibly be multiplied, but whatever exists in the divine that is of one sort, is of itself just 'this'; therefore, etc.[41]

After having articulated the dependence of the argument from the adequacy of production on the permanence of the effect, Scotus proposes an argument to show that, whatever is posited or removed, the productive principle would nevertheless be incapable of another production; even if this one ceased to exist, therefore, it still would not be capable of another. His argument is the irreducible singularity of everything of one type in the divine, the necessary individuation of every formal aspect by itself which excludes its multiplication. To corroborate this argument, Scotus explains the major premiss by means of the legs of an alternative: what cannot be determined by another, is either one by itself, or, insofar as it from itself, is able to be in an infinite number of instantiations. The minor then proves the assumption, that the innertrinitar-

40 See *Lect. Par.* I d. 2 p. 3 q. 3 nn. 185–191, ed. Wolter and Bychkov, pp. 174–176.

41 Ibid. n. 192–193, ed. Wolter and Bychkov, p. 176: "Ideo dico ad quaestionem quod tantum est una productio numero unius rationis in divinis, ita quod si ponatur per impossibile vel incompossibile quod haec productio non esset, non posset in aliam productionem illud principium productivum. Huius ratio est quia quidquid est in divinis, est de se hoc et ideo nihil in divinis potest plurificari quod sit unius rationis. Arguitur ergo sic: quidquid est de se hoc, impossibile est quod plurificetur, sed quidquid est in divinis unius rationis est de se hoc; igitur etc. Maior est evidens, quia quod non potest ab alio determinari, vel est de se unum, vel in quantum est ex se potest esse in infinitis." See also *Lect. Par.* I d. 31 q. 1–3 nn. 77–79, ed. Wolter-Bychkov, pp. 292–293.

ian production is one by itself, by inferring the absurdity of its negation. If one does not want to accept an infinity of processions of the same type in God, one has to concede that the divine procession is determined by something else to a finite number of its instantiations. This type of argument is known to be ineffective; it strongly resembles Averroes's refutation of Avicenna's claim that an essence is not one by itself. Scotus concludes that the reason why there cannot be more than one production of the same type in God is that each divine production is by itself a 'this', just like everything else of one formal aspect in God.[42]

We may conclude that the Parisian solution for the problem of accounting for the impossibility of many processions of the same type in God rejects the argument from the adequacy of production and instead turns to Scotus's characteristic doctrine of individuation by 'thisness', which accrues by itself to every formal aspect in the divine. This conclusion is of interest for two reasons. Firstly, the Parisian solution for the problem of accounting for the impossibility of many processions of the same type in God aligns with specific aspects of Scotus's revision of his doctrine of individuation in the Parisian lectures,[43] which

42 Ibid. n. 194, ed. Wolter and Bychkov, pp. 176–177.

43 Characteristic for the Parisian account of individuation is its decision to move the entire section from the third distinction of the second book to the 12th distinction, viz. immediately following upon the redefinition of prime matter as a positive entity; as a consequence, both the refutation of the position that matter is the principle of individuation and the formulation of Scotus's own position, viz. the individuation of the common nature by 'thisness', acquire additional complexity. Scotus ends up with the unitive containment of six positive 'entities' (or however they may be called, if we cannot accept the received text of the Wadding edition) in the material composite, positing individuating properties added to the each of the common natures of matter, form, and the composite. See *Lect. Par.* II d. 12 q. 3–8 n. 244–245, ed. Wad-Viv. 23, p. 39: "Dico quod sicut compositum in genere ⟨substantiae⟩ habet in se partes, materiam et formam, et materia potest concipi sub ratione universalis, similiter forma et compositum; et similiter in aliis generibus et in negationibus et privationibus, quidquid potest concipi ut universale, illud non est de se hoc, cum potest sic concipi absque modo concipiendi opposito obiecti. Et cum non potest ita concipi est de se haec, ideo in materia est natura et haec proprietas, et similiter in forma, similiter et in composito. Et formalitas naturae non est formalitas, quae est incommunicabilis, nisi denominative, tamen in composito est formalitas, quae est communicabilis; igitur sex sunt entitates in composito per identitatem unitive." The reference to six entities in the composite at the end of this quotation is philologically problematic, for the full collation of the manuscript tradition of this question has revealed that the reading "communicabilis … composito" is proper to the Wadding edition; the manuscripts read *unisono* "incommunicabilis" (thanks to G.R. Smith for this observation). For the corresponding argument in the second question in the *Quodlibet*, see ibid. a. 1 n. 24, ed. Wad.-Viv. 25, p. 65: "Utrumque

stipulate exactly such a solution.[44] Secondly, the association of the account for the unicity of innertrinitarian production with the doctrine of individuation refers to a more fundamental correlation, which informs the second question of the *Quodlibet* and explains its relation with the magisterial debate between Duns Scotus and William Peter of Godinus.

3 The Adequacy of Production according to the Second Question of the *Quodlibet*

8. In the second question of the *Quodlibet*, Duns Scotus inquires whether a plurality of productions of the same kind in God is possible.[45] Since all theologians agree that this is not possible, as Scotus repeats in accordance with the Parisian lectures, the actual question is whether such an impossibility can be demonstrated by reason or is to be accepted on the basis of faith alone. This resulting question is resolved in three articles. In the first article, Scotus presents the proofs of Thomas Aquinas and Henry of Ghent and refutes these in detail. Subsequently, the second article presents his own solution, for which Scotus advances two arguments and a confirmation based on Aristotle. In the third article, finally, he reacts to three challenges to his own solution. In the present section, we discuss the elements in Scotus's argument in the second question of the *Quodlibet* that indicate his final position regarding the adequacy of pro-

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enim per se principium compositi oportet habere indifferentiam consimilem indifferentiae compositi et determinationem similem determinationi compositi, quia neque indifferens constat ex determinatis, neque determinatum ex indifferentibus indifferentia universalitatis." See also *Lect. Ox.* II d. 3 q. 6 n. 179, ed. Vat. 18, pp. 285–286; *Ord.* II d. 3 q. 6 n. 187–188, ed. Vat. 7, pp. 484–485.

44 See *Lect. Par.* II d. 12 q. 3–8 n. 249–250: "Ad primum principale dico quod non sequitur, quodlibet individuum esse compositum proprie, quia compositio non est proprie nisi ex actu et potentia proprie acceptis, et quod ista proprietas individualis est eadem essentia identitate, ideo ex talibus nunquam proprie fit compositio. (…) Si tamen velimus extendere 'compositionem' ad omne illud quod habet sic naturam, quae non est ex se haec, et talem proprietatem, concedo quod in individuis est talis compositio, *et tamen talis non est in divinis, quia quodlibet ibi est de se haec; nec etiam est ibi essentia prius natura proprietate quasi complente rationem individui et determinante essentiam*. Et cum quaeritur an illa proprietas accipitur a materia vel a forma vel composito, dictum est modo quod in quolibet istorum est natura et talis proprietas ultra materiam et formam contrahens naturam quae est entitas positiva." (My italics, WG)

45 See *Quodl.* q. 2, ed. Wad.-Viv. 25, pp. 59–112: "Utrum in Deo possint esse plures productiones eiusdem rationis." For this text, see Wetter, *Die Trinitätslehre des Johannes Duns Scotus*, pp. 170–175.

duction. Subsequently, the fourth section will highlight the elements in his discussion in the first article of this second question, that will prove to correspond with—and to throw new light on—his argument in the magisterial debate with Godinus.

In the first article of the second question of the *Quodlibet*, Scotus lists the same proof from Henry of Ghent as he did in the Parisian lectures. The argument states that in the generation of the son the total fecundity of generation is exhausted. The second argument is Ware's recapitulation stating that the adequacy of a productive act entails its incompatibility with another act of the same kind proceeding from the same active principle.[46]

Against the first proof, Scotus objects that it insufficiently argues that in the son's generation all the fecundity available in the divine for begetting a son is exhausted. For Henry's argument recurs to the generation's everlasting character, which sollicits just like in the Parisian lectures the objection that a power which could have an additional act if its first act would not remain forever is able absolutely to have another act. After having argued separately for this claim, Scotus adds the example of the sun lightening up the universe with an illumination that is both intensively and extensively adequate; then the necessity of its single act, he concludes, is never unqualified nor does it result from its everlasting character.[47] Again, Scotus points out that it is to be proven that the necessity of one production of the same type is of such a nature that, if *per impossibile* this production would not always continue or would not exist, still no other production of the same type could exist in God. Now, Scotus continues, this objection rules out the second proof as well. For the act's adequacy is to be interpreted either as intensive or extensive adequacy. Taken in the first sense, adequacy only implies that another production cannot exist at the same time, which means that absolutely another production is possible. Taken in the second sense, the argument is only cogent on the assumption of the

46 Ibid. a. 1 n. 35–37, ed. Wad.-Viv. 25, p. 81.

47 Ibid. n. 42, ed. Wad.-Viv. 25, p. 82: "Exemplum huius est: Si sol illuminaret universum una illuminatione adaequata sibi intensive, quia scilicet ita perfecte sicut posset illuminare, et extensive, quia scilicet illa illuminatio esset totius illuminabilis quod posset esse illuminatum a sole, si ille actus semper staret, ita quod sol non posset habere aliam illuminationem, hoc non esset quia simpliciter repugnat soli, ut est principium illuminativum, quod sit principium alterius illuminationis, imo solummodo ex hoc quod totale suum passivum est proportionabiliter actuatum; absolute ergo soli est compossibilis alia illuminatio et, per consequens, si sol necessario causaret omnem illuminationem quam posset causare, sol haberet illam illuminationem in actu. Nunquam est ergo necessitas simpliciter illius unicae productionis, nec est necessitas istius unitatis, ex hoc quod una productio semper stat."

everlasting character of the unique production, an assumption that had already been challenged.[48]

In the second article of this second question of the *Quodlibet*, where Scotus is to formulate his own position, he states that the negative conclusion, viz. that more than one production of the same type is impossible in the divine, is not to be accepted merely on the basis of faith, but can be demonstrated in a necessary way. He advances three arguments: a negative or indirect proof (in the form of a *reductio ad impossibile*), a positive proof, and a confirmation on the basis of Aristotle. The argument is basically the same as in the Parisian lectures, although less explicitly focused on the necessity that every formal aspect in the divine is of itself a 'this'—instead, much of what counted as the proof's corroboration in the Parisian lectures now enters into the demonstration itself.

The *reductio ad impossibile* says that if more than one production of the same type can exist, an infinite manifold of productions is possible and, if possible, necessary in God; since the consequent is false, the antecedent is false as well. The proof for the inference shows that anything that can be multiplied or that can exist in more than one individual of the same kind is not of itself limited to any determined number. What can thus by itself be multiplied infinitely, can only be limited to a definite plurality on external grounds, which does not obtain in God. Hence, if in God there could be more than one production of the same type, then an infinity of productions of the same type would exist—which is impossible.[49]

The positive proof argues along the same lines that what cannot be restricted to a definite plurality in the divine cannot be multiplied at all. Since a production of the same type in the divine cannot be restricted to a definite plurality, it cannot be multiplied at all. The proof of the major premise repeats the claim that the possibility of an infinity of productions of the same type in the divine entails its necessity. The minor premise is more elaborately argued for. A production of the same type in the divine cannot be restricted to a definite plural-

48 Ibid. n. 45, ed. Wad.-Viv. 25, p. 83: "Ex hoc patet quod secunda ratio de adaequatione, abbrevians istam, non concludit: quia, aut maior accipit adaequationem intensivam tantum, vel extensivam et intensivam. Si intensivam tantum, ex tali adaequatione non concluditur quod sit unica productio possibilis, immo alia potest esse possibilis, licet non simul stans; habetur ergo tantum quod unica est possibilis simul; sed ubi non habetur de unica productione possibili nisi sic quod alia non sit simul possibilis, ibi non habetur quin alia sit simpliciter possibilis et, per consequens, in proposito necessaria simpliciter. Si accipiatur adaequatio secundo modo, minor non probatur nisi forte innitatur isti, 'quod unica productio semper stat,' et de hoc tactum est supra."

49 Ibid. a. 2 n. 47–50, ed. Wad.-Viv. 25, pp. 87–88.

ity, since what does not presuppose several different types of principles which might restrict it to a certain plurality cannot be limited to a smaller number of the same type at all. This is clear on the basis of the prior negative argument, viz. the *reductio ad impossibile*. But it is likewise clear that a production of the same type in the divine does not presuppose several different types of principles which might restrict it to a certain plurality. For different productions of the same kind only presuppose two principles, viz. the producer and the formal principle by which the production is accomplished, and neither of these presupposes a plurality of factors different in type that might limit these productions to a certain number.[50]

It seems, therefore, that the argument from the adequacy of production has been definitively superseded in the second question of the *Quodlibet*, in accordance with its rejection in the Parisian lectures. Scotus recognizes the inherent singularity of every formal aspect in the divine as the better argument to explain why there cannot be more than one production of the same type in God. But, as we will see, this is not the whole story yet. The argument of the adequacy of production was dismissed as ineffective, because it did not prove by itself alone the impossibility of many productions of the same type in the divine. Now, as soon as the inherent singularity of every formal aspect in the divine is recognized, i.e. when the additional conditions for the argument from the adequacy of production to be effective are satisfied, the argument can be restored to its original function.

9. Among the challenges to Scotus's solution listed in the third article of the second question of the *Quodlibet* we find the second doubt, which claims that since the second person in the trinity possesses the formal principle for generating, viz. perfect memory as the principle of generation or diction, it can produce accordingly.[51] Scotus replies first to the substance (*ad rem*) of the objection and then to its form; the first part, which contains two counter arguments, is of interest here. As we will see, these counter arguments suggest a more positive appreciation of the argument from the adequacy of production, which can be explained by the fact that meanwhile the additional conditions for the argument to be effective have been satisfied.

The first counter argument states that a form that is a productive principle in some supposit according to a production that is adequate to that form cannot be the principle of production for another supposit. Since memory is for the

50 Ibid. n. 51–57, ed. Wad.-Viv. 25, pp. 88–90.
51 Ibid. a. 3 n. 69–90, ed. Wad.-Viv. 25, p. 98.

father in the divine the principle of production according to a production that is adequate to that principle, it cannot be the principle of production for the son, even when it is in the son. Scotus corroborates his argument with the help of an example to explain the underlying idea of complete adequacy, viz. that it is impossible for the formal principle of acting to exceed the action.[52] Under this interpretation it is clear that memory is for the father the principle of such a complete production. For the father's memory, Scotus argues, has "such an adequate diction in the father that it is impossible for the dictive principle to exceed the diction, just like it is impossible that there be another diction in God than this, since it is by itself a 'this'."[53] Evidently, we see here the Parisian argument from the inherent singularity of every formal aspect in the divine recur. As Scotus continues, he connects this argument with his solution of the question:

> This is clear from the solution of the question. For everything in the divine that does not of necessity presuppose a plurality of a different type is of itself a 'this'. Now the diction in the divine does not necessarily presuppose a plurality of a different type. Therefore, diction is by itself a 'this' and, consequently, its principle has this diction as completely adequate to it; hence, it cannot be the principle in the son.[54]

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52 Ibid. n. 82–83, ed. Wad.-Viv. 25, p. 104: "Ad rem potest dupliciter responderi: Forma, quae est in aliquo supposito principium producendi productione adaequata illi formae, non potest esse alicui alteri principium producendi; nunc autem, memoria est Patri principium producendi productione adaequata illi principio; ergo; et si sit in Filio, non potest esse Filio principium producendi. Maior probatur exemplo sic: Si calor esset igni principium calefaciendi lignum calefactione adaequata illi calori, et ille idem calor communicaretur ligno, non posset esse ligno principium calefaciendi. Probo: quia nec calefaciendi se, quia tunc calor esset principium calefaciendi sive producendi calorem in eodem supposito, nec alterum, quia calefactio ista ponitur adaequata illi calori. Et procedit ista probatio de adaequatione omnimoda, ubi impossibile est actionem excedere principium formale agendi."

53 Ibid. n. 83, ed. Wad.-Viv. 25, p. 104: "Et secundum istum intellectum patet minor: quia memoria sic in Patre habet dictionem in Patre adaequatam quod impossibile est principium dictivum excedere hanc dictionem, sicut impossibile est in divinis dictionem esse nisi hanc, quia de se est haec."

54 Ibid. n. 83, ed. Wad.-Viv. 25, pp. 104–105: "Patet ex solutione quaestionis, quia quidquid in divinis non praeexigit pluralitatem alterius rationis, illud de se est hoc; dictio in divinis non necessario praeexigit pluralitatem alterius rationis ergo de se est haec et, per consequens, principium eius habet hanc dictionem omnino adaequatam sibi; non potest ergo esse principium in Filio." (transl. modified from *God and Creatures: the Quodlibetal Questions*, trans. Felix Alluntis and Alan B. Wolter [Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975])

Whereas Scotus's solution in the second article had indeed shown that since a production of the same type in the divine cannot be restricted to a definite plurality, it cannot be multiplied at all, he now equates the impossibility of being multiplied in the divine with its inherent singularity, viz. that it is of itself a 'this'. Only on the basis of this inherent singularity, the argument from the adequacy of production is cogent.

Finally, the second counter argument against the second objection to Scotus's solution of the question states the same reasoning in other terms. If a supposit acquires a form by a production adequate to that form, it cannot produce by that same form—which applies to the second person in the divine, which receives the paternal memory by a production adequate to that memory. That a supposit cannot produce by the same form it acquires by a production adequate to that form is clear, for if so, it would produce itself or something else. But nothing is the cause of itself. And it could not produce something else either, for the production is adequate to the productive principle. Thus the possibility that the memory in the son would function as a principle to produce another son is excluded both by the first counter argument, since the adequate principle of production is already in the father, and by the second counter argument, as it is communicated to the son by that production.[55]

4 The Unicity of Innertrinitarian Production and the Parisian Doctrine of Individuation

10. The first section of the first article of the second question of the *Quodlibet* of Duns Scotus shares common features with his magisterial dispute with William Peter Godinus, which, as has been suggested, was probably part of the

55 Ibid. n. 84–85, ed. Wad.-Viv 25, p. 105: "Ad eandem rationem probandam accipienda est ista propositio, et redit in eandem sententiam cum alia: suppositum accipiens formam per productionem adaequatam illi formae non potest per illam formam producere; Filius recipit memoriam per productionem adaequatam illi memoriae; ergo etc. Minor declaratur sicut in ratione iam facta. Probatio maioris: Quia si secundum illam produceret, aut ergo se, aut alterum; non se, quia hoc est impossibile, secundum Augustinum, I *De Trinitate* cap. 1; nec alterum, quia illa productio illius ponitur adaequata principio productivo; sic ergo non oportet quaerere determinativum concurrens cum principio elicitivo ut sit una dictio, nec etiam aliquam negationem potest habere sic ut tale principium formale. Sed esto quod essentia vel quodcumque positivum mere acceptum sit in Patre formalis ratio dicendi vel generandi, tamen non potest esse in Filio ratio dicendi vel generandi; quia ipsum ut in Patre est principium productionis adaequate, quantum ad primam rationem, et per illam Filio communicatur, quantum ad secundam rationem."

Parisian inception ceremony of Duns Scotus as regent master.[56] This match is of interest, since it strongly suggests that the topic of the second quodlibetal question, viz. the impossibility of a plurality of divine processions of the same kind, was the actual theme of the magisterial dispute between Scotus and Godinus. The magisterial dispute has been reported under the title "whether matter is the principle of individuation." This topic, however, comes up at the magisterial dispute only because the first among the arguments by which Aquinas had defended the impossibility of a plurality of persons terminating the notional act restricts the multiplication of forms belonging to one species expressly to the material realm. Elsewhere, I interpreted the magisterial dispute between Scotus and Godinus as the search for a unificatory account of the principle of individuation.[57] This new evidence now restores Scotus's objection against a merely regional explanation to its original context.

As we have seen, Duns Scotus discusses in the first article of the second question of the *Quodlibet* the arguments of other theologians attempting to demonstrate the impossibility of a plurality of productions of the same kind in God. Before turning to the proof of Henry of Ghent, Scotus presents and refutes the four arguments by which Thomas Aquinas had argued for the impossibility of a plurality of persons terminating the notional act in *S.th.* I, q. 41, art. 6.

The first argument proposed by Aquinas is taken from the relations, which alone distinguish the divine persons. Since the divine persons are subsistent relations, there cannot be several fathers or sons without there being several fatherhoods and sonhoods as their formal principle. Now this would only be possible on account of their material distinction, Aquinas argues. For forms belonging to one species can only be multiplied according to matter. And since there is no matter in the divine, there can only be one subsisting sonhood in the

56 On this magisterial dispute see Stephen D. Dumont, "John Duns Scotus's Life in Context," in *Interpreting Duns Scotus: Critical Essays*, ed. Giorgio Pini (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2022), pp. 8–43, p. 38, who refers to Pelster, "Thomas von Sutton," pp. 368–369. The *quaestio magistralis* "Utrum materia sit principium individuationis" was edited for the first time in Clemens Stroick, "Eine Pariser Disputation vom Jahre 1306: Die Verteidigung des Thomistischen Individuationsprinzips gegen Johannes Duns Scotus durch Guillelmus Petri de Godino, O.P.," in *Thomas von Aquino: Interpretation und Rezeption: Studien und Texte*, ed. Willehad Paul Eckert (Mainz: Matthias-Grünewald, 1974), 559–608, at pp. 581–608; see our recent edition: W. Goris and G. Smith, "Duns Scotus's Debate with William Peter Godinus over the Principle of Individuation" (https://www.scotus.de/editions).

57 See Wouter Goris, "Does Unity Entail Distinction? Godinus And Scotus on the Principle of Individuation," in *The Lectura Thomasina in its Context. Philosophical and Theological Issues*, ed. Andreas Speer, Andrea Colli, and Francesca Bonini (Leuven: Peeters, 2020), pp. 189–207.

divine, just like there could also be only one subsisting whiteness—if whiteness could subsist at all.[58]

The argument recurs to the famous doctrine that plurification under one species requires matter—which is the reason why angels, since they are immaterial, are each a separate species according to Aquinas. The conclusion, viz. that there can be only one unique subsisting sonhood in God, equates without much ado the plurification of forms under one species with the plurification of persons by one notional act. In his presentation of the argument, Duns Scotus strengthens it by rephrasing the major premiss: "A form of the same species or, speaking more properly in the case of the divine, forms of the same type are multiplied only by reason of matter."[59] Despite its benevolent interpretation, however, the argument remains inconclusive, as Scotus claims to show in an extensive and detailed refutation.

Duns Scotus objects to the major premiss by means of two arguments. The first objection is that Aquinas would have based his proof of a most certain conclusion on a dubious premiss—which is discussed mainly in relation to the problem of the individuation of angels. The second objection advances another aspect, viz. the problem of the individuation of the rational soul, to show that the major premiss is not necessary in the sense that its opposite would include a contradiction. I will focus on the first objection here.

The first objection sets out to show the dialectical nature of Aquinas's first argument by distinguishing between two possible interpretations of its major premiss.

> The first argument, it seems, exceeds the claim under investigation (*transcendens propositum*) and assumes something which many consider dubious or false. The major, viz. 'a form of the same species is multiplied only by reason of matter', which they claim holds for the angel as well as for God, can be interpreted in two ways: (i.) Every immaterial form is a

58 See Thomas Aquinas, *S.th.* I q. 41 a. 6: "Prima (ratio) quidem ex parte relationum, quibus solum personae distinguuntur. Cum enim personae divinae sint ipsae relationes subsistentes, non possent esse plures patres vel plures filii in divinis, nisi essent plures paternitates et plures filiationes. Quod quidem esse non posset nisi secundum materialem rerum distinctionem, formae enim unius speciei non multiplicantur nisi secundum materiam, quae in divinis non est. Unde in divinis non potest esse nisi una tantum filiatio subsistens; sicut et albedo subsistens non posset esse nisi una."

59 See Duns Scotus, *Quodl.* q. 2 a. 1 n. 5, ed. Wad.-Viv. 25, p. 60: "Prima (ratio) est ista: Forma eiusdem speciei sive, quod magis proprie dicitur in divinis, eiusdem rationis, non multiplicatur nisi secundum materiam; materia autem in divinis esse non potest; unde in divinis non est nisi unica filiatio subsistens, sicut albedo subsistens non potest esse nisi una."

> 'this' of itself or by reason of its quiddity, such as God is a 'this' in virtue of his deity in the sense that, were one to think of deity alone, it would be a formal contradiction if God were not a 'this'. (ii.) Even though an immaterial form is not formally a 'this' by reason of its quiddity, it cannot be multiplied in reality, because such a unique singular and individual form contains in itself the total entity of that form both intensively and extensively, as is clear from the case of the sun.[60]

Scotus blames Aquinas for having introduced a controversial issue, viz. whether matter is the principle of individuation, into the question whether the same divine procession can produce many divine persons. The result is that his argument is based on a debatable premiss. To evidence its lack of demonstrative necessity, the premiss is shown to be amenable to two different interpretations, neither of which will turn out to be acceptable.

The first interpretation of the major premiss suggests that an immaterial form would necessarily be instantiated by itself or by its quiddity. Scotus stresses this necessity as that of which the opposite involves a contradiction and recurs to the example of angelic nature to disprove the assumed necessity of the major premiss. If the major is understood in the first way, he says, it would follow that the notion of a specific form of angels would be incompatible with its multiple instantiation in reality. That means, whoever would defend that the angelic nature can be plurified, would have formally repugnant concepts in his mind, and the same formal repugnance would come about if one would conceive of the angelic nature as having the character of a universal, i.e. as what can be said of many. However, since many 'theologians and Catholics', who understood the angelic nature and species in the same way as other species, have admitted its plurification and universality without any repugnance between the concepts involved, this consequent does not seem plausible.[61] Scotus illustrates the latter claim with the example of John Damascene, who allows for a

60 Ibid. n. 9, ed. Wad.-Viv. 25, p. 61: "Prima ratio videtur esse transcendens propositum et assumere dubium sive falsum secundum multos. Illa enim propositio maior, scilicet quod 'forma eiusdem rationis non multiplicatur nisi secundum materiam,' quae secundum eos aeque haberet locum de angelo sicut de Deo, aut intelligitur sic quod forma quaecumque immaterialis sit de se haec sive ex ratione suae quiditatis, sicut Deus deitate est hic ita quod nihil aliud intelligendo nisi deitatem est contradictio formalis Deum non esse hunc; aut intelligitur sic quod, quamvis forma immaterialis aliqua non sit haec formaliter sua quiditate, tamen ipsa in re multiplicari non potest, quia unica forma talis singularis et signata habet in se totam entitatem illius formae et intensive et extensive, ut patet de sole." (transl. Alluntis and Wolter mod.)

61 Ibid. n. 10, ed. Wad.-Viv. 25, p. 61.

communicable species within the divine and in the angelic order, and that of three articles listed in the condemnation of 1277.[62]

Upon the second interpretation of the major premiss, the specific nature of the archangel Michael would not be a 'this' by itself. Consequently, it would not be incompatible with such a nature to not be a 'this' and to not exist in 'this' supposit, for by absolute power this nature can be generated without being in 'this', as there is no contradiction involved. And there is no use of appealing to the present dispensation, as such would not dismiss the argument. For even if Michael would be destroyed and the angelic nature came about in another supposit, it would still not be necessary that Michael would be 'this' unique instantiation of his nature. Moreover, such an appeal would be false. For only the mutual repugnance of what is simultaneously within an agent's power makes it impossible to be realized simultaneously. Now since the angelic nature is not a 'this' of itself, there is no such mutual repugnance between this and that Michael. Hence, they can be realized simultaneously.[63]

Scotus concludes that the second interpretation, even if it were conceded to be true, still would not produce the intended outcome, which can consequently be inferred only on the basis of the first interpretation, which, however, was shown to be disputable—now, on such a shaky foundation one can and should not base the most necessary of conclusions.

> Hence, even if the second interpretation were correct, at least regarding the claim under investigation (*quantum ad propositum*) it is evident that this proposition 'A form of the same species can only be multiplied by reason of matter' does not allow us to conclude the complete impossibility of the plurification of sonship within the divine. And yet such multiplication is absolutely impossible, for it implies a contradiction. Hence, this proposition does not allow us to conclude the claim under investigation (*propositum*), viz. the conclusion that we defend and which is true, unless according to the first interpretation, which reasonably seems false

62 See ibid. n. 12, ed. Wad.-Viv. 25, p. 61: "Et articuli damnati tres videntur istum articulum prima facie reprobare. Unus est a Domino Stephano condemnatus, quid dicit sic quod 'quia intelligentiae non habent materiam, Deus non posset eiusdem speciei facere plures; error.' Secundus, quod 'Deus non potest multiplicare individua sub una specie sine materia; error.' Tertius, 'quod formae non recipiunt divisionem nisi secundum divisionem materiae, error; nisi intelligatur de formis eductis de potentia materiae'; ergo de formis non eductis de potentia materiae hoc dicere, est error." See for these articles (listed as n. 42–43 and 110), Roland Hissette, *Enquête sur les 219 articles condamnés à Paris le 7 Mars 1277* (Louvain: Publications universitaires, 1977), pp. 82, 181.

63 Ibid. n. 13–14, ed. Wad.-Viv. 25, p. 62.

> to many, as was said. Now it is not good theory (*doctrina conveniens*) to base a most certain and necessary conclusion on an overly general argument that to many seems objectionable on several counts.[64]

On neither of its possible interpretations does the major premiss of Aquinas's first argument lead to the required conclusion. If the second interpretation were to be accepted as true, that is to say, if one would accept that the immaterial form, even though not a 'this' by its quiddity, cannot be multiplied in reality, still the argument would hold only for the angelic nature. But such a regional account resists being transferred to the divine realm. The conclusion that more than one divine sonship is impossible hence follows only on account of the first interpretation of the major premiss of Aquinas's first argument, viz. that the immaterial form cannot be multiplied in reality, since it is a 'this' by its quiddity. And since this interpretation presents a disputable claim, it is unsuitable to serve as a premiss for a most necessary conclusion. For a proper syllogism should infer necessary truths from premisses that are more evident and true than the conclusion.

We may conclude, therefore, that Scotus's objection against the major premiss of Aquinas's first argument points out two insufficiencies. On the one hand, Aquinas would violate the norms of good scientific practice by inferring a necessary evident truth from debatable premisses—which is a matter of dialectics, not of science. On the other hand, Aquinas would have introduced an explanatory account into the domain of divine processions that is alien to it—an inconclusive *metabasis eis allo genos*. This is why Scotus objects that the first argument exceeds the claim under investigation—it is *transcendens propositum* and *nimis generalis*.

11. If we now turn to the magisterial debate between Scotus and Godinus, we should methodically disregard the title which its medieval redactor bestowed upon the question and inquire what the text is actually about. For the arguments exchanged in the frolic back and forth of the original disputation re-

64 Ibid. n. 15, ed. Wad.-Viv. 25, p. 62: "Esto etiam quod secundus intellectus esset verus; saltem ad propositum habemus quod ista propositio 'forma eiusdem rationis non potest plurificari nisi per materiam,' non concludit omnimodam impossibilitatem plurificationis filiationis in divinis; cum tamen illa plurificatio sit impossibilis simpliciter includens contradictionem. Ista ergo propositio non concludit propositum, scilicet conclusionem quam tenemus sicut ipsa est vera, nisi accepta secundum primum intellectum, qui rationabiliter videtur multis esse falsus, ut dictum est. Non enim est doctrina conveniens conclusionem certissimam et summe necessariam tenere propter rationem nimis generalem, quae videtur multis habere plures instantias." (transl. Alluntis/Wolter mod.)

ported by the question suggest an entirely different issue underlying the debate. We can recur to an explicit remark of Duns Scotus in the debate to corroborate this claim.

> Furthermore, the proposition that we are chiefly dealing with is posited as a foundation in the divine, on account of which it should be upheld that there cannot be many sons in the divine. For the proposition by which a conclusion is upheld must be better known. Yet, this proposition is not of such nature. For the conclusion is admitted by the theologians, but not the proposition.[65]

Clearly, we are dealing here with the same constellation that we encountered in the first article of the second question of Scotus's *Quodlibet*. Scotus states explicitly that the magisterial debate deals with a proposition that serves as the basis of a theological proof for the impossibility of many divine sons. And he argues that, if such a proposition is to serve as a premise, it should be better known than the conclusion. In the case at hand, however, the conclusion is admitted by theologians, but not the proposition.

Evidently, the proposition which the magisterial debate deals with is the major premise of Aquinas's first argument in *S.th.* I, q. 41, art. 6. In the argument immediately following, we encounter the same objection, viz. that Aquinas's argument for a most certain conclusion is based on a debatable premise, corroborated by the same argumentative strategy, viz. by showing that the premise is amenable to two different, equally inacceptable interpretations. Scotus claims to agree with Aristotle here, who would not admit a conclusion of which the principles are to be denied. Now Aristotle would say, Scotus suggests, that an immaterial substance (*intelligentia*) is either formally a 'this' by its quiddity or not. According to neither interpretation, however, would the premiss be acceptable for Godinus. Hence, the conclusion that Godinus defends in agreement with Aquinas is based on premises that are to be denied.[66]

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65 Scotus-Godinus, *Quaestio magistralis*, ed. Goris and Smith, §88: "Praeterea, propositio, de qua agitur principaliter, ponit[ur] fundamentum in divinis, propter quam tenendum est quod non possunt esse plures filii in divinis. Propositio enim, per quam tenetur conclusio, debet esse notiorum, sed haec non est hic, quia conclusio conceditur a theologis, non autem propositio." See also the reaction of Godinus, ibid. §110: "Ad illud quod additur de propositione nota dicendum quod duplex est notitia: evidentiae et adhaesionis. Ista autem propositio quod 'immaterialia' etc. notior est notitia evidentiae quam quod Filius sit aliquis in divinis, licet notitia adhaesionis secus sit."

66 Ibid., §§89–94: "Item, nec Philosophum tenet, sed ego, quia magis tenet Philosophum, qui negat principia et conclusiones quam qui tenet conclusiones et negat principia, quia

It seems, therefore, that the major premiss of Aquinas's first argument in *S.th.* I, q. 41, art. 6 sollicited the magisterial debate and received a similar treatment as in the second question of the *Quodlibet*, in which the proposition 'A form of the same species is multiplied only by reason of matter' was interpreted as claiming either that an immaterial form would necessarily be instantiated by itself or by its quiddity, or that an immaterial form, which is not formally a 'this' by reason of its quiddity, still cannot be multiplied in reality, since it contains in itself the total entity of that form. In fact, this dual interpretation was formulated from the outset in the fourth and last of the opening arguments of Duns Scotus and runs like a thread through the magisterial debate.[67] Naturally, a distinct role is reserved in the debate for the three articles from the Parisian con-

Philosophus, si negasset principia, et etiam conclusiones. Hoc est in proposito, quia alterum duorum istorum dicit Philosophus, scilicet quod aut intelligentia sua quiditate formaliter est haec aut non. Si primo modo, hoc intendit altero trium modorum: Aut quia in eis est idem suppositum et natura, sicut videtur dicere VII *Metaphysicae*, scilicet quod quod quid erat esse in quodam est idem ut in primis substantiis, quae sunt sine materia. Hoc secundum te non stat, quia secundum te in omnibus a primo differt quod quid est et cuius est, et suppositum et natura. Item, articulus est 'quod substantiae separatae immateriales sunt sua essentia vel substantia, quia in eis est idem esse et quod est, error'. Aut, quia angelus est ultima actualitas et ideo non est receptibilis in aliquo nec receptiva alicuius. Sed hoc non ponis, quia ponis compositionem ex essentia et esse in angelo et ex subiecto et accidentibus. Aut tertio modo, quia angelus est quaedem necessitas essendi, et ideo oportet quod sit semper. Sed nec hoc tu ponis, quia ponis quod Deus potest Michaelem annihilare, sed non eundem numero reparare, sed eiusdem speciei. Si autem ponas secundo modo, quod non potest esse nisi hic, quia non potest haberi materia alia aliqua et alia in qua recipiatur, quae est causa proxima intelligendi per Philosophum VII *Metaphysicae* et in *De caelo et mundo*, ubi ponit singularia definiri non posse, quia si definiantur, oportet in definitione eorum poni aliquid quo ablato nihilominus esset substantia. Ideo secundum eum ratio quiditatis communis est, nec aliquid ex se est ratio essendi hoc. Et cum dixit quod non potest esse alius sol, intellexit servato ordine causarum qui nunc est, sed nullus negat, quin Deus posset mutare hunc ordinem causarum et facere materiam eiusdem rationis cum materia, quae nunc est cum forma solis. Sic in proposito." In the corresponding section of the second article of the second question of the *Quodlibet*, Scotus presents the argument from the 12th book of the *Metaphysics*, which concludes on account of the first mover's immateriality to its being one in kind and number (see *Metaph.* XII c. 8, $1074^{a}33–35$), as *prima facie* evidence for the first argument of Aquinas and sets out to show that the relevant notion of matter is not that of the real part of the composite, but rather of a determining or contracting factor; the absence of matter in this sense in the divine argues that there is not contracting of the essence so that it is a 'this', as it is a singular in virtue of its essence. Baconthorpe discards Scotus's explanation: "Item ad principale propositum trahunt Philosophum, 12 *Metaphysicae*, text. 49, sed violenter, et ideo non curo." See John Baconthorpe, *In I Sent.* d. 7 q. un. a. 2 (ed. Cremona 1618), p. 145.

67 See *Quaestio magistralis* §§ 4, 13, 44, 49–50, 54, 88–94, 110–115.

demnation of 1277 which corroborated Scotus's refutation of the first interpretation of Aquinas's major premise. These are introduced for the same purpose by Duns Scotus in the debate and fuel the subsequent discussion.[68] Finally, there is abundant evidence of parallels with the second objection to Aquinas's first argument in the *Quodlibet*, viz. about the rational soul, which Scotus likewise proposes to deal separately with in the magisterial debate.[69]

The main point of contention in this magisterial dispute from 1305, viz. whether the principle of individuation allows of a unificatory account, as Scotus claims, or only of a regional account, as Godinus defends, follows from their contrary evaluation of the major premise of Aquinas's first argument against the possibility of a plurality of persons terminating the notional act. What Scotus affirms, viz. that numerical multiplication under one species is a possibility for any common nature as such and therefore also for the angelic nature, Godinus denies. Numerical multiplication under one species requires, Godinus claims, a real potentiality resulting from the essential features of a given nature and necessarily involves matter—which does not obtain in the case of angelic nature. Hence, Godinus argues that the major premise of Aquinas's first argument, viz. that 'a form of the same species is multiplied only by reason of matter', holds for the angel as well as for God. Scotus rejects this premise, since it deploys different explanatory principles for the individuation of material and immaterial substances.[70]

5 Conclusion

12. The present essay argued that there is a certain development in the way Duns Scotus deploys the argument from the adequacy of production. The original argument meant to demonstrate, from the *Lectura Oxoniensis* onwards, that there cannot be more than one son in God. As Scotus challenged this original argument in his Parisian lectures, a different solution was established to prove the impossibility of a plurality of production of the same type in the divine. The new solution is the inherent singularity of every formal aspect in the divine. On the basis of this new solution, finally, the argument from the adequacy of production is restored to its demonstrative cogency in the second question of the *Quodlibet*. And, as we have seen, the dependence of the argument from the

68 See ibid. § 54, and the subsequent discussion in §§ 65–67, 85–87, 91, 106–109, 113, 126, 146.
69 See ibid. §§ 119, 127.
70 See Goris, "Does Unity Entail Distinction?"

adequacy of production on the permanence of the effect is effectively solved by this new solution. For Scotus requires the proof to show that the necessity of one production of the same type is of such a nature that, if *per impossibile* this production would not always continue or would not exist, still no other production of the same type could exist in God.

As suggested, the issue of the impossibility of a plurality of divine productions of the same type was at the basis of the magisterial dispute between Duns Scotus and William Peter Godinus, which evidences its close relation with the issue of the principle of individuation. Other reverberations of the debate on the impossibility of more than one son in the divine attest to the significance of the position of Duns Scotus as well. Hervaeus Natalis attacks the position in Scotus's *Quodlibet* as part of his broader criticism of the formal distinction in the second question of his first *Quodlibet*.[71] Peter of Auriol rejects Hervaeus's criticism as even more problematic than the position it disproves and formulates his own assessment, which builds on the idea that the sonship in the divine is a quiddity (viz., "tota quidditas et tota ratio existens in Deo") and therefore neither one nor many by itself; if Scotus proves that a production of the same type in the divine cannot be restricted to a definite plurality, Auriol objects that for the same reason, viz. the quiddity's indifference, such a production is not determined to one unique instance as well.[72] Finally, the integral debate has been reproduced by Peter Thomae and John Baconthorpe alike. Both reject the criticism of Scotus's position by Peter of Auriol and present the combination of intensive and extensive adequacy as the most effective argument to prove that there cannot be a plurality of productions of the same kind in God, which argument, both authors emphasize, presupposes the facticity of such a perfect production in God.[73]

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71 See Hervaeus Natalis, *Quodl.* I q. 2 a. 4, ad 6 (ed. Venetiis 1513), f. 7^{rb}.

72 See Peter of Auriol, *Scriptum* I d. 7 sect. 20 a. 2, ed. Eligius Buytaert (St. Bonaventure, NY: Franciscan Institute, 1956), p. 877.

73 See John Baconthorpe, *In I Sent.* d. 7 q. un. a. 3, (ed. Cremona 1618), pp. 146–147; Peter Thomae, *Quodl.* q. 9 a. 2, ed. M.R. Hooper and Eligius Buytaert (St. Bonaventure, NY: Franciscan Institute, 1957), pp. 155–156. See also Francis of Meyronnes, who rejects the solution of Scotus that everything in the divine is by itself singular ("Apparet etiam mihi dubium quod omne quod est in Deo sit huiusmodi") and ultimately discards the assumption underlying the adequacy of production: "Dico ergo ad hoc quod adaequatio non est praecisa causa." (*Conflatus* I d. 8 q. 4 [ed. Venetiis 1520], f. 43^{rD})

12

Intuitive Erkenntnis im *Quodlibet* des seligen Johannes Duns Scotus im Hinblick auf das Problem des erkenntnistheoretischen Realismus

Witold Grzegorz Salamon OFM

Duns Scotus sagt, dass auf der Ebene der einfachen Erkenntnis (*simplex apprehensio*) neben der abstraktiven Erkenntnis auch eine andere intellektive Erkenntnis möglich ist, die eine Sache in ihrer Präsenz und Existenz wahrnimmt.[1] Von intuitiver Erkenntnis ist in den *Quaestiones* 6, 7, 13 und 14 des *Quodlibet* des seligen Johannes Duns Scotus die Rede. In den *Quaestiones* 6 und 13 finden wir eine allgemeine Beschreibung und Definition der intuitiven Erkenntnis in Gegenüberstellung zur abstraktiven Erkenntnis. In der Quaestio 7 wird die Intuitiverkenntnis mit der *cognitio definitiva* – der höchsten Stufe der wissenschaftlichen Erkenntnis eines einfachen Inhaltes verglichen und in der Quaestio 14 bestimmt Scotus die Rolle der intuitiven Erkenntnisart bei der Gotteserkenntnis von Seiten der menschlichen Seele auf Erden.

Es gibt etliche Monographien und Artikel, in denen die obengenannten Texte des Doctor Subtilis angeführt und analysiert werden.[2] Hier möchte ich

1 Vgl. Duns Scotus, *Quodl.* q. 6 n. 7–8, ed. Wad.-Viv. 25, pp. 243b–244; ed. F. Alluntis, a. 1 n. 18–19 (Madrid: La Editorial Cathólica, 1968), pp. 212–213: „Maior probatur ex perfectione actus beatifici, qui, ut melius capiatur, distinguitur de duplici actus intellectus, et hoc loquendo de simplici apprehensione sive intellectione obiecti simplicis; unus indifferenter potest esse respectu obiecti exsistentis et non exsistentis, et indifferenter etiam respectu obiecti non realiter praesentis sicut et realiter praesentis […]; iste actus intelligendi, qui scientificus dici potest, quia praevius et requisitus ad scire conclusionis, et ad intelligere principii, potest satis proprie dici abstractivus, quia abstrahit obiectum ab exsistentia et non exsistentia, praesentia et absentia. Alius autem actus intelligendi est, quem tamen non ita certitudinaliter experimur in nobis; possibilis tamen est; talis qui, scilicet praecise sit obiecti praesentis ut praesentis et exsistentis ut exsistentis."

2 Die wichtigsten Publikationen diesbezüglich sind folgende: Sebastian Day OFM, *Intuitive Cognition. A Key to the Significance of the Later Scholastics* (St. Bonaventure, New York: The Franciscan Institute 1947), pp. 48–70; Camille Bérubé OFM Cap, *La connaissance de l'individuel au moyen age* (Montréal/Paris: Presses de l'Université de Montréal, 1964), pp. 180–183; Ludger Honnefelder, *Ens inquantum ens. Der Begriff des Seienden als solchen als Gegenstand der Metaphysik nach der Lehre des Johannes Duns Scotus* (Münster, Aschendorff, 1979), pp. 218–231; Michal Chabada, *Cognitio intuitiva et abstractiva. Die ontologischen Implikationen*

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mich vor allem auf die Definitionen der intuitiven Erkenntnis – immer im Verhältnis zur abstraktiven Erkenntnis – und auf die Argumentation für diese Erkenntnisart auf der Ebene der intellektiven Erkenntnis in den genannten *Quaestiones* des *Quodlibet Scoti* begrenzen. Im zweiten Schritt werde ich zu Spannungen zwischen den verschiedenen Stellen in *Opera omnia Scoti* bezüglich intellektiver Intuitiverkenntnis *pro statu isto* (im Erdenleben) Stellung nehmen. Danach werde ich die verschiedenen Arten der Intuition in den Werken des Scotus erläutern und untersuchen, was genau das Objekt der intellektiven Intuitiverkenntnis in der Sache nach Johannes Duns Scotus ist. Im nächsten Schritt muss bestimmt werden, um welchen Realismus es hier geht. Und schließlich muss man die Frage beantworten, ob die intuitive Erkenntnisart dem Verstand wirklich Zugang zu den real existierenden Dingen ermöglicht und damit als Grundlage des erkenntnistheoretischen Realismus in Scotus fungieren kann.

1 Definitionen und Beweise für intellektive Intuitiverkenntnis im *Quodlibet* des Johannes Duns Scotus

Die erste Definition aus der Quaestio 6 bezieht sich auf den Zustand der Seele in der beseligenden Gottesschau (*visio beatifica*). Bei der Begründung der intellektiven Intuitiverkenntnis stellt Scotus fest, dass all das, was es bei sinnlicher Erkenntnis an Vollkommenheit gibt, in erhabener Weise der intellektuellen Erkenntnis zukommen kann.[3] Zur Vollkommenheit eines Erkenntnisaktes gehört es, dass das eigentliche beziehungsweise erste Objekt der Erkenntnis in sich – das heißt für Scotus: in vollkommener Weise – und nicht in einem Abbild, erfasst wird. Die sensitive Erkenntnispotenz hat diese Vollkommenheit, indem sie das Objekt in sich als gegenwärtig in seiner realen Existenz berühren kann. Folglich kommt diese Vollkommenheit auch der intellektuellen Erkenntnispotenz aufgrund ihres Vorrangs zu.[4]

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der Erkenntnislehre des Johannes Duns Scotus mit Gegenüberstellung zu Aristoteles und I. Kant (Mönchengladbach: B. Kühlen Verlag, 2005), pp. 64–81; Grzegorz Witold Salamon OFM, *Koncepcja poznania intuicyjnego u Jana Dunsa Szkota* (Teresin: Niepokalanów, 2007), pp. 24–36; Gérard Sondag, „Jean Duns Scot sur la connaissance intuitive intellectuelle (cognitio intuitiva)," *Veritas: Revista de filosofia* (Porto Alegre) 53 (2008), pp. 38–53.

3 Vgl. Duns Scotus, *Quodl.* q. 6 n. 8, ed. Wad.-Viv. 25, p. 244a; ed. Alluntis, n. 19, p. 213: „Hoc probatur: quia omnis perfectio cognitionis absolute, quae potest competere potentiae cognitivae sensitivae, potest eminenter competere potentiae cognitivae intellectivae".

4 Vgl. ibid: „Nunc autem perfectionis est in actu cognoscendi, ut cognitio est, perfecte attingere primum cognitum; non autem perfecte attingitur, quando non in se attingitur, sed tan-

Der hier dargestellte sogenannte „Vernunftbeweis“[5] für die intellektive Intuitiverkenntnis wird nochmals in etwas anderer Form in der Questio 13 angeführt. Dort wird klargemacht, dass der Verstand in der intuitiven Weise Zugang zu allen Gegenständen haben kann, weil er in Potenz gegenüber allen begreifbaren Gegenständen ist.[6]

Die wichtigste Argumentation für die intellektive Intuitiverkenntnis bezieht sich auf die beseligende Gottesschau von Angesicht zu Angesicht und wird als theologischer Beweis bezeichnet.[7] Bei dieser Argumentation wird angenommen, dass das Objekt der beseligenden Schau unbedingt existierend sein muss, weil die Glückseligkeit nur dann gegeben wird, wenn das beseligende Objekt unmittelbar in sich berührt wird.[8] Die reale Existenz Gottes ist eine Wahrheit theologischer Natur, die wir aus der Offenbarung entnehmen. Für den Theologen Johannes Duns Scotus war sie eine sichere Wahrheit, weil sie durch die Bibel eindeutig bestätigt ist. Und in der *visio beatifica* werden wir Gott von Angesicht zu Angesicht schauen, wie der erste Korintherbrief bezeugt (1 Kor 13, 12). Die einzige Art und Weise, in der das hier unmittelbar gegebene und existierende Objekt (d. h. Gott) wahrgenommen werden kann, ist offensichtlich die Intuitiverkenntnis – was klar aus der Definition dieser Erkenntnisart hervorgeht.[9]

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tummodo in aliqua diminuta vel derivata similitudine ab ipso; sensitiva autem habet hanc perfectionem in cognitione sua, quia potest obiectum attingere in se, ut exsistens et ut praesens est in exsistentia reali, et non tantum diminute attingendo ipsum in quadam perfectione diminuta; ergo ista perfectio competit intellectivae in cognoscendo“.

5 Vom „Vernuftbeweis“ („rational proof“) für die Intuitiverkenntnis schreibt S. Day, *Intuitive Cognition*, pp. 75–76. Mehr dazu in: Salamon, *Koncepcja poznania intuicyjnego*, pp. 86–93. Honnefelder spricht diesbezüglich von „philosophischer Argumentation“ aufgrund der Vollkommenheit, vgl. *Ens iquantum ens*, p. 221 (ähnlich auch Chabada, *Cognitio intuitiva et abstractiva*, p. 75).

6 Vgl. Duns Scotus, *Quodl.* q. 13 n. 29 [8], ed. Francesco Pica, in John Duns Scotus on Cognitive Acts: Their Causes, Ontological Nature, and Intentional Character, Ph.D. Thesis, University of Toronto 2023, p. 254: „Secundo probatur idem, quia quidquid est perfectionis in cognitione magis potest competere cognitioni intellectivae quam sensitivae. Nunc autem posse attingere obiectum in se realiter perfectionis est, ubi non in hoc vilesceret potentia attingens propter imperfectionem obiecti. Ergo intellectus potest habere actum quo sic attingat aliquid in sua reali exsistentia, saltem illud obiectum quod est nobilius tali intellectu vel aeque nobile. Et pari ratione potest hoc concedi de quocumque obiecto, quia intellectus noster potentialis est respectu cuiuscumque intelligibilis“.

7 Vgl. Salamon, *Koncepcja poznania intuicyjnego*, pp. 82–86. Siehe auch Day, *Intuitive Cognition*, p. 76.

8 Vgl. Chabada, *Cognitio intuitiva et abstractiva*, pp. 75–76.

9 Vgl. Duns Scotus, *Quodl.* q. 6 n. 20 [8], ed. Alluntis, p. 214: „Actus beatificus intellectus non potest esse cognitio abstractiva, sed necessario intuitiva, quia abstractiva est aeque exsis-

Auch in der Quaestio 7 erinnert Scotus kurz an die Definition der abstraktiven und intuitiven Erkenntnis.[10] Danach stellt Duns Scotus fest, dass die *cognitio definitiva* – bei der das Objekt unter dem Begriff eines definierten Allgemeinen erfasst wird[11] – eine abstraktive Erkenntnisart darstellt und keine Intuitiverkenntnis des definierten Allgemeinen umfasst.[12] Intuitiverkenntnis ist also auf der begrifflichen Ebene nicht möglich.

Eine wichtige Eigenschaft der intuitiven – sowie der abstraktiven – Erkenntnisart ist nach Duns Scotus die Direktheit, das heißt, dass sie eine unvermittelbare Erkenntnis (*notitia immediata*) des erkennenden Objektes ist.[13] Deswegen

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tentis et non exsistentis, et sic beatitudo potest esse in obiecto non exsistente, quod est impossibile; abstractiva etiam posset haberi, licet obiectum non attingatur in se, sed in similitudine; beatitudo autem numquam habetur nisi ipsum obiectum beatificum immediate in se attingatur, et hoc est quod aliqui vocant, et bene, ipsam intellectionem intuitivam visionem facialem; et accipitur ab Apostolo, I ad Cor. 13: ‚Videmus nunc per speculum et in aenigmate, tunc autem facie ad faciem'". Ähnliche Argumentation finden wir auch in *Quodl.* q. 13 n. 28 [8], ed. Pica, pp. 253–254: „Hoc probatur primo, quia aliqua potest esse intellectio non exsistentis – patet –, aliqua etiam potest esse obiecti exsistentis et ut exsistentis, quia talem habebit beatus de obiecto beatifico, de quo dicitur habere claram visionem sive facialem, propter hoc quod actus eius cognoscendi tendit in illud ut in se praesens in propria exsistentia actuali".

10 Vgl. *Quodl.* q. 7 n. 22 [8], ed. Alluntis, p. 260: „Et breviter hic repetitur: Quia, etsi cognitio abstractiva possit esse non exsistentis aeque sicut et exsistentis, tamen intuitiva non est nisi exsistentis ut exsistentis est".

11 Vgl. ibid. n. 20 [7], ed. Alluntis, p. 259: „... ultimus tamen gradus cognoscendi aliquod incomplexum cognitione scientifica sive praevia scientiae est cognitio definitiva; quia ipsa est cognitio per se in particulari distinctissima, excedens etiam illam confusam cognitionem .... Saltem in hac cognitione definitva habetur conceptus evidenter includens omnes veritates necessarias de tali obiecto". Alle Stufen dieses Erkennens von Seiten unseres Verstanden sind vier: 1) Erkenntnis *per accidens*, 2) Erkenntnis *per se in universali*, 3) Erkenntnis *per se in particulari confuse*, 4) *cognitio definitiva* – in der ein Begriff gegeben wird, in dem virtuell alle notwendigen Wahrheiten über den Gegenstand enthalten sind. Mehr dazu: Chabada, *Cognitio intuitiva et abstractiva*, pp. 77–78.

12 Vgl. *Quodl.* q. 7 n. 22 [8], ed. Alluntis, p. 260: „cognitio autem hominis abstractiva et definitiva potest esse non exsistentis et exsistentis. Patet ex dictis ibi, et patet ex se, quia ita habetur si res non exsistat, sicut si exsistat; ergo illa cognitio definitiva est citra cognitionem intuitivam obiecti definiti universalis". Honnefelder (*Ens inquantum ens*, p. 228) übersetzt „citra" mit „unterhalb" und schreibt: „In Quodl. 7 heißt es, daß die abstraktive und definitive Erkenntnis ‚unterhalb (citra) der intuitiven Erkenntnis des definierten allgemeinen Objekts' steht". Ich folge hier der Interpretation von Day (*Intuitive Cognition*, p. 66), der diese Aussage so wiedergibt: „Cognition pertaining to a definition stops short of that intuitive cognition of an object about which a universal definition is made" („citra" wird hier mit „stops short of", „außer, ohne" übersetzt).

13 Vgl. Giorgio Pini, *Scotus on Intuitive and Abstractive Cognition*, in *Debates in Medieval Philosophy. Essential Readings and Contemporary Responses*, ed. Jeffrey Hause (New York: Routledge Taylor & Francis Group, 2016), p. 354.

ist es nicht möglich für uns in diesem Leben (*pro statu isto*) von Gott eine vollkommene, eigentliche Erkenntnis zu erlangen, weil Gott uns hier weder unmittelbar in seiner Existenz noch in einem ihn in seiner Erkennbarkeit repräsentierenden Medium gegenwärtig ist. Für die intuitive Erkenntnis wird eben verlangt, dass der Gegenstand in seiner Existenz gegenwärtig ist; im Fall der abstraktiven Erkenntnis muss der Gegenstand in seiner eigenen Repräsentation (*species*) – die in sich begreifbar ist – gegeben sein.[14]

Die wichtigsten Züge der intellektiven Intuitiverkenntnis im *Quodlibet* sind also folgende: 1) sie ist eine Erkenntnisart auf der Ebene der einfachen Erkenntnis (*simplex apprehensio*); 2) sie betrifft die existierenden Dinge in ihrer Existenz und Präsenz; 3) in der Intuitiverkenntnis gibt es ein direktes und aktuelles Verhältnis zwischen dem erkennenden Subjekt und dem erkannten Objekt; 4) Intuitiverkenntnis ist jenseits des Bereichs begrifflicher Erkenntnis.

2 Das Problem der intellektiven Intuitiverkenntnis *pro statu isto*

Man kann mit Sicherheit sagen, dass der menschliche Verstand absolut genommen intuitiv erkennen kann. Duns Scotus spricht jedoch oft von Intuitiverkenntnis in anderem Zusammenhang als jenes, des Erdenlebens.[15] Konkret wird diese Problematik in den folgenden Kontexten behandelt: im Kontext der beseligenden Gottesschau sowie der Selbsterkenntnis der Engel (*Quodl.* q. 6, n. 19–21 [8–9], ed. Alluntis pp. 213–215), der Erkenntnis der Engel (*Ordinatio* II d. 3 n. 318–323 [6–7], *Op. om.* 7, pp. 552–554; *Lectura* II d. 3 n. 285–290, *Op. om.* 18, pp. 321–323), im Zusammenhang mit der Erkenntnis Christi während des Erdenlebens (*Ordinatio* III d. 14 n. 107–123 [4–9], *Op. om.* 9, pp. 465–473; *Lectura* III d. 14 n. 133–160, *Op. om.* 20, pp. 349–356) und in Bezug auf Erkenntnis sowie

14 Vgl. Duns Scotus, *Quodl.* q. 14 n. 36 [10], ed. Alluntis, pp. 509–510: „Licet notitia per se et propria et immediata possit distingui in intuitivam et abstraktivam, de qua distinctione prius est habitum, tamen de utraque videtur ista conclusio tunc tenenda, quod anima non potest attingere ad notitiam Dei propriam et immediatam ex perfectione sua naturali, concurrentibus etiam quibuscumque causis naturaliter motivis animae ad cognoscendum … Et ratio est, quia omnis talis intellectio, scilicet per se et propria et immediata, requirit ipsum obiectum sub propria ratione obiecti praesens, et hoc vel in propria exsistentia, puta si est intuitiva, vel in aliquo representante ipsum sub propria et per se ratione cognoscibilis, si fuerit abstractiva; Deus autem, sub propria ratione divinitatis, non est praesens alicui intellectui creato, nisi mere voluntarie". Dazu vgl. Honnefelder, *Ens inquantum ens*, p. 228.

15 Darauf weist u. a. John Marebon hin in: *Later Medieval Philosophy*, chap. 10: *Duns Scotus: intuition and memory* (London/New York: Routledge, 1987), pp. 158–159.

Gedächtnis der Seele ohne Körper nach dem Tod (*Ordinatio* IV d. 45 n. 62–67 [q. 2 n. 12–13].], n. 136–149 [q. 3 n. 17–20], *Op. om.* 14, pp. 156–159, 180–185). Es gibt hingegen eine Stelle im siebenten Buch, Quaestio 15 der *Quaestiones super libros Metaphysicorum*, wo Scotus dem menschlichen Verstand *pro statu isto* eindeutig eine intuitive Erkenntnisweise (*visio*) zuschreibt.[16]

Schon anhand von eben angeführten Zeugnissen ist es offensichtlich, dass diese Angelegenheit in Duns Scotus ziemlich kompliziert ist. Dazu muss man noch zwei weitere Scotus-Texte hinzufügen, in denen intellektive Intuitiverkenntnis im Erdenleben bestreitet wird. Die erste klare Aussage diesbezüglich finden wir in *Quaestiones super libros Metaphysicorum* II q. 2–3 n. 81, wo es heißt, dass keine Potenz, die eine *species* oder ein formales Erkenntnisprinzip auch in Abwesenheit des Objekts aufbewahrt, in intuitiver Weise erkennen kann.[17] Als zweites negatives Zeugnis kann man den Text aus der *Lectura* II d. 3 n. 250 anführen, wo Scotus klar feststellt, dass der Verstand, außer abstraktiver Erkenntnis über keine andere Erkenntnisweise verfügt.[18]

Robert Pasnau äußerte sich in seinem Aufsatz über die Erkenntnis in Scotus sehr skeptisch zur Frage, ob unser Verstand in diesem Leben über Intuitiverkenntnis der extramentalen Objekte verfügt.[19] Der Grund dazu waren die oben angeführten Texte des Doctor Subtilis und seine Behauptung, dass die Aussagen des *Quodlibet* nur Kondizionalsätze waren, in denen Scotus erklärte, wie intellektive Intuitiverkenntnis funktionieren würde, wenn es sie geben würde.[20] Pasnau beruft sich ebenfalls auf eine ganze Reihe von Texten, in denen behauptet wird, dass „unser Verstand für diesen Stand nur jenes ver-

16 Vgl. Duns Scotus, *Quaestiones super Metaph.* VII q. 15 n. 27, OPh 4, p. 303: „intellectus noster habet aliquam intellectionem, quae dicitur visio, quae potest naturae exsistentis sine visione singularitatis, sicut visus oculi videt. Ergo intellectus noster est immediate receptivus actionis a re; ergo a singulari".

17 Vgl. Duns Scotus, *Qq. super Metaph* II q. 2–3 n. 81, OPh 3, p. 225: „In intellectu, notitia visionis vel intuitiva – prima cognitio – non est possibilis in via, quia nulla potentia reservans speciem vel formale principium cognoscendi in absentia obiecti potest sic cognoscere, quia illa idem habet principium re praesente et non praesente. Et illa cognitio [scil. intuitiva] tantum est de re praesente et sub ratione praesentis".

18 Vgl. Duns Scotus, *Lect.* II d. 3 p. 2 q. 1 n. 250, ed. Vat. 18, p. 308: „… quia nihil intelligimus nisi per abstractionem, igitur si obiectum extra esset praesens intellectui, non esset praesens in ratione intelligibilis, quia non in ratione universalis; et ideo si esset praesens intellectui secundum se, intellectus per essentiam illius non intelligeret".

19 Vgl. Robert Pasnau, „Cognition", in *The Cambridge Companion to Duns Scotus*, ed. Thomas Williams (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), pp. 299–300.

20 So wird Pasnau von Richard Cross, meiner Meinung nach, richtig interpretiert. Vgl. Richard Cross, *Duns Scotus' Theory of Cognition* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), p. 50.

steht, dessen Erkenntnisbilder im Vorstellungsbild aufleuchten".[21] Im Erdenleben gälte also das aristotelische Prinzip von der Notwendigkeit der sinnlichen Wahrnehmung für die intellektive Erkenntnis („nihil est in intellectu quod prius non fuerit in sensu"). Im Fall der begrifflichen Erkenntnis ist es auf jeden Fall so. Intuitiverkenntnis findet sich aber, laut Scotus, jenseits des Bereichs begrifflicher Erkenntnis. Was ist also der Fall, nach Scotus?

Camille Bérubé meinte, nach Scotus erlange der Verstand in diesem Leben alle Kenntnisse, auch in Bezug auf intuitive Erkenntnisweise, mittels der Sinne, und trotzdem wäre die Direktheit und Unmittelbarkeit der intellektiven Intuitiverkenntnis gewährleistet.[22] Diese Aussage basiert auf der Analyse von *Ordinatio* IV d. 45 q. 3, wo sich Scotus mit dem Gedächtnis in der Seele nach dem Tod beschäftigt. Nachdem die Problematik für das Thema des erkenntnistheoretischen Realismus wichtig ist, wird sie in diesem Zusammenhang näher analysiert.

In *Ordinatio* IV d. 45 q. 2 n. 65 äußert sich Duns Scotus zugunsten der Notwendigkeit der intellektiven Intuitiverkenntnis *pro statu isto* mit den Worten: „Denn eine solche Erkenntnis, die ‚intuitiv' genannt wird, kann eine intellektive [Erkenntnis] sein, anderenfalls wäre der Verstand bezüglich der Existenzen keines einzigen Objektes sicher".[23] Zwar ist im ersten Teil des Satzes nur allgemein davon die Rede, dass es eine intellektive Intuitiverkenntnis geben kann; doch im zweiten Teil des Satzes wird die intuitive Erkenntnisart als unentbehrlich für das Urteilvermögen des Verstandes über die existenten Dinge eingeschätzt. Intellektive Intuitiverkenntnis ermöglicht also Zugang zur existenziellen Ebene des Daseins.[24]

Bisher wurden etliche Texte aus verschiedenen Werken des Doctor Subtilis angeführt, die man je nach Entstehungszeit nach Allan B. Wolter[25] in fünf

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21 Johannes Duns Scotus, *Die Erkennbarkeit Gottes. Ordinatio I, d. 3, pars 1, q. 1–3*, übersetzt und erklärt von Hans Louis Fäh, *Franziskanische Studien* 50 (1968), p. 285 (*Ordinatio* 1 d. 3 n. 187, ed. Vat. 3, p. 113: „Firmatus est autem illis legibus, quod intellectus noster non intelligat pro statu isto nisi illa quorum species relucent in phantasmate"). Andere ähnlichen Texte: *Ordinatio* 3 d. 14 n. 123, ed. Vat. 9, p. 473; 1 d. 3 n. 35, ed. Vat. 3, p. 21; n. 392, ed. Vat. 3, p. 239; n. 487, ed. Vat. 3, p. 289; *Qq. super Metaph.* 1 q. 4 n. 14, OPh 3, pp. 99–100; *Qq. super secundum et tertium De anima* q. 11 n. 13, OPh 5, p. 94.

22 Vgl. C. Bérubé, *La connaissance de l'individuel au Moyen Age*, p. 201. Ähnliche Meinung finden wir in J. Marenborn, *Later Medieval Philosophy*, pp. 168–169.

23 Duns Scotus, *Ord.* IV d. 45 q. 2 n. 65, ed. Vat. 14, p. 158: „Talis autem cognitio, quae dicitur ‚intuitiva', potest esse intellectiva, alioquin intellectus non esset certus de aliqua exsistentia alicuius obiecti".

24 Deswegen nenne ich diese Argumentation als „existenziellen Beweis" für intellektive Intuitiverkenntnis, siehe: Salamon, *Koncepcja poznania intuicyjnego*, pp. 96–99.

25 Vgl. Allan B. Wolter, „Duns Scotus on Ituition, Memory, and Our Knowledge of Indivi-

Gruppen einordnen kann. So können wir – von den frühen Werken beginnend – folgende Werke Scoti in Betracht ziehen: 1) *Lectura* I und *Ordinatio* I, 2) *Lectura* II und *Ordinatio* II, 3) *Quaestiones super libros Metaphysicorum*, 4) *Lectura* III und *Ordinatio* III, 5) *Quodlibet* sowie *Ordinatio* IV d. 45. Die reifste Form von diesem Werdegang stellt *Quodlibet* und *Ordinatio* IV d. 45 dar.

Was die letzten zwei Werke des Duns Scotus anbelangt, muss man sagen, dass sie nicht ganz eindeutig die Faktizität der intellektiven Intuitiverkenntnis im Erdenleben bezeugen. Denn in *Quodlibet* q. 6 heißt es, dass wir den intuitiven Erkenntnisakt in uns nicht so sicher als den abstraktiven Erkenntnisakt erfahren und dass der intuitive Erkenntnisakt nur „möglich" ist.[26] In *Quodlibet* q. 13 heißt es, dass der Verstand einen Erkenntnisakt haben kann (*potest habere*), durch den er seinen Gegenstand in seiner realen und aktuellen Existenz berührt, und nicht, dass der Verstand einen solchen Erkenntnisakt hat.[27] In *Ordinatio* IV d. 45 q. 2 äußert sich Scotus mit seinem existenziellen Beweis für intellektive Intuitiverkenntnis schon deutlicher für die Faktizität dieser Erkenntnisart im Erdenleben, obwohl auch hier die Rede von der Möglichkeit einer solchen Erkenntnis im Verstand ist (*potest esse intellectiva*).[28] In diesem Zusammenhang stimme ich den Herausgebern der kritischen Ausgabe der *Quaestiones super libros Metaphysicorum* zu, indem sie meinen, die Quaestiones ab 13 des siebenten Buches stammen aus einer späteren Periode der akademischen Karriere des Doctor Subtilis als bisher behauptet.[29] So würde ein klares Zeugnis für die intellektive Intuitiverkenntnis *pro statu isto* aus dem

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duals", in *The Philosophical Theology of John Duns Scotus*, ed. Marilyn McCord Adams (Ithaca/New York/London: Cornell University Press, 1990), pp. 103–117. Es gab in den 1990er Jahren eine Diskussion zur Chronologie bezüglich *Quaestiones super libros Metaphysicorum* 7 q. 13 und *Lectura* 2 d. 3 sowie *Ordinatio* 2 d. 3 (die Texte zum Individuationsprinzip). Die Zusammenfassung der Diskussion in: Witold G. Salamon OFM, „Chronologia, struktura i analiza kwestii Jana Dunsa Szkota o jednostkowieniu z Quaestiones super libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis VII. q. 13", *Roczniki Filozoficzne* 56 (2008) n. 2, pp. 256–262. Die Herausgeber der kritischen Ausgabe der *Quaestiones super libros Metaphysicorum* meinen, dass einige Teile dieses Werkes, und zwar die Bücher 8 und 9 sowie wahrscheinlich Buch 7 (zumindest ab der q. 13), aus der späteren Phase der akademischen Karriere des Duns Scotus stammen (siehe: „Introduction", in B. Ioannis Duns Scoti *Quaestiones super libros Metaphysicorum*, lib. 1–5, ed. R. Andrews, G. Etzkorn, G. Gàl, R. Green, F. Kelly, G. Marcil, T. Noone, R. Wood, OPh 3, p. xlvi).

26 Duns Scotus, *Quodl.* q. 6 n. 19 [8], ed. Alluntis, p. 213: „Alius autem actus intelligendi est, quem tamen non ita certitudinaliter experimur in nobis; possibilis tamen est".

27 Siehe Fußnote Nr. 6.

28 Siehe Fußnote Nr. 23.

29 Siehe Fußnote Nr. 25.

siebenten Buch, q. 15 n. 27[30] die reifste Phase des Werdegangs des Duns Scotus diesbezüglich widerspiegeln.

Die innovative Konzeption der intellektiven Intuitiverkenntnis spielte eine wichtige Rolle und nahm einen zentralen Platz in der Erkenntnistheorie des Duns Scotus ein. Diese Konzeption wurde in eine „Lücke" in das aristotelische System eingebaut, weil es bei Aristoteles keinen Platz für eine intellektive Schau (*visio*) gab.[31] Laut Wolter war intellektive Intuitiverkenntnis vielleicht der wichtigste Beitrag von Duns Scotus für die mittelalterliche Erkenntnistheorie.[32] Deswegen bin ich wie Richard Cross[33] der Überzeugung, dass Duns Scotus nicht nur von einer Möglichkeit der intellektiven Intuitiverkenntnis im Erdenleben sprach, sondern von einer realen Fähigkeit des menschlichen Verstandes in unserem Stand auf Erden. Die Meinung von Duns Scotus musste sich also im Laufe der Zeit geändert haben – von einer anfänglich klaren aristotelischen Überzeugung, die keine intellektive Intuitiverkenntnis *pro statu isto* zuließ, bis zu der eher augustinischen Auffassung, die dem Verstand im Erdenleben eine direkte Erkenntnis der extramentalen Dinge zusprach.

3 Verschiedene Arten der Intuition und das Objekt der intellektiven Intuitiverkenntnis in der Sache nach Duns Scotus

Über die intellective Intuitiverkenntnis verfügen laut Scotus: Gott, die Engel und die Menschen. In unserer Studie wird nur die menschliche intuitive Erkenntnispotenz in Betracht gezogen, und zwar in zweierlei Situationen: die beseligende Gottesschau der Seele im Himmel (*visio beatifica*) und verschiedene Weisen der intuitiven Erfassung von Seiten des Verstandes in diesem Leben (*pro statu isto*).

Die Seele im Himmel verfügt über die genaue Intuitiverkenntnis der singulären Entität (*entitas singularis* = *haecceitas*) ihrer Objekte, und diese Erkenntnisart kann deswegen „Totalintuition" („total intuition") genannt werden. Im

30 Siehe Fußnote Nr. 16.

31 Vgl. Axel Schmidt, „Intellektuelle Anschauung bei Duns Scotus", in *Franziskanische Forschungen 45 Heft: Zwischen Weisheit und Wissenschaft. Johannes Duns Scotus im Gespräch*, ed. Franz Lackner, (Kevelar: Verlag Butzon & Bercker, 2003), pp. 156–157.

32 Vgl. Wolter, „Duns Scotus on Ituition", p. 98.

33 Vgl. Cross, *Duns Scotus' Theory of Cognition*, p. 51. Eine positive Meinung bezüglich der Faktizität intellektiver Intuitiverkenntnis *pro statu isto* vertreten auch: Douglas C. Langston, „Scotus's Doctrine of Intuitive Cognition", *Synthese* 96 (1993), p. 5; Sondag, *„Jean Duns Scot sur la connaissance intuitive intellectuelle* (*cognitio intuitiva*)", n. 3, pp. 45–46; Honnefelder, *Ens inquantum ens*, pp. 238–239; Salamon, *Koncepcja poznania intuicyjnego*, p. 116.

Erdenleben ist unser Verstand grundsätzlich auch imstande, diese Totalintuition auszuüben, aber wegen der notwendigen Verbindung des Verstandes mit der sinnlichen Vorstellung (*propter connexionem eius ad phantasiam*) in diesem Stand, ist es in der Tat nicht möglich, die Objekte in ihrer ganz singulären Natur (*haecceitas*) zu erfassen.[34] Deswegen wird sie „partielle Intuition" („partial intuition") genannt. Diese von Richard E. Dumont vorgeschlagene Unterscheidung[35] richtet sich auf das Objekt der Intuitiverkenntnis, d. h. sie antwortet auf die Frage: Was wird erkannt?

Duns Scotus schlägt eine andere Unterscheidung vor, die auf den Modus, in dem das Objekt erkannt wird, hinweist; er spricht nämlich von der vollkommenen und unvollkommenen Intuitiverkenntnis. Vollkommene Intuitiverkenntnis haben wir, wenn das Objekt in seiner Existenz aktuell gegenwärtig ist. Unvollkommene Intuitiverkenntnis dagegen nimmt Abstand von der aktuellen Existenz des erkannten Objektes, indem sie in zweierlei Form gegeben ist: 1) eine Meinung über die Zukunft (*opinio de futuro*) und 2) ein Erinnerungsakt von den in der Vergangenheit erkannten Dingen und Ereignissen (*memoria de praeterito*).[36]

Diese Unterscheidungen haben eine große Bedeutung, wenn man bestimmen will, was genau in dem Objekt, in der Sache, nach Scotus, durch intellektive Intuitiverkenntnis erfasst wird. Absolut genommen kann das singuläre Wesen,[37] die letzte Realität der Form (*ultima realitas formae*), das heißt

34 Vgl. *Ord.* III d. 14 n. 123, ed. Vat. 9, pp. 474–475: „Entitas autem singularis non est propria ratio gignendi phantasma, sed tantum entitas naturae praecedens illam entitatem singularem: illa enim entitas singularis non esset nata immediate movere aliquam potentiam cognitivam nisi intellectum; et quod nostrum nunc non moveat, est propter connexionem eius ad phantasiam. In patria autem non erit talis connexio; et ideo ibi, cum erimus beati, hoc ut hoc intelligetur sicut est in se".

35 Vgl. Richard E. Dumont, „Scotus' Intuition viewed in the Light of the Intellect's Present State," in *De doctrina Ioannis Duns Scoti. Acta Congressus Scotistici Internationalis Oxonii et Edimburgi 11–17 sept. 1966 celebrati*, vol. 2: *Problemata philosophica*, ed. Commissio Scotistica (Rome 1968), pp. 61–64.

36 Vgl. *Ord.* III d. 14 n. 111, ed. Vat. 9, p. 467: „Loquendo autem de alia cognitione, quae est de natura vel singulari ut concernit actualem exsistentiam, dico quod illa est vel perfecta, qualis est de obiecto ut exsistens est praesentialiter, – vel imperfecta, qualis est opinio de futuro vel memoria de praeterito". Dazu siehe: Chabada, *Cognitio intuitiva et abstractiva*, pp. 95–96 (in der dort dargestellten Tabelle der verschiedenen Weisen der Intuition fehlt die *opinio de futuro*; ansonsten laut Scotus verfügt die Seele nach dem Tod über die Erinnerungsakte vom Erdenleben – was in der Tabelle nicht berücksichtigt wurde).

37 So wird das Individuationsprinzip des Duns Scotus von Peter King genannt, in: „Duns Scotus on Singular Essences", *Medioevo* 30 (2005), pp. 111–137.

die *haecceitas* durch Totalintuition erkannt werden.[38] Intellektive Intuitiverkenntnis der individuellen Gegenstände in ihrer Singularität war in der von Duns Scotus vorgeschlagenen Form eine Neuigkeit in der Philosophie- und Theologiegeschichte, obwohl schon die früheren Vertreter der Franziskanerschule, wie etwa Richard von Mediavilla, Matthäus von Acquasparta und Heiliger Bonaventura, von einer direkten Erkenntnis der Einzeldinge sprachen.[39]

Peter King hebt hervor, dass Duns Scotus die Unterscheidung zwischen einem singulären Gedanken und einem das Ding betreffenden (*de re*) Gedanken einführte, wobei Scotus den ersten akzeptierte und den zweiten verneinte.[40] King meint, dass Intuitiverkenntnis auf die Einzeldinge gerichtet sein muss und die singulären Gedanken im Bereich dieser direkten Erkenntnisart sein müssen.[41] Wir können in dieser Welt (*pro statu isto*) die Einzeldinge mit singulären Gedanken erfassen, aber wir können die Einzeldinge nicht in ihrer Singularität, in ihrer letzten Identität (Gedanken *de re*) erfassen.[42] Was können wir also von den Einzeldingen in unserem Stand mit intellektiven Vermögen erkennen?

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38 Der Begriff „haecceitas" kommt selten in Scotus vor (12 mal, davon 6 mal in *Reportata Parisiensia*, 4 mal in *Collationes* und 2 mal in *Quaestiones super libros Metaphysicorum* 7 q. 13 – als „haecitas"). In *Ordinatio* spricht Scotus eben von der letzten Realität der Form (*ultima realitas formae*). Ansonsten benutzt er in *Quaestiones super libros Metaphysicorum* 7 q. 13 noch andere Begriffe, wie: „individuelle Differenz" (*differentia individualis*), „individuelle Form" (*forma individualis*) oder „individueller Grad" (*gradus individualis*). Siehe dazu: Stephen D. Dumont, „The Question on Individuation in Scotus's *Quaestiones super Metaphysicam*", in *Via Scoti. Methodologica ad mentem Joannis Duns Scoti. Atti del Congresso Scotistico Internazionale Roma 9–11 marzo 1993*, ed. Leonardo Sileo, vol. 1 (Rome: Edizioni Antonianum, 1995), pp. 217–219; Katsumi Shibuya, „Duns Scotus on ‚ultima realitas formae'", in *Giovanni Duns Scoto. Studi e ricerche nel VII Centenario della sua morte in onore di P. César Saco Alarcón*, ed. Martín Carbajo Núñez (Rome: Edizioni Antonianum, 2008), vol. 1, pp. 379–394; Witold G. Salamon, „Una ‚quaestio' di Scoto intorno alla natura di una cosa: analisi di ‚Quaestiones super libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis', *VII, q. 13*", in *Religioni et doctrinae. Miscellanea di studi offerti a Bernardino de Armellada in occasione del suo 80° compleanno* (Rome: Bibliotheca Seraphico-Capuccina 89, Istituto Storico die Cappuccini, 2009), pp. 327–328.

39 Vgl. Christoforo Kržanić, „La conoscenza diretta ed immediata del singolare da parte dell'intelletto secondo Duns Scoto", in *De doctrina Ioannis Duns Scoti. Acta Congressus Scotistici Internationalis Oxonii et Edimburgi 11–17 sept. 1966 celebrati*, vol. 2: *Problemata Philosophica*, ed. Commissio Scotistica (Rome 1968), pp. 65–66.

40 Vgl. Peter King, „Thinking About Things. Singular Thought in the Middle Ages", in *Intentionality, Cognition, and Mental Representation in Medieval Philosophy*, ed. Gyula Klima (New York: Fordham University Press, 2015), p. 111. Im Original King spricht von: „singular thought" und „*de re* thought".

41 Vgl. ibid, pp. 112–113.

42 Vgl. ibid. p. 115.

Intuitiv erkennt der menschliche Verstand hier die Einzeldinge in ihrer aktuellen Existenz. Was bedeute das? Ist es Existenz, Essenz, gemeinsame Natur (*natura communis*) oder sonst etwas, was durch Intuitiverkenntnis erfasst wird? Weil die Texte des Doctor Subtilis diesbezüglich nicht ganz eindeutig sind, haben wir verschiedene Interpretationen, die eben von Existenz zu gemeinsamer Natur (*natura communis*), von Quiddität (*quiditas*) bis zu einer Einheit von Existenz und Individuum (*simul totum*) als Objekt der intellektiven Intuitiverkenntnis in der Sache reichen.[43]

Nach der Auffassung von Étienne Gilson erkennt unser Intellekt abstraktiv die Natur des Einzeldinges und intuitiv seine Existenz.[44] Weil Duns Scotus die intuitive Erkenntnis als die des „Existierenden, insofern es existiert"[45] bezeichnet, beruht laut Gilson die Intuitiverkenntnis „auf dem Objekt, insofern es existiert, und sie beruht nur darauf".[46] Damit stimmt ebenfalls der Text aus *Quodlibet* q. 13 überein: „Es gibt eine Erkenntnis des in sich Existierenden, dergestalt dass sie die Sache als sein Objekt in seiner eigenen und aktuellen Existenz berührt".[47] Deswegen meint Wolter, die intuitive Erkenntnis sei generell eine Art von existenziellem Bewusstsein.[48]

In diese Richtung geht auch Carlo Giacon in seinem Artikel: „L'intuizione dell'essere in Duns Scoto".[49] Wenn ich also irgendeinen Gegenstand, der vor mir steht (z. B. eine Wand, einen Menschen) intuitiv erkenne, bedeutet das, dass ich die tatsächliche Existenz dieser Einzeldinge als Objekt der Intuitiverkenntnis erfasse.[50] So ist die Feststellung: „ich existiere" das Resultat einer anderen Feststellung: „ich intuiere meine tatsächliche Existenz". Solche Erkenntnis ist nicht

43 Vgl. Salamon, *Koncepcja poznania intuicyjnego*, pp. 139–148.

44 Vgl. Étienne Gilson, *Johannes Duns Scotus. Einführung in die Grundgedanken seiner Lehren*, übersetzt von Werner Dettloff (Düsseldorf: Verlag L. Schwann, 1959), p. 566: „Da der Sinn nur die indifferente „Natur" dieses Seienden wahrnimmt, erlaubt er [Duns Scotus] dem Intellekt, abstraktiv die Natur dieses Einzeldinges und intuitiv seine Existenz zu erkennen".

45 *Ord.* I d. 1 p. 1 q. 2 n. 35, ed. Vat. 2, p. 23: „visio est exsistentis ut exsistens est et ut praesens est videnti secundum suam exsistentiam". Visio steht hier für eine direkte, unvermittelte – eben intuitive – Erkenntnis.

46 Gilson, *Johannes Duns Scotus*, 567 (Fußnote 1). Gilson verweist dort an: *Ordinatio* 1 d. 8 p. 1 q. 4 n. 187, ed. Vat. 4, p. 257: „Praeterea, intellectus intuitivus nullam habet distinctionem in obiecto nisi secundum quod exsistens est, quia sicut non cognoscit aliquod obiectum nisi ut exsistens, ita non cognoscit aliqua distincta formaliter in obiecto nisi ut exsistens est".

47 Duns Scotus, *Quodl.* q. 13, n. 27 [8], ed. Pica, p. 253: „Aliqua cognitio est per se exsistentis, sic quod attingit pro per se obiecto rem in sua propria exsistentia actuali".

48 Wolter, „*Duns Scotus on Ituition*", p. 99.

49 *De doctrina Ioannis Duns Scoti*, vol. 2: *Problemata Philosophica*, pp. 33–45.

50 Vgl. Giacon, „L'intuizione dell'essere in Duns Scoto", p. 39.

wissenschaftlicher Natur, das heißt sie ist weder begrifflich, noch ist sie Frucht eines Gedankenganges, sondern sie ist eben intuitiv, direkt, primär, evident und in sich gültig.[51]

Eine andere Interpretation stellt die gemeinsame Natur oder die Quiddität als Objekt der intellektiven Intuitiverkenntnis in der Sache dar. Dazu haben wir eine interessante Studie von Giorgio Pini unter dem Titel: „Scotus on the Objects of Cognitive Acts".[52] Anhand der Analyse der *Quaestiones super libros Metaphysicorum* I q. 6 stellt der Autor fest, dass das Sinnesvermögen und der Intellekt das gleiche Objekt, und zwar die gemeinsame Natur (*natura communis*) oder die Quiddität (*quiditas*) – und nicht die Singularität – wahrnehmen.[53] Intuitiverkenntnis ist auf das Individuum nur im nicht eigentlichen Sinne gerichtet, das heißt als etwas Existierendes, was Aristoteles *simul totum* nennt.[54] Für diese Lösung haben wir ein klares Zeugnis in *Ordinatio* IV d. 45 n. 152: „aktuelle Existenz entspricht erstlich der Natur; deswegen ist ‚diese Natur' nicht formell existent als ‚diese', sondern durch die Natur; diese Natur, als existente, erkennt aber der Verstand intuitiv".[55]

Mit dieser Auffassung polemisiert Richard Cross, der meint, die gemeinsame Natur könne nicht getrennt von Singularität durch das Sinnesvermögen wahrgenommen werden.[56] In diesem Fall gilt das Gleiche für die intellektive Intuitiverkenntnis, weil, wie schon gesagt, das Objekt der Wahrnehmung in beiden Fällen gleich ist. Anderenfalls wäre die scotische Intuition eine Intuition des abstrakten Begriffs eines Objektes[57] (als gemeinsame Natur eben), was im Kontext verschiedener Definitionen der Intuitiverkenntnis in Scotus nicht akzeptabel ist. Mit Recht sagt Cross, dass die gemeinsame Natur nicht ohne Singularität existiert und dass wir die Natur als existent sowie gegenwärtig – ohne Singularität – intuitiv nicht erkennen.[58]

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51 Vgl. ibid. Der Autor beruft sich hier auf einen Text von *De rerum principio* (a. 1 sect. 7, ed. Wad.-Viv. 4, p. 498b), das jedoch heutzutage als nicht authentisches Werk des Scotus gilt.

52 *Franciscan Studies* 66 (2008), pp. 281–315.

53 Vgl. Pini, „Scotus on the Objects of Cognitive Acts", p. 294. Dort wird eine wichtige Stelle aus den *Quaestiones super libros Metaphysicorum* I q. 6 n. 39 angeführt: „ita quod quiditas secundum se, sicut est obiectum sensus – secundum praecedentem responsionem – ita etiam et intellectus" (OPh 3, p. 144).

54 Vgl. Pini, „Scotus on the Objects of Cognitive Acts", p. 312.

55 Duns Scotus, *Ord*. IV d. 45 q. 3 n. 152, ed. Vat. 14, p. 186: „exsistentia actualis primo convenit naturae; unde ‚haec natura' non est exsistens formaliter quia ‚haec', sed per naturam; illam autem naturam – ut exsistentem – intuitive cognoscit intellectus".

56 Vgl. Cross, *Duns Scotus' Theory of Cognition*, p. 21.

57 Diese Meinung vertrat Léon Veuthey, „L'intution scotiste et le sens du concret", *Etudies franciscaines* 49 (1937), pp. 84–88.

58 Vgl. Cross, *Duns Scotus' Theory of Cognition*, p. 22.

Konkreter noch drückt es Ludger Honnefelder aus: „Was aber in der intuitiven Erkenntnis erfaßt wird, ist nicht die (ihrerseits durch vermittelnde species intelligibilis erkannte) Washeit in ihrem formalen Inhalt und zusätzlich zu ihr die aktuelle Existenz dieser Washeit, sondern das noch undifferenzierte, den Sinnen aktuell gegenwärtige simul totum von konkretem Was und aktueller Existenz".[59] Anders ausgedrückt heißt es dort: „Was folglich die Intuition des Verstandes aufgrund ihrer Parallelität zur sensatio intellektiv wahrnimmt, kann nicht anders sein als das, was die Sinnesvermögen auf ihre Weise als existierende Gesamtheit sinnlicher Qualitäten erfassen".[60] Also ist das, was nach Scotus in der intellektiven Erkenntnis erfasst wird, das Ganze (*simul totum*), das heißt das Individuum in seiner Existenz.[61]

Der Unterschied zwischen der abstraktiven und intuitiven Erkenntnis findet im ersten Moment des Kontaktes zwischen dem Verstand und dem Objekt, d. h. in einer einfachen Erkenntnis oder einer Erkenntnis einfacher Objekte (*simplex apprehensio sive intellectio obiecti simplicis*) statt. In konfuser Weise erfasst in diesem Moment der Verstand die *species specialissima*, d. h. die Artnatur des Einzelseienden, die das Sinnesvermögen am wirksamsten und stärksten bewegt.[62] Parallel dazu meint Bérubé haben wir eine konfuse Intuitiverkenntnis des *simul totum* von der Gesamtheit der sinnlichen Qualitäteten eines existierenden Objektes.[63] Die letzte Interpretation von Honnefelder und Bérubé entspricht meiner Meinung nach am Besten den Texten des Duns Scotus.

4 Intuitiverkenntnis und das Problem des erkenntnistheoretischen Realismus in Duns Scotus

Was die Universalienproblematik angeht, beschreibt die Historiographie gewöhnlich Duns Scotus als einen der *doctores reales*, obwohl er die Frage nach der Existenz der Universalien in den Dingen mit „nein" beantworten würde. Für Scotus sind Entitäten weder universal noch individuell, sondern gemeinsam, nämlich in der gemeinsamen Natur (*natura communis*). Die gemeinsame

59 Honnefelder, *Ens inquantum ens*, p. 252.

60 Ibid. p. 249.

61 Vgl. Duns Scotus, *Qq. super Metaph.* 7 q. 15 n. 18 [4], OPh 4, p. 300: „Intellectio secunda [scil. visio] est simul totius, id est, singularis in quantum exsistens".

62 Vgl. Duns Scotus, *Ord.* 1 d. 3 p. 1 q. 1–2 n. 73, ed. Vat. 3, p. 50: „quoad hoc dico quod primum actualiter cognitum confuse, est species specialissima, cuius singulare efficacius et fortius primo movet sensum".

63 Vgl. Bérubé, *La connaissance de l'individuel au Moyen Age*, pp. 220–222.

Natur existiert in den Dingen und ist sowohl das Prinzip der intellektuellen Erkenntnis wie auch eine Art von Ursache der Einzelheit in den Dingen.[64] Aufgrund seiner Lösung, die als der dritte Weg (*tertia via*) von Todd Bates[65] bezeichnet wird, wurde er von den Neuscholastikern als „gemäßigter" Realist genannt.[66]

Die oben genannte Problematik der Allgemeinbegriffe ist sowohl ontologischer als auch erkenntnistheoretischer Natur, jedoch in anderem Sinne als in diesem Vortrag gemeint. Es geht hier eher um das Problem der Erkennbarkeit der real existierenden Dinge in ihrer Existenz oder zumindest in einigen Eigenschaften. Eine solche Fragestellung kam zum Vorschein in Folge der cartesianischen und kantischen Philosophie. Der erkenntnistheoretische Realismus in dem hier gemeinten Sinne behauptet also, dass die real existierenden Dinge (die Seienden) erkennbar sind, und zwar in ihrer Existenz und mindestens in einigen Eigenschaften. Parallel dazu vertritt der metaphysische Realismus den Standpunkt, dass einige Seienden – besonders die uns durch das Sinnesvermögen gegebene extramentale Welt – real existieren.[67] Beide eben genannten Versionen des Realismus sind eng miteinander verbunden. Denn wenn man meint, dass die Seienden in ihrer Existenz erkennbar sind, dann folgt daraus, dass diese Seienden real existieren. In diesem letzten Teil meines Vortrags erörtere ich die erkenntnistheoretische Dimension des Realismus in Scotus.

In *Quodlibet* q. 13 sagt der Doctor Subtilis: „Man kann sagen, dass der erste [nämlich intuitive Akt], der eben von einer in sich existierenden Sache ist, notwendig damit verbunden ein reales und aktuelles Verhältnis zu diesem Objekt hat".[68] In der Intuitiverkenntnis wird solch ein reales und aktuelles Verhältnis zum existierenden Objekt gegeben, was eindeutig aus der Analyse verschiedener Texte aus den Werken des Duns Scotus hervorgeht. (Siehe zum Beispiel Punkt 1 und 3 meines Vortrags.) In unserem jetzigen Stand erfassen

64 Vgl. Todd Bates, *Duns Scotus and the Problem of Universals* (London/New York: Continuum International Publishing Group, 2010), pp. 21–22.

65 Ibid. p. 22.

66 Vgl. Allan B. Wolter, „The Realism of Scotus", in *The Philosophical Theology of John Duns Scotus*, ed. Marilyn McCord Adams (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1990), p. 42. Zur Universalienlehre des Duns Scotus siehe auch: Timothy B. Noone, „Universals and Individuation", in *The Cambridge Companion to Duns Scotus*, ed. Thomas Williams, pp. 100–128.

67 Vgl. Józef Herbut, „Realizm", in *Leksykon Filozofii Klasycznej*, ed. J. Herbut (Lublin: TN KUL, 1997), p. 459.

68 Duns Scotus, *Quodl.* q. 13 n. 34 [11], ed. Pica, p. 257: „potest dici quod primus, qui scilicet est rei ut exsistentis in se, necessario habet annexam relationem realem et actualem ad ipsum obiectum".

wir durch die intellektive Intuitiverkenntnis Individuen in ihrer aktuellen und realen Existenz als *simul totum*. So stellt die scotische Konzeption der intuitiven Erkenntnis die Grundlage des erkenntnistheoretischen Realismus dar, weil uns durch die intuitive Erkenntnis die existenzielle Dimension der Seienden zugänglich ist.[69]

Von der intuitiven Erkenntnisweise spricht jedoch Scotus nicht nur in Bezug auf die extramentalen, realen Gegenstände, sondern auch in Bezug auf das intellektive Gedächtnis und auf die Meinung über die Zukunft (*opinio de futuro*), wie schon gesagt (Punkt 3). In diesem Fall der unvollkommenen Intuition werden die Objekte der Erkenntnis nicht in ihrer aktuellen und realen Existenz dem Verstand gegenwärtig, sondern in einer Art von Repräsentation der realen Gegenstände, Ereignisse, Willensakte und von uns in Vergangenheit gelernten Wahrheiten.[70] Diese Art der individuellen Repräsentation ist eine andere als die in der *species intelligibilis* gegebenen Repräsentation. Denn nach Scotus befasst sich unser Intellekt nicht ausschließlich mit Universalien, sondern zumindest im Zustand nach dem Tod ist er, wie Dominik Perler sagt, „vielmehr

69 Diesbezüglich vertrat Wolter laut Langston eine andere Meinung, und zwar, dass die intuitive Erkenntnis nur unsere mentalen Akte, aber keine extramentalen Gegenstände betreffen würde (siehe Langston, „Scotus's Doctrine of Intuitive Cognition", p. 10: „according to Wolter, intuitive cognition, which is of our mental acts alone, involves neither phantasm nor intelligible species"). Dabei verweist Langston auf: Wolter, „Duns Scotus on Intuition", p. 101 (die Ausgabe von 1982 auf der Seite 82). Langston missinterpretiert dabei nach meiner Einschätzung die Meinung von Wolter zu dieser Problematik, weil Wolter auf der genannten Seite schreibt: „By contrast [d.h. zur abstraktiven Erkenntnis], intuitive intellection has the thing itself, rather than a substitute species, interacting with the mind or soul to cause actual knowledge of itself". Fragwürdiger ist auch eine Feststellung Wolters in den Schlussworten seines Aufsatzes: „As for Bérubé's contention that Scotus deserves to be called an immediate, rather than a mediate realist, if this means nothing more than that *qua* intentional or tendential the cognitive act terminates directliy with what is known, one can admit this. But it does not imply Scotus believed our intellect was ever in direct causal, as opposed to intentional, „contact" with extramental object in the physical world" (Seite 122). Wolter drückt hier eher seinen Zweifel als eine feste Überzeugung aus, ob wir den direkten Kontakt mit den extramentalen Gegenständen in der Welt haben. Wie schon gesagt, meine ich, es gebe genügend textuelle Beweise bei Scotus für die These vom direkten Kontakt des erkennenden Intellektes mit den extramentalen Gegenständen in der intuitiven Erkenntnis.

70 Von der Möglichkeit des intellektiven Gedächtnisses und von der Notwendigkeit einer *species* in einem solchen Gedächtnis (*in potentia memorativa*) siehe: 1) *Ord.* III d. 14 q. 1–2 n. 115, ed. Vat. 9, p. 469: „de talibus pluribus, perfecte intuitive cognitis, derelicta sunt plura experimenta et plures memoriae in intellectu"; 2) Ibid. n. 116, ed. Vat. 9, p. 470: „de re praesente non tantum derelinquitur species intelligibilis in intellectu qua cognoscitur sub nulla differentia temporis, sed alia (supple: species derelinquitur) in potentia memorativa". Die Worte in Klammern sind vom kritischen Apparat T (Testimonia).

zu zwei Tätigkeiten fähig: zum Abstrahieren der allgemeinen Natur und zum Erfassen der individuierten Natur".[71]

Wie schon angedeutet, beschäftigt sich Duns Scotus mit dieser Problematik in *Ordinatio* IV d. 45 q. 3.[72] Er stellt dort fest, dass wir nicht nur im Sinnesvermögen, sondern auch im Verstand dank der Intuitiverkenntnis Erinnerungen an vergangene Akte und Ereignisse aufbewahren.[73] Ebenfalls die rein geistigen Akte, wie die intellektiven Erkenntnisakte (*intellectiones*) und die Willensakte (*volitiones*), können wir im intellektuellen Gedächtnis dank der Intuitiverkenntnis bewahren, anderenfalls könnten wir die schlechten Entscheidungen aus der Vergangenheit nicht bereuen und die einmal gelernten Wahrheiten für die Zukunft nicht übertragen.[74] Dazu ist eine *species* notwendig, die kein

71 Dominik Perler, „Gibt es eine Erinnerung nach dem Tod? Zur methodologischen Funktion der post mortem-Argumentation in der spätmittelalterlichen Erkenntnistheorie", in *Ende und Vollendung. Eschatologische Perspektiven im Mittelalter*, ed. Jan A. Aertsen und Martin Pickavé (Berlin/New York: Walter de Gruyter, 2002), p. 456. Als Beispiel sagt Perler, dass wir nicht nur einen allgemeinen Begriff ‚Dom' bilden, wenn wir den Kölner Dom anschauen, sondern auch den Begriff ‚Kölner Dom', „der einzig und allein auf einen Dom zutrifft" (ibid, p. 456).

72 Es gibt folgende Literatur zum sinnlichen und intellektuellen Gedächtnis in Scotus als es in *Ordinatio* IV d. 45 q. 3 dargestellt ist: 1) Reinhold Messner, *Schauendes und begriffliches Erkennen nach Duns Scotus mit kritischer Gegenüberstellung zur Erkenntnislehre von Kant und Aristoteles* (Freiburg im Breisgau, 1942), pp. 93–96; 2) Camille Bérubé, *La connaissance de l'individuel au Moyen Age*, pp. 193–202; 3) Wolter, „Duns Scotus on Ituition", pp. 117–122; 4) Giovanni Pizzo, *Intellectus und memoria nach der Lehre des Johannes Duns Scotus. Das menschliche Erkenntisvermögen als Vollzug von Spontaneität und Rezeptivität*, Veröffentlichungen der Johannes-Duns-Akademie für franziskanische Geistesgeschichte und Spiritualität, Band 7 (Kevelaer: Verlag Butzon & Bercker, 1998), pp. 188–197; 5); Dominik Perler, *Gibt es eine Erinnerung nach dem Tod?*, pp. 450–456; 6) Axel Schmidt, „Intellektuelle Anschaung bei Duns Scotus", pp. 163–167; 7) Grzegorz Witold Salamon, „Poznanie, jakim dysponuje dusza oddzielona od ciała po śmierci, według bł. Jana Dunsa Szkota na podstawie analizy *Ordinatio* IV d. 45 (XIV 135–197)", *Roczniki Filozoficzne* 67 (2019) Nr. 2, pp. 39–50.

73 Vgl. Duns Scotus, *Ord.* IV d. 45 q. 3 n. 136–137, ed. Vat. 14, pp. 180–181: „Dico ... quod in intellectiva est memoria et actus recordandi proprie dictus. Supposito enim quod intellectus non tantum cognoscat universalia ..., sed etiam intuitive cognoscat illa quae sensus cognoscit (quia perfectior et superior cognoscitiva in eodem cognoscit illud quod inferior) et etiam quod cognoscat sensationes (et utrumque probatur per hoc quod cognoscit propositiones contingenter veras, et ex eis syllogizat; formare autem propositiones, et syllogizare est proprium intellectui; illarum autem veritas est de obiectis ut intuitive cognitis, sub ratione scilicet exsistentiae, sub qua cognoscuntur a sensu), – sequitur quod in intellectu possunt inveniri omnes condiciones prius dictae pertinentes ad ‚recordari': potest enim percipere tempus, et habere actum post tempus, et sic de ceteris".

74 Vgl. ibid. n. 138, ed. Vat. 14, p. 181: „Et potest breviter recordari cuiuscumque obiecti, cuius potest memoria sensitiva recordari, quia potest illum actum – qui est proximum obiec-

im passiven Verstand eingeprägter allgemeiner Begriff (*species intelligibilis*) ist, sondern ein Erkenntnisbild des in der Vergangenheit wahrgenommenen Objektes oder Ereignisses, das als Gedächtnisspur vom Verstand aufgefrischt und abgerufen werden kann.[75] Nach Axel Schmidt besitzt das intellektuelle Gedächtnis eine Fähigkeit, „den eigenen Akten quasi einen Zeitindex zu verleihen; nur so werden diese als vergangene erinnert und nicht lediglich einfach neu hervorgeholt".[76]

Die *species* ist das nähere Objekt (*obiectum proximum*) des intellektiven Gedächtnisses. Aber das wahre, wenngleich entferntere Objekt (*obiectum remotum*), auf das die Erinnerung zielt, ist das Ereignis, der Gegenstand, der Willensakt oder der Erkenntnisakt von der Vergangenheit.[77] Während der vergangene Erkenntnisakt in Gegenwart des Objektes stattfand, wurde ein Abbild davon in der Erinnerungspotenz eingeprägt, und dank dieses Abbildes ist eine Aktualisierung des vergangenen Aktes in Zukunft möglich.[78] Die Erinnerung

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tum – intuitive cognoscere quando est, et ita recordari postquam fuit; potest etiam recordari multorum obiectorum proximorum, quorum non potest sensitiva recordari (utpote omnis intellectionis et volitionis praeteritae). Quod enim talium recordetur homo, probatur, quia alias non posset poenitere de malis volitionibus, nec etiam praeteritam intellectionem ut praeteritam conferre ad futuram, nec per consequens, ex eo quod ista speculatus est, ordinare se ad speculandum alia sequentia ex istis".

75 Vgl. Messner, „Schauendes und Begriffliches Erkennen", p. 96. Siehe auch: Salamon, „Poznanie, jakim dysponuje dusza", pp. 45–46. Von der Notwendigkeit einer intellektiven Repräsentation, die im intellektuellen Gedächtnis eingeprägt wird, aber nicht identisch mit der *species intelligibilis* in der abstraktiven Erkenntnis ist, sprachen auch: Wolter, „Duns Scotus on Intuition", p. 101; Honnefelder, *Ens inquantum ens*, p. 238; Bérubé, *La connaissance de l'individuel au Moyen Age*, p. 197; Chabada, *Cognitio intuitiva et abstractiva*, pp. 93–94.

76 Schmidt, „Intellektuelle Anschauung bei Duns Scotus", p. 164. Schmidt kritisiert zu Recht in seinem Aufsatz die Interpretation der scotischen Spezieslehre durch Douglas Langston („Scotus's Doctrine of Intuitive Cognition", pp. 4–13), der „normale" *species intelligibilis* auch für das intellektuelle Gedächtnis einsetzt und meint, die *species intelligibilis*, verstanden als *medium quo*, sei immer für Intuitiverkenntnis notwendig. Laut Schmidt übersieht Langston, „dass nach Scotus ein und derselbe Gegenstand eine zweifache Weise der Erkenntnis veranlassen kann und dass beide Erkenntnisse erinnert werden können, was aber je eine andere Leistung des Gedächtnisses sein muss" (Schmidt, loc. cit., p. 166).

77 Vgl. *Ordinatio* IV d. 45 q. 3 n. 139, ed. Vat. 14, pp. 181–182: „ista recordatio est propria intellectui, et hoc ratione obiecti proximi. Est etiam alia propria non solum ratione obiecti proximi, sed remoti, utpote recordatio, quae tendit in necessarium ut necessarium ut in obiectum remotum, cuiusmodi est recordatio habens pro obiecto remoto ‚triangulum habere tres'; nam obiectum proximum recordationis, scilicet actus tendens in tale obiectum, non potest esse nisi actus partis intellectivae".

78 Vgl. ibid. n. 95, ed. Vat. 14, p. 167: „Secundum, quod cum oporteat potentiam recordativam habere speciem, et hoc loquendo de tota integra requisita ad recordationem, non posset

zielt aber auf die real existierenden Gegenstände ab, und damit verteidigt Scotus, wie Perler sagt, den Erkenntnisrealismus in seiner Theorie der Erinnerung.[79]

Zusammenfassend funktioniert das intellektive Gedächtnis so: 1) im ersten Kontakt eines real existierenden Gegenstandes wird er als existierend in einer vollkommenen Intuitiverkenntnis erfasst; 2) der Gegenstand (d. h. eine Sache, ein Ereignis, ein Erkenntnis-oder Willensakt) prägt im Intellekt eine *species* (eine Gedächtnisspur) ein; 3) durch diese *species* wird die Erinnerung abgerufen und erfrischt; 4) das *obiectum proximum* des intellektiven Gedächtnisses ist ein Erkenntnisakt (*actus partis intellectivae*), eine *sui generis species*; 5) das *obiectum remotum*, auf das das intellektive Gedächtnis notwendigerweise gerichtet ist, ist der real existierende Gegenstand von der Vergangenheit. Gerade das letzte Element dieses Schemas bietet eine Lösung der dargestellten Schwierigkeit der unvollkommenen Intuitiverkenntnis an. Denn wenn der real existierende Gegenstand aus der Vergangenheit (*obiectum remotum*), auf den die Erinnerung (*recordatio*) notwendigerweise gerichtet ist, das Objekt der unvollkommenen Intuitiverkenntnis ist, so wird die direkte Verbindung zwischen dem erkennenden Subjekt und dem real existierenden Objekt hergestellt – was die Voraussetzung des Realismus für die Erkenntnistheorie des Duns Scotus ist.

Beide der bekanntesten philosophisch- und theologischen Systeme der Hochscholastik, d. h. Thomismus und Scotismus, waren – metaphysisch und erkenntnistheoretisch gesehen – realistische Systeme. Im existenziellen Thomismus wird der Zugang zu den real existierenden Seienden durch die Existenzurteile garantiert, die im intellektiven Bewusstsein wahrgenommen werden.[80] Im Scotismus spielt diese Rolle die intellektive Intuitiverkenntnis, die die real existierenden Dinge in ihrer Existenz als das gleichzeitig Ganze (*simul totum*) vom konkretem Was und der aktuellen Existenz erfasst und somit als Grundlage des erkenntnistheoretischen Realismus fungiert.

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illa imprimi ab obiecto quando non est vel quando non est praesens; illud autem obiectum proximum est actus humanus praeteritus, – ergo dum ille fuit, imprimebatur species necessaria".

79 Vgl. Perler, „Gibt es eine Erinnerung nach dem Tod?", p. 454. In der Fußnote (N. 17) stimmt Perler zwar Wolter zu, dass man, aufgrund der vermittelnden Rolle der *species*, nicht von einem „immediate realism" sprechen sollte, aber weiter präzisiert Perler: „Trotzdem bleibt die Tatsache bestehen, dass die Gegenstände selbst erfasst werden und dass Scotus somit eine realistische Position vertritt, die man „modifizierten Realismus" nennen könnte". Zur Unterscheidung zwischen dem direkten Realismus und dem Repräsentationalismus in der Erkenntnistheorie siehe: Dominik Perler, „Essentionalism and Direct Realism: Some Late Medieval Perspectives", *Topoi* 19 (2000), p. 111.

80 Vgl. Mieczysław A. Krąpiec, *Psychologia racjonalna* (Lublin: RW KUL, 1996), pp. 226–234.

13

John Duns Scotus on Social Philosophy: *Quodlibet*, Question 20

Christian Rode

In this paper, I would like to focus on Scotus's social philosophy and ontology in a very specific context: my main subject will be *Question* 20 of Scotus's *Quodlibet*, where he examines the question of whether "a priest who is obliged to say a mass for each of two different people" satisfies "his obligation by saying one mass for both". At first glance, this question does not seem to belong to the field of philosophy, or particularly social philosophy, as this is clearly a theological and liturgical question.[1] However, I would like to show that in answering this question, Scotus presents an account of the social sphere that is primarily relational, and at the same time individualistic. In this approach to social philosophy the concepts of obligation and free will play a key role. Furthermore, and more specifically, I want to put forward the thesis that the obligation a priest has in view of his almsgivers is unlike a purchase contract, although it bears striking resemblance to it, as it appears to be a simple *do ut des* kind of agreement. With such a non-legal agreement, for Scotus the secular and the religious realms are bound together, and thus finally laypersons, priests and God are connected in a network of relations that have individual persons as their relata.

First, I will focus on the role of the priest's personal merit, then on the importance of the general merit of the church, finally I will present Scotus's reply to

1 For liturgical and theological interpretations of *Quodlibetal Question* 20 that also take into account the aspects of canon law see G. Ostdiek, "The Threefold Fruits of the Mass: Notes and Reflections on Scotus' Quodlibetal Questions, q. 20," in *Essays Honoring Allan B. Wolter*, ed. W.A. Frank and G.J. Etzkorn (St. Bonaventure, N.Y.: Franciscan Institute Publications, 1985), pp. 203–219; E. Iserloh, "Der Wert der Messe in der Diskussion der Theologen vom Mittelalter bis zum 16. Jahrhundert," *Zeitschrift für katholische Theologie* 83 (1961), pp. 44–79, here pp. 55–58. For a general overview of the topic, see also K. Rahner, "Die vielen Messen und das eine Opfer. Eine Untersuchung über die rechte Norm der Meßhäufigkeit," *Zeitschrift für katholische Theologie* 71,3 (1949), pp. 257–317; M.F. Mannion, "Stipends and Eucharistic Praxis," *Worship* 57 (1983), pp. 194–214; E.J. Kilmartin, "The One Fruit or the Many Fruits of the Mass," *Proceedings of the Catholic Theological Society of America* 21 (1967), pp. 37–69; W. Dalton, "Mass Stipends, Mass Offerings, Mass Cards," *The Furrow* 41,9 (1990), pp. 500–508.

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the question. In order to elucidate my thesis, I will also draw on *Question* 17 of the Quodlibet, where the concept of merit is treated, a concept that serves as a starting point for the argumentation in *Question* 20. Furthermore, I will take a look at Scotus's notions of contracts and of buying and selling, as presented in *Ordinatio* IV, d. 15, q. 2, in order to examine the differences and the similarities of a purchase contract with regard to the agreement between an almsgiver and a priest. But in advance, some preliminaries:

In answering the question of whether a priest can resolve his debt with regard to two almsgivers by celebrating only one single mass, Scotus introduces two distinctions that became relatively prominent in theology: the first distinction is between the value a mass has in virtue of the merit of the celebrant (*ex opere operantis*) and the value it has in virtue of the sacrifice or work performed (*ex opere operato*) (20.3).[2] However, the *ex opere operato* here means the value a mass has due to the merit of the whole church. The second distinction is the one between three fruits of the mass; this distinction goes back to the 9th century theologian Amalarius of Metz.[3] For Scotus, among all the meritorious works, the merit of praying is the most easily applicable kind of merit, as it placates and conciliates God. That means that the celebrant can apply a good equal to his or the church's merit to himself or other persons when praying. In establishing a relation to God by praying, a good is given by God, a good that the celebrant can apply in a certain way and even according to his own will. Hence, the mass—that is identified with prayer here—can have three fruits: one (1—*specialissme*) value for the celebrant, if he is in grace, since he has good intentions and performs a good deed. This good or value of the mass is not transferable, if it were transferred, the celebrant would even commit a sin (20.4). The (2) second fruit or value of the mass (*generalissme*) belongs to the whole church, if the celebrant does not exclude anyone from his "habitual intention" (20.4). The third fruit (3) of the mass (*modo medio*) has special value for the person or persons to whom the celebrant especially applies this good (*bonum*) to (20.4). If this third fruit of the mass did not exist, the custom of saying masses for particular living or dead persons would be completely in vain, a custom that even became manifest in the Roman Missal.

2 The first number in parentheses refers to the number of the quodlibetal question, the second to the paragraph number taken from the Alluntis edition of the *Quodlibet*: Juan Duns Escoto, *Cuestiones Cuodlibetales*, Introducción, Resúmes y Versión de F. Alluntis (Madrid: La Editorial Cathólica, 1968).

3 Amalarius of Metz (775–850), *De ecclesiasticis officiis* 3 c. 23, PL 10S, col. 1138. See Kilmartin, "The One Fruit or the Many Fruits of the Mass," p. 51.

Now, in order to answer the question, Scotus combines those two distinctions: Concerning the second distinction, he is only interested in the third option, the *modus medius*, the third fruit of the mass—the value a mass has for particular persons, say A and B, other than the priest and the whole church (20.4). And this value can be given to the particular persons A and B either in virtue of the merit of the single priest (*ex opere operantis*) or in virtue of the merit of the whole church (*ex opere operato*). So we have the following picture: either a single priest or the whole church are endowed with a certain merit, and either of them can apply the good (*bonum*) that goes along with this merit to persons A and B.

But why can a merit lead to a *bonum* that might even be applicable to other persons? Here *Quodlibetal Question* 17 can help us: a meritorious act is an act accepted by God. The only difference between a natural practical human and a meritorious act is that together with the meritorious act come two relations: one relation to God who accepts this act, and another to the *praemium* or *bonum* that is God's reward for the meritorious act. Both relations are relations of reason or rather, relations of will, as they are only established due to God's will (17.6). The meritorious act has a double principle (17.8): on the one hand, the free will of the person performing the act, as a meritorious act has to be imputable to or in the power of the respective person, on the other hand, the grace or the *caritas* given by God, as the act can only be accepted, if the whole person is accepted, and the act can only be performed due to the *caritas* that inheres in the person. Unlike in early modern theories, for example in Immanuel Kant's conception of the Highest Good, where the adequate distribution of the reward of happiness to those worthy of it can be achieved only in the afterworld,[4] for Scotus, a meritorious act is—even in this life—accompanied by a good, a *bonum* or *praemium*, and in the case of the priest saying a mass, this good that is the reward for a good deed, can be transferred to other persons. Hence, the will of the priest is introduced in this picture twice: a first time, as the priest willingly says the prayer or celebrates the mass, and this work indicates his good intentions, a second time, when the priest applies the good that has been the reward for his good intentions and his praying, to the persons A and B. By establishing a relationship or a connection with God via prayer or the mass, the priest is rewarded by a good that he can voluntarily apply to other persons, thus entering into another relation with these persons.

4 See e.g. I. Kant, *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*, B 832–847.

1 The Personal Merit of the Priest

Now Scotus first examines the case where the priest (*medio modo*) wants to transfer the *praemium* of his personal merit to almsgivers A and B. This is the case where the value of the mass is obtained *ex opere operantis*, in virtue of the merit of the celebrant. And in this case, the priest does not resolve his debt with regard to persons A and B by saying only one mass. This is so because the personal merit of the celebrant is of limited nature, it is determined to a certain degree. If the priest devotes the good of his personal merit to person A, there is nothing left for person B (20.5). Scotus explains this with the norm that an equal good be the reward for an equal merit; there has to be an exact equality of good and corresponding merit (20.6). Now in our case, the priest says the mass with equal devotion for one or for two persons. Hence the merit is in both cases the same. But if the celebrant offers an equal good in both cases, in the case where he says the mass for two persons, the first person A will receive the whole good, and the second person B is left empty-handed. The good for person B is not included in the good that adequately corresponds to the personal merit of the priest. The value of the mass cannot be divided between the two persons A and B, as this value is of limited nature.

Scotus considers a possible objection to this conclusion: In the case where the priest celebrates the mass for both persons A and B, there is the same merit according to the intensity, but a greater merit as far as the extension is concerned. Even if the merit is distributed to several persons, the intensity may remain the same (20.7).

Another objection concerns the spiritual nature of the good merited by the priest: a spiritual good is not communicated part per part, but only as a whole, and consequently it is not diminished when it is communicated to many other spirits (20.9).

Moreover, the good that corresponds to the personal merit of the priest is compared to the light of a candle, which does not communicate less when it illuminates several things than when it illuminates one object (20.10). This example with the candle goes back to Praepositinus of Cremona, who compared the value of the mass to the light of a candle that equally shines on one or on several objects.[5]

5 Praepositinus of Cremona (d. 1210), *Summa Theologiae*, *De novissimis*, ed. D.E. Pilarczyk, *Praepositini Cancellarii De Sacramentis et De Novissimis* [*Summae Theologiae Pars Quarta*] (Rome: Editiones Urbanianae, 1964), pp. 117–119. See Kilmartin, "The One Fruit or the Many Fruits of the Mass," p. 47.

Scotus replies to these objections: "Equal merit no more deserves a numerically greater good than an intensively greater good" (20.12). Scotus compares this with the case of friendship: If one asks a friend a favor for one person alone, one will be more successful than if one asks a favor for a multitude of persons. Scotus considers this case to be an example of applied justice, it is "secundum iustum legem amicitiae" (20.16). Otherwise, everyone would have to pray for all souls and not only for particular persons, as one could succeed in asking for the good of the greatest possible number of persons with one single prayer. All these arguments and examples aim at showing that the good that corresponds to the personal merit of the priest is limited and cannot be distributed to a plurality of persons without any loss in intensity. Hence, where there is a greater extension, there is a lesser intensity for each single person A or B. But this doesn't have to do with lesser devotion on the part of the priest. Even if he celebrates the mass for more people the devotion may remain the same, although the actual attention to each of the addressees can diminish. Thus, the main reason why the priest cannot solve his debt to persons A and B by saying one single mass for both is the limitation of the good that corresponds to his limited personal merit.

Regarding the objection that points to the spirituality of the good merited by the priest, Scotus argues that spirits are not divided extensionally, but one spirit can be numerically distinct from another, as the spirits belong to distinct bodies, in the case of human persons. Hence numerically more spirits possess more natural and extensive goodness than just one of them. Their goodness "is even equivalent to a goodness that is intensively greater" (20.19). The goodnesses of several spirits are of greater value and hence require either numerically more goods or one greater good as a compensation. For example, one person can by her prayer revivify one human being, but she is not able to bring to life more than one human (20.19). Thus, even concerning spirits, several smaller spiritual goods can amount to a greater good intensively. So, if the priest gives away one limited spiritual good that corresponds to his limited merit to person A, this spiritual good is not enough to cover the demands of person B.

The example with the candle is a bit more difficult to tackle: Scotus argues with a counter-example (20.23): I cannot carry two equal weights as I can carry one single of them. There is only one adequate object of my power of moving, and this power is exceeded when there are two objects, each of equal size as the adequate object. Then I cannot move both. Here, Scotus compares the power to move an object with the priest's ability to apply the good corresponding to his personal merit to persons A or B. If his power to move—that is, his ability to distribute a good—is exhausted when he gives his whole good to person A, there is nothing left for person B. What does this counterexample have in com-

mon with the example with the candle? For Scotus, the illuminative power of a candle has exactly one adequate object, like the power to move something. This adequate object of the illuminative force of the candle is a sphere with the candle as its center, as light is multiplied spherically. Now two things that are included in the sphere are equally illuminated, but this does not mean that the candle has the power to equally illuminate two adequate objects—the adequate object in this case is only one, the sphere itself, of which the two things are just integral parts. In the figurative sense this means that even in the case of the candle, there is just one object at one time which the candle is able to illuminate with its light. Likewise, the priest can apply the *bonum* of his personal merit only to one person A and not to person B, as only person A, and not person B, is included within the adequate scope of his merit.

Hence, the personal merit of the priest is limited in such a way that he can apply the limited good that corresponds to this merit only to person A and not to person B. From this it appears that the reward for his personal merit just suffices for one person. So, the priest is not allowed to say one mass for his two almsgivers A and B, as far as his personal merit is concerned. In the next section we will see whether this is different with regard to the collective merit of the church.

2 The Merit of the General Church/The Merit of the Sacrifice

In the next article of the question, Scotus no longer focuses on the personal merit of the priest, but on the merit of the general church, which he identifies with the merit in virtue of the sacrifice, that is the offering of the Eucharist (20.28). Does the priest—in regard to the merit of the church—satisfy his obligation by saying only one mass for both almsgivers? First of all, Scotus makes clear that the priest *is* allowed to voluntarily apply the merit in virtue of the church offering the Eucharist. He compares the case to a master presiding over a house who wants to distribute goods to the members of the household (20.32). Now it is customary and reasonable that the master transfers this task to a minister who takes care of the distribution. The same holds for the church, where the Lord transfers the task of distributing the sacramental good to his ministers, that is to the priests. The priest can determine to whom the good that is petitioned by persons A or B will be distributed. And the celebrant can distribute this good at his own will—we human beings do not ultimately know God's exact will in this matter, so either we could stop distributing the good of the sacrifice, as we don't know whom God would favor (which is not an option for Scotus), or we let the priest do this job and let him voluntarily apply the good

of the sacrifice that corresponds to the merit of the general church (which is the only viable option for Scotus, as we have no insight in God's particular volitions) (20.36). Hence the priest has the distribution of two separate goods in his power and at his will: first, the good that is the reward for the personal merit of the priest, and second, the good that is the reward for the merit of the general church, which is identical with the good of the sacrifice. Here, Scotus again invokes the distinction between the three fruits of the mass: the first and most special, belonging to the celebrant, the second and most general to the church, and the third, *medio modo*, to those persons to which the priest is obliged somehow. To the last group pertain donors or benefactors of the particular church, or members of a *collegium* belonging to this church (20.39). This application of the good of the sacrifice meets the demands of justice, probably commutative justice, as those providing for the subsistence of the clergy obligate the priests to celebrate masses for them or those the donors would like to help. Scotus calls this obligation "rationabilis": "It is reasonable that in return for temporal alms one be obliged to offer the spiritual suffrages of prayers and sacrifice, just as one must return a temporal good for the spiritual benefit of preaching"—Scotus draws on 1 Corinthians 9:11 here, "alms require prayers in return" (20.39). At this stage of the argument, it seems as if there existed a simple *do ut des* agreement between the clergy and their donors: the latter give alms and provide for the living of the priests, and the priests in turn preach and offer the Eucharist for the donors or their relatives. It appears as if this is a special case of commutative justice where one good is exchanged for another one. However, nothing is said about a possible equality or comparability of those goods yet. At any rate, in this passage (20.39), for the first time, Scotus addresses the concrete obligations the priest and the donors enter into. The obligatory bond between the donors and the priests is so strong for Scotus that even the successors of the original clergy have to oblige and say masses for the original donors (20.39). Howsoever such priests are obliged to say masses for their donors, there is enough room for them to take over obligations to particular other persons (20.40). In this case, there can be degrees of obligation and of the application of the good of the sacrifice: For example, person A is given the good in the first degree, person B in the second, and so on. Scotus raises the doubt that it is difficult to determine to whom the priests are more indebted: by natural law, one would say that the priest is more obliged to say masses for his parents (20.41). But if the parents are members of a different parish, their parochial priest is more obliged than their own son. And it is equally difficult to decide whether one should attribute the good of suffrages and the mass to morally good persons or to sinners who might have more use for them, or to the living more than to the dead. Scotus ends this article with the comment that it might be safest to just use very general formulae

so as to apply the good of the mass in virtue of the general church or the sacrifice to other persons (20.44). If one gets more specific, one should at least add the words "if it pleases you, Lord" to the particular dedication of the mass.

In this article, Scotus introduces the aspect of obligation into the picture of the social relationships between priests and laypersons. Because laymen, such as donors or benefactors, have the power to oblige the clergy with their donations of temporal goods, the priests are obliged to "pay back," as it were, these donations with spiritual goods. These obligations are subject to commutative justice, and even considerations of natural law in a very broad sense play a role here.[6] Scotus seems to make a case for a just division of labor within medieval society: the donors contribute temporal goods, according to their belonging to the mundane part of society, whereas the priests offer spiritual goods in return that have a bearing on the salvation of the laypersons. Both the mundane and the religious or spiritual sphere are bound together with mutual obligations, and these obligations serve justice, here commutative justice. At this point, the reader gets the impression that we have a case of simple *do ut des* here. But the main question has not been decided yet: can a priest resolve his debt with regard to persons A and B if he says only one mass for those two people—now in virtue of the merit of the whole church or in virtue of the merit of the sacrifice? In the next article, Scotus gives a reply to this question, first by showing that the merit of the church and the merit of the sacrifice coincide. His reply is that the good that rewards the merit of the church is as limited as the merit of the church. And because it is a limited good, the priest cannot give it to both persons A and B—if he gave the good to person A, there would be nothing left for person B. Scotus argues that it is according to justice that to a limited and finite merit corresponds a limited and finite good. But why is the good corresponding to the merit of the church limited? Isn't the merit of the church a case that is different from the personal merit of the celebrant? Scotus answers

6 For Scotus on natural law see e.g. L.A. De Boni, "Legislator, lex, lex naturalis und dominium bei Johannes Duns Scotus," in *Lex and Ius. Essays on the Foundation of Law in Medieval and Early Modern Philosophy*, ed. A. Fidora, M. Lutz-Bachmann, and A. Wagner (Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt: frommann-holzboog, 2010), pp. 221–239; L. Honnefelder, "Naturrecht und Normwandel bei Thomas von Aquin und Johannes Duns Scotus," in *Sozialer Wandel im Mittelalter. Wahrnehmungsformen, Erklärungsmuster, Regelungsmechanismen*, ed. J. Miethke and K. Schreiner (Sigmaringen: Jan Thorbecke Verlag, 1994), pp. 197–213; H. Möhle, "Scotus's Theory of Natural Law," in *The Cambridge Companion to Duns Scotus*, ed. T. Williams (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), pp. 312–331; id., "Gesetz und praktische Rationalität bei Johannes Duns Scotus," in *Lex and Ius*, ed. Fidora et al., pp. 205–220; T.M. Ward, "A Most Mitigated Friar: Scotus on Natural Law and Divine Freedom," *American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly* 93 (2019), pp. 385–409.

this question by showing that the good in virtue of the general church is not the same as the Eucharist because otherwise the good would remain the same even if the Eucharist remained in the pyx (20.47). Hence the good in virtue of the sacrifice has also to do with the offering of the Eucharist, and this offering has to be accepted by God. But it can only be accepted by God if the offerer is accepted. Who is the offerer in this case? Not the priest alone and his will—this option can be excluded, as this would pertain to the personal merit of the priest and the corresponding good, which was the subject of the first article. But Christ can be excluded too, because if Christ would be the offerer of the Eucharist, each mass would amount to a new passion of Christ, which is absurd for Scotus. Hence, the only viable option is that the offeror of the Eucharist is the church taken as a whole, or more specifically the will of the general church (20.48). Consequently, Scotus thinks that the church can be a moral or better sacramental agent and it can have a collective will. But as the church as a whole is finite and of a limited degree, the merit of the church is also finite and limited, as well as the reward for this merit, the good that can be attributed to persons A or B. In an addition to the Question (Vivès 26, 321–322),[7] Scotus makes clear that by church he means the *ecclesia militans*, that is the church comprising the persons that live in grace at a present moment in time. If there were only one human being living in grace, then the merit of the church would coincide with his or her personal merit, in this case "there is at least a virtual or habitual intention of wanting God to accept the prayers of the Church" (Addition 20.49).[8] And God has provided that there will always be at least one person who lives in grace and charity. Hence Scotus has a summative or atomistic ontological account of the church and its merit, close to what Ockham[9] will put forward later: the general church is nothing other than the collection of its individual

7 Johannes Duns Scotus, *Quodlibet* q. 20, ed. Wad.-Viv. 26, pp. 321–322: "Dici potest, quod est in eo motus virtualis, vel saltem habitualis, quo vult Deum acceptare preces Ecclesiae. Propter ista argumenta dici potest sicut dicitur, respondendo ad argumentum principale hujus quaestionis in fine. Secundo dicitur, quod istud meritum est ad meritum passionis Christi, non quod nunc Christus mereatur, sed quia quando passus est, meruit quod istud meritum esset ad meritum illud applicabile. Tertio dico pro prima instantia, quod nunquam erit Ecclesia militans sine aliquo, qui sit in charitate ex ordinatione Dei, juxta illud dictum Christi. Luc. 22. Ego rogavi pro te Petre, ut non deficiat fides tua."

8 For the translation: John Duns Scotus, *God and Creatures. The Quodlibetal Questions*. Translated with an Introduction, Notes and Glossary by F. Alluntis and A.B. Wolter (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1975), p. 491.

9 For Ockham's social philosophy and ontology see J. Miethke, *Ockhams Weg zur Sozialphilosophie* (Berlin: De Gruyter, 1969); J. Pelletier, "Kingdoms and Crowds: William Ockham on the Ontology of Social Groups," *British Journal for the History of Philosophy* 29 (2021), pp. 24–44.

members. And for there to be a merit of the church, individuals have to exist who have particular intentions, intentions of wanting God to accept the offering of the Eucharist in our case.

3 The Nature of the Priest's Obligation

The final section of the Question is devoted to answering the main question: can the priest resolve his debts to persons A and B if he celebrates one mass for both? Scotus distinguishes between a liberal promise and a strict obligation. As far as the liberal promise is concerned, the priest is allowed to promise whatever he wants to persons A and B. This is different with the strict obligation that previously seemed to be a *do ut des* kind of agreement. Scotus is keen to eliminate any connotations of such a *do ut des* agreement here, as this would amount to simony (20.50). But why is the agreement between a donor or almsgiver and the priest not a legal agreement similar to a purchase contract or a barter? Scotus deals with legal contracts in *Ordinatio* IV, d. 15, q. 2, where he says that in a purchase contract or in the exchange of goods the equality of value has to be observed, although this equality allows for a certain latitude that has to do with the free will of the buyer and seller involved.[10] If we compare this with the exchange in our case, where alms are given and a mass is said, we can see why Scotus so eagerly underscores the difference of the obligation arising from almsgiving from the mutual obligations involved in a purchase contract: the goods exchanged in the case of almsgiving and the celebration of a mass are completely incommensurable, one temporal and one spiritual and completely higher good, whereas in the case of a purchase contract there has to hold a certain equality of the goods exchanged. How does Scotus come to grips with this different situation? Unlike Thomas Aquinas[11] or Scotus himself in *Ord.* IV, d. 5, q. 2,[12] who both contend that the almsgiver pays for the physical labor of the priest, Scotus argues in the *Quodlibet* that in our case, the alms-

10 Scotus, *Ord.* IV d. 15 q. 2 n. 123–126, ed. Vat. 13, pp. 88–89. For Scotus' economic philosophy, see R.I. Mochrie, "Justice in Exchange: The Economic Philosophy of John Duns Scotus," *Journal of Markets & Morality* 9,1 (2006), pp. 35–56; *Duns Scotus' Political and Economic Philosophy. Latin edition and English translation*, ed. and trans. A.B. Wolter (St. Bonaventure, NY: Franciscan Institute Publications, 2000); R. Lambertini, "'Usus' and 'Usura': Poverty and Usury in the Franciscans' Responses to John XXII's 'Quia vir reprobus'," *Franciscan Studies* 54 (1994–1997), pp. 185–210.

11 Thomas Aquinas, *S.T.* II,II, q. 100 a. 2 ad 2; IV *Sent.* d. 25 q. 3 a. 2 qc. 3 sol. 1. See Kilmartin, "The One Fruit or the Many Fruits," p. 44.

12 Scotus, *Ord.* IV d. 5 q. 2 n. 60, ed. Vat. 11, p. 297.

giver freely (*liberaliter*) gives away his gift, plus he entreats the priest to say a mass for the almsgiver or one of his relatives. In this context, *liberaliter* means "without expecting a compensation". As a next step, the priest obligates himself to pray for the benefactor (20.50). Hence, this practice does *not* amount to a *do ut des* kind of agreement since it is a case of self-obligation on the part of the priest and of a free donation[13] on the part of the almsgiver. However, this self-obligation of the priest is as strict as the obligation arising from a purchase contract. So, Scotus keeps the two realms of the temporal and the spiritual at the greatest possible distance, nonetheless he binds those two realms together in the priest's self-obligation to take care of the spiritual well-being of the donor. Scotus emphasizes the role of language in this agreement between the donor and the priest: the words of the obligation (*verba obligationis*, 20.53) decide whether the priest is allowed to say a mass only for person A and not for person B, or whether he will celebrate for A along with those persons he is customarily obliged to. The priest and the almsgiver should take the words of the obligation in their common sense (*ad communem verbi intelligentiam recurratur*, 20.57). Consequently, both parties should employ a common language, a precondition for agreements that is underlined by modern authors such as Margaret Gilbert.[14] Moreover, both parties should share a common knowledge of the situation, another feature of social agreements that Gilbert highlights:[15] if an almsgiver who is acquainted with the custom of his local church to say masses for several defunct persons simultaneously—and Scotus even calls this custom "rationabilis" (20.65)—, asks the priest to celebrate for him, he implicitly acknowledges the custom and won't ask for one special mass celebrated only for him. He thus implicitly waives his right to a single mass. In contrast, if someone new to this church gives alms and entreats the priest to say a mass for him, the priest has to explain the custom of his parish to the almsgiver, so as to give him the opportunity either to accept the custom of the church or to withdraw his alms (20.64). Or if one priest is unable to say two masses at a given day, he can delegate this task to another priest. In all these cases, for Scotus justice has to be observed; the main questions are whether the priest does justice to the supplication of the almsgiver and whether the priest can justly be obligated to say one single mass in addition to his customary duties. It is noteworthy that Scotus claims that there can be a conflict of obligations

13 By *liberalis*, Scotus means: without a strict expectation of compensation. See *Ord.* IV d. 15 q. 2 n. 116–117, ed. Vat. 13, p. 86.

14 M. Gilbert, *On Social Facts* (London/New York: Princeton University Press, 1989), pp. 80–83, 214–219.

15 Ibid. pp. 162, 463, 194–195.

here, obligations that—taken separately—are by all means rational, but that are repugnant or contradictory if they are considered simultaneously: on the one hand, the general customary obligation to celebrate an anniversary for the defunct, and on the other hand, the particular obligation to say a mass for the individual donor (20.65).

To sum it up, concerning the merit of the church, the priest cannot resolve his obligations with regard to persons A and B by saying only one mass because the merit of the church is limited in the same way as the good that the priest wants to apply to both persons is of a limited degree. If he applies this good to person A, there is nothing left for person B. The merit of the church is finite as it is not identical to the merit of Christ's passion. Rather, it is the merit of the militant church offering the Eucharist. With this offer, the church asks God for a good that corresponds to its merit and that the priest can apply to person A or B (20.71).

4 Conclusion

Our final ontological inventory thus comprises the two donors A and B, the priest, an individual person, his personal merit, consisting in two relations of reason (one to God's will, the other to the reward of his merit), furthermore the good that is his reward, a transferable *bonum* that the priest can apply voluntarily to persons A or B, plus the alms that A and B are giving. However, unlike in modern social ontologies, this transferable good is of a supernatural, spiritual kind. Moreover, we can add to the picture the church as an aggregate of individual persons living in grace, its merit that is identical to the sum of the individual merits of the church members, and the offering of the Eucharist that is a symbol of Christ's passion, plus Christ being really present in the Eucharist. All these individual ingredients are bound together by a network of obligations and relations: the alms are offered to the priest together with a plea for saying a mass, in turn, the priest obligates himself and is responsive to the plea. He applies two kinds of goods to persons A or B: on the one hand the reward for his personal merit in praying, on the other hand the good that corresponds to the merit of the church in offering the Eucharist, a goodness that is given to persons A or B, mediated by the priest's will, because God has accepted the offering.

In *Question* 20, Scotus's social ontology is atomistic or individualistic, as even the church is nothing more than the sum of its members. All the substantial parts of this ontology are individual persons, or in the case of the Eucharist, individual signs signifying one singular event. At the same time, these individ-

uals are connected via voluntary obligations or acts of entreaty, either in view of God or in view of the priest, who acts as an amplifier or reinforcer, as it were, of the original entreaties of the almsgivers before God. The connections between the persons are established due to common language and shared knowledge of the involved situation. Obligations are formed by means of language. One possible point of criticism concerns the unclear status of the *bonum* corresponding to the merit of the church. If the church consists of two or more persons living in grace, then why doesn't their merit and their respective good suffice for the two almsgivers A and B? Be that as it may, Scotus shows—and this is the main consequence of *Question* 20—that the huge gap between the mundane and the religious realm, between the temporal and the spiritual, can be bridged with the aid of almsgiving on the part of the laypersons and strict self-obligation on the part of the priests. Hence, *Quodlibetal Question* 20 has more to offer than a strictly liturgical reply to a theological question. Rather, it also presents a case study of Scotus's individualistic and relational social ontology that is based on human free will and an account of the division of labor between the religious and the mundane in a medieval society.

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When John Duns Scotus arrived at the University of Paris in 1302 he came face to face with a vibrant intellectual community. Every religious order seemed to have a significant thinker active, such as Hervaus Natalis for the Dominicans and Gerard of Bologna for the Carmelites, and the secular theologians were represented by no less than Godfrey of Fontaines.

The present volume builds upon previous scholarship on Duns Scotus' Parisian experience by investigating his interactions with his contemporaries at the university rather than on his doctrine in isolation. This new perspective is greatly enhanced by a plethora of texts edited herein for the first time, including Duns Scotus' debate with Godfrey of Fontaines and various quaestiones by Jean de Pouilly, Gonsalvus Hispanus, and Alexander of Alessandria.

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